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Thesis Abstract
The dissertation is a chiasmic reading of the works of Jean Genet and Emmanuel 
Levinas, examining the way they each address the relation to the Other in terms of 
ethics and subjectivity. Whereas a straightforward association between the two 
writers might seem paradoxical because of the differences in their approaches and 
rhetoric, a chiasmic reading allows intricate approaches, moments of proximity 
and departures to be read both conceptually and aesthetically. We show that these 
two writers share a tightly-woven discursive neighbourhood, and examine that 
neighbourhood through detailed analysis of various textual encounters. We trace 
patterns of influence which allow us to consider our writers’ decision-making 
processes in the genesis of their texts.
Genet and Levinas develop views surprisingly close to each other’s of the 
“face-to-face encounter”, which they place at the origin of language seen both as 
expression and commandment. Each approaches that encounter simultaneously in 
terms of the possibility of welcome, and the possibility of violence and betrayal. 
Considerations of influence from sources common to both, especially Paul Valery 
and Fyodor Dostoevsky, serve to extend our analysis of their thought on address 
to include the encounters they share within discursive history and across the 
genres.
The theatre figures in both oeuvres as a powerful way of considering the 
radical passivity of the individual’s relation to the world. The passive subject, 
unable to escape alterity, is also unable to escape a certain liberty of choice and 
action, and a call to engagement. This call may take surprising forms, and even 
provoke the subject’s defection over to the Other; or the substitution of the 
Other’s claims for its own. This interstice between the individual and a plural 
world serves to disorder totalisation, characterised by hostility, and open new 
possibilities of interaction in its place.
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Introduction
Genet and Levinas have each received wide-ranging attention from the critical 
community for the way they address the philosophical and aesthetic questions of 
subjectivity and ethics. They each provide important contributions which 
illuminate the traumas of being from observations of the minutiae of selfhood. In 
spite of this, they have very rarely been examined in relation to one another. Their 
respective approaches and the crossing points between them create a critical 
neighbourhood across literature and philosophy. By studying this neighbourhood, 
especially in terms of its margins, and its proximity with further writers, it is 
possible for their apparently very different objectives and rhetoric to be shown to 
share a common attentiveness to the flicker of transcendence in the other. More 
demandingly still, this neighbourhood points to the capacity of each author to 
address the involvement of this sense of alterity with the hatred of the other.
Levinas is sometimes held to the utopian ambitions of certain readers who, 
when describing ethics, are tempted to overplay or oversimplify the disruptive 
power of the other in its alterity. It is important to note that this power is not 
physical resistance, but instead the ethical commandment of the other which 
reaches the subject preconsciously. The need to relate this originary kindling of 
ethics in the other to the pragmatic political world has led other critics -  through 
dissatisfaction both with the state of the world and of the human sciences -  to 
become increasingly demanding of Levinas’s view of the irruption of the other 
and its effect on action. In Ethical Issues in Twentieth-Century French Fiction, 
Colin Davis produces a critique of Levinasian commandment through a reading of 
Genet. He arrives at the position that if commandment does not work or is not 
obeyed, then ethics does not control human behaviour; that on balance “Levinas’s 
philosophy offers no means of establishing a regulative link between ethical 
responsibility and actual behaviour”.1 This would seem somewhat at odds with 
Davis’s acknowledgement that in Genet, the transgression involved in betrayal
1 Colin Davis, Ethical Issues in Twentieth-Century French Fiction: Killing the Other (London: 
MacMillan, 2000), p. 187.
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itself implies an acknowledgement of its opposite -  responsibility -  and the 
priority it takes: a position that Genet holds in common with Levinas. The central
issue is the passage from commandment to action. Here Davis favours Genet’s
<■>
“concentration on the fact that responsibility does not entail compulsion.” It 
should be pointed out that in Levinas, compulsion is also eschewed. But the 
fascinating rigour of Genet’s descriptions of ethics and the hatred of the other man 
is indeed compelling. However, Davis’s opposition erroneously attributes to 
Genet the position of supporting the banality of evil, which his own examples do 
not bear out.
Earlier in the essay, Davis articulates the difference between the two 
writers by imputing to them, in a surprising dual formulation, a contrasting 
understanding of ‘altericide’ which oversimplifies the issues to the point of 
caricature. By evoking Querelle de Brest he explains, “Levinas is like Gil, the 
unwitting murderer who regrets his crime and seeks to deny it; Genet’s writing on 
the other hand, occupies the position of Querelle, the deliberate, self-conscious 
murderer who has taught himself to desire his own crimes.”3 While one 
understands the synecdoche by which Genet’s writing, as a whole, is being 
compared to the position of Querelle, one of Genet’s own characters, this critical 
comparison does not adequately describe the movements within these writings or 
their active and disruptive role in relation to discourse. Davis seems to pitch a 
poetic realist who knows the world is foul against someone billed as a wishful 
idealist, who merely longs this were not the case. On the one hand, such a reading 
fails to rework the perceived deadlock in Levinasian studies between ethics and 
politics; and on the other, it implies that in Genet the desire of crime runs without 
challenge. But when Genet finds bad conscience within good conscience, he is not 
doing it primarily to prove to the reader simply that the bad takes place, but to 
implicate the reader in its unfurling. Merely corroborating betrayal as something 
that happens would not function as a critique, even of the kind Davis envisages, 
but would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Genet’s work does not limit itself to
2 Davis, Ethical Issues, p. 187.
3 Davis, Ethical Issues, p. 185.
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demonstrating lack of compulsion, but also examines the complication this 
produces in the originary disposition which takes notice of the other. He performs 
this complication by projecting parallel encounters through the evocative power of 
language; these produce internal dramas which examine responsibility in its 
intimate relation to betrayal.
Davis seeks to avoid a complacent reading of Levinas which presents him 
as a sort of philanthropist. But in so doing, he risks not doing justice to the 
competition between the different ethical demands Levinas’s thinking is able to 
describe. When Levinas describes the human encounter as presupposing 
responsibility, in which “[l]a guerre suppose la paix” {Tel, p. 174, Telb, p.218), 
this is not a utopian declaration. What Levinas is alerting us to is the difficulty of 
penetrating an inhuman condition that would seem to contradict the earlier 
statement, in which “[l]a paix des empires sortis de la guerre repose sur la guerre.” 
{Ibid., X, Ibidb, p.6) Not only does War presuppose Peace, but peace in a politics 
of totality, which aims to win by any means necessary, rests on war. This is 
because the exterior relations with the other necessary for peace, (or, indeed, to 
win a war) are eroded, merely enlarging war’s sphere. In the face of conflict, 
however, originary alterity may still be discovered, for good conscience is 
assailed by the environment, which consciousness has to interpret, and in the 
process produces disquiet. This is where Genet’s literary encounters across 
discursive history come into play, showing the dissipation, mutation and 
resurgence of obligation.
From a critical point of view, the mobility of encounter itself serves to 
bring together neighbouring enquiries, allowing them to pose difficult questions to 
each other, clarifying or intensifying the concerns of each writer. This is not 
performed through direct dialogue, Genet and Levinas do not mention one another 
in their works; neither is it a question of an intertextuality in which merely 
ambient ideas crop up; instead their shared concern is for the nature of encounter 
itself, both in the face-to-face relation, and in the hermeneutics of adaptation and 
influence. Where singularity is detected there is language. In Levinas, the
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originary form of this language is the commandment of the face which seeks to 
speak in discourse.
Davis as well as other critics have consistently run the risk of attributing 
directly to Genet positions which he is, instead, complicating and inflecting 
through the processes of his stylisation. While it is important not to be enraptured 
by poetry in the examination of ethical debates that call instead for vigilance, 
resistance to the effects of fascination should not lead us to keep Genet’s writing 
at arm’s length as a way of inuring ourselves to its enigmas; for those too may 
conceal otherness. Readings of multiplicity of tone may find their greatest enemy 
in readings of influence if  these work only in the light of a single source. For 
example in a discussion of Genet’s epigraph in Querelle de Brest on Oscar Reich, 
the Butcher of Drancy, rather than producing a reading on the face-to-face 
relation, Harry E. Stewart comments simply: “A man made to Genet’s order!”4 
Stewart’s text is full of perceptive textual remarks and historical research, and yet 
comes over as rigorously unliterary. The dialogic capacity of Genet’s writing is 
dissolved in its context without regard for the fragmentary nature of this writing. 
In Ivan Jablonka’s study5, the gap between reading historical sources and reading 
the literary artefact seems even more marked than in Stewart’s approach. Eric 
Marty has commented on the Levinasian receptiveness to alterity in Genet’s 
theatre6; but he does not adequately measure the tensile inventiveness of the prose 
works. He sees them as monological expressions of a compulsive authorial intent 
-  in the form of an “angoisse du Bien” -  rather than as renderings of bipolar 
ethical impulses in the subject generally.7
4 Harry E. Stewart, Jean Genet: from Fascism to Nihilism (Peter Lang: London, 1994), p.90. The 
epigraphs are reproduced in the body o f the Imaginaire edition. {ImQU, pp. 19-20)
5 Ivan Jablonka, Les verites inavouables de Jean Genet (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
6 Eric Marty, ‘Jean Genet dramaturge ou l’experience de 1’Autre’, Critique, 671 (April, 2003), 
252-65 (p.255).
7 Eric Marty, B ref sejour a Jerusalem (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), pp.91-96.
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We shall be examining closely the intricacies of the encounter with the 
other embedded in the texts of Genet and Levinas; and to do so, we will be 
analysing their textual encounters through the intermediary of other writers in 
philosophical and literary history. These discourses are not compared directly, but 
in the manner of approaches and departures around shared preoccupations or 
modes of expression, be they conceptual or aesthetic, creating a chiasmus between 
our two writers. Our textual encounters do not therefore take place within a single 
well delimited corpus, but in a diverse neighbourhood in which the literatures of 
different nations and languages circulate, as well as different genres and times. 
Our analysis of the influence produced on our writers from within a tightly-woven 
discursive neighbourhood common to both will allow us to consider certain 
decision-making processes they make when creating their texts. Amongst the 
sources shared by our writers we shall consider especially Paul Valery and Fyodor 
Dostoevsky. The engagement of both Genet and Levinas with each of these 
writers allows their concerns to be discussed in relation to novelistic and poetic 
language, starting from questions of voice and the circulation of experience 
between the mind and the world; while theatre will later emerge as a privileged 
form for Genet and Levinas in the presentation of subjectivity.
This approach involves the introduction of beacon terms and a continual 
return to them in the course of our text. They will appear in different lights, and 
gain meaning iteratively. This method will be familiar to the reader of continental 
philosophy. More particularly, this dissertation seen as a reading of influence 
must take sometimes more concrete, sometimes more circuitous routes through its 
secondary sources and other accompanying material. Alterity by definition has a 
strong association with the unknown, and for that reason is approached in diverse 
ways by writers in the source texts of our study. To follow the impact of the 
unknown on the subject will require the reader’s patience as we delve into and 
follow traces in arguments of adaptation and origin. To read alterity and influence 
together through shifting usage and inflexion will involve detailed checking 
forwards and backwards between different terms, texts, and genres.
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Levinas is well known for the unusual use he makes of certain terms, and 
for their recurrence throughout his work with subtle evolutions of meaning. Our 
own iterative approach will seek to clarify these evolutions. This practice in 
Levinas’s writing can also be said to have something literary about it in so far as it 
makes particularly extensive exegetical demands. We shall take three pairs of key 
terms as examples which the reader might like to keep in mind, and we will 
indicate briefly here the suggestiveness with which they draw together the two 
writers of our study.
To begin, we shall take a pair of terms each of which refers to the third 
person singular form in French, ‘il’. First, the il y  a, which indicates anonymous, 
impersonal being within which the subject has no power or initiative and from 
which the subject cannot extricate him or herself. It ressembles impersonal verbs 
such as il pleut or il neige in that none is under the command of the T  of the 
subject, or within its power. It is used by Levinas to describe the suffering of the 
subject within pure being, an atmosphere within which various Genet characters, 
not least the narrator of the novels, are imprisoned and crave an escape by 
reaching out to alterity. The partner term arriving far later in Levinas’s writing 
and thought is illeite. Once again it is formed from the ‘il’ form, but this time it is 
used to desribe not an indifferentiation within pure being, but a connectedness to 
the other; and not just any other, but an unnameable and absent third, the Other 
(Autrui). The Other is beyond the direct claims made on it by a particular 
individual or party; but it imposes responsibility and releases the subject from 
bondage in the il y  a. The il y  a and illeite therefore bespeak a relationship 
respectively to being, and to alterity, which is beyond being. Levinas considers 
the intimation of the beyond being from a position of being to be the key ethical 
event of the human.
Another pairing of terms is trahison and defection, each of which has 
Genetian as well as Levinasian resonances. While betrayal might at first seem an 
activity more familiar to Genet, it figures in Levinas in the form of compromises 
made in a plural world between an individual other and the Other -  as figured in
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illeite. Defection on the other hand can denote involuntary movement beyond the 
preoccupation with one’s own being, placing one at the disposal of an other, who 
may be an enemy; whose claim is heard, one could say, even in the fort of the fo r  
interieur of the subject.
A third example is used to describe the subject’s encounter with the world 
in the en-dega and au-dela de Vetre, which Alphonso Lingis translates as “the 
hither side” and the “beyond” being, and which we will often refer to as the ‘near 
side’ and the ‘beyond’. (OB, p.28) As preconscious events arrive on the hither 
side of being, they are interpreted by the subject’s mind. As they pass through 
reduction, that which was on the hither side of being, but has not been explainable 
by ontology, may flicker on its thither side, i.e. beyond being. The Other may, 
therefore, disrupt being, while these terms are a way of catching valencies which 
are not usually measured in the rational mind. Also the separation between the en- 
dega and the au-dela brings with it the need for judgement and the pursuit of truth 
in reality taken generally, through the need for interpretation. The hither side of 
being cannot operate alone since it is only made up of states and sensations, and 
must enter into the drama and conflict of being in order to pursue what is beyond 
it. The pain, evolution and drama involved in the interpretation of phenomena 
themselves encourage vigilance; something which both art and ethics may also 
favour.
Genet and Levinas are read here as contributing to such vigilance: both 
within the word of discourse, and in the traces and passages between this word 
and a world which is as yet unenunciated.
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Chapter I: Alterity and Influence in Dostoevsky
[Cjette activite derivee est essentielle a la production dans tous les genres. 
Qu’il s’agisse de la science ou des arts, on observe, si Ton s’inquiete de la 
generation des resultats, que toujours ce qui se fait repete ce qui fut fait, ou 
le refute: le repete en d’autres tons, Pepure, Pamplifie, le simplifie, le charge 
ou le surcharge; ou bien retorque, Pextermine, le renverse, le nie; mais done 
le suppose, et Pa invisiblement utilise.
Valery (VOl, p.634)
1. Intersubjective space and polysemy
This chapter will examine the relationship of the self to the other in literary 
interaction and adaptation. The encounter with the other may create an opening, 
which is both the possibility of human contact and intimacy, but also of untold 
difference. This chapter examines these experiences through a reading of the 
relationship with the other in Dostoevsky, and the ways in which this seems to 
have influenced Genet and Levinas. Levinas conceptualises this encounter with 
the other as the anteriority of responsibility to any given interaction with the other, 
thus making ethics first philosophy. Meanwhile, Genet’s writing describes 
through different registers of separation the tensions between the subject’s 
egology and the exterior. By bringing an alchemy of appearance to bear on 
morality, the reader is brought into proximity with the mystery of a world of 
primary, though not necessarily reliable, first-hand ethical experience in which the 
language used to denote these realities has undergone a shift, bringing criminal 
and devotional universes into mutual proximity. A reading of the influence of 
Dostoevsky upon Genet and Levinas will serve to illuminate the similarities in 
characterisation they give the structure of the subject, the relationship to the other, 
and the complexity of interpreting the phenomena involved in ethical realities.
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In Dostoevsky, independent characters form separate, equally valid worlds 
whilst at the same time entering into one another’s proximity, and altering one 
another’s orbits. Mutual influence is thus described with enormous verisimilitude 
and complexity. Dostoevsky characterizes two different kinds of multi-voiced 
writing which are of particular interest to us: one interpersonal, between different 
characters and their worlds; the other transliterary as the peculiarly rich 
intertextual quality of novelistic discourse creates reminders and reworkings of a 
whole history of writing; a language which is, as Bakhtin expresses it, at once 
“living and acting in the great dialogue of the epoch and calling back and forth to 
kindred ideas of other epochs.” (PD , p.89) Parallel to the event of interactions 
between characters and the heteroglossia of their environment, within literature 
there also runs a history of reevocation, encounter, and reconstrual. The invisible 
valencies of the encounters which constitute intersubjective space are thus 
reproduced in writing, such that the passage into proximity with various orbits 
leaves traces of form or meaning. Character, plot, intrigue, and trace may thus be 
drawn from apparently unconnected sources and splice unexpected signatories 
into one another in common address. The symphonic aspect of polyphony found 
in communication should therefore be understood in the context of language as a 
whole. Thus, however tortuous or apt to manifest itself in undeclared opposition 
to hidden sources, influence can provide insight into the mysterious significance 
of the human encounter which rather than transcribing a symphonic whole onto a 
single keyboard, may alter the resonation of the single voice in its difference and 
separation, cupping it in an ethical acoustic, setting off sympathetic notes from 
unknown sources.
The influence of Dostoevsky is everywhere apparent in the work of the 
two authors of this study, and may provide a kind of subterranean bridge between 
their practices. The possibility of opening a channel of communication between 
the two seems especially promising as each of our authors not only quotes, adapts 
and structures around Dostoevsky, but also enters critically into discussion of his 
influence on themselves. This is especially unusual for Genet, who preferred to 
give an idea of himself as entirely self-made, which would make him resistant to
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attempts to trace his sources. However, in this instance, he even goes so far as to 
leave a critical text for us, ‘Les Freres Karamazov’ (1981), set aside for 
publication at the same time as Un captif amoureux. As for Levinas, he also 
directly acknowledges his debt to the Russian author and stresses the scientific 
role of art in bringing being in general to our understanding:
L’expression artistique assemblerait l’etre en signification et apporterait
ainsi la lumiere originelle qu’emprunterait le savoir scientifique lui-meme.
CHdH, pp.28-29)
But the importance of examining the texts primarily for the notions or 
ideas which inhabit the characters, rather than simply themes or arguments is, as 
Bakhtin stresses, to curb the temptation to reflect upon Dostoevsky’s writing as 
though it were comprised of a piecing together of conceptual assertions into a 
single finished treatise or single-levelled scientific enquiry. (PD, pp.85-90) 
Neither Genet nor Dostoevsky as literary writers are speaking directly in the guise 
of a philosopher, but seek in their individual styles of representation to show the 
relationship between sense as meaning and sense as the experience of the senses. 
Meaning, its experiential canopy, and powers of association may interact in the 
subject to produce uncharted conceptions and confrontations. Levinas himself, as 
a phenomenologist, by looking at experience, eschews a finished system. These 
writers do not therefore work for the unveiling of a common single truth, but seek 
uncertainties and inconsistencies that serve to reveal their objects of interest. In 
the same way, the reader’s struggle to interpret the material and to relate it to the 
world comes in fits and starts, intuitions and leaps of understanding, as in an 
instance of esprit d ’escalier. A book cannot be understood in one fell swoop but 
takes teams and generations of readers, as thoughts and interpretations prompt and 
exceed one another. Thus, the activity of dynamic interpretation for Levinas
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mirrors the activity of a community, leading him to refer to such cognitive 
interaction as no longer “objectivation”, but “societe”. (DHH, p.188)8
Society is therefore teaming with distinct intervals rather than being the 
monolithic result of unitary historical time. Genet observes in his interview with 
Hubert Fichte that Dostoevsky creates a different time for each character, 
necessitating dynamic interpretation between shifting horizons. (ED, p. 166) 
Bakhtin describes the Dostoevsky character as independent, able to interact with 
the environment in a real present, one might say, as though it were a quill dipped 
repeatedly into its own interiority. (PD, p.5) The individual character can share 
this present without being simultaneous or quite contemporaneous to the other 
characters, and as though not bent to the will and language of the author, but 
instead as “a fully valid, autonomous carrier of his own individual word”. (Ibid.) 
To the depth of the independent individual, then, is added the inflectional 
complexity of language between individuals and the depth of literary and 
historical expression, in which these inflections have been reproduced and 
studied. It is for this reason that the novel as a genre tests discourse generally and 
especially literary discourse. (DI, p.412) Novelists employ heroes who look at life 
through the eyes of literature or another ambient discourse, while these heroes are 
at the same time preoccupied with the devices through which this account or 
discourse is related. The elliptical and manifold nature of voice and the different 
times converging therein mean that the residue of the unsaid is preserved, and 
leads to a resaying by characters and readers alike. Together such writing could be 
said to form a choral work arranged between independent participants communing 
in the present over the significance of the unfinished, perhaps unidentifiable, 
dialogues of the past: possibly encountering an immemorial past of human 
interaction, overflowing into present significance.
The preservation of the autonomy and separation of others is such that the 
world is lived between as well as within individuals; dialogue involves both an
8 Literature is elsewhere described as part o f an ongoing “investigation” into the world which may 
therefore be understood as both part o f society and o f science. Levinas, Alterite et transcendance, 
intro. Pierre Hayat (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1995), p. 129.
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address and the possibility of a response. Bakhtin puts it in the following way, 
“For the author the hero is not ‘he’ and not T  but a fully valid ‘thou,’ that is, 
another and other autonomous ‘I’ (“thou art”).” (PD, p.63) Dialogic relationships 
cannot, therefore, be adequately expressed in the third party summary of the 
minutes of a meeting, but take place in the absolute present of a dialogue between 
an I  and a thou, what Bakhtin calls life “on the threshold”, (p.61)9 Jacques 
Rolland, after Todorov, draws our attention to the Buberian inflection of this 
liminality.10 He then quotes from ‘Le Dialogue’, a late Levinas essay found in De 
Dieu qui vient a I ’idee, to describe, in contrast to Buber, the absolute and 
asymmetrical distance between the I  and the thou, which is at the same time the 
possibility of an opening, “separes absolument par le secret inexprimable de leur 
intimite [...] sans commune mesure ni domaine disponible pour une quelconque 
coincidence”. (DVI, p.221; QDL, p.23) Their intimacy is therefore constructed out 
of the absoluteness of the separation between the je  and the tu, each “unique dans 
son genre”, since it is only because they are irreplaceable instances that they can 
enter into dia-logue without fusing -  a dialogue “qui transcende cette distance 
sans la supprimer”. (Ibid.) It is this absolute distance or separation which Bakhtin 
finds in Dostoevsky.
It is worth, however, clarifying Bakhtin’s and Levinas’s respective views 
on language, before continuing the comparison begun by Rolland and looking 
more closely at artistic language and genre in particular. Neither Bakhtin nor 
Levinas is thinking of a simple interpersonal space between defined discourses 
and interlocutors. Each instead develops ideas on interlocution from a position of 
separation, in which the confluence of ‘innumerable semantic streams’11 
assembles being in its entirety between different subjects in communication. For 
Bakhtin, the dialogic relationships drawn in language are not graspable through a
9 See also Shatov’s address to Stavrogin in The Possessed, “...we are two beings and have come 
together in infinity... for the last time in the world.” (PD, p. 177; QDL, p.252)
10 The link is made by Todorov in Mikhail Bakhtine: le principe dialogique (Paris: Le Seuil,
1981). QDL, p.24.
11 “[...] au confluent de fleuves semantiques innombrables”. HdH, p.20. Except where otherwise 
stated, quotations given in single quotation marks are my English translations, provided for 
reasons o f euphony, and are followed by the original French in the note, except where a common 
and identical term is used in near isolation.
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diagrammatic awareness alone of their multifaceted form. Compositionally 
speaking linguistics can envisage dialogic speech. However, its specific nature 
takes place between the rejoinders in a dialogue, and not directly in the utterances 
themselves. This can be illustrated by the dialogism already at work in the 
narrator’s language, which may operate through the removal of the quotation 
marks surrounding different subject positions, acting so as to meld different 
discourses, and so create encounters.12 This may equally take place in what is 
apparently a single voice, when Dostoevsky’s narrator also fulfils the function of 
a character, as in Notes from the Underground, a technique also to be found in 
Genet’s novels. For Bakhtin:
Dialogic relationships are extralinguistic. [...] They must clothe themselves 
in discourse, become utterances, become the positions of various subjects 
depicted in discourse, in order that dialogic relationships might arise 
among them. (PD, p.l 83)
For Levinas, as for Bakhtin, the space between interlocutors and interlocutions is 
of a special kind. The Je and Tu cannot be considered as objects taken generally, 
as the language used in their encounter predates the experience of this encounter. 
Language precedes designated contents and is, at once, “la distance absolue et la 
relation du dialogue plus ancienne que toute distinction des termes dans n’importe 
quelle conjonction.” (DVI, p.222) In a similar way for Bakhtin, genre is 
simultaneously a place of meeting with certain rules, and something permanently 
evolving in contemporary discourse. For Bakhtin, therefore, dialogism is extra-
12 In ‘Dialogue sur le dialogue’, Jean-Luc Nancy addresses the observation to Philippe Lacoue- 
Labarthe that in the theatre there is no narrator, as there is in the novel, to act as intermediary or to 
guide the staging, but only stage directions. If one takes the names o f  the dramatic personae as the 
most basic o f stage directions, then it is from these positions that the separation between subjects 
must be imagined, and from which the play must be produced. “[L]es noms fixent une topologie 
des presents tandis que le texte [that is the novel] proprement dit opere la presentation de ces 
presents (ce qu’on attendrait comme leur socio/psycho/onto-logie [...]).” This topological 
relationship in dialogue is fundamental to separation and liminality in expression.
In Un nouveau partage des voix, Vol. 1 Dialogismes, Conference proceedings, 24-27 March 2004 
l’Universite Paris III -  Sorbonne Nouvelle, texts compiled by Jean-Pierre Sarrazac and Catherine 
Naugrette. p.81.
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linguistic, but only traceable once clad in utterance or genre, while for Levinas, an 
encounter with the exterior producing an address is already language, and swarms
13with dialogic interaction preceding utterance :
Le langage ne serait pas la pour exprimer les etats de conscience; il serait 
l’evenement spirituel sans pareil de la transcendance et de la socialite 
auquel tout effort d’expression -  tout vouloir communiquer un contenu 
pense -  deja se refere. (p.223)
It is therefore only from a position of separation that sociality is possible, in which 
a “vouloir communiquer” precedes the vouloir-dire, such that the act of 
expression comes before any agreement as to what meaning means. The question 
of genre and multi-voicedness examines precisely the production of meaning 
through different kinds of address. The author’s familiarity with various kinds of 
language and views on the world allows several subject viewpoints to be made to 
resonate in a single image, such that “[t]he image becomes polysemic, like a 
symbol”, and may “live different lives in different epochs.” (DI, p.410)
It is important to emphasize that for Bakhtin the problem of prose is 
“double-voicedness”, and for poetry it is “poetic ambiguity”, (p.328) These 
positions oppose one another in Bakhtin, but do share a point of contact in the 
symbolic, which will, however, require some unraveling. For Bakhtin double- 
voicedness creates semantic tension in “dialogic resistance” between separate, 
shared and conflictual resonations of meaning within a single utterance. This 
creates a density of meaning in prose which Bakhtin states can behave like a 
symbol. For Bakhtin, however, this is only like a symbol, and not actual symbol, 
as for him, the polysemy to be found in a poetic symbol cannot be multi-voiced or 
multi-accented, and “cannot presuppose a fundamental relationship to another’s 
word, to another’s voice.” (p.328) Genet’s ambiguous comparisons owe
13 In William Golding’s novel The Inheritors, the Neanderthal protagonists speak through a kind 
of telepathy whereby language precedes utterance. William Golding, The Inheritors (London: 
Faber, 1955). The dialogic relationship between the Grand Inquisitor and Christ in The Brothers is 
also o f particular interest, as Christ does not pronounce a word.
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something to the symbolists in their obscure codification; metaphor opens into 
metaphor to the point at which the chains of double-voices quickly become 
unrecognisable to one another, and cross the reader’s interiority as though 
independent of the profane world of communication, emanating from the solitary 
and unique interiority of the poet. As Bakhtin writes, “The polysemy of the poetic 
symbol presupposes the unity of a voice with which it is identical, and it 
presupposes that such a voice is completely alone within its own discourse.” (Dl, 
p.328) While this is certainly reductive, such a position forms the premise for one 
of Genet’s wagers with the reader; the one in Journal du voleur, that any attempt 
at his artistic reeducation would result in the educator being won over themselves. 
(LM, p. 133; JV , pp.207-208) This is because the symbolic comparisons made, 
although they could not be considered as straightforwardly true, resonate 
nonetheless with being and its other occupants strewn throughout the oeuvre, and 
produce other meanings through other genres. Bakhtin continues, “As soon as 
another’s voice, another’s accent, the possibility of another’s point of view breaks 
through this play of the symbol, the poetic plane is destroyed and the symbol is 
translated onto the plane of prose.” (DI, p.328) The will to situate the symbolic- 
poetical outside prose and dialogism, conceiving of it as a closed lyrical self, is 
peculiar to Bakhtin, though he nevertheless points out the route followed for 
language to penetrate heteroglossia generally. We do not have time here for a full 
discussion of the novelisation which Bakhtin later comes to associate with 
successful non-prose works; however, he does provide us with a framework for 
discussing transgeneric shift, which will help to illuminate Genet’s oeuvre, (p.7)
Genet’s ideas on drama appear at this dividing point between a solitary 
poetic self and one in dialogue with the world. In Notre-Dame-des-fleurs, Genet 
describes the movement from a symbolic tragic drama, founded in the ritualistic 
repetition of a solitary past, to a dramatic one in dialogue, engaging the writer in 
the meaning of a living present:
au fur et a mesure que ma vie entrait dans le revolu, je l’ai dramatisee.
Eliminant ce qui fut espieglerie, legerete, gaminerie, je n’ai conserve que
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les elements qui sont proprement du drame: la Peur, le Desespoir, 
l’Amour triste ... et je m’en delivre qu’en declamant ces poemes 
convulses comme le visage des sibylles. Ils laissent mon ame clarifiee. 
Mais si l'enfant dans lequel je crois me revoir rit ou sourit, il rompt le 
drame qui s'etait elabore et qui est ma vie passe, quand j'y songe; il 
detruit, le fausse, tout au moins parce qu'il apporte une attitude que le 
personnage ne pouvait pas avoir; il dechire le souvenir d'une vie 
harmonieuse (bien que douloureuse), m'oblige a me voir devenir un autre 
et, sur le premier drame, en greffe un second. (ND, p. 195)
The gaze of the boy has caused Genet to change genre. The critical open- 
endedness of this passage transfers the poetic ambiguity of his lyrical writing to 
the shared semantic space of prose. However, he does not stop there, but moves 
from prose form to drama as he comes into proximity with another. This drama 
nourished by prose describes the passage of language from a symbolism peculiar 
to the poet, to a polysemy in which the other’s participation has become a direct 
element in the generation of meaning. This is consonant with Bakhtin’s late 
appreciation of the dialogism of theatre, which he had described in the 1920s as 
“subordinated wholly to the higher, ultimate authority of the author” (PD, p. 188); 
and in the 1930s as of a single “unitary language”. (£>/, p.405) This single voice or 
world is not, for all that, quite the autism with which Bakhtin describes poetry, 
where “a voice is completely alone within its own discourse” (p.328); although he 
does not think poetry in terms of live, organic exchange. In ‘Toward a 
Methodology for the Human Sciences’, however, Shakespearian theatre is 
described “as a sequential transformation of all reality that affects the heroes into 
the semantic context of their actions, thoughts and experiences”, expressed either 
through words or “translated into the language of the interpretive potential 
word.”14 These lines from 1974 echo an internal review from 1971 of his friend 
L.E. Pinsky’s book on Shakespeare, which argues for a theatrum mundi springing
14
Bakhtin, Speech Genres (Texas: Texas University Press, 1986), p.164.
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from “that special significance [...] to each image, each action, and each word in 
Shakespeare’s tragedies [...].” He goes on, “the main thing is the perception (or, 
more precisely, the living sense unaccompanied by any clear awareness) of all 
action in the theater as some kind of special symbolic ritual.” (p.171) The 
symbolic may thus penetrate normal language. While Bakhtin thinks this writing, 
as far as the theatre is concerned, died with the Bard, semantic context and 
interpretative word must necessarily be open in all times, and it is to this which 
Genet is exposed in the gaze of the boy, at a meeting point between the visible 
and the invisible, the ritualistic and the real. It is these contacts with the exterior, 
however brief, which move Genet’s images from sometimes being irreducibly 
obscure, multi-faceted symbols, to repositories of resonation with the world at 
large.15
The bridging from symbol to polysemy in everyday interaction denotes a 
more direct relationship to heteroglossia than a purified, literary poetic language 
can provide, in which the reader is already alerted to a special symbolic identity. 
This is not however to say that such verbal performance, or such artistic language 
may not be accepted into language generally. What may at first have seemed a 
straightforwardly literal or material reality may quickly be assigned an alternative 
function, and be ‘irrealised’.16 The courtier-sonneteer starting from the flower
15 The entry of different voices into poetic ambiguity need not therefore be translated onto the 
level o f prose, nor be covered in a “mantle o f materiality” (DI, p.329), but instead lead to a 
broadening of polysemic effect. If one thinks o f the ‘Shakespeherian Rag’ (11. 128-172) section to 
Eliot’s The Waste Land, however, Bakhtin’s argument against the dialogic character of poetry 
would seem to be partially bom out. The pronounced change in voice and register between the 
narrator and the occupants o f the cockney tavern endows their voices neither with any great 
prosaic autonomy, nor do they become aware o f the poetic symbols elsewhere in the text. They 
therefore are not reinflecting or responding to symbols they are exposed to, but are behaving as a 
counterpoint to the narrator. While on the one hand the greater documentary and discursive back­
up o f prose can create a meta-critical layer showing that numerous subjects are interpreting the 
same reality differently, a multi-accented poetry is still possible, one which nonetheless remains 
symbolic. One has only to think o f Pope’s The Rape o f  the Lock as a poetic reworking 
simultaneously o f the Iliad, the Aeneid, and Paradise Lost', and of a contemporary society scandal 
between the Petre and Fermor families. The available interpretative vocabulary is therefore very 
broad.
16 “Irrealisation”: see Jean-Paul Sartre, Un theatre de situations, ‘L’acteur’, Gallimard/folio essais, 
Paris, (1973) 1992,p.215.
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may long have drawn the comparison with verbal dexterity or female beauty, only 
later coining as part of his craft the idea of a ‘flower of rhetoric’, freeing it from 
its botanical content. As Bakhtin puts it, “A word forms a concept of its own 
object in a dialogic way.” {DI, p.279) The flower may be a weed, the lady a 
tramp, and verbal dexterity used to violent ends, but in each case multiple subject 
positions, however unidentifiable, have been congregated, and been allowed to 
speak.
For Derrida, Genet himself is the flower of rhetoric, both flora, genet, and 
fauna, genet, the small breed of Spanish racehorse. (Glas, 43b) He is also both 
signatory and character -  or more properly, object of his own account. (20b) In 
the following quotation, Derrida accuses Sartre of dealing far too quickly with the 
argument of the rhetorical value of the flower:
la question de savoir pourquoi la fleur est, comme dit Sartre, « l’objet 
poetique par excellence » cette question fuit entre un meontologisme pre- 
heideggerien et un mallarmeisme vague. On evoque la « disparition 
vibratoire » et la fleur absente de tous bouquets, « voila toute la poesie de 
Genet ». {Glas, 21b; StG, pp.564-65)
We do, however, see the merit of Sartre’s anecdote in which Genet claims not to 
like flowers at all, “ce n’est pas la rose qu’il aime, c’est son nom” {StG, p.438); an 
anecdote in which the name supplies a concept, or several, for the object it 
denotes. For example, in Miracle de la rose, roses reconceptualise Harcomone’s 
chains by flowering there, setting off a chain of miracles of refiguration in 
language from the chain of flowers, of which Mairead Hanrahan tells us “II n’y a 
pas de miracle -  ou de rose -  central.”17 After an image of the crown of thorns, 
the most beautiful of the roses becomes the prefigurement of Harcomone’s 
beheading, cut by Genet using the nail scissors held by each prisoner once a 
month in turn. The prisoners are described as turning to face Harcamone like
17 Mairead Hanrahan, Lire Genet: Unepoetique de la difference, Montreal: Presses Universitaires 
de Montreal, 1997. pp.42-43.
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sunflowers the sun, while we also remember the flower of the innocence of the 
girl Harcomone has murdered. (MR, pp.233-34) The name grafts itself with great 
readiness.
Derrida remarks in Glas that the strength of the flower image in Genet is 
to be found in its supplementary quality to the pre-existing plant. “La fleur est 
partie.” (Glas, 21b) It is interesting to note that in Japanese No theatre, the actor 
tries to reach an objective awareness of his art, the at once poetic and technical 
term for which is ‘the flower of the No’. The actor’s perfection of the flower 
endows the roles with an interiority come to light, or come from the light of the 
plant. As is noted in Glas, the flower in the context of Genet is at once an 
appendage, and at the same time an appearance of transcendence. (21b) The 
flower is always an acme of presence, condensed by the poet or actor. According 
to Genet’s poetic, as he remarks in one of his letters to Roger Blin, even abject 
attitudes or words “doivent emerveiller, toujours, etonner, toujours, par leur
1 Xelegance et leur force d’evidence.” (GOC4, p.240)
The disjunction possible in language between a word and its object may, 
therefore, already produce internal dialogism between voices, accents and 
inflections, creating a reconceptualisation of the object. The semantic drift caused 
by the multiplication of terms and metonymies means that the object may
18 In N5 theatre each character is a personality whose complexity and discreet presence, for Zeami, 
are each expressed in the flower, which undergoes constant changes. This goes for the Old man as 
much as for the Maiden, (p. 12) The flower o f the No, the perfection o f  which is the actor’s life’s 
work, is contiguous to the mystery o f each character’s interiority from where it emanates, (p.77) 
“No matter what the role -  whether the character be o f high or low rank, a man, a woman, a priest 
or lay person, a farmer or a country person, even a beggar or an outcast -  it should seem as though 
each were holding a branch o f flowers in his hand.” (p.94) These interiorities are then related to 
one another through their substance rather than their function in the performance, (p.72) The 
flower is this substance, but always remains at one remove. One surmises, in reading the chapter 
‘Mirror Held to the Flower’, that the mirror is that which reflects the actor’s figuration o f the 
character, or his model of interpretation. It is not grasped in itself but is artistically proffered to the 
spectator. Its point o f emanation once again is mysterious, and should allow an experience o f the 
individual within reality generally. “The following might be said concerning making judgements: 
forget the specifics o f the performance and examine the whole. Then forget the performance and 
examine the actor. Then forget the actor and examine his inner spirit. Then, forget that spirit, and 
you will grasp the nature o f the no.” (Zeami, On the Art o f No Drama, The Major Treatises o f  
Zeami, trans. Thomas Rimer, Yamazaki Masakazu, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
p. 102. This multi-layered vision separates the audience member at each stage from the mere 
external physicality of the performance.
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therefore become a desubstantivated source of polysemy. It is this that poetic 
ambiguity seeks to recreate in microcosm. Poetic ambiguity, while not emulating 
the verisimilitude of ordinary language, cannot simply be subsumed into 
Bakhtin’s imputed “single-personed hegemony” (DI, p.297) of the poet. Indeed 
this is the difference between polysemy, at the interface between different 
ascribable worlds, and dissemination, which is a fragmentary explosion of 
different pollens, names, voices and signatures.19 The sonnet cycle with its 
evolving image repertoire and array of characters is a good example of a literary 
language which is at once reified and linked to discourse generally, as the 
difference between signifier and meaning is addressed generally in the linguistic 
community. Linguistic phenomena are not, to quote Shakespeare’s sonnet 94, “the 
lords and owners of their faces”.20 To determine what has been written is up to the 
interpretation of the reader, like the flower of rhetoric, which is opened to 
interpretation and so may change meaning.
As Mallarme describes in ‘Crise de vers’, the engenderment of an idea 
may be quite separate from the object from which it is produced, springing not 
from a physical or moral association, but instead a ‘musical’ one. Having 
forgotten the contours of a real flower, we are told, “en tant que quelque chose 
d’autre que les calices sus, musicalement se leve, idee meme et suave, Tabsente 
de tous bouquets.”21 The ‘same smooth idea’ of the flower has produced 
something which cannot be found in a bouquet.
But does this mean that two objects can be suffused with the same 
semantic glow without disturbing an outward limpid sense of logicality? There is 
after all a great difference between what ‘is’ and what something may be figured 
‘as’. In the polyvalent play of figures it is difficult to distinguish sense and its
19 “Perdre la tete, ne plus savoir ou dormer de la tete, tel est peut-etre 1’effet de la dissemination.” 
Derrida, La dissemination (Paris: Seuil/Points Essais, 1972), p.30. Thus dissemination takes over 
from polysemy.
20 In an interview, Poirot-Delpech observes to Genet that he [Genet] has an innocent face. Genet 
insists that interpretation is different for each observor: “Je n’ai pas pris le visage de Tinnocence.
Si vous me dites que je I’ai, je l’ai. Si vous pensez que je ne l’ai pas, je ne l’ai pas. Mais j ’aurai 
davantage de plaisir si vous me disiez que je l’ai et si vous pensiez que je l’ai.” ED, p.241.
21 Mallarme, ‘Crise de vers’, Igitur, Divagations, Un coup de des, ed. Bertrand Marchal, Poesie, 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2003), p.259.
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intermediaries, as they are inseparable. In this way one can say that the flower as a 
being releases a semantic glow from being itself. The effort to think being directly 
dispels metaphor, because as Llewelyn explains, it causes “beings [to] disappear 
and with them the direct literal and indirect metaphorical presence to beings.” 
{GE, p. 175) In On the Way to Language, Heidegger interprets the Holderlin poem 
‘Bread and Wine’, saying that the line “words like flowers” should not be 
understood as a metaphor, as this would lead the reader to become bogged down 
in metaphysics, by causing a being (Seiendes) to eclipse Being (Sein). (OWTL, 
p. 100) “Words like flowers” is not a comparison of Being with flowers, which are 
already familiar to us, but for Heidegger, “the awakening of the largest view”. 
{Ibid.) He quotes another version of Holderlin’s verse, “Long and hard is the word 
of this coming but / White (Light) is the moment.” {Ibid.) But this white light, one 
objects, is no more describable than Being. The plant and the flower it produces, 
however, provide an intermediary. The absence from bouquets in Mallarme, and 
from herbaria in Holderlin -  which is related to Entziehung (withdrawal) in 
Heidegger, and retrait in Derrida -  are, therefore, to quote Llewelyn, at best 
“quasi-metaphor[s]”, subject to “the quasi-condition of metaphorical discourse 
about entities”. In other words, they are certainly comparisons: to something not 
already known, perhaps to something of a larger, if  not the “largest”, view, but 
nonetheless comparisons. {GE, p. 175) In Glas, Derrida reworks this quasi- 
metaphoricity: the flower is “la figure des figures” {Glas, 21b), at once 
recognisable and yet not yet inventoried, like the flower of the No which, 
although instantly recognisable, is not indicative of one thing in particular, but 
instead of a breadth of existence.
In the case of Genet, or rather genet, the flower is a metaphor of metaphor, 
both a figure, a figure for the maker of figures, and a figure for figuration. If we 
were temporarily to call this a symbolic relationship, it is worth pointing out that 
it is at the same time real for the subject, who has undergone the play of figures 
creating polysemic effect, such that the subject is not thinking by metaphor, but 
appropriating meaning through language which itself exists within metaphor. 
Having been real for the poet and then for the reader, it is possible for a
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“symbolic” discovery to enter verbal orchestration with other discourses and 
exercise a real, yet semantically disruptive, influence through dissemination. 
Mallarme cannot sit on the tiers in a musical concert without anticipating, through 
this experience, future discoveries, “sans percevoir parmi l’obscure sublimite telle 
ebauche de quelqu’un des poemes imminents a Thumanite [...] d’autant plus 
comprehensible que tu”.22 This means that the “absent” is also “immanent”, in the 
sense of impending. This effect of a partial penetration into communal 
comprehensibility, which at the same time remains incompletely enunciated or 
absent, shows that obscurity is part of linguistic structure, corresponding to the 
spaces crossed in the forms of address, used to receive or impart meaning in the 
assembly of being. If poetry is bom in a genealogical line, at once generic and 
unique, like Bakhtin’s idea of utterance, then ambiguous or anomalous meaning 
may register within a multi-universed interaction, and require the interpretation of 
form and content dynamically. Thus, to return to our earlier quotation from 
Levinas, the effort of ‘objectivation as society’ works analogously in the symbolic 
and in the real. (DHH, p. 188) Neither would this be a concludable activity of 
encoding and recoding, as this would imply a finished society. For these reasons, 
we consider the symbolic and the dialogic to be mutually illuminating in the 
appropriations they allow within the quasi-metaphorics of language, and remark 
that although the dialogic may lap at the symbolic, the symbolic is not at the same 
time drawn all the way into heteroglossia, but remains semantically disruptive and 
irreducible.
We shall now look at symbolic instances of language in Dostoevsky’s 
polyphony as a prelude to similar instances in the less narrative work of Genet. In 
the musical relation we have just examined, the object itself cannot be identified 
by Mallarme or the occupants of the other tiers of the auditorium; what is more, 
the transference of thought to word is different for each contemplator. As the 
music is appreciated, the assembled ears attempt to listen for the ‘poem imminent 
to humanity’, that is its transfer into shared language, which Mallarme describes
22 Mallarme, ‘Crise de vers’, p.258.
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later in the paragraph as “la transposition au Livre”. This transposition from 
played music to proffered language is at this stage an address without a message.
Levinas’s idea of language as a ‘spiritual event’ is pertinent here (DV1, 
p.223); that is, the idea of language as prior to the transfer of any content, 
behaving not as a vehicle, but as address. However,consostent with a society of 
great diversity, the movement to language from music is achieved, Valery tells us, 
through the objectivation of the slightest snatches of sense input:
Nous substituons une melodie a un accord ou a une dissonance. Nous 
ajoutons a ce que nous avons ressenti et intuitivement forme ou verifie -  
ce qu’il faut pour que ce produit psychologique immediat soit negotiable 
en valeurs linguistiques usuelles. Nous changeons nous-memes en 
monnaie interhumaine ce que notre « vie interieure» c’est-a-dire 
inhumaine, extra-humaine, subhumaine, nous a produit...24
It is from these pieces of input that the en-dega de Tetre of primary sense 
impression is filled in by language, rendering these experiences malleable and 
opening them to exegesis, thus issuing in interhuman form what the subject 
experiences as the inhuman, the extra-human and the subhuman. Thus parallel 
possibilities swarm to and from the interhuman subject, who converts them in 
their turn into the language of exegesis.
I have discussed the reconceptualisation of objects emanating from the 
root of dialogic words, and the desubstantivation which attends the symbolic. I 
would now like to observe their point of contact, starting with a relatively trivial 
example in Madame Khoklakov from The Brothers Karamazov. She is both 
impressed and worried by the precocious comments of her daughter, Lise, who, 
remembering a conifer in her childhood garden comments, “I’ve such a vivid 
recollection of the pine as if I pined for it.” (BK, p.249) The musical bond of the 
original Russian ‘sosna’, to langour for, is homonymous with the expression ‘so
23 Mallarme, ‘Crise de vers’, p.258.
24 Paul Valery, ‘Fragments des Marginalia’, Commerce, 14, (Winter, 1927), 14-42 (p.28).
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sna’, meaning ‘to be hardly awakened’. This is felicitously reproduced by 
Magarshack’s pine-pined. The play on words, therefore, between the dreamlike 
memory and the remembered non-human object seems to threaten the kindred 
bond between mother and daughter, as her interiority spirals asymmetrically out 
of reach of simple logic or motherly attentiveness. Lise will later move from this 
kind of poetic languor to delirium as she ceases to be the mistress of her 
interhuman life.
In Genet, at the trial of his character Notre-Dame-des-fleurs, the boy is 
asked what first gave him the idea of murdering the old man. The defence he 
gives does not adhere to the rules of what one is usually considered free to think. 
He comes out with a trope, which is ‘a turning’ in a literal sense, not only of one 
thing into another in the conscious mind, but also in the sense of a physical 
torque: it was the old man’s tie, he claims, seen as a garotte or tourniquet, which 
made him want to strangle. One could perhaps say, extending Mallarme’s 
desubstantivation of the flower, that the ‘same suave idea’ of the tie had attained a
9 <musical structure and cinesthetically behaved as a prompt. It is in this sense that 
Levinas argues that meaning comes before the objects which they illuminate, be 
they human or non-human. Meaning precedes particular uses to which it is 
applied and does not belong to one more than to another, as essences gathered in 
one context can be reevoked in another. This is the danger of art as Levinas 
describes it in 1948 in ‘La Realite et son ombre’, to which we shall return in 
considerable detail. However, in 1964 in ‘La signification et le sens’, he explains 
that, “le rayonnement ne caracterise pas plus authentiquement une joumee de mai 
qu’un visage de femme.” (HdH, p.22) As with the old man’s tie, an object 
participating in being with a subject may lead to a structure or semantic 
confluence being discovered for the reconceptualisation or musical transformation 
of the object. In this way, Levinas explains, referring to a Homeric comparison of 
rock and human resistance, the figure is not necessarily anthropomorphic, but 
instead petromorphic. {Ibid.) In the same way, we could say that for Baudelaire,
25 See also the murder scene o f Joachim in Querelle, which is described in musical-floral terms 
highly reminiscent of ‘Crise de vers’. (ImQU, p.238)
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evil is not primarily human, but floral. The relation between figurative and literal 
senses may come out of kilter. Genet, in common with Mallarme, addresses 
something absent from any flower, and indeed confesses to not even liking them. 
(StG, p.438) Poetic identity may therefore be said to show the asymmetry of 
interhuman, dialogical, and symbolic relations.
2. Intersubjective space and the Other
Even though the books of our study are objectively finished (bound and 
published), the absolute distance between writer and oeuvre, reader and text, 
world and its rendering, provides insights into the possibilities of intimacy 
between interlocutors described by Levinas in ‘Le Dialogue’. These dialogues 
always leave the impression of having been interrupted or rather that they derive 
their meaningfulness from an influence that is incomplete because still devolving 
from the other. A parenthesis in the Levinas passage addressing Buber quoted 
above identifies the importance of the discretion with which the distance between 
the self and the other is brooked but remains intact: “secret inexprimable de 
l’autre pour moi, secret auquel, a tout jamais, je n’accede que par l’appresentation, 
mode d’exister de T autre comme autre”. (DVI, p.221) Thus, through 
‘appresentation’, a self-conscious experience may take place whereby the implicit 
in the unknown other may come meaningfully to the fore, as though arising from 
the blind spots or walking from the ruins of the subject’s own representation of 
them. Literature could be said, therefore, to prepare experiences for the reader, 
starting from the implicit, which may lead to discoveries out of phase with the 
‘lucidity of the intellect’. This preparatory nature of literature may also show us 
that the self-conscious experience of the other in real life may begin even before
26 In ‘La Ruine de la representation’, Levinas criticises “une histoire des idees oil le concept 
d’actualite coi'ncidait avec l’etat de veille absolu, avec la lucidite de l’intellect.” (DHH , p. 181)
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an actual encounter has occurred, or be the experience of an encounter before any
27mutually intelligible content has been communicated.
Levinas argues for the need to alter slightly the Buberian terminology used 
to describe the absolute distance between individualities by concentrating on a 
discrepancy in the mode of address which, Levinas claims, should not be in the 
form of a familiar thou, whereby one already has equality or acquaintance, for 
intersubjective space is curved and asymmetrical, not linear and reciprocal. Thus 
the exchange is not between a je  and tu, but between a je  and vous. The polite or 
plural form outweighs the singular I  form, and accounts for the overweening need 
in Dostoevsky’s characters to address the other, as though appearing before a
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superior or before a diverse and judging humankind. This even applies across
29what were, until the Emancipation of the Serfs (1861), feudal class divisions. 
Bakhtin’s use of Buber, therefore, finds a further development in Levinas’s 
description of the experience of the other as structurally important to the self.
This does not, however, mean that the self is always aware of or 
responsive to this role of the other and, in spite of this possible interdependency, 
Dostoevsky’s characters seem through everything that befalls them to remain 
defiantly themselves, as though in some way buffered against the world and its 
other occupants. For Levinas this quality is characteristic of the knowing subject’s 
ability to apply its knowledge and understanding, giving it “le pouvoir de se 
trouver toujours derriere ce qui [lui] arrive”. (DEE, p.78) And yet, they also have 
a mania for communicating this consistency to others, as though their self- 
knowledge contained an uncertainty. Whether it be Rashkalnikov’s theories on the 
sovereignty of the exceptional man, or Svidrigaylov’s belief in the ultimate 
seducability of any woman (CP, p.486), they are all witness to the burning will to 
exteriorise and even succeed in meeting characters with whom they are partnered
27 “[L]e langage est un parler-a avant d’etre un parler-de; il est exposition a un autre avant d’etre 
communication d’un contenu.” (QDL, p.28)
28 The following extreme minimalist example o f asymmetry is found in The Possessed, as Shatov 
addresses Stavrogin: “‘Our’ conversation didn’t take place at all; there was a teacher, uttering big 
words and a pupil, who had arisen from the dead.” (PO , p.253-254; QDL, p.28)
29 It is also worth remembering that in the Atelier d ’Alberto Giacometti, Genet comments on 
miniscule figures sunk into feudal bases, leaving the statues at once wholly individual and 
grounded in pedestals many times their own mass. {AT, p.67)
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in relation to an idea, to whom they are seemingly drawn because they complicate 
the process of intentionality -  Rashkalnikov is drawn deep into discussion of his 
article by the detective pursuing him; Svidrigaylov touches on subjects in 
conversation with the brother of the woman he is trying to seduce, going far
30beyond the necessities of the blackmail on which he is already embarked. It is as 
though they cannot refuse the challenge of justifying their behaviour to another 
who might have a very different view on their undertaking; as though, propelled 
by their own words, this were the only way of maintaining their perception. This 
attraction seems to come from the other’s resistance as an independent singularity 
out of the subject’s reach, one which could lead to a meaningful rethink or 
shakedown of themselves. This would seem to imply that the self is always, as 
Husserl puts it in his Cartesian Meditations, “gros d’un ‘plus’ qui s’etend au- 
dela”, making the subject susceptible to dialogic relations, in the same way that 
meta-phore in ‘La signification et le sens’ is carried beyond primary content. 
{HdH, p. 17)
In the next section of this chapter, we shall see how the secret intimacy 
with the other on the personal level seems to run parallel to the tracing of meaning 
and influence between texts on a trans-literary level -  as though the language and 
texts we are examining were “gros d’un plus” as well, with one referential object 
concealing another. Therefore, just as the subject is sometimes forced beyond the 
self, so, it would seem, is the reader on encountering poetic effects which refer 
outside the confines of the original text. Failure to notice these would, as Bakhtin 
comments, turn ‘stylization’ into simple ‘style’, and ‘irony’ into ‘bad art’, by 
transcribing what are in fact dialogic inflections onto a single level. (PD, p. 185) 
Valery makes a very similar point in his annotated translation of extracts from 
Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘Marginalia’ when he emphasizes the horizontal associations 
that should be stimulated in the reader by the text, thus sounding different notes in 
another’s soul:
30 Svidrigailov even hints to Dunya that he poisoned his wife, though perhaps in the hope o f  
creating an isolating criminal complicity. (CP, p.507)
31 DHH, p. 180, Edmond Husserl, Meditations cartesiennes, trans. from German Gabrielle Peiffer 
and Emmanuel Levinas, (Paris: Vrin, 1999), p.40.
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La valeur d’un ouvrage pour un lecteur donne est mesuree par 
l’importance de ces reactions paralleles a la lecture. L’ouvrage peut, en 
definitive, etre juge fort mauvais; si les notes en question ont ete
'  r 32nombreuses et explicites, la valeur excitante du livre est demontree.
If for Valery the power of a text is measurable by its ability to produce other texts 
in the reader, then the “gros d’un plus” can be understood in the generative sense
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of nascent alterity. Texts “imminents a l’humanite” , as Mallarme said above, are 
therefore in a mercurial musical relation to their sources, as polyphony leads to 
polysemy and dissemination, generated by undecidability, irony, reinflection, and 
stylization, in the creation of new meanings. As Valery states, “Le sujet d’un 
ouvrage est a quoi se reduit un mauvais ouvrage.” (V02 , p.679) Generally 
speaking, therefore, what is judged to be ‘bad art’ may be down to the reader for 
not being receptive to the parallel stimuli of stylization and reinflection, or it can 
be down to the writer who has overdetermined their subject. To know the subject 
of a text is to be able to delimit the enclosure describing otherness, and therefore 
to fix its alterity through definition. The opening of the hermetic text to others 
also bespeaks the opening of the reader’s self to the other in heteroglossia.
Bataille is also sensitive to this contiguity with others in heteroglossia, and 
writes in his essay on Genet in La litterature et le mal\
[Jj’ai cette certitude: l’humanite n’est pas fait d’etres isoles, mais d’une 
communication entre eux [...]. [Njous baignons dans la communication, 
nous sommes reduits a cette communication incessante dont, jusque dans 
le fond de la solitude, nous sentons l’absence, comme la suggestion de 
possibilites multiples, comme l’attente d’un moment ou elle se resout en 
un cri que d’autres entendent. Car Texistence humaine n’est en nous, en
32 Valery, ‘Fragments des Marginalia’, p.20.
33 Mallarme, ‘Crise de vers’, p.258.
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ces points ou periodiquement elle se noue, que le langage crie, que spasme 
cruel, que fou rire, ou 1’accord nait d ’une conscience enfin partagee de 
Timpenetrabilite de nous-memes et du monde. {LM, pp. 148-49, my 
emphasis)
Moments when communication does not function, and when the unintelligible 
gains the upper-hand, are intolerable for consciousness, and have an isolating 
effect; but this may also stir the possibility of a ‘consciousness at last shared’. 
Later on, Bataille proceeds to locate the feeling of communion in shared crisis 
with the Other in the pain of being itself, and claims that “la conscience d’etre est 
le scandale de la conscience” (p.150). The ‘scandal of consciousness’ is highly 
reminiscent of Levinas’s concept of saturation in being, the il y  a, but seems to 
open the simultaneous possibility of a beyond being in relation to the Other. The 
scandal of being is something which, when faced by the individual or society in 
recognition that being is not the only human register, is capable of producing 
desinter-esse-ment -  even though there is also the possibility of exaltation in the 
difficulty and injustice occasioned by being. Levinas also points out in De 
I ’obliteration that in modem philosophy the divine tends to receive artistic rather 
than religious expression. (OBL, p.28) This would seem to concur with what 
Bataille says about the relationship sought by society with the scandal of being: 
“nous maintenons avec le scandale qu’a tout prix nous voulons soulever, auquel 
neanmoins nous tentons d’echapper -  un lien indefectible, mais le moins 
douloureux que nous pouvons, en l’espace de la religion ou de l’art (de Tart qui 
herita une partie des puissances de la religion).” {LM, pp. 150-51) This view of 
religion, however, includes a pronounced tendency towards theodicy, the 
reconciliation of a beneficent God with an imperfect world in the minimisation of 
suffering for the greatest number, something which we shall examine more at the 
end of this chapter. If a certain view of religion seeks to attenuate the pain of 
being by offering cosmogonies, explanations, and views of the self in the grand 
scheme, art may occupy a similar access for man to an impenetrable world. The 
scandal of being in relation to which man seeks to position himself, for Bataille,
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may show at the same time a kind of ambiguous appeal, as it belongs to the 
privileged moments of communication which approach the ineluctable aspects of 
human existence.
The aesthetic aspect of scandal and misfortune is a manner in which being 
is made resonant. We take an example from Crime and Punishment. Rashkalnikov 
keeps himself up late turning over his misfortunes in his mind, bringing rejoinders 
from his mother, sister, Marmeladov, and Luzhin into his internal dialogue, 
tightening the screw on his ability to understand and act: “So he kept torturing 
himself, tormenting himself with these questions, and he seemed even to derive 
some pleasure from it.” (CP, p.63) Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov provides 
another example. He collects a catalogue of moral aberrations within civilised 
society, which may provide aesthetic pleasure, not least to him, as they enable his 
theological musings. However, in their scandalous unintelligibility, they leave him 
entirely unsure of how to act, and leave him prey, however secretly, to 
Rashkalnikov’s analogous state of rebellion. (Book V, Chapter 3) Whereas Ivan 
and Rashkalnikov’s aesthetic reactions to the scandal of being are each on the 
point of creating disinterestedness, their intervention makes matters worse. If, as 
Bataille observes, religion also seeks to provide a regulative link to the scandal of 
consciousness, then arguably a digression into an only apparently alternative 
register, the spiritual, could equally lead, through mystification, to an 
intensification of being. This is a risk that arouses ire in critics of organised 
religion. However, as Zossima observes in The Brothers Karamazov, when the 
spiritual world is rejected, it may also be “dismissed with a sort of triumph, even 
with hatred.” (BK, p.369) This leads later in the novel not to the defence of 
another within being, but to a kind of exaltation at the ravages of being upon 
others. When Zossima dies, rather than remaining incorrupt, his body begins to 
stink, and there results a general excitement at the fact that he does not provide an 
exception to shared fate.
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The unbelievers were delighted, and as for the believers, there were some 
among them who were even more delighted than the unbelievers 
themselves [...] (BK, p.387)34
The scandal of being is tacitly approved, therefore, by altered aesthetic and 
religious sensibilities.
It is the very same solution to scandal that Bataille perceives in Genet’s 
novels, whereby the cause of suffering is presented in aestheticised form as a 
solution, in which solipsism is proposed as a cure for indifference, fate used to 
inure to the arrows of fortune, and masochism proposed as an answer to violence. 
This may amount to the temptation towards a deliberate transgression against the 
Good in an expression of sovereignty, a thinking which is outlined in the 
following way by Bataille, “je suis au-dessus de Tessence: je fais ce que je veux, 
je me fais ce que je veux...”. (LM, p. 147) However, the aim of being “au-dessus 
de I 'essence ” is not, to use more Levinasian terminology, the same as the “au-dela 
de 1’essence”; it is an “etre autrement” rather than an “autrement qu’etre”, that is 
to say an attempted indifference, rather than disinterestedness exceeding the 
subject through heterology. (AQE, p.3, AQEb, p. 13) Bataille quotes in a footnote 
the following observation from Sartre’s Saint Genet:
Si le criminel [...] a la tete solide, il voudra jusqu’au bout demeurer 
mechant. Cela veut dire qu’il batira un systeme pour justifier la violence:
35seulement du coup celle-ci perdra sa souverainete. (LM, p. 130)
The personal bet is to see whether it is possible through a kind of misrule to assert 
one’s liberty in a hostile, impenetrable world, by which the usual order of the 
world may be sustainably inverted and its morality suspended. Bataille will 
attribute a ‘classic attitude’ to Genet, which could also easily have been derived
34 Bakhtin explains in his 1961 notes on Dostoevsky, in highly Levinasian manner, that “a miracle 
would have enslaved”. (PD , p.298)
35 Bataille gives the StG reference as p.223, which is in the original edition that has 579 pages. In 
the more widely available edition, which has 692 pages, it is on p.267.
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from Rashkalnikov, a sovereign who claims a right to both recognition and tribute 
from the social world:
L’exemple de Genet repond exactement a 1’attitude classique en ce qu’il 
chercha la souverainete dans le Mai, et que le Mai, en effet, lui donna ces 
moments vertigineux ou il semble qu’en nous, l’etre est disjoint, et ou, 
bien qu’il survive, il echappe a l’essence qui le limitait. (p. 152)
This founding violence, violently maintained, is presented as an illusory 
independence, which few of Dostoevsky’s or Genet’s characters survive mentally 
or physically unscathed. Fear of failure need not discourage the most daring, 
outrageous and self-destructive acts. In fact, Kirilov, in The Possessed, plans to 
escape altogether the limitations of being by committing suicide; Ippolit too, in 
The Idiot, attempts to overcome his moral disappointments, and a body weakened 
by consumption, by taking his own life. {ID, p.459, Book 3, Chapter 5-7)
Many of Dostoevsky’s heroes find themselves struggling with the doomed 
effort of finding self-fulfilment already within the confines of the self. The 
narrator of The Brothers Karamazov explains in Book One that this abortive 
undertaking is avoided by the religious novice, who instead of seeking sovereign 
self-affirmation, seeks instead to renounce his will in order to achieve
freedom from himself, and so escape the fate of those who have lived their 
whole lives without finding themselves in themselves. {BK, p.28, my 
emphasis)
This self-inflicted religious servitude to an elder could, as Dostoevsky points out, 
lead to abuse in a master-slave dynamic in which, as Bataille remarks, “son 
apparente souverainete n’est alors que la volonte autonome de la servitude”, {LM, 
p. 144) -  and upon which Genet styles his failures. This would be the position 
sought by humanity in relation to the Grand Inquisitor, surrendering itself to a 
tyrannical elder. The novice’s hope tends instead towards election, in which
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freedom is a freedom from the self, and a choseness for the other. Ivan and 
Rashkalnikov have created for themselves unusual heights of anguish in their 
attempts to find themselves in themselves. Rashkalnikov has asserted his will and 
committed murder in developing the hypothesis that the self may indeed rest upon 
itself, and that the rights of others may, under certain circumstances, be 
disregarded. In contrast, Ivan, at first far more calmly, asserts that without the idea 
of God to unify people, or a system of obligations, “all is permitted”, (p.78, 92, 
Book II, Chapter 6 and 7) They each prepare an article on their philosophical 
position or idea, as they each try to come up with an answer to division in the 
world: for Rashkalnikov, the exceptional man will not tolerate resistance and may 
be compelled to swim a river of blood for his self-expression, while for Ivan, it is 
only after the failure of belief in a divine unifying principle that the same 
conclusion is reached. Without a unanimous commitment to community in the 
love of man for mankind, people can only be ruled by force, by the autos-da-fe of 
‘The Grand Inquisitor’ poem. Ironically, then, they both feel compelled to share 
their findings with others, producing a cocktail detonnant of simultaneous 
solipsism and sociality.
It is interesting to see to what extent these ideas are developed in the social 
environment. Rashkalnikov, in his article, (which is more of a manifesto when set 
next to Ivan’s muse), argues for the general social acceptability of his 
psychopathic belief, while Ivan wistfully asserts that tyrannical sovereign rights 
may already be inseparably part of a world which lacks regulative ethical 
principles. Rashkalnikov’s assertion will, however, return to haunt its author. The 
detective, Porfiry, has read the article, and can therefore interrogate the prime 
suspect by using the suspect’s own words and idea. Furthermore, as 
Rashkalnikov’s antisocial idea of the exceptional powers the exceptional man may 
grant himself becomes increasingly exteriorised, it becomes increasingly likely to 
bloom into an exchange in the present -  which indeed happens: first through 
Rashkalnikov’s admission to Sonia, and then through his surrender to Porfiry. It 
seems that an anti-social thesis, initially developed in the social environment, but 
then nurtured in an individual subjectivity, may under special artistic or
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diplomatic circumstances make a return to the social. After all, secretly harboured 
belief only becomes discourse upon contact with an exterior.
Dostoevsky’s heroes tend to be obsessed by an idea that inhabits their 
character and it is this idea that forms their voice seeking an interlocutor. Thus 
even the solipsistic idea of mastery through what we might call ‘self-discovery’, 
and the assertion that the self rests upon itself, risks undergoing fission at the 
moment when the hero comes into proximity with others. This failed attempt to 
find oneself in oneself also precisely describes the split style of Genet’s 
fictionalised biographical voice in his first five novels. He demonstrates, through 
the pursuit of a particular kind of Sainthood, the failed attempt to find himself in 
himself; a Sainthood which is neither traditional nor simply false: for through it, 
marginal or often invisible characters find their dramas carefully described. Genet 
both narrates, borrowing the points of view of his characters, and figures himself 
as a character. He is thus drawn between the detailed description of these others 
and their martyrisation by his own, and by their own, hands. Divine’s sainthood 
figured as a vent in Genet’s barred throne-room is redolent of a mysterious 
dialogism between characters whose solipsistic view of the other seems only to 
furnish an interior, subjective landscape. Yet at the same time, in Genet’s 
depiction, one interior landscape is made to furnish another’s, and therefore 
constitutes the preamble to the spiritual event of address. In a way that is 
reminiscent of the paradox of Rashkalnikov, whose promised triumphant return to 
himself after the robbery leaves him instead in a state of obsessional need to 
address the other, Genet’s narrator makes a virtue of failing to secure self- 
mastery. He then addresses himself to the Other in the reader, usually from a 
slum, prison or totalitarian environment, and claims, in spite of all, that everything 
has gone according to plan. If an idea-character such as Rashkalnikov has great 
difficulty admitting error, and drawing conclusions from his sneaking suspicions, 
then Genet uses an analogous movement by refusing, in almost all cases, any 
possibility of error. Genet does occasionally, however, gesture to the conceit of 
his writing, and indicates the limit of his powers and patience to evoke beauty 
within the prison environment. In Miracle de la rose Genet even expresses his
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desire for revenge upon his fellow prisoners, “du mal qu’ils m’ont fait, de l’ennui 
que m’a cause leur inegalable betise.” (MR, p.220) For Bataille, in such a moment 
Genet undoes some of his most successful manoeuvres (LM, p. 140), although 
such a view overlooks more tender demythologizing moments. In Miracle de la 
rose, Genet comments of his fellow prisoners, “Ils ne sont plus que Foutrageante 
caricature des beaux criminels que j ’y voyais quand j ’avais vingt ans”, and later 
evokes in something of a vigil on the unhappiness of those confined twenty years 
previously, “la douleur vraie, la peine lamentable de ces gosses courbes sur les 
champs de betteraves (MR, p.246, 362) The literary effect of a faulty or 
fissured narrative filled with traces allows the Genet environment also to become 
“gros d’un plus”, and opens the possibility that this grossesse may carry 
something completely different from that which its environment suggests.
In this movement, and with the other in view, Genet pitches his conceit 
against our expectations. The result is a kind of ghost writing, which makes the 
appearance and disappearance of the other a constantly evolving feature. We do 
not know whether they are real characters to whom we should feel attached or 
instead erotic fantasies drawn around the totem of the phallus. But to complicate 
matters further, the phallus, an interpretative centre based on power, and the other, 
the ex-centric placement of meaning, are only present by dint of writing, with the 
reality of neither guaranteed. Idea partners in Dostoevsky are drawn to one 
another precisely because they are dialogically other, in an interaction taking 
place before or beyond the Ego and the Same, le Moi and le Meme, the enclosures 
of the individual and of the world which Levinas’s thought seeks to open.36 In like 
manner, Genet’s poetics allows a certain rescuing from the Same: a rescuing from 
the sum of institutions, communities and discourses which, already alike, 
recognise one another, but in which the marginal other may easily become lost or 
go unrecognised, and therefore be refused dialogical opening. But most often 
Genet performs rescues from obscurity, only then to annex them, in a second 
movement, to himself.
36 As in Levinas’s usage of le Meme and le Moi, and le Dire and le Dit, in English they will 
sometimes be capitalised for reasons of emphasis.
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To put it differently, Genet undoubtedly produces a movement in Desire 
from the Same to the Other by giving characters flesh; however, he very often 
describes them only to consign them, once more, to the preferences of his own 
ego. For example his mourning for Jean Decamin first leads him to graft his 
friend’s desire onto himself as envoy into the world, “Par mes yeux, il verra les 
etoiles, l’echarpe des femmes et leur sein.” (PF, p.57) While this image is for 
Genet chastely erotic, he had already begun to transfer his affections to Riton the 
milicien, who is designated amongst the French enemies of the Resistance at 
random as responsible for Decamin’s death, that Genet explains himself to be 
“decide a employer n’importe quel moyen pour me debarasser de son souvenir”, 
and that with regards to Riton “le meilleur tour a ce gamin, serait bien de le 
charger de l’amour que je portais a sa victime.” (p.42) This sexual betrayal will 
lead to some of the more disturbing and prurient passages in the novel. So these 
manifestations of eros involve rescuing the other from the Same, to then assign 
them to the Self. Genet thus enables a comparison between an appropriative 
personal eros and an appropriative eros in the Same, as a way of justifying the 
order of the day. Decamin is mourned by France as a resistant, but was killed by a 
French milicien. Hence Genet operates an alternation of conflictual desires for 
Decamin through the use of a surrogate, which enables the interpenetration of 
equivocal ethical concerns. The grafting of the surrogate, Riton, is contrived as a 
way of helping Genet to displace his affections for Decamin. It is as though the 
anarchic claim of alterity could be pushed to a safe distance through 
thematisation, as we quoted from Levinas above. Genet, however, only 
reproduces this distancing after the link of responsibility has already gained a hold 
on himself and the reader through Desire. Sole reliance upon thematisation is 
therefore subverted.
Genet’s entreprise here is illuminated by the way Levinas distinguishes 
between philosophy in an idealist tradition, and the ‘philosophy of eros’. Levinas 
thinks the philosophy of eros through the nature of desire and metaphysical desire
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examined in Phaedrus3?, and also through the related argument on the good 
beyond being in the The Republic38. Although previously, “[l]a philosophic [...] 
s’identifiait a l’absorption de tout ‘Autre’ a partir du ‘Meme’ ou a la deduction de 
tout ‘Autre’ a partir du ‘Meme’”, the phenomenological relation of phenomena to 
one another means that: “[...] desormais une relation entre le Meme et 1’Autre ne 
vient pas invertir l’eros philosophique.” (DHH, p. 177) Thus encounters may be 
perceived as individual exchanges or events concerning the other, before 
becoming narratable results. This does not suggest a privileged link to truth, but 
an attentiveness to the events from which judgements are made. The movement 
from the Same to Other is frequently performed by Genet; in the case of Decamin, 
and Divine, for example, as he sets them apart, respectively, from triumphant 
narratives of the Liberation, and amongst the characters of the Montmartran 
underworld. However, they are then bent to his own storytelling requirements. 
Genet thus manages to run concurrently a phenomenological gesture in encounters 
with alterities in the downtrodden not usually found in literature through 
philosophical eros, and simultaneously a movement from the Meme to the Moi, 
reproducing in perverse form the repression and neutralisation of these same 
others in thematisation and the unitary view of totality.
This double movement is able to think both inside and outside dominant 
readings of the world by gesturing both to their outside, and to the way in which 
alterity is absorbed. It is a manner of both indicating parallel possibility, and its 
loss. Reading ‘Tout autrement’ (1973) in Noms Propres, Critchley remarks on the 
way Levinas salutes the “disruptive power” of Derrida’s deconstruction.39 He 
does this in a fable set in the “no man’s land” of the 1940 exodus from Paris 
following the invasion, in which a hint of another time chiasmically crosses 
events:
37 Plato, ‘Phaedrus’, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, trans. Walter Hamilton, (London:
Penguin, 1973), Phaedrus, 237, (“Love is a kind of desire”), p.36. Levinas describes Phaedrus as 
one o f the five most important books in the history o f philosophy. (Eel, p.27)
38 Plato, The Republic, trans. A.D. Lindsay, (London: Everyman, 1976), The Republic, 509, (“the 
good is not itself being but transcends even being in dignity and power”), p.203.
39 Simon Critchley, The Ethics o f  Deconstruction, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999), p. 154.
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En ces jours d'entre-temps, un episode symbolique: quelque part entre 
Paris et A len in , un coiffeur a moitie ivre invitait les soldats qui 
passaient sur la route -  les «petits gars» comme il les appelait dans un 
langage patriotique planant au-dessus des eaux, ou sumageant dans le 
chaos -  a venir se faire raser gratuitement dans son echoppe. Avec ses 
deux compagnons, il rasait gratis et ce fut aujourd'hui. La procrastination 
essentielle -  la future dijferance -  se resorbait dans le present. Le temps 
arrivait a sa fin avec la fin ou avec l’interim de la France. A moins que le 
coiffeur ne fut aussi delirant que la quatrieme forme du delire du Phedre 
ou, depuis Platon, se tient le discours de la metaphysique occidentale. 
(NP, p.83)
The “demain on rasera gratis” is spoken in the sense, Critchley points out, of the 
English “It’s jam tomorrow”, or “That’ll be the day”; only this tomorrow alluded 
to is today.40 Levinas, on the other hand, inserts a word of hesitation or caution, 
that perhaps the drunkenness of the half drunk barber was that described in Plato’s 
Phaedrus in which love is described as an extension to the fourth form of 
madness. Possession includes at once an elevation from the sensible to the 
intelligible realms, and from the physical to the metaphysical.41 It is philosophical 
eros, and may allow the Other to be distinguished in beauty. Beauty, however, 
may equally lead to possession of the beloved and move in the direction of the 
Same. This double reading is also to be found in Genet, and seems to refer 
ambiguously in places to the Phaedrus passage. Socrates describes the elevation 
of beauty by the growth of wings, as “the stump of each feather under the whole 
surface of the soul swells and strives to grow from its root”.42 Genet, in the 
passage in which he fails to absorb another into his own drama of moribund
40 Critchley, Ethics o f  Deconstruction, p. 153.
41 Critchley, Ethics o f  Deconstruction, pp. 154-55.
42 Phaedrus, 251, p.58.
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erotics alluded to above, is inspired in his reverie by the sight of two boys on a 
prison visit,
Quand ils sont passes devant moi, roulant leurs hanches et gardant bien 
droites leurs epaules, je voyais deja a leurs omoplates la bosse des 
muscles, couvrant les racines de leurs ailes. (ND, p. 195)
The wings are given to the beloved and not to the lover, as a sign of the beloved’s 
independence. This unconfining image therefore goes out to the Other. However, 
it is also possible to find examples of an eros moving in the direction of the Same 
or the Ego in Plato, in which the beloved is worshipped “as if it were a god, and, 
if he [the lover] were not afraid of being thought an utter madman, he would 
sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a divinity.”43 In Genet, such an idolatry 
can extend as far as implied human sacrifice, and in Notre-Dame Genet greets the 
sound of a German bomber, “oiseau de fer”, from his cell with joy, while his cell 
mates bleat with fear: “Je vis, dis-je, ou crus voir un enfant de dix-huit ans dans 
Tavion, et du fond de ma 426 je lui souris d’amour.” (ND, p. 10.)
The ability to manipulate the other at a safe distance is not possible in this 
instance; and indeed, for this narrator, unconcerned with being thought mad, it is 
unimportant, as he claims to enjoy the idea of general suffering. The poetic effect, 
however, is to draw our attention to turnarounds in philosophical eros, in favour 
of a totality hostile to life. That this hostility should also threaten Genet’s life 
highlights the abortive character of his disregard for the Other, the alternative he 
so illogically rejects, and in rebellion against whom he overcompensates in an 
indifference to all life.44 As Rudi Visker explains:
43 Phaedrus, 251, p.57.
44 For a parallel example see George Jackson’s description of an overheard conversation in which 
a deathrow prisoner argues in favour of the death penalty to a guard. Soledad Brother: The Prison 
Letters o f  George Jackson (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1994), p.282.
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the Other, Levinas seems to suggest, is precisely an ethical Other because 
he silently puts me before the question whether it is worthwhile to live a 
life that has to engage in a ‘war’ [of thematisation] in which it [death] 
always wins, in order not to engage in that ‘inner’ war [with being as 
expressed in the ‘il y a’] which it will lose anyway. (TaS, p.257)
The war it wins is the absorption of the other in the recuperation of the self, while 
the ‘inner’ war takes place within its own existence, which takes itself for a 
substance rather than a verb, resistant to the il y  a and to the other. Since the 
power, pouvoir, or “je peux” of the conatus essendi, will meet death, and the im­
possibility that accompanies it, then the Other should be preferable, as it leaves 
the subject’s power and initiative intact, whilst at the same time making the 
subject responsible for it. (p.255) So the simple approach of the other may not be 
enough to rupture the solus ipse, but does at least place it in doubt. As the narrator 
in The Brothers Karamazov seems to imply, the attempt to find the other in the 
self risks finding the self in the self, in the perpetuation of the Ego, as the subject 
tries to lose itself in the exterior world, and so loosen the bonds that ache at its 
centre. Genet likes to play on the ambiguity of this encounter as the will of 
consciousness and its powers of exegesis are brought into play.
In illustration of this, let me return to the passage in the The Brothers, 
mentioned above, in which the self is found in the self. This passage illuminates 
and is illuminated by another in Notre-Dame-des-fleurs where Genet describes an 
inward sensitisation caused by the solitude of entering prison:
Apres la monstruosite immonde de mon arrestation [...] la cellule de 
prison, que j ’aime maintenant comme un vice, m ’apporta la consolation 
de moi-meme par soi-meme. (ND, p.49, my emphasis)
This consolation of “moi-meme par soi-meme” would seem to be a derelict state 
of self-discovery. It is then complicated by inscriptions which are “gros d’un 
plus”, and carry the reader on a would-be transcendent route through fellow-
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suffering, as Genet’s narrator derives courage from the knowledge of his shared 
lot:
Chaque fois nouvelle que je tombe, je cherche sur les murs les traces de 
mes precedentes captivites, c’est-a-dire de mes precedents desespoirs, 
regrets, desirs qu’un autre detenu aura graves pour moi [...]. (Ibid., my 
emphasis)
His wishing then begins to change pitch from a receptivity to the other, to a 
tailoring of the other to his own tastes:
je desire quelquefois avoir une amitie fratemelle, mais toujours pour un 
homme -  de mon age -  qui serait beau, de qui j ’aurais toute la confiance, 
qui serait le complice de mes amours, de mes vols, de mes desirs criminels 
[...]. (Ibid.)
The beauty of this other does not create a respectful distance, since he attributes to 
him a personality so similar to his own that it is on the point of merger with the 
self He then annexes this other to himself outright, as the final resting place of his 
confidence and secrets:
J’attends sur le mur la revelation de quelque secret terrible: meurtre, 
surtout, meurtre d’hommes, ou trahison d’amitie ou profanation des Morts, 
et dont je serais le tombeau resplendissant. (Ibid.)
So it turns out that the “gros d’un plus” is of himself, stillborn. He is on his own 
again after all, with his crimes filtered through emissaries that resemble him, 
before being enclosed once more in the sepulchre of himself. This return to the 
self is at odds with the triumphant return Hegel ascribes to deduction, by which 
“la conscience revient triomphalement a elle-meme pour reposer sur elle-meme.” 
(DHH, p.273, my emphasis) Rather than helping control the environment, it
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seems that for Genet this condition is moribund and despairing. Genet frequently 
describes this curve of a movement away from the self and back again in its 
various declensions, and offers privileged insights into it in his ethico-aesthetic 
texts. We now turn to ‘Ce qui est reste d’un Rembrandt...’ (1967).
Genet describes the separated state occupied by people and objects 
depicted in art. Having described a feeling of uncanny contact with a fellow 
passenger in the train, he goes on to claim that the only ‘true’ experiences of his 
life had been gruelling self-consciousness surrounding moments o f stress. But 
then a different kind of event in a look exchanged with a fellow passenger 
occurred. In the first case, danger or indignation fuelled the experience in an 
assertion of the self, whereas in the second, it is as though the self definitively 
loses its priority. Interestingly, Genet does not then insist that the exchange with 
the other, rather than the continuation of the self, is the truer experience. The full 
quotation clarifies the importance of the event:
avant tout je devais noter ceci: les seuls moments de ma vie que je pouvais 
tenir pour vrais, dechirant mon apparence et laissant a decouvert... quoi? 
un vide solide qui ne cessait de me perpetuer? -  Je les aurais connus lors 
de quelques coleres tres saintes, dans des trouilles egalement benies, et 
dans le rayon -  le premier -  qui allait de l’ceil d’un jeune homme au mien, 
dans notre regard echange. (CQR, p.29)
His encounter with truth in the rediscovery of himself is described in the 
following way, “dechirant mon apparence et laissant a decouvert...quoi? un vide 
solide qui ne cessait de me perpetuer?” He could be said, therefore, to have found 
himself in himself but why does he consider this grimly described experience to 
be so true?45 The inertia of the “vide solide” attempts to describe the impact of
45 This anguish is different from the Sartrian identification o f the other as a hole in the world. If in 
Sartre the other as a hollow limits my empire, in this Genetian example it is the self which is the 
lacunae, a solid lacunae, not so different from the above sepulchral description. Levinas insists on 
the ethical significance for the subject o f the unknowability o f the other, but doubts that dialectical 
momentum can be achieved from a starting point o f nothingness: “Sartre di[sait] d'une fagon
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anger and fear on the subject (“coleres”, “trouilles”). Perhaps these moments 
could be considered as true for the reason that they create a total will to escape: 
they involve crises which may be experienced at the same time as others, but from 
which the ego re-emerges alone in self-perpetuation. This self-perpetuation may, 
however, contain a trace of the other, glimpsed in crisis, as even though the self 
persists, it has been given an insight into its own imperfection. (Tel, p.56, Telb., 
p.82) The self may not necessarily forget the other it is unable to absorb, as this 
other represents something new in the idea of perfection or infinity, which on 
further reckoning “n’est pas idee, mais desir.” (Ibid., Ibidb; TaS, p.260) Levinas, 
for his part, argues that suffering may provoke an outrageous feeling of hope that 
things might one day be Different, rather than the Same. (DEE, p. 158) It can 
occasion an awakening from the conditions of normality and self-recognition that 
we might previously have considered to be perfectly natural. In order to examine 
this idea further, we must reflect on the subject’s experience of itself in the 
context of existence generally.
Both Genet and Levinas develop a similar conceptual vocabulary for 
treating self-perpetuation and its alternatives, and we shall compare them in the 
next section. In Levinas it is only the selfish subject able to enjoy itself in 
isolation that can be ethical, as following enjoyment, the relationship to being 
asserts itself once again, as Levinas argues in the section of Totalite et infini 4 La 
joie et ses lendemains’. (Tel, pp.l 16-18, Telb, pp.152-54) If suffering may open 
into hope, and ‘joy’ into renewed dependency, then the ligature to the self can 
neither be permanently fixed nor undone. In Genet’s account of the continuation 
of the self after trauma on the occasion of his return to prison in Notre-Dame-des- 
fleurs, and his experiences of coleres tres saintes and trouilles benies, the other is 
noticed both in hope and in dismay, solitude and society. The Genet narrator goes 
unendingly under the heading of an Ego, with a separate self providing a running
remarquable, mais en arretant l'analyse trop tot, qu'Autrui est un pur trou dans le monde”; instead 
Levinas emphasizes that “II [Autrui] procede de l'absolument Absent.” (DHH, p.276) Closer to the 
“vide solide” description is Levinas’s oblique return to the hole image in his book on Blanchot, 
describing the il y  a as an obstructed route to nothingness, “le trou du neant -  autrefois l’unique 
sortie -  est bouche par l’etre noue en nceud sans denouement”. (SMB, p.63)
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commentary, sometimes tenderly, but most often as a depraved but hypersensitive 
side-kick.46 This impossibility for the self to escape the role allotted by the Ego, 
with whom it has to share fair weather and foul, has been described by Levinas as 
the “encombrement du Moi par le Soi-meme” {TA, p. 13), or “l’enchamement d’un 
moi a son soi” {DEE, p. 143). This state is one of simultaneous enchainment to 
being, and to the self; an engagement with existence in which the pain (or 
scandal) of being for the subject -  d ’etre -  becomes the pain of being in general -  
de I ’etre. (p. 134, 147) Levinas describes a state similar, therefore, to Genet’s 
“vide solide”: in each case, the etant has become etre, freezing all initiative in a 
kind of passivity.
Something has also gone awry with the dramatic nature of the instant. This 
is revealed with regard to the passage between existants and existence. As Levinas 
explains in the preface to the second edition of De I ’existence a I ’existant, it is not 
a case of prioritising the “« existant», dans Vetant humain” over being, 
‘existence’ or ‘etre’, which would merely be to inverse the ontological difference 
in Heidegger (p. 12); instead he looks at their crossover through economic life and 
later, in Totalite et infini, the dwelling. Whereas usually one expects existants to 
convert existence from a state into a verb, albeit in the sweat of their brow, here, 
however, being is not being mastered in work (p. 16), or sheltered from in the 
demeure, the store for economic life. Levinas comments in the section ‘La 
Demeure’ from Totalite et infini, that the task of contemplation for the planning of 
further work, already takes place in a separation which prefigures the demeure 
and also contains a dialectical relationship between being as a verb and being as a 
state: “La contemplation avec sa pretention de constituer, apres coup, la demeure 
elle-meme, atteste certes la separation ou, mieux encore, est un moment 
indispensable de sa production.” {Tel, pp. 126-27, Telb, pp.163-64)47 In fact here,
46 This division in the subject is displayed in Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground in which 
the hero senses he is probably despicable and in writing his story, does not justify himself, but 
instead takes a kind of pleasure in making the fact undeniable. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the 
Underground, trans. Jane Kentish, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Similarly, the Genet 
narrator in the novels becomes the criminal he is considered to be.
47 Paul Valery produces a similar description in L ’Homme et la coquille, in which the snail 
produces its shell from calcite crystals absorbed then secreted from its environment: “1’etre
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the existants seem to be occupied by existence, rather than them maintaining a 
dwelling within it. Genet and Levinas each manage to locate the breakdown of 
temporal experience itself, and manage to infuse this with a dramatic form, even 
to the point where it ceases to function dialectically, the point at which it ceases to 
be an event. The lack of differentiation of etre and etant will require us to 
examine more closely the nature of the instant as lived by the subject in 
‘commencement’, the Levinasian term for the existant’s positing of itself in 
relation to being.
The possible continuation of time for the etant is in communication with 
an exterior, which offers relief from itself through non-identity. {DEE, p. 160) This 
can only work with the other as other, because as soon as the other is absorbed 
into the subject, he becomes etre once more, the state fled from in the first place. 
The manner in which being is mastered is therefore of the utmost importance. For 
the il to grasp its est, it has to pursue reward by overcoming resistance. But the 
resistance and reward yielded from the elements or nature through labour are not 
the same as the resistance and reward offered by another person. The desirability 
of a person is offset by the possibility that they may resist, refuse to reciprocate, 
or betray, traits common in the Genet universe; or never even be conscious of the 
efforts exerted for their benefit . Nonetheless, however uncertain this live 
negotiation may be, it is still preferable to totality whose unitary state of 
applicability cannot relieve the individual’s bond and bondage within their own 
being.
inarticule, dont 1’oeuvre peu a peu se distingue de la chair, et se detache progressivement de l’etat 
vivant”. This is a work in which it can choose to live as a demeure or to adorn itself as “une tiare 
ou un turban prodigieux”. L ’Homme et la coquille (Paris: Gallimard, 1937), p. 16 and 80. Levinas’s 
admiration for this essay can be made out in the description o f the ego as formative o f the dwelling 
which bridges the exterior and interior: “Le moi est la contraction meme du sentiment, le pole 
d’une spirale dont la jouissance dessine Tenroulement et 1’involution: le foyer de la courbe fait 
partie de la courbe.” {Tel, p.91, Telb, p. 123)
48 See in The Brothers, Dmitry arrives at the dwelling of the peasant, Lyagavy, with whom he has 
some business, but the man is too drunk to talk sense. Dmitry determines to await the following 
morning before opening negotiations, but wakes up in the night to save them all from carbon 
monoxide poisoning; upon finally waking, Dmitry finds that the peasant is once again too drunk to 
talk. {BK, pp.441-46)
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This is not the result of a reckoning whereby such negotiation is the only 
way to prevent one’s own fate as an individual from being ignored in favour of 
the well-Being of the whole; this would amount merely to a “do unto others” kind 
of moral attitude. The difference is in the way the instant itself opens up the 
subject directly, rather than passing through a reasoned account as to whether we 
are or are not connected as people. In other words, a moral attitude is consciously 
argued and is applied from the exterior, whereas the opening of an interiority to 
the other as an exteriority is a preconscious, spontaneous, an-archic ethical 
experience. It is, paradoxically, an approach of the exteriority from within the 
subject. This, for Levinas, is the difference between morality and ethics.49
Even if the other is detected then rejected, an ethical experience remains 
intact which may, nevertheless, constitute a bondage through the other, in the 
other’s bondage to being. This may create a common experience, reminding the 
subject of his or her own linkedness to being. Thus, for Levinas, fear or anguish is 
an exception to the Heiddegerian Befindlichkeit, translatable as ‘feeling’ or 
‘mood’, but with its own specialised philosophical meaning, according to which 
the reflexivity of verbs expressing emotion (‘s’effrayer’, ‘se facher’, 
‘s’emouvoir’) signifies both being moved by something, and a being moved for 
the self. This strengthens the active reflexive sense of such verbs, as they apply to 
the self in the menace of being-towards-death; that is to say in a double 
intentionality, both moved by an affect and for  their own finitude. In the 
Levinasian conception of anguish, it is possible for feeling to be provoked by 
some cause, but fo r  the other in a “double « intentionnalite »” that does not return 
to the self; in which “La crainte pour l’autre homme ne retoume pas a l’angoisse 
pour ma mort”. (DVI, p.263; see also E e f p. 118) This should make Levinas 
sympathetic to Genet’s trouille and probably also his colere, as long as they are 
aroused pre-reflexively by the other’s predicament and not through self- 
indulgence. But can I truly experience fear which, while being my fear, is not for
49 Cocteau makes a parallel distinction, when he refers to Genet as a moral writer, but not as a 
moralist, since moralisation comes from the exterior. Jean Cocteau, La Dijficulte d ’etre, (Paris: 
Editions du Rocher Le Livre de Poche, 1989), p.177. Also quoted in StG, p.617.
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me? How intolerable does the subject find this fundamental relationship to the 
other which, we have now established, springs from the interior? Need it really 
raise the blood pressure?
In a mental experiment in Le temps et I 'autre, Levinas proposes a world in 
which there are no people, nor any links between things, only a generalised 
relationship to being, “ni sujet, ni su b s ta n tif (TA, p.26) This means the conatus 
essendi no longer has purchase, and cannot grasp being through activity.50 It is as 
though the exterior were no longer exterior at all, but had become symmetrically 
spaced with the self, turning them into a single substance with their environment. 
This suggests a despair in being, which would then seek release, and an end to 
despair in a time without suffering. It is a great mystery that such a hope should 
arrive in the moment of despair itself, not as a future promise of pleasure, but as a 
possible redemption of the moment of pain, of the scandal of being. Levinas 
explains that, “Toute Tacuite de Lespoir dans le desespoir tient a T exigence du 
rachat de l’instant meme du desespoir/’ {DEE, p.158)51 The expectancy of another 
instant in its alterity cannot be found or dialectically produced within the self: this 
would be as impossible as coming to one’s own rescue. The spur of hope in 
despair, Levinas tells us, is to be found in the ultimate desirability of the Other:
Etre dans le monde, c’est precisement s’arracher aux demieres 
implications de Tinstinct d’exister, a tous les abimes du moi qui jamais ne 
se depouillera de ses masques et dont toutes les positions seront des poses,
50 Similar to the section ‘Existence sans existant’ in De I ’existence a 1’existant. (DEE, pp.94-95) 
Especially: “La disparition de toute chose et la disparition du moi, ramenent a ce qui ne peut 
disparaitre, au fait meme de l ’etre auquel on participe, bon gre mal gre, sans en avoir pris
1’initiative, anonymement.” (p.95)
51 See Genet’s total concentration and single-minded resourcefulness in addressing the death of 
Jean Decamin: “Tel etait mon chagrin de savoir Jean depuis quatre jours dans une tombe etroite, 
dans un cercueil de bois blanc, son corps deja defait, que je fus sur le point de demander a un 
savant, mais tres serieusement:
- Etes-vous sur qu’on ne puisse plus le ressusciter?
La folie de cette question ne m’apparait meme pas aujourd’hui, car ce n’est pas ma raison qui 
la pose, mais mon amour. N ’ayant pas de savant sous la main, c’est moi-meme que j ’interrogeai. 
J’attendis la reponse en fremissant d’espoir. L’espoir, en effet faisait fremir tout, autour de moi et 
en moi. J’attendais une invention que Tespoir seul pouvait trouver.” (PF, p.60)
56
a qui la confession est impossible, pour aller sincerement au desirable et 
pour le prendre pour lui-meme. (p.68)
Instead of tearing off (‘arrachant’) the ‘masks of the ego’, one is instead disturbed 
in the slough52 (‘egarement’) of the self by the call of the other. Being in the 
world requires some accountability from the subject. It is this that Genet finds so 
appalling in the episode on the train; that the unpleasant individual should appear 
to him as an equal or superior (CQR, p.27); that is to say, as an asymmetrical vous 
form, not the tu of a meeting between equals. Feeling in some way answerable, he 
experiences first despair.53 The alternative placed before him is formulated by 
Visker as
the choice between an egocentrism that is no longer involuntary, and a 
giving up of that position in favour of that other centre which is precisely 
the Other qua Other. (TaS, p.257)
Genet then feels the promise of something else, in a kind of redemption of his 
initial pain through “le rayon -  le premier -  qui allait de Tceil d’un jeune homme 
au mien”. (CQR, p.27) Genet gives credit for this event to the artist of the essay’s 
title: this is what has remained of Rembrandt, an indebtedness through the alterity 
of the Other. There is next an intriguing use of the notion of ‘denunciation’: 
“Rembrandt le premier me denon9a.” (p.29) It is no longer used in its usual 
Genetian sense as delation, or ‘trahison d’amitie’, in the way that it figures in the 
above passage about Genet’s arrival in prison, but in the sense of being forced to 
stand responsible. This is a responsibility whose demands are ever young and 
serve to transform the initial descriptions, in both the Atelier and ‘Rembrandt 
dechire’, of a ‘miserable little old man’ into the beam from a young man’s eye. 
(p.29)
52 Here the semantics o f the ‘Slough o f Despond’ section to The Pilgrim ’s Progress seem to 
combine with the sloughing o f a skin in the will to escape confused subjectivity. John Bunyan, The 
Pilgrim ’s Progress, ed. W.R.Owens, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
53 “[...] la tristesse qui s’etait abattu en moi”. (Ibid.)
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This would appear to be at one with the Levinasian idea of a pre- 
contractual guilt and indebtedness before the Other (Autrui), as though to be 
forgiven for being, one had to answer to the other with whom one is confronted. 
This makes the other’s position of weakness one of commandment. It is important 
to remember, at the same time, that the other commands, but does not compel, and 
the debt is a general one to all others and not just to the particular individual en 
face. So, the fact that the other can forgive my being does not mean that he will, 
or that it would be reasonable for me to satisfy his conditions. As Didier Franck 
points out, this relatedness to the Other does not stop the subject from remaining 
temporal, and life from going on.54 This inability to act from the vantage point of 
any subject but one’s own shows at the same time that the temporality of the 
subject is traversed by the diachronic time between subjects. This means that 
people have a generalised stake in the time of the Other, even if a particular other 
does not notice or appreciate this. When Genet reduces existence to the truths of 
reproduction of the self and responsibility for the other, he gives emphasis to the 
continuity of time for the separated subject, both with and without the other. He 
does this in his “engraissement” (DVI, p.58) (that is, his self-perpetuation), while 
at the same time “tenu en eveil par un autre” (p.59): this second outcome 
describes the possibility of an obverse moral adventure in which the subject is 
rerouted through the other, and wrenched from the Same.
Rather than insisting on any truth value in these experiences themselves, 
later in the passage Genet changes tack and declares that everything else, 
including fear and anger, might have been false -  that the whole of reality outside 
these moments might have been an optical illusion: “Le reste tout le reste me 
paraissait l’effet d’une erreur d’optique provoquee par mon apparence elle-meme 
necessairement truquee”. (CQR, p.29) So if his own appearance is rigged, then 
after tearing off the masks of the Ego to find the “vide solide”, the only 
dependable reality left is The ray from the other’s eye’. This is not only to enter 
into contact with a pre-existing Other, but also to be constituted through the
54 Didier Franck, Le drame des phenomenes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001),
p.101.
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reality of this other. To return to Bakhtin’s expression, this is “life on the 
threshold”, and is an address prior to the transfer of any content. A rerouting also 
takes place in time: “je m’ecoulais de mon corps [...]. Ou plutot: je  m ’etais ecoule, 
car le regard fut si bref que je ne peux me le rappeler qu’avec l’aide de ce temps 
verbal.” (p.22, 23) Genet does not know at what moment in an unremembered 
past he acquired this other, but it is an accomplished action, in the pluperfect. The 
present he comes to share with this man depends on a common past, and he finds 
that the desirability of the world can be accessed even through this undesirable 
other. This concurs closely with Levinas’s thought in ‘Dieu et la philosophic’ in 
which the mark of freedom and ethical desire is being able to hear ethical 
commandment from the non-desirable. (DVI, p.l 13)
Before moving on to the textual relationship Genet has with Dostoevsky, I 
will discuss another of Genet’s rather condensed verbal tricks for enunciating this 
newly found rapport between self and other. It concerns separation, without the 
possibility of common measure, as a condition of desire and intimacy. He writes:
Si chaque enveloppe, precieusement, recele une meme identite, chaque 
enveloppe est singuliere et reussit a etablir entre chacun de nous une 
opposition qui nous parait irremediable, a creer une innombrable variete 
d’individus qui se veulent: l’un-1’autre. (CQR, p.28)
Is singularity, then, a prerequisite for association, bom out of separation, allowing 
attraction; or is it instead the origin of competition and war? Characteristically, 
Genet does not clarify. On a first reading we might understand “vouloir” to be a 
reciprocal verb, giving with only a tiny alteration ‘individus qui se veulent Tun 
T autre’ in mutual desire. But then strange use is made of a colon and hyphen, 
giving instead “individus qui se veulent: I ’un-l’autre” (my emphasis) in limitless 
competition, as one and other. This textual twist need not express mutual desire in 
an activity with the other as direct object, but a sum of individuals, all of whom 
want to attain the state of “Pun-Tautre”; that is, of the one containing the other. 
This could be someone who first recognises the other in their singularity, but then
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becomes tempted by solipsism, in spite of the initial outreach. Franck’s assertion 
that the ‘I’ in isolation remains a temporal creature, whether or not it recognises 
the other, is therefore bom out by Genet in this hinging of the ‘Tun-1’ autre” 
between solipsism and mutual desire. Further along in the passage, however, 
Genet returns to the implications of the look, which contained “la certitude 
aussitot que l’un l’autre n’etait qu’un, a la fois ou moi ou lui, et moi et lui.” {Ibid.) 
This newfound association and incarnation serves to “ten[ir] en eveil” {DVI, p.59), 
drawing the subject’s attention away from its self and to the Other, moving from 
separation into the One, not of the Ego or of the Same, but the One of a possible 
shared ethical space. This One is, in a strange way, plural, and corresponds to the 
unspecified individuality of Autrui in Levinas.55 The interconnectedness of the 
self and all others has at this point become a certainty for Genet.
The reciprocal nature of desire, however, is entirely dependent on the 
individual. As Genet explains, “Je n’etais pas tres sur qu’un autre homme eut pu 
se sentir s’ecouler, par son regard, dans le corps d’un autre, ni que la signification 
pour lui de cette sensation eut ete celle que je donnais ici.” It transpires that in 
Genet’s recounting of the episode in the train, he reformulates some words 
recounted by the Elder Zossima’s dying brother in The Brothers Karamazov. The 
similarity is striking. In Dostoevsky we have: “every one of us is responsible for 
everyone else in every way and I most of all” (BK, p.339); which becomes, in 
Genet, the realisation “que tout homme est tout autre homme et moi comme tous 
les autres.” (CQR, pp.30-31) Like Genet, Levinas also uses this quotation to 
express the assymmetry of subjectivity, and it is evoked numerous times 
throughout his oeuvre.56
In Genet’s first recounting of the train incident in L ’Atelier d ’Alberto 
Giacometti, a slightly fainter echo of the Zossima quotation can be heard, which 
serves to underline again the far-reaching effects of this realisation, and of the
55 The idea o f the One o f the shared impact o f the subject on the world as an undiscovered 
community is reminiscent of Plotinus, as cited by Levinas in the ‘La trace de l’Autre’, DHH,
p.281.
“[N]ous sommes tous coupables de tout et de tous, et moi plus que tous les autres”,
EN, p. 115; See also AQE, p. 186, AQEb, p.228; DVI, p. 119, pp. 134-35 to mention but a few.
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douleureux sentiment que n’importe quel homme en ‘valait’ exactement 
[...] n’importe quel autre. {AT, p.51)
Although this seems to bespeak more of a symmetrical relation between the two 
passengers when set next to the previous formulation, Genet proceeds to elaborate 
further on his loss of mastery, and explains that he does not work from simple 
choice:
Ne nous meprenons pas [...] il ne s'agissait pas d’une bonte venant de moi, 
mais d’une reconnaissance. {Ibid.)
The reconnaissance of enchainment to the other is involuntary and therefore 
certainly not a disposition towards ‘generosity’ in the sense of a self-proclaimed 
benevolence. This position of responsibility is also argued for by Levinas in 
‘Humanisme et an-archie’. There, the approach of the other does not trigger an 
inbuilt philanthropy, nor a perspective-less holy inclination, nor is it initially even 
an undertaking of will. It is instead an ethical footing elsewhere than in the terra 
firma of being. In this way Levinas speaks of exteriority creating a “lien 
anarchique entre le sujet et le Bien [...], lien anarchique sans que le sujet ait ete 
volonte, il n’est pas la constitution de « l’instinct divin » de la responsabilite 
d’ « une nature altruiste et genereuse », d’une « bonte naturelle ».” {HdH, p.88) 
Neither writer could savour their bonte, since this would make it attainable within 
the subject, rather than being an inspiration ducted through the other in their 
unknowability. The link to the Bien, because it is anarchic, is founded on the 
responsibility and response of the subject alone, and is not a state of repose in a 
mutual relationship with a targeted other, any more than sainthood can be a state. 
The realisation of the other as a possible source of Good has nevertheless been 
made, as though displacing the subject; and for this reason Genet moves from his 
realisation to depression, and, at last, as though ineluctably, to the awareness that 
his discovery would “contraindre a de serieux changements”. {CQR, p.26)
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We therefore surmise that it is only from the ego and the rending open of 
the ego that it is possible to reach the exterior. Genet’s egology therefore wrestles 
with the first principles of the move towards the other. Its links to the Dostoevsky 
text in their turn aid interpretation as it transpires that both Genet and Levinas are 
describing the operations of a painful ethical process of encounter with the other, 
which may, nevertheless, yield a joy beyond pleasure. Interpersonal encounters in 
Genet may therefore, I would argue, be elaborated discursively. Dostoevsky’s 
exposition of the relationship of the subject to itself is not only extended by Genet 
and Levinas in a conceptual continuation, but is followed by them in its 
repercussions in different kinds of discourse, both literary and philosophical. 
These efforts then lead through Dostoevsky’s description of universal 
responsibility to reworkings of intersubjective asymmetry. The asymmetry of 
responsibility, which so devastates Genet, may have peculiar effects on the 
subject whereby the incredible weight of being accountable to all leads to a 
concealed rejection of the other. The other is not immediately recognisable in his 
desirability, and may even be highly undesirable, especially to the “inexperienced 
in love” as Alyosha says in The Brothers, quoting Zossima to Ivan. (BK, p.276) It 
may cause the exclusion or elimination of people from the individual’s staging of 
their field of experience. The claim, whether voiced or not, that one is interceding 
for a third party, as we shall see, is at the same time a primary way of justifying 
volition on behalf of the self alone, and a necessary part of life in a plural world. 
Levinas is quite aware of the difficulty this poses to infinite responsibility, and 
addresses it using his notion of ‘the Third’:
Le moi peut etre appele, au nom de cette responsabilite illimitee, a se 
soucier de soi. Le fait que l'autre, mon prochain, est aussi tiers par 
rapport a un autre, prochain lui aussi, est la naissance de la pensee, de la 
conscience et de la justice et de la philosophic. (AQE, p.165, AQEb, 
p.204)
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Between the different others {autres) with which one is faced, and the Other 
(iautrui), who cannot be avoided, there is the relation to the non-present Third, 
who obliges the individual to negotiate between different others. This allows the 
individual to plot a course which, while it does not exclude the possibility of 
illusory routes to the Other, does discourage their proliferation, as the Third 
supplements and alters the imperative of the address of individual others. We shall 
also discuss in the next section of this chapter the confusions Rashkalnikov 
experiences in trying to reach out: he starts off with the intention of helping 
others, but in the interference between his will, particular others, and the Third, 
finishes by committing murder.
3. Egology and substitution
Genet makes much of false routes to transcendence, and the dual impulse of 
Desire and its refusal on the approach of the other. ‘Rembrandt dechire’ and 
L ’Atelier d ’Alberto Giacometti are powerful reviews of his method. In fact, Genet 
and Dostoevsky spend most of their poetic energy describing the perpetuation of 
the self, with only chinks of redemption, or most often aborted routes to 
transcendence. It is a marvel to observe the unstable universes they manage to 
hold together, and interesting to note the similarly chaotic treatment they reserve
en
for their characters. Rashkalnikov bounces from suffering through confession to 
defiance, without reaching full penitence or potential for regrowth until perhaps 
the coda of the novel. The way had long since ceased to be clear to him. 
Rashkalnikov feels desperately responsible for his family and their predicament,
57 Catteau, quoted by Rolland, remarks on the author’s relationship to the universe o f his novels: 
“Dostoievski y apparait comme l’ordonnateur supreme des gestes et le maitre des vies. II y 
organise les tourments pour saisir la souffrance dans les regards, extorque l’aveu avec une 
cruaute plus grande que dans le roman, tranche les vies et ressuscite les morts avec une 
desinvolture de despote.” (QDL, p. 142) Sartre also comments on Genet not dissimilarly: “II joue 
sur un clavier dont il n’entend pas le son mais il sait qu’on entend la-bas dans la chambre voisine 
(StG, p.607)
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as they are financially destitute and his sister is about to marry the unpleasant 
lawyer, Luzhin, to help secure the completion of his studies and future 
employment. It is ostensibly for this reason that he plans the murder and robbery. 
As Rolland remarks, two episodes of utter passivity are described one after the 
other in the lead-up to the murder: the meeting with the raped girl, whom he 
protects, followed by the recounting of the childhood episode in which he saw a 
horse beaten to death by drunken peasants. It is at this point that his plan is all but 
abandoned, as he encounters other others than his family. On his return to himself 
he comments:
Good God! Is it possible? [...] No, I couldn’t do it! I just couldn’t do it!
Even if there were no mistake whatever in all my calculations, even if
anything I had decided during the last month were as clear as day and as
true as arithmetic. (CP, pp.78-79)58
This review of the operations of his own thoughts is of particular interest in the 
context of multi-voiced criticism, as well as for phenomenology. For the hero, 
strange new thoughts had begun to follow the patterns of everyday reasoning, 
without setting off alarm bells. The comparison with arithmetic is of particular 
interest in the context of phenomenology, initially conceived by Husserl as a 
method for better describing the event of logical operations in mathematics. 
Husserl’s worry, like Rashkalnikov’s, was that logical operations may 
unknowingly allow erroneous meanings to be applied to terms, whilst not 
disturbing their surface impression of logicality: that is to say that even in exact 
sciences one cannot rule out the emission of a whole halo of supplementary 
meaning of which one is not in control.59 The real danger with what we shall term 
“false transcendence” is that, deriving its meaning from the reduction of
58 For the meaningful succession o f scenes see Rolland, QDL, p.99.
59 In ‘De la connaissance a la veille’, Levinas quotes Husserl, “En vertu d’une equivoque qui passe 
inapergue, d’autres concepts peuvent se glisser apres coup sous ces mots, et, pour les significations 
professionnelles qui ont ete modifiees, on peut faire appel a tort a 1’evidence experimentee 
anterieurement.” {DVI, p.40)
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neighbouring phenomena, it functions as though it were ‘more objective than 
objectivity’, and therefore authentically a ‘transcendental movement’60. So, for 
example, Ivan who is subconsciously implicated in his father’s murder does not 
engage knowingly in dissimulation when he feels “reassured” at the apparent 
proof of Dmitry’s guilt, which “assume[s] in his eyes the nature of a mathematical 
certainty.” (BK, p.727) It is significant that in Crime and Punishment, exposure to 
others’ suffering has transcendentally called the student away from obsession with 
his plan. But then in the very next scene, Rashkalnikov overhears a Lieutenant 
and a student discussing the same murder, albeit from a purely abstract point of 
view, during their game of billiards. For them the rightness of the murder has no 
rigorous truth value and they leave it at that: “if you’re not prepared to do it 
yourself, it’s not a question of justice at all. Come on, let’s have another game.” 
(CP, p.85; QDL, p.27-28) Their eavesdropper, however, cannot escape the logic 
of his idea; the fact that another on his horizon has brought him into proximity 
with a desire, even in the ultimate form of dissuasion, confirms that the exegeses 
of intentionality are also intimately connected to volition. He knows that 
objectively the murder is wrong, but to him the earlier readings derived from his 
subjectivity, which wants to murder, are more objective than any objectivity. 
Therefore, Rashkalnikov not only repents, thinking better of the murder, but then 
repents of this repentance. This intentionality is not used in the intellectual sense it 
holds for Husserl, “non point au sens neutralise et desincame [...] mais dans son 
sens courant avec l’aiguillon du desir qui l’anime”, to use Levinas’s formulation. 
{DEE, p.56) After the murder, Rashkalnikov defends the logicality of his plan to 
Porfiry. It is interesting to note that genuine and sociable resourcefulness of mind 
and an eager will to explain have been brought to bear on psychopathic 
tendencies.
In his article, Rashkalnikov has latched onto a great universalising abstract 
idea of what the extraordinary man may be allowed. He even suggests that 
Newton would have had the right to kill if  someone had stood in the way of his
60 “Comme si l’evenement ontologique fondamental, deja perdu dans l’objet saisi ou reflete, etait 
plus objectif que l’objectivite, un mouvement transcendental.” (DHH , p. 176)
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theories. If we manage to reach behind the apparent lucidity of our subject, the 
choice of Newton is of particular interest because the association of his laws with 
truth constitutes a universal. However, Rashkalnikov misuses this association to 
spearhead his desire. That Newton would have a “duty” to murder in order to 
prove the laws of gravitation and movement, to which everyone is subject in any 
case, is to subject human happiness to a hypothetical scientific opportunity for the 
pursuit of knowledge.61 His argument becomes completely circular, however, at 
the point at which a given scientific investigation takes the sacrifice of the other as 
its object, rather than as a possible sanction for its successful completion. 
Rashkalnikov wants to know whether murder is possible without an outcry of 
internal ethical law, and through this transgression to find out whether he is 
sovereign. It is a test of the total independence of the self against a theory from 
which no-one is independent. The implications of his plan have a pretension to 
seek the other, but succumb instead to an in-tum of the self into the self.
His parallel and simultaneous wish to murder and to help the needy meets 
its full dereliction in Sonia. She has “stepped over” (CP, p.344) into sin by 
becoming a prostitute, against the inclination of her pure heart, not as an 
experiment, but purely out of need. Because she is still unable to earn enough to 
support her family, this creates a downward spiral of self-destruction. Sonia’s ruin 
luminously signals Rashkalnikov’s own, as his step was taken deliberately. Where 
she is in need out of simple need, his need is the result of a number of deliberate 
decisions. This realisation has a devastating effect on him.62 He finally recognises
61 “I simply hinted that the ‘extraordinary’ man has a right -  not an officially sanctioned right, o f  
course — to permit his conscience to step over certain obstacles, but only if  it is absolutely 
necessary for the fulfilment o f his idea on which quite possibly the welfare o f all mankind may 
depend. [...] In my opinion, if  for some reason or another the discoveries o f the Keplers and 
Newtons could not be made known to people except by sacrificing the lives o f  one, or a dozen, or 
a hundred, or even more men who made discoveries impossible or in any way prevented them 
from being made, then Newton would have had the right, and indeed would have been duty bound, 
to — to eliminate the dozen or the hundred people so as to make his discoveries known to all 
mankind. That, however, does not at all mean that Newton would have had the right to murder 
anyone he liked indiscriminately or steal everyday in the street market.” (CP, p.276)
62 The manner in which Rashkalnikov at first taunts Sonia leads Rolland to speculate that he is 
preparing himself mentally for another murder. (QDL, p. 100)
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in the confession scene that “no doubt [he] did wrong” (p.429), and later becomes 
more effusive:
It was because I knew perfectly well I was not a Napoleon. [...] I wanted to 
murder, Sonia, to murder without casuistry, to murder for my own 
satisfaction, for myself alone. I didn’t want to lie about it. I did not commit 
this murder to become the benefactor of humanity by gaining wealth and 
power -  that, too, is nonsense. I just did it; I did it for myself alone [...] 
(p.432, my emphasis)
His aim therefore seems to have been to murder the claims of the other upon 
himself, and the other in himself, for himself alone. His embrace of the “vide 
solide” feels to him like suicide, and yet one suspects that here too self­
denunciation may be a way of trying to distract himself from the recurrence of the 
self that condemns his act, “Was it the old hag I killed? No, I killed myself, and 
not the old hag. I did away with myself at one blow and for good.” (p.433) 
Nevertheless, his instinct towards life proves strong, but even after his sentencing, 
and indeed upon reaching prison in Siberia, he reverts for a matter of (perhaps) 
years to justifying the murder, and earns the enmity of his fellow prisoners to 
such an extent that he is almost murdered in his turn, (p.554) Both Rashkalnikov 
and Genet’s narrator-character, in contradistinction to the author himself, retain 
the hope of persuading the other of the finesse of their plan and of their ultimate 
autonomy. Any transcendence found in these novels has been prepared by the 
author to be discovered at the moment when the reader moves beyond a 
homophonic manner of reading, exceeding the individual characters, contexts and 
texts as they unfurl.
In spite of the marked resistance of Dostoevsky to expressing redemption 
as an achieved object, only allowing it to exert its pull from beyond the borders of
63 In The House o f  the Dead it is considered “not done” between prisoners to exchange crime 
stories. (HofD, p.31)
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his texts, there is an important difference between himself and Genet. In 
Dostoevsky’s major novels, it is the heroes who fluctuate between community and 
their inadaptability to community. In Genet, it is the author-narrator himself who 
enters the community of the book with a fully developed poetic language, 
nourished by the canon and a history of belles lettres, only then to imply he does 
not belong there.64 Bakhtin calls this kind of hero in Dostoevsky a “declasse 
member of the intelligentsia”. (PD, p.22) This would not quite be an accurate 
description of Genet’s narrator-character, who is a more dedicated vagabond 
wielding a more fragmentary language. On the other hand, he does present 
himself as a marginal member of an “accidental tribe” {Ibid.) through his 
descriptions of failed communities of forced association, starting with prison. The 
effects of polyphony in both cases are comparable. Genet comments of 
Dostoevsky’s major novels that the only one to have a comic structure is The 
Brothers Karamazov, in its singularly unpredictable, even bipolar, universe, in 
which an intention may produce the most unexpected effects, and one 
interpretation be as valid as its opposite. {ED, p.214) This comedy is also the 
pinnacle of dialogism for Bakhtin, as the outcome for any of the three brothers 
remains undecided.65
An objection that might be made to Genet is that his novels seem to be 
little more than internally dialogised throughout, and may be viewed as limited to 
the author’s conceit not only in their endings, but in their entirety. However, we 
are dealing neither with dialogised monologue nor poetic ambiguity, but a 
dialogic language evolving between different characters, traces and marks 
disseminated throughout literature and the diverse world it represents. As Bernard 
Sichere points out, Sartre does not grasp Genet’s use of language in its full 
complexity when he describes the irrealisation of the novel corpus -  “[1]’Opera
64 “Mon talent sera l'amour que je porte a ce qui compose le monde des prisons et des bagnes. [...] 
[J]e reconnais aux voleurs, aux traitres, aux assassins, aux mechants, aux fourbes une beaute 
profonde -  une beaute en creux -  que je vous refuse.” (JV, p. 117)
65 For Bakhtin, The Brothers Karamazov contains the only fully dialogic ending o f all his novels. 
{PD, p.40)
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fabuleux” -  as having masturbation for its outcome. (StG, pp.409-10)66 The game 
Genet plays with the reader can be reduced neither to fantasy nor to the crude 
identification with any of his characters, which is sometimes attempted and about 
which Sichere warns us. He quotes the following comment from Sartre, “Divine, 
c’est-a-dire Genet.” {StG, p.328)67 There may be a moribund aspect to each of 
them but they are separated from one another, and remain out of kilter. The self- 
destruction Sonia chooses is tracked by an author for whom the finding of himself 
in himself is ceasing to distract, and is beginning to force reflections upon, if  not 
relations with, the exterior. This does not mean that the reflection upon the 
exterior cannot return to self-admiration, such as when, echoing Sonia from Crime 
and Punishment, Madame from Les Bonnes promises to follow her jailed husband 
to Siberia. (GOC5, p. 160) Nonetheless, the veiled relationships we have seen to 
other texts in ‘Rembrandt dechire’ lead one to realise that Genet’s working 
hypothesis on self-sufficiency is as double-accented as those of Rashkalnikov and 
Ivan Karamazov, characters with whom Genet opens discrete dialogues.
This does not of course mean that idea-characters recognise one another 
head on, nor that they fulfil the same function in their source texts as in Genet’s. 
Indeed, they may have inverse attitudes and intents, and only brush past one 
another on the passerelle, or hidden passage between works, and so signify only 
as trace. The effect is, borrowing again from Levinas’s essay ‘Le Dialogue’, the 
opening of a passage “la ou il n’y a plus de passage”. {DVI, p.223) We shall give a 
fairly literal example before looking at the more ambiguous, symbolic variations 
in which, as Sichere puts it, “tout peut devenir autre et signifier autrement.”68
Rashkalnikov has been told by Sonia, “Go to the cross-roads, bow down to 
the people, kiss the earth, for you have sinned against it, and proclaim in a loud 
voice to the whole world: I am a murderer!” We follow his thoughts as he heads 
for the crossroads:
66 Bernard Sichere, Le Dieu desphilosophes (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), p .143. Sichere refers to the 
578 pp. edition o f StG, the quotation for which is on p.341.
67 Sichere, p. 144.
68 Sichere, p. 145.
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I’m just like a child -  bragging to myself. [...] Lord, how they push! The 
fat one [...] who pushed me just now -  does he know whom he pushed?
[...]
He had a strong aversion, for being among the common people; but now 
he deliberately went where the crowd was thickest. {CP, p.536)69
The opening to Notre-Dame-des-fleurs is in direct and deliberate contrast to the 
above passage from Crime and Punishment. The criminal Weidmann, cast as a 
German aviator, crash lands in the barley fields, while his radiant newspaper 
image is spread into the furthest comers of France. Here, Rashkalnikov’s 
question, ‘does he know whom he pushed?’ is answered, and it is revealed:
aux bourgeois attristes que leur vie quotidienne est frolee d’assassins 
enchanteurs [...]. (ND, p.9)
In each passage the contact with the murderer is made unknowingly or passively 
(‘se faire froler’), but whereas one is on the point of confession and possible 
redemption, the other is moving in the opposite direction, and is surrounded by an 
aura of beauty and enchantment which may last as long as the author’s conceit. In 
each case, there is a sense of imminent moral drama invisibly taking place. In 
each case, the reader has to look outside the confines of the text in order to find 
any transcendence of the described conditions, as, at the present moment, 
Rashkalnikov is mocked and Weidmann is imprisoned, awaiting execution. The 
traces one situation leaves in the other signify without their point of contact 
needing to form a separate sign. The trace does not render present the thing that 
has passed, redeeming it, but merely signals its absence. Similar to the address 
which, as we discussed above, is the ‘spiritual event’ of language even before any 
content has been communicated, the trace creates an attentive or receptive
69 The narrator-hero of Sartre’s short story ‘Erostrate’ in Le Mur is reminiscent in different ways o f  
Rashkalnikov, including a decisive descent into the street towards its conclusion. Le Mur (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1939).
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passivity before something that has not been intended as enunciation. Such 
associations of absence and address are the province of the artist who organises 
them to be resonant with the world. In such a logic, the creative mode of ‘showing 
not telling’ may be inadequate, as that which has withdrawn will leave more 
absence than trace.
For example, in Crime and Punishment, transcendence is hinted at through 
the coda, with Rashkalnikov spontaneously reading the raising of Lazarus in 
prison. Arguing within the logic of the trace, Rolland points out that in the first 
reading of the passage in Book IV, Chapter 4, it is from a Bible given to Sonia by 
Lizaveta, Rashkolnikov’s second murder victim, that they read. (CP, pp.342-43; 
QDL, pp. 137-38) So, the resurrection of Lazarus is in an important sense a trace 
left by someone murdered. Similarly, in Genet, beyond the general need to quit 
the atmosphere of the hero-narrator, we may glimpse through its parallel texts 
other literary attempts at escape from the self. So, when at the very beginning of 
the Genet novel we are given a hint of the penitent Rashkalnikov, a transcendent 
exterior has been alluded to, even though it is counterposed with a different and 
more potent criminal context, as the murderer Weidmann is confused with the 
Blitzkreig. Thus, if the transcendent content in Crime and Punishment takes place 
in the coda, its annex, then any transcendence to be found in Notre-Dame-des- 
fleurs may also exist in different times to that of the action. The trace and the 
aesthetic have something in common in that they are out of phase with the 
reader’s own present. One of these alternative times, it would appear, is in a 
completely different book, in the coda to the Dostoevsky text.
The major Dostoevsky novels are constructed from tendencies towards 
monology set in a fabric of polyvalence. Genet’s novel, on the other hand, 
requires the reader to work even harder in pursuit of polyvalence, as the style 
derives its very power from an attack on the reader’s expectations, and its 
dominant impulse towards the nurturing and smothering of alterity, to the 
detriment of both the characters and the narrator. In fact, the failure to recognise, 
the multiplicity of tone or of parallel possibilities has led some critics of Genet to 
woefully misread the novels as expressions of tendencies to monology in
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antisocial characters, themselves set in the tendency to monology of an antisocial 
narrator, without noticing the complexity of the bursts of awareness occasioned by 
this contraction within a contraction.70 The ability to follow human relations 
behind monology, towards the irreducible polyphony that formed these relations, 
lies in the ability to explore modes of the relation to the Other Itself.
We shall now take a look at a more sophisticated dialogised monologue 
than Rashkalnikov’s in order to observe the manner in which a single statement 
may refract meaning in manifold ways between individuals. To this end, we shall 
examine the double-voiced, double-accented relationship between Ivan and 
Smerdyakov in The Brothers.
As we have observed in the dismantling of monological discourse in 
Rashkalnikov, and in the narrative voice of Genet’s novels, a single idea may 
create quite contrary meanings within the subject. We will look at Ivan with his 
“ethical and metaphysical loopholes” in his relationship to Smerdyakov, and how 
the monstrous or marvellous event takes place whereby Ivan’s “consciousness is 
seized by another’s discourse”. (PD, p.205) Bakhtin offers the following analysis:
One of the thoughts is obvious, determining the content of speech; the 
other is hidden but nevertheless determines the structuring of speech, 
casting its shadow upon it. (p.247)
70 One such example is the superb account in Pompes funebres o f the prison riot in which, upon 
regaining control, the milice are placed in authority over both the political and ordinary prisoners. 
A boy thief, Pierrot, must placate the authorities and points out prisoners o f his own age not on the 
basis o f guilt, but choosing those whom he simply dislikes. His role in the prison is compared by 
Genet to the role of the milice in France. (PF, pp. 145-48) That is to say, the criminality o f a thug 
on a prison wing containing the innocent is compared to the criminality o f the milice holding sway 
over an occupied nation. Stewart, however, does not seem to recover from his discovery that this 
episode has a historical basis in the Sante prison rebellion. Although he is careful to note that 
Genet could not have been a first hand witness, having been released a few months earlier, his not 
having passively withstood the action then assumes the proportions of the worse form o f  agency in 
the drama, by speculating that he got his information direct from the militia, and not only from the 
militia but from its leaders: “perhaps Toesca, Dubois or Buissiere himself.” (Stewart, Jean Genet: 
from Fascism to Nihilism, p.78). If this were true, then the terrible irony o f its retelling would be 
all the more far-reaching and acerbic.
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According to Bakhtin’s schema, for Rashkalnikov the “content” of his plan was to
71help his family, while the “structure” was to commit a murder. Ivan’s dynamic 
is still more complicated, as its end-point is arrived at through a form of 
accidental maieutics; one which leads to confusion and indirectly to murder 
before it approaches the truth again, in Ivan’s decision to testify at Dmitry’s trial. 
Let me quote at some length from Bakhtin’s analysis of Ivan’s speech:
First his desire for his father’s death and then his participation in the 
murder are the facts that invisibly determine his discourse [...]. To a 
considerable extent the process of Ivan’s inner life as depicted in the novel 
is the process of his recognition and affirmation, for himself and for 
others, of what he has in fact already long known. [...]
This process unfolds primarily in dialogues, and above all in dialogues 
with Smerdyakov. Smerdyakov gradually gains control over that voice of 
Ivan’s which Ivan is hiding from his own self. Smerdyakov is able to 
govern that voice precisely because Ivan’s consciousness does not look in 
that direction and does not wish to look there. [...] (PD, pp.247-48; BK, 
Book V, Chapter 7)
Ivan has been seized by Smerdyakov’s discourse because the murder was also a 
desire. Ivan leaves for Chermashnya, and although the object of discourse remains 
this destination, its significance changes from a mere journey to the green light for 
murder. As Ivan becomes delusional after his resolution to confess to the murder, 
his idea-partner shifts from Smerdyakov to the devil, who reads his responsibility 
into every act. The play of voices, therefore, “is not dependent on any opposition 
in content or plot” (PD, p.222), but merely on vari-directional words which 
become shadowed in guilt. The shift in accent within Ivan’s words begun by 
Smerdyakov, and continued by the devil, launches a hidden polemic inside the
71 William Golding’s Pincher Martin is structured around just such an example o f double thought. 
The content o f Pincher’s “Hard a-starboard for Christ’s sake!” is to save the boat, while the 
structure is to murder another officer leaning out from the port side in prayer. William Golding, 
Pincher Martin (London: Faber, 1956), p. 15.
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hero. This internally fought controversy sends Ivan into mental illness before he 
can effectively witness in the trial to his partial responsibility, which would at the 
same time almost certainly lead to Mitya’s acquittal. Smerdyakov then becomes 
immaterial to the obsessional advance of guilt, and it is in a very real sense that 
Ivan’s final idea-partner should be the Accuser himself He finds dishonourable 
intentions in confession, his only hope, and his second mind, in the form of the 
idea-partner, works to prevent it. The devil addresses him, “you had a hope that 
Smerdyakov might be convicted and sent to Siberia, and Mitya would be 
acquitted, while you would only be punished with moral condemnation”, (p.222; 
BK, Book XI, Chapter 10) Although this was not his primary consideration, Ivan’s 
disintegrating mind turns clemency into his primary motive, rather than merely a 
consideration. Ivan was already acquainted with the possibility of his father’s 
murder, but his willing it was an unenunciated, preconscious wish. So having 
learned that he provided the prompt for the event, Ivan can only see his own 
explicit conscious responsibility. The donnee and the donor of sense have merged, 
and even without practical involvement, he has become the deed’s creature. This 
results in a kind of possession by guilt: for Levinas, a “possession ou disparait la 
difference entre possedant et possede”. (HdH, p.88)
There is an early portent to the physical coming to be of vari-directional 
thought after the initial discussion with Smerdyakov over Chermashnya {BK, 
p.321), when Ivan without “of course know[ing] himself’ several times leaves his 
apartment and listens to his father’s movements below, as though assessing his 
vulnerability. It is next explained:
That ‘action’ of his he called ‘contemptible’ all his life afterwards; and 
deep inside him, in the most secret recesses of his heart, he thought of it as 
the vilest action of all his life, (p.324)
What would normally pass as an innocent piece of behaviour has here become an 
“action”, as it is the preconscious manifestation of an act of double thought. These 
considerations will be very important for our analysis of different kinds of action
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in the third chapter, though it is worth commenting now that Genet is highly 
interested in such acts of omission and their relationship to will, as when, in his 
interview with Hubert Fichte, he suggests a question to the interviewer; whether 
or not he, Genet, had ever caused anyone’s death. Immediate moral latitude 
appears, as one wants to know whether the question refers to a voluntary or 
involuntary cause of death. For Genet, this is the very crux of the argument, which 
is why he questions himself in the presence of a witness, and then refuses to 
answer, deliberately refusing the possibility of different increments of guilt. {ED, 
p. 160) It is just such a maddening mode of questioning that seizes Ivan in The 
Brothers.
If Ivan inadvertently planted the idea of murder in Smerdyakov’s mind, 
then in return Smerdyakov more than convinces a part of Ivan’s mind that it was a 
joint venture. The hidden internal polemic producing an unsuspected will to 
murder seems to witness to the extreme precarity of just behaviour. What is 
especially interesting to note here is that, while Ivan’s idea-partner gravitated 
from being Smerdyakov to being the devil, it started out as being the Elder 
Zossima, whose declaration on the subject of responsibility was examined above. 
This move from Zossima the Saintly to Satan the Accuser seems to show them 
forming part of the same ethical figure of obsession, though while one suggests 
hyperbolic responsibility, the other suggests the production of cynicism. This 
cynicism or insincerity works for the extinction of alternative existences, times 
and courses of action, and behaves as a rebellion against the Good, a struggle 
which reaches titanic proportions in Ivan. The significance of Smerdyakov, who 
separates the commandment of Zossima from the accusation of Satan, will prove 
an important dividing line in our discussion.
One reading could be very lenient on Ivan and hard on Smerdyakov, 
saying that Smerdyakov premeditated and executed the murder alone. Indeed, that 
Ivan did not consciously will the murder allows Alyosha to intervene during his 
brother’s description of his torments:
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You have accused yourself and have confessed to yourself that you are 
the murderer and no one else. But you didn’t do it: you are mistaken: you 
are not the murderer. Do you hear? It was not you! God has sent me to tell 
you so. {BK, p.706, Book XI, Chapter 5)72
A closer reading, however, shows that Smerdyakov cannot be considered a 
devilish tempter or accuser since he thought he was merely executing Ivan’s 
wishes, albeit seeking the added advantage of escaping his position as lackey. 
What Smerdyakov construes as their partnership over the murder would constitute 
the first community to which Smerdyakov has ever belonged. We return to 
Bakhtin:
Ivan, according to Dostoevsky’s plan, wants his father murdered, but he 
wants it under the condition that he himself remain not only externally, but 
even internally uninvolved in it. He wants the murder to occur as an 
inevitability of fate, not only apart from his will, but in opposition to it. 
“Be sure,” he says to Alyosha, “I shall always defend him [father...]. But 
in my wishes I reserve myself full latitude in this case.” (PD, pp.258; BK, 
p. 167, Book III, Chapter 9)
Bakhtin continues:
The internally dialogic dissociation of Ivan’s will might be presented in 
the form of two such rejoinders in a dialogue:
“I do not desire my father’s murder. If it happens, it will be against 
my will.”
“But I desire that the murder take place against my will, because 
then I will be internally uninvolved in it and will have nothing with which 
to reproach myself.” {PD, p.258)
72 Also examined by Bakhtin, whose edition of The Brothers we reproduce. {PD, p.255)
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This is an absolutely central tenet of Genet’s poetic method: that crime may be 
unknowingly desired by the right-thinking, not only independently of their will, 
but also against it. This is not directly a problem of people’s egoism, but a 
problem found in the egological structure of consciousness itself, which allows 
self-referentiality to cleave to the will. In order to render the egology of such 
events “no longer involuntary” (TaS, p.257), and to make responsibility for the 
other possible, the subject must first be made conscious of these movements, the 
chief of which is in the risk of betrayal on the hazy dividing line between 
omission and commission, of which Dostoevsky’s instantiation is an extremely 
subtle example.
Bakhtin develops the point in the following way:
The first rejoinder in Ivan’s internal dialogue Smerdyakov does not hear, 
and to the very end he does not believe that Ivan’s first voice really and 
seriously did not desire the death of his father. (PD, p.258)
So, the death may genuinely not have been actively desired by Ivan, but at the 
same time, a prompting or interrupting “Smerdykovian” voice still exists in him, 
otherwise he could not have been prompted into any realisation of complicity at 
all:
Therefore Ivan’s words, which Smerdyakov understands as an allegory 
with the opposite meaning, are in fact not allegories at all. They are Ivan’s 
direct words. But the voice that answers Smerdyakov is interrupted here 
and there by the hidden rejoinder of his second voice. Thanks to these 
interruptions, Smerdyakov remains fully convinced of Ivan’s compliance. 
(pp.258-59)
Ivan has therefore failed adequately to protect his father, while his passive desire 
has been eerily lived out without his intervention. He has discovered
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simultaneously his partial guilt in the murder and his neglect of Dmitry, as well as 
his neglect of Smerdyakov, a future persecutor whose daring he encouraged. This 
translates into hyperbolic responsibility for the persecutor described by Levinas. 
(AQE, p. 162, AQEb, p.200) We remember the words of Zossima, suggesting that 
the prosecutor -  also a kind of Accuser -  may be more responsible than the 
criminal in the dock:
[Y]ou too are guilty, for you might have given light to the evil-doers, even 
as the one man without sin and you have not given them light. If you had, 
you would have lighted a path for them too, and he who had committed the 
felony would not have committed it if you had shown him a light. (BK, 
p.379)
This also brings to mind the first of the three epigraphs to Autrement qu ’etre in 
which responsibility for the persecutor is thought of in terms of an extreme or 
hyperbolic responsibility.73 The virtuous turned from the righteous path will be 
stopped by God, “parce que tu ne Lauras pas averti, il mourra dans son peche et 
les actes de vertu qu’il a accomplis ne seront pas mentionnes, mais de son sang, je 
te demanderai compte.” (Ezekiel 3.30)
It transpires that regardless of belief in God or of direct intervention, ‘all 
has not been permitted’, as Ivan had pretended in his philosophy, for he descends 
into madness and Smerdyakov takes his own life. Just like Rashkalnikov, who 
wanted to escape all responsibility, the two men have been caught by the anarchic 
link to the Other, which we described above in ‘Rembrandt dechire’. The trace of 
the Other in Levinas is also described as Illeity, in relation to the third person //, 
which opens the dimension of the Good, and even the trace of God in His ab-solu, 
present through absence in His flight, or absolute discretion. Very significantly, 
Smerdyakov betrays a more direct belief than Ivan, not only in the Other (in the
73 Cf. also a sceptical Paul Ricceur in Soi-meme comme un autre (Paris: Seuil/Points Essais,
1990), p.390.
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way encounters signify not only in the face-to-face, but in relation to absent third 
parties), but also, astonishingly, in God. Their final interview includes the 
following dialogue:
‘No, sir, there ain’t no phantom here except the two of us, and another one 
besides. No doubt he’s sitting here between the two of us, the other one.’ 
‘Who is he [...]?’
‘The other one’s God, sir. Aye, Providence itself. It’s here beside us, sir. 
Only you needn’t look for it. You won’t find it.’ (BK , p.731)
It is only at this meeting that Smerdyakov realises it will not be possible to 
conclude the practical aspects of the robbery with his unwilling partner, and falls 
low on moral energy. Ivan decides to testify, but very soon, his diseased mind 
with all the intellectual virtuosity at its disposal, rebels against the enormity of his 
decision. They have each excluded themselves from the possibility of 
“Providence”, or union, in the One.
This proves fatal to Smerdyakov, who realises that the ‘se veulent l’un 
l’autre’ with Ivan he thought they had established in cooperation has changed 
form. By this we do not mean his backing off in the belief that the whole venture 
was a misunderstanding, nor that Ivan would not respond to blackmail. If indeed, 
as Bakhtin claims, “Smerdyakov remains fully convinced of Ivan’s compliance” 
(PD, p.259), then it is possible that he feels purely instrumental in the 
proceedings, and that he has been trapped in the “se veut l’un-l’autre” (with 
hyphen) of Ivan’s designs. A key fact supporting this view is his handing Ivan the 
three thousand roubles at the third interview. That Ivan should take them is even 
more surprising. This seems to follow a similar logic to the sporadic answers 
given by his second voice, which at moments understands Smerdyakov’s 
allegorical speech and its murderous intentions, even though Ivan’s cooperation is 
more practical than verbal within the logic of the shared undertaking. Ivan then 
has his unbelief in God supplanted by belief in the devil, who tempts him through 
what Levinas calls the “mensonge luciferien” of suggesting that Good and Evil
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are contemporaries, or twin brothers. (HdH, pp.88-89) These lines can be usefully 
understood in the context of The Brothers, as Levinas can be seen to argue in ‘La 
trace de TAutre’ that Ivan’s confusion is in reaction to a pre-existing Good, and so 
is of Luciferian character. Ivan is twice tempted: first to consider Dmitry as guilty, 
and then not to testify. The twin brothers are reminiscent in this chapter first of 
Genet’s imaginary cellmate, a partner in crime, who he would like both to be 
utterly similar to himself and to have within his power, and then of the myriad 
relationships between the different Karamazov boys, all of whom become subject 
to what Levinas goes on to call “l’attrait erotique de l’irresponsabilite”. (p.88)74 
This attraction exercises itself over he who is not “le gardien de son frere”, in 
whom the invisible interchangeability of Good and Evil may find a footing. This 
refusal of responsibility is an echo of Cain, the first fratricide, who tried to 
conceal the murder of his brother by claiming non-responsibility, ignorance and 
indifference. (Ibid.)
This indifference is increased by differences in rank. As Levinas goes on 
to remark, in ‘Humanisme et an-archie’:
L’etre perseverant dans l’etre, Tegoi'sme ou le Mai, dessine ainsi la
dimension meme de la bassesse et la naissance de la hierarchie. (HdH
p.89)
The only glaring hierarchy amongst the brothers is that Smerdyakov is always at 
the bottom, and is made to abase himself to other’s plans, preceding his own 
venture. Since, in this case, kinship relations are superseded by relations of social 
hierarchy, the temptation to sovereign choice creeps in even under the guise of 
obedience to others, as when Smerdyakov thinks he has been commissioned to 
murder their father (which will be discussed in further detail later). Furthermore, 
the Good is not a form of servitude, but an obedience to the Other. However, the
74 We remember that Bataille illustrates transgression against the Good, thought of as decency, in 
terms o f the arousal caused by nudity, or more properly the denuding o f another, which serves also 
to underline the erotics of irregularity, or irresponsibility. (LM, p. 137)
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Other is not isolatable within a particular person, nor to the feedback or readings 
they may occasion. The concrete interactions made by an individual are hence 
caught between their incarnation in any given situation and the flux in the Third of 
the different beings upon whom the situation will impact. The Other, or ‘T  autre 
demeurant autre”, consisting in a flux of meanings, cannot be inventoried ahead of 
time as though from a wallet of labels; it remains absent: past, or as yet to come. 
(p.89, 19) The carnality of subjects separates them from one other, and places 
them “au bord de l’eros”, in relation to being and double intentionality, whereby I 
am made to feel desire by something or someone which is at the same time fo r  the 
self. As Levinas remarks, “Cette tentation de se separer du Bien, est l’incamation 
meme du sujet ou sa presence dans l’etre.” (p.89) This Eros, as we have suggested 
in discussing Genet’s imaginary cellmate, may be a movement from the Same to 
the Self and be at the point where egology becomes egoism, whereby others 
noticed in being are left to suffer. This does not mean, however, as Donna Brody
75claims, that the Other is “always” and “already endogenous to being” , but that 
certain others obscured by hierarchy may remain out of sight. That is, until they 
are noticed, and their suppression ceases to be involuntary -  as in the episode on 
the train with the old man described by Genet. It is only on the perception of 
unperceived confluences joining the Other that the Ego, previously unabashed -  
“se posant comme sa propre origine -  incree -  principe souverain, prince” (HdH, 
p.89) -  can notice the broader relationships which underline, and therefore 
challenge, the founding of the self on the self. The experiences described in The 
Brothers Karamazov are too traumatic to obviate the discovery of unexpected 
others; this necessitates a redrawing of the boundaries of sovereign space, and 
requires changes in being. After all, ignorance and confusion as well as temptation 
and egoism can determine behaviour. For this reason, we do not consider the 
Tuciferian lie’ which says that Good and Evil are contemporaries to be, as Brody 
writes, a piece of “pulpit fervour”76, but instead as a complex imperative: that we
75 Donna Brody, ‘Levinas and Lacan: Facing the Real’, Levinas and Lacan: the Missed Encounter, 
ed. Sarah Harasym, (New York: State University o f New York Press, 2000), p.67.
76 Donna Brody, ‘Levinas and Lacan’, p.73.
81
should look behind the dramas forming the world, and seek the dialogic moments 
which form the erotic relationship to the exterior, moments stretching out between 
others, both as part of the Other, and as the annexation of others to the self. The 
results such a pursuit produces, far from “rehabilitating] the axiological 
bipolarity of Good and Evil”77, instead, when read in the context of The Brothers 
Karamazov, become highly un-Manichean and deserve to be analysed further.
Ivan has been irresponsible in his discourses to such an extent that from 
Smerdyakov’s point of view it was Ivan who had been Luciferian, first as the
78Tempter, and then later as the Accuser, on his three visits to him on his sick bed.
It is therefore perfectly consistent with a Levinasian reading of the ‘Luciferian lie’ 
to see Smerdyakov as a victim, who has destroyed himself, as well as in the guise 
of perpetrator. Alyosha has been sent by Zossima to find Dmitry. He first tries his 
father’s house and meets Smerdyakov who scornfully tells him he is not
Alyosha’s brother’s keeper.79 Alyosha finds Ivan and receives the same answer,
80though Ivan recognises the irony, and feels caught out in front of Alyosha.
81Others to indict themselves in this fashion are Dmitry, Perkhotin and Rakitin . 
However, Alyosha, who spends all his efforts in caring for others, is also indicted, 
as although he could not be said to deny he is his brother’s keeper, he twice keeps 
the wrong brother, once before the murder by staying with Ivan for the Grand 
Inquisitor poem instead of seeing Dmitry, and again by visiting Dmitry in prison
77 Donna Brody, ‘Levinas and Lacan’, p.73.
78 “Fancy a clever man like you trying to pull my leg like that!” Smerdyakov to Ivan. (BK, p.731)
79 “‘What makes you think I know about Mr Dmitry Karamazov’s movements?’ Smerdyakov 
replied quietly, in measured tones and with a scornful air. ‘It isn’t as though I was his keeper, is
it?”’ (BK, p.264)
80 “ ‘But what about Dmitry and father? How will it all end?’ Alyosha asked anxiously.
‘You’re still harping on it! What have I to do with it? I am not my brother Dmitry’s keeper, 
am I?’
Ivan snapped irritably, but suddenly he smiled bitterly.
‘Cain’s reply to God about his murdered brother -  eh? Perhaps that’s what you’re thinking 
now, aren’t you?” (BK, p.270)
81 These other examples have been gathered by Alain Toumayan in ‘"I more than the others”: 
Dostoevsky and Levinas’, Yale French Studies 104, Encounters with Levinas, ed. Thomas Trezise 
(Yale: University of Yale Press, 2004), 55-66 (p.60).
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8 2  r ,  ,1instead of Ivan who is beginning to lose the dialogic battle with the devil. This is 
one of the perils of living in a plural world, as betrayal becomes difficult to avoid. 
Genet chooses to be playfully critical:
Et Smerdiakov?
Parce qu’ils sont quatre, les trois fils Karamazov. Le tendre, le 
chretien Aliocha n’a pas une parole, il ne fait pas un geste indiquant que ce 
larbin est son frere. (ED, p.216)
Alyosha is not able to calm Dmitry or to properly reach Ivan, ultimately failing, as
83Levinas puts it in Totalite et infini, to ‘adjourn the moment of betrayal’. But is 
failure to prevent betrayal the same as betrayal? Yes, if  it is known about in 
advance, and is therefore to some extent voluntary. Yet there are millions of 
injustices that take place which are known about and yet at the same time are 
allowed to escape our gaze and agency. This, Levinas tells us in ‘Transcendance 
et hauteur’ is the nature of the hierarchy of the State, which even when it 
functions perfectly from a rational point of view, may create suffering by 
restricting the individual’s access to justice, such that, “[i]l y a [...] des larmes
82 He goes to the dying elder who asks him. ‘Have you been home and seen your brother?’ The 
paragraph continues:
It seemed strange to Alyosha that he asked so firmly and precisely about one o f his brothers only 
-  but which one? So it was for that brother that he had perhaps sent him out yesterday and today. 
‘I’ve seen one of my brothers,’ replied Alyosha.
‘I’m talking o f your elder brother to whom I bowed down to the ground yesterday.’
‘I only saw him yesterday,’ said Alyosha. ‘I could not find him today.’
‘Make haste and find him. Go again tomorrow and make haste. Leave everything and make 
haste. Perhaps you’ll still be in time to prevent something terrible happening.’ (BK, p.334)
And then later, once again, after visiting Dmitry in prison we read, “He should really have gone to 
see Ivan first thing in the morning”, (p.702)
83 “La liberte consiste a savoir que la liberte est en peril. Mais savoir ou avoir conscience, c ’est 
avoir du temps pour eviter et prevenir l’instant de l’inhumanite. C’est cet ajoumement perpetuel de 
l'heure de la trahison -  infime difference entre l’homme et le non-homme -  qui suppose le 
desinteressement de la bonte [...]”. (Tel, p.5, Telb, pp.23-24)
83
O A
qu’un fonctionnaire ne peut pas voir”. This can only be overcome, as Levinas 
goes on to say, by “la responsabilite infinie de chacun, pour chacun, devant 
chacun.”85 And yet here it becomes necessary to evaluate the relative invisibility 
of suffering between different social strata. Even the individual obsessed by 
responsibility discovered from within his or her own misery, may not act radically 
enough to avert disaster. Such is the case when Dmitry sends Alyosha from the 
prison to “[l]ove Ivan” (BK, p.701), but no-one is sent to “love” Smerdyakov. 
Smerdyakov is, it appears, an effect of injustice as well as a cause, making his 
position in the book highly problematic. Dostoevsky runs concurrently the 
vigilance of individuals with the injustice of hierarchy, refusing a deterministic 
explanation of Evil which would argue that Smerdyakov could not have behaved 
otherwise. In so doing, Dostoevsky avoids flattening out the dramas producing the 
events. Rakitin is planning an article on Dmitry in this vein, “with a political 
tendency” (p.690), arguing that Dmitry too was a victim of his environment, and 
that his case is not so much a question of right or wrong, as the symptom of an 
overarching social issue. This is an approach to general suffering, but not one 
which interests itself in the suffering of individuals, or in the capacity of 
individuals to notice this suffering. How then do the brothers approach suffering?
In Dmitry’s dream about the starving baby, whom he affectionately refers 
to as “the babby”, he manages through his own passivity at the hands of his 
interrogators to face the problem of others’ powerlessness in suffering. He, unlike 
Ivan, is able to relativise his guilt, and he understands that it is all of humanity to 
whom he is responsible. His declaration echoes Zossima once again: “And so I 
will go to Siberia because of that ‘babby,’ since everyone o f  us is responsible for  
everyone else. [...] I didn’t kill father, but I accept the guilt and I must suffer.”86 
(My emphasis) From the impetus of the il y  a, therefore, his appreciation of the
84 Levinas, ‘Transcendance et hauteur’, Bulletin de la Societe frangaise de Philosophie, 3, 1962, 
89-101, repr. in Cahier de I’Heme: Levinas, eds C. Chalier and M. Abensour (Paris: L’Heme,
1991), p.105.
85 Levinas, ‘Transcendance et hauteur’, p. 105.
86 We reproduce Toumayan’s quotation. The passage is found on BK, p.694 in the Magarshak 
edition.
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Other evolves, and his behaviour changes meaning, a noise that was always 
present in him, is picked up by a new acoustic:
You see, I never had all these doubts before, but it was all hidden inside 
me. Perhaps it was just because all these ideas were raging inside me 
without my being aware of it that I drank and fought and raged. {BK, 
p.695)
Ivan also has ethical feelings for humanity in general and is able to right 
some former wrongs, though in spite of the messianism of the ‘Grand Inquisitor’ 
poem, the wrongs he addresses do not stretch very far into the past. On his way to 
the third interview with Smerdyakov he meets a singing drunk, knocks him down 
and abandons him unconscious in the snow, even commenting, “He’ll freeze to 
death!” (p.729) The disgust he arouses is absolutely consistent with that of Genet 
faced by the old man in the train who, like the drunkard, is an undesirable one 
would not automatically want to help. Yet, upon realising through Smerdyakov 
that he had left his father to die, he immediately hears the song of the drunken 
peasant run through his mind, as a reminder of someone he is leaving to die in real 
time, (p.732) His failure over his father in the past reminds him of a current 
failure, opening a glimpse of humanity through a retrospective engagement with 
the drunkard. Able to help the man, he then stumbles into self-awarded bonte and 
congratulates himself on his philanthropy, paying for his treatment using the 
newly transferred booty “with a liberal hand”. He even draws the conclusion that 
it is only because of his resolution for the following day that he had helped the 
peasant. He believes this to be altruism or bonte rather than a utility function, as 
he reassures himself, “how well I’m still capable of analysing myself’.(p.744) 
On returning to his lodgings, however, he delays making a statement, only then to 
lose his self-possession:
87 Strangely, Toumayan finds caring for the drunkard to be an uncomplicated awakening o f  moral 
consciousness in the non-present Third, rather than an act o f displacement performed by a 
conscience still grappling with guilt. Toumayan, T more than the others’, p.58.
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He knew that he was ill but he was loath to be ill at this time, at these 
approaching fateful moments of his life, when he had to appear in court, 
when he had to put his case boldly and resolutely, and ‘justify himself to 
himself ’ (p.746, my emphasis)
Even in the act of kindness to the drunkard, followed by the noble undertaking of 
giving evidence, there is the distinct danger that Ivan will return to internal 
considerations of himself. He knows more than he thinks, and, after the interview 
with the devil, involuntarily predicts Smerdyakov’s suicide before it is announced 
by Alyosha, (p.766)
So what of the “babby” that triggered this reflection on universal 
responsiblity? Mitya likes to hear “babby” pronounced in the peasant way because 
“there seem[s] to be more pity in it”, (p.595) Perhaps, as Dmitry explains, “All of 
us are ‘babbies”, (p.694) However, Smerdyakov is most particularly alluded to 
here by Dostoevsky. It is, after all, he who has had the most unfortunate parenting 
of the four brothers, and for whom least responsibility has ever been taken. He is 
the son of Fyodor Karamazov and ‘Stinking Lizaveta’, a homeless mute who died 
in childbirth, leaving her infant to be taken in and trained up as cook. Smerdyakov 
reacts badly to the sentimentalised compassion of those who pity him. He even 
interrupts a serenade to denounce the reminiscences people liked to address about 
the “wee” mother to the little “babby”, now grown up:
she was four feet tall and a wee bit over. Why say a wee bit, when she 
might have said a little bit, like everyone else. Wanted to move me to tears 
I suppose [...] (p.262)
The author ironically re-echoes one of his own most successful manoeuvres in the 
description of universal need and responsibility in the “babby” by having such an 
infant grow up to be a murderer. Thus Dostoevsky discourages a sentimental 
approach to others’ suffering, demonstrating instead the difficulty of action. It has
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transpired that none of the three brothers has defended the fourth. Alyosha is 
silent, Ivan triggers his suicide, and Dmitry, who can suffer for the “babby” in the 
Steppes, cannot tolerate Smerdyakov in the scullery.
Let us summarise these complex movements. We have argued in turn that 
the passing of the Other is indeed effective in creating moral awakening, but have 
nuanced this by describing the manner in which multiple Others may obscure the 
just path. If there is infinite responsibility to the Other, but multiple others, then it 
is possible that we can find ourselves in a position of betrayal, whereby the more 
demanding other is forgotten. This may be reflected in tradition, both in its 
ossification into structures, and the betrayal of the individual within those 
structures. This play between the active and the ossified is strangely redolent of 
the Dire and of the Dit, of the movement of preoriginary proximity into accepted 
and recognisable language. (AQE, pp.6-7, AQEb, pp. 16-17) Objectivation as 
society in both its good and bad senses is expressed by Genet as a connection 
between words in the individual and in the communal, which is both formative 
and deformative:
Si tradition et trahison sont nes d’un meme mouvement originel et
divergent pour vivre chacun une vie singuliere, par quoi, tout au long de la
langue, se savent-ils lies dans leur distorsion? (EMD, p. 17)
The link between tradition and treason ‘in their distortion’ lies in the singular 
trajectories of meaning that come to confront one another in language before 
losing their distinct origin, as they are edified into tradition, or buried in its 
foundation. Thus a poetic event is created out of words, upon which Genet 
comments in an interview: “[i]l en faut au moins deux”. (ED, p.232) Such 
confrontation may be the breath of profferation acting within poetry, or there may 
be physical confrontation with its own allure and power to fascinate. Faced with 
the choice, however, Genet replies, “je choisirais l’expression poetique par des 
mots.” (Ibid.) Confrontation between words, it is implied, allows something to 
take place which is reducible neither to tradition (e.g. the canon), nor the betrayal
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of alterity; instead, the crossing of traces may create something new outside of 
tradition, or reanimate the claims of the other.
Treason, therefore, does not mean that the Other is “endogenous to being”; 
that is, internally caused by being, as Brody claims.88 If the assembly of being is 
begun from an origin of illeity, then it will be translated into that which may be 
comprehended by tradition, which is the Dit, though once again be reanimated 
into part of the Dire. In this sense, translation is not reducible to betrayal, just as 
the other is not reducible or endogenous to the being to which it is contiguous. 
Rational necessity is not the ultimate origin of being and the self; these are instead 
matters whose principles philosophy would like to grasp. This origin is instead 
“un en-dega, un pre-originel, un non-representable, un invisible et, par 
consequent, un en-de£a suppose autrement qu’un principe n’est suppose par la 
consequence dont il est synchrone.” (AQE, p.203, AQEb, p.249) To read the Other 
as endogenous to being would be to read the cause synchronically with the result 
that follows it as a principle, rather than as emanating from the “en-desa” or hither 
side, which is a blind spot in our ability to observe. To confide oneself to a 
principle would lead to the loss of outside variables and unexpected forces, which 
‘control theory’ in the hard sciences accepts may not be fully identifiable, 
meaning that a system may never be fully stabilised. ‘Observability’ is a related 
problem, as the complexity of a state may not be fully inferred from the 
incomplete nature of the measurements available. Unexpected forces, like the 
Other, may create an irruption in the system. Such questions preoccupied Valery 
in his ideas on production, as we shall argue in the next chapter. Illeity, which lies 
outside the system, is therefore part of a subtle overlapping of forces whereby the 
weaker force that does not impose itself, can, at times, be stronger than the strong 
force of tradition or power, causing a clinamen, or bending, of the subject. (TaS, 
p.260) Because the beyond being is not yet affiliated to being it may have a highly 
disruptive effect on a society, if  the previous unproblematic identification with its 
organisations, like Rashkalnikov’s identification with his plan, is interrupted.
88 Donna Brody, ‘Levinas and Lacan’, p.69.
The Smerdyakov-Ivan example is especially complex because their 
meeting has resulted in the shadow of the Other fleeing between them, bringing to 
mind people they thought uninvolved or unimportant; Ivan understands that he 
had approved the sacrifice of Dmitry, while Smerdyakov re-evaluates his 
partnership with Ivan which made him believe in the plan as providential. So what 
went wrong in their initial interaction? As Levinas tells us, the Other is found in 
the trace of God who has passed: “Aller vers Lui, ce n’est pas suivre cette trace 
qui n’est pas un signe. C’est aller vers les Autres qui se tiennent dans la trace de 
l’illeite.” {HdH, pp.69-70) The God who has passed, we are told in ‘Dieu et la 
philosophic’, is not an identifiable individual, not the first or absolute “autrui”, 
nor “autrui par excellence”, but “autre qu’autrui, autre autrement, autre d’alterite 
prealable a l’alterite d’autrui, a l’astreinte ethique au prochain, et different de tout 
prochain, transcendant jusqu’a T absence, jusqu’a sa confusion possible avec le 
remue-menage de 1’// y  d \  (DVI, p. 115) This multiplication of others makes 
betrayal unavoidable, as one cannot at the same time be responsible to all and to a 
particular other. That Smerdyakov had his imagination dominated by a violent 
plan, and should explicitly refer to the plural terrain of the Third in the singular as 
God to Ivan, seems to suggest an encroachment of the il y  a into illeity, since God
on
should not be present and identifiable, nor a direct interlocutor. Smerdyakov 
seems instead to be enthralled by the transcendence of a single criminal escape 
route, as opposed to being opened into communication with others beyond 
himself.
The interruption performed by the infinite, rather than the subjugation we 
have just described, follows two stages. Firstly, transcendence does not embody a 
single other who requires sacrifices to be made. Instead, my obsession with the 
individual is betrayed in the name of the claims of others; hence, “La relation avec 
le tiers est une incessante correction de l’asymetrie de la proximite” in “un arret 
ou se trahit ma relation an-archique a l’illeite [...]”. (AQE, p.201, AQEb, pp.246- 
47) While it is true that this suspension of infinite responsibility means that my
89 For God as a direct interlocutor see the film Breaking the Waves, Dir. Lars Von Trier. October 
Films. 1996.
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link to illeity is betrayed for a society of others, a new relation is opened with this 
society, as “« Grace a Dieu » je suis autrui pour les autres.” {Ibid., Ibidb, p.247) 
Characters in The Brothers experience great difficulty with this second 
interruption, which opens into questions of personal responsibility for shared 
justice, in so far as the ‘thanks to God’ is also a thanks to the fellow human being. 
Not only does Ivan fear the judicial system may have a Grand Inquisitor at its 
head, but he already blames himself entirely for the murder, such that he would 
find it difficult to subject himself to others’ judgement. Smerdyakov also finds 
this late appeal to community to be too risky, as he is already convinced he is 
being defrauded and set up. It is very difficult, therefore, for them to subject 
themselves to justice. Cynicism on the one hand, and despair on the other, prevent 
the deflation of the divine into interpretable commandment in service of the other, 
which leads to the “retoumement du sujet incomparable en membre de societe.” 
(AQE, p.202, AQEb, p.247) The necessary betrayal of total responsibility requires 
not the “wallowing in the infinity of my betrayal” {TaS, p.309), but a new 
relationship based on the hope of justice for myself. {AQE, p.202, 205, AQEb, 
p.247, 205) And yet it is just this intoxication by betrayal which leads to Ivan’s 
insanity and Smerdyakov’s suicide. To take a neighbouring example from Genet 
in Les Bonnes, Claire commits suicide, and Solange defiantly waits for the police, 
neither of them able to conceive of life without Madame, choosing instead to stay 
in what Visker has called “the epicentre of an infinite sacrifice”: one through self- 
immolation, the other through acceptance of fate, waiting for the arrival of the 
police. {TaS, p.310) This refusal of all rights is a similar egoism to staking the 
right to find the self in the self, and indeed the two are explicitly combined in 
Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, who chooses to deceive humanity against his 
better inclination, and in Genet’s novels in which force and transgression are 
worshipped to the detriment of the narrator.90 Genet’s way of founding himself
90 Infinite responsibility can also be evaded in a manner described by Arendt, by which, if  I am 
responsible for everything, then I am responsible for nothing, since the problems are too great for 
remedy through my engagement. (Chapter 3, On Violence, New York: Harvest, 1970) Thinking of  
Rashkalnikov or o f Kirilov in The Possessed, it is possible that someone in despair over a situation
90
against society, his resistance to a “retoumement” or reversion into one of its 
members, shows the refusal of grace, which is the favour not of a privileged link 
to the divine but in being connected to others who allow there to be justice for me 
as well, and therefore for responsibility to be withstood. Such a refusal is made by 
a subject that wishes to maintain its separation in isolation. Yet it is unclear to 
what extent Genet is holding a sharable vigil for those in isolation, albeit in many 
cases an isolation they have imposed on themselves, and to what extent he himself 
is dramatising his own personal, antisocial rebellion. In either case, there is for 
people an unavoidable experience of being and also something that sets the 
subject apart, since the subject in the world remains always separated, while 
separation needs must already exist in the world. The Brothers Karamazov will 
provide us with further insights.
4. Egology and betrayal
Faced with imminent family drama, Alyosha, the youngest Karamazov, is sent 
from the monastery by Zossima: “you will go forth from these walls, but you will 
live in the world like a monk.” {BK, p.334) Levinas formulates this antithetical 
idea of the anchorite in the world as “l’anachorese du Moi en Soi” (AQE, p.148, 
AQEb, p. 183). This serves to build on earlier formulations of enclosure in the il y  
a by discerning a bond of contemplative closure, which is at the same time on the 
threshold to the beyond of being. Separation in the world lies in the endless 
questionings and inversions the self operates within the linear, smooth and 
imperturbable progress of being. Before the subject can find itself in itself in a 
constituted Ego, it is headed off on the hither or near side of its identity by 
something otherwise than being, producing a contemplative solitude even within 
the social world.
could take refuge in the hypocentre o f an infinite sacrifice, in which one’s agency is abdicated in 
the very act o f engagement: such as in the extreme solution found by the suicide bomber.
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Levinas’s generalisation of the anchorite as part of the structure of the 
subject envisages separation, therefore, as an event. The gap between the me and 
the not-me is such that anachoresis is at the point of inversion or substitution in 
relation to the phenomena that tug at its vestments. After Zossima’s death, 
Alyosha leaves the coffin vigil and, seized by a strange mood, responds to 
Rakitin’s cajoling, and goes for a glass of champagne at Grushenka’s, where the 
inversion in the flow of being results in him almost having his cassock turned 
inside out as well (like a glove one might say), until his sheer modesty touches his 
hostess. Anachoresis is not a finished, affiliated political or ecclesiastical Ego in 
relation to counterpart Egos whose function is set.91 Anachoresis cannot succeed 
or fail in relation to the not-me, as it is on the near side of activity and passivity, 
after involvement in a phenomenon and before action. (AQE, p. 148, AQEb, p. 183) 
If anachoresis itself does not fail, then the piloting subject, on the other hand, can, 
as it has to thematise what is beyond being and enter into social praxis between 
the for-itself and the for-all. Only then can redemption (rachat) find purchase.
Ivan demands expiation for all, but has also argued that if there is no 
beneficent order or God, then everything is permitted. This is what the Inquisitor 
practices. But this compulsion has come at an immense cost, because the 
Inquisitor’s “correction” of Christ’s work in the abolition of sin has necessitated 
him bearing the pain of deception and the burden of humanity’s sins himself. This 
“charge” is so onerous as to render him sovereign. This can be illustrated using 
Genet’s formula from Haute surveillance, in which Yeux-Verts complains that he 
carries “tout le poids. De quoi je ne sais pas.” (GTC, p.6) There is, however, a hint 
in the next line as to what the burden may be, as the inmate is not the ‘King of 
Kings’, but the ‘Thug of Thugs’, “le Cai'd des Caids qui la supporte pour le monde 
entier.” {Ibid.) Apart from his place at the top of an equivocal hierarchy, 
everything would suggest he was speaking about the weight of sin, though as a 
death row prisoner, he may equally be speaking of his punishment. Whereas
91 Derrida in Politiques de I ’amitie speaks about “la communaute anachoretique” whose 
prerequisite is separation, if not isolation, in “l’amitie des solitaires et la chance a venir de la 
philosophic nouvelle.” Derrida, Politiques de Vamitie, (Paris: Galilee, 2004), p.53.
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Yeux-Verts had attempted every course of life before becoming a murderer, and 
accepts his guilt, the Inquisitor’s identity is gnawed by grief but not remorse 
(remorsure), and remains intact. (AQE, p. 161, AQEb, pp. 198-99) Rashkalnikov’s 
responsibility for the other leads him to murder; the Grand Inquisitor’s 
responsibility leads him to tyranny. But whereas Rashkalnikov reforms, the 
intellectual defect in the Inquisitor is so ingrained that he retains the impression of
acting for humanity; his anachoretic relationship with the Ego is not successfully
/  92interrupted by the other, and yet the Ego remains, “comme faite de samtete.” 
This is why Ivan confers a tragic, though at the same time saintly status upon the 
Inquisitor for having so seriously misjudged his vocation, and for persisting in 
defiant separation.93 It is the grasp of this enclosure within the self that makes the 
other’s heterological appeal undesirable. As Genet comments from prison, “Libre, 
c’est-a-dire exile parmi les vivants.” (ND, p.205) The consciousness of this 
contempt for others, which is also expressed by the Grand Inquisitor, leads to the 
conviction of holding a position beyond being and its moral laws, mentioned 
above by Bataille. (LM, p. 147) Just before the episode in which Divine allows a 
neighbour’s child to fall to its death, Genet writes, “Contrairement a la plupart des 
saints; elle en eut connaissance.” (ND, p. 198) This sainthood as such is manifestly 
false, and yet provocative elements of iconographic sainthood have been 
assembled to confuse the reader’s response as usually incompatible universes 
resonate one within the other, creating a fragmentary excess of meaning in 
alterity. In Dostoevsky we have learnt that illeity, in the manner of dissemination 
rather than polysemy, is other than all describable others (“autre d’alterite 
prealable a l’alterite d’autrui” (DVI, p. 115)), such that, incapable of being 
pinpointed, responsibility is instead radicalised.
92 Levinas,‘Transcendance et hauteur’, p. 106.
93 In The Adolescent, Arkady Dolgoruky continues gambling with the ruined Prince Sokolsky:
“But the baseness? But the meanness o f the act?” the prince asked suddenly.
“That we’re going to play roulette? No, that’s everything!” I cried. “Money is everything! 
It’s only we who are saints [...].” AD, p.324. He argues that an honest recovery o f the situation 
would be so arduous as to render their wrecklessness a kind o f asceticism.
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We have already seen the connection between Smerdyakov and the 
“babby”, but there is another point in the text at which the failure to recognise the 
claims of a vulnerable child are reflected upon in the context of the failure of 
man’s love for mankind generally. This is in Ivan’s collection of moral anecdotes 
in which a civilised society is seen to disgrace itself. Since it is possible for people 
inexperienced in love to reject the other because of their appearance, he takes the 
example of children, the one tenth of humanity whose innocence holds a special 
appeal and represents no barrier to affection. Ivan then identifies the vulnerability 
of the child itself as that which most inflames the abuser: for in the eyes of the 
child the abuser himself is part of the Providential universe, something in which 
the child still believes, where Good has priority over Evil.94 A little girl has been 
locked in the privy all night, and still cries out to God to protect her. {BK, p.283) 
Ivan’s next example is drawn not from the tenth of humanity whom it is possible 
to love, but from elsewhere, from the most difficult sections of society, the 
criminal minority. He tells of a Genevan brochure in which there is a story of a 
child given by his parents to some shepherds “as a present”, even though they are 
not good shepherds. Like the prodigal son, Richard would have liked to eat the 
pigs’ food. He escapes his captor foster parents and lives by banditry, heading 
then to the city where he commits murder, like Notre-Dame-des-fleurs, killing an 
old man. It is only then that society takes an interest in him; he repents and is 
converted to Christianity. He writes to the court declaring his guilt, and explaining 
that God has given him “grace”.95 They behead him nonetheless: “Yes, yes, 
Richard, die in the Lord. You’ve shed blood and you must die in the Lord.” 
(p.280) He cannot be made to revert to society, never having known it, while to
94 That is Providence, rather than merely the “persecution innomable” that Laplanche flags in the 
book of Job. Jean Laplanche, Entre seduction et inspiration: L ’Homme, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1999), p. 166.
95 There are two passages in Genet which borrow from this brochure described by Ivan, which we 
will examine further in Chapter Two. Genet mentions a newspaper article which tells the story of 
an old woman, who having spent a lifetime caring for a disabled daughter, arrives at the end o f her 
tether and sets fire to the house. If Richard is given “grace” in execution, the old woman is 
“sauvee” by her appearance and condemnation at the courthouse. (JV, p.30) The execution o f  
Notre-Dame also comes to mind, at whose trial the defence had been so bad that the jurors were 
deprived even o f the pleasure o f overcoming their pity. (ND, p. 193)
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invoke the Lord, here, is not to give thanks for the trace of God shepherding the 
lost back through conscience, but to mark someone out for death.96 That Richard 
too should confuse this God with the bounty of heaven is a scathing indictment of 
the mercy of the society to whose power he must submit. This can be seen as a 
form of perverse sovereignty on the part of the society, which is killing one of its
97own, turning absolute responsibility for the other into their absolute sacrifice.
Transgressive sovereignty means that a child may be martyrised like a 
criminal, a criminal may not receive a fair trial, and that an innocent group or 
individual, like Christ Himself, may be executed. In the trial scene in Notre- 
Dame-des-fleurs the child criminal is himself figured as the Redeemer, but other 
expiatory victims are also listed by Genet, as Notre-Dame shares in their glow and 
is “revetu d’un caractere sacre, voisin de celui qu’avaient autrefois les victimes 
expiatoires, qu’elles fussent bouc, boeuf, enfant, et qu’ont encore aujourd’hui les 
rois et les Juifs. Les gardiens lui parlerent et le servirent, comme si, le sachant 
charge des peches du monde, ils eussent voulu attirer sur eux la benediction du 
Redempteur.” (ND, p. 194) Of all these, it should be firmly remarked, Notre-Dame 
is the only criminal. However, since in 1942 Genet could have had no firm 
knowledge of the Final Solution, he seems to display a remarkable prescience in 
this list, through his association of ‘kings and Jews’ with the common criminal. 
Furthermore, this opens out into a discussion of the criminality of Christ, the King 
of the Jews, in his play Le Bagne, to which we shall now turn our attention.
The Chaplain is talking with the Director and is confused over his decision 
to give Forlano the death sentence for a crime of which the Director is almost 
certain Forlano is innocent. The Chaplain intuits that the prisoner’s troubling pride 
and beauty have a part to play in this, but approves the difficult choice before 
drawing an unexpected comparison, “Si le Christ avait ete encore -  et etait encore 
un afffeux petit juif, chetif... rabougri... bossu... cul de jatte...”, then the
96 This story, then, is inscribed in a Christianity which is a continuation o f tragedy, rather than a 
possibility o f Redemption, or Providence. It is also significant that Richard is brought up by 
shepherds, as was Oedipus.
97 This tendency towards the avoidance of assignation through the volunteering o f  another Levinas 
describes as “sacrifice humaine”. (AQE, p. 162, AQEb, p.201)
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Crucifixion would not have presented any difficulty or retained any significance.
(GTC, p.808) The “s’il avait ete encore” implies that the view of Christ as a dying 
Jew has since been changed. The Director counters, in case the Chaplain is 
missing the point, that Christ’s dominant characteristic was his innocence rather 
than his appearance, on the grounds that “il n’a pas commis de crime...”. But the 
chaplain rejoins:
L’AUMONIER: Des blagues! Pas de crimes, lui! Et son suicide sur la 
croix qu’est-ce que c’est? {GTC, p.808)
To think of Christ’s death on the cross as a suicide is to think that the victim of 
sacrifice accepts his end as a direct and logical consequence of his own actions, in 
the same way that a criminal accepts the punishment handed out for their crimes. 
If the crime meriting execution is suicide itself, then there would be no need for 
communal guilt on the part of the community, and no infinite responsibility, as 
someone has volunteered themselves already to both accept guilt and to be 
sacrificed, as though by their own hand.
In ‘The Grand Inquisitor’ poem Ivan argues that on Christ’s second 
coming, his immolation by a hostile society will be repeated, in a sovereign 
assertion against Christ. As Bataille puts it:
La souverainete est le pouvoir de s’elever, dans l’indifference a la mort, 
au-dessus des lois qui assurent le maintien de la vie. Elle ne differe de la 
saintete qu’en apparence, le saint etant celui qu’attire la mort, tandis que le 
roi l’attire au-dessus de lui. (LM, p. 134)
By calling death upon themselves, Genet and his characters represent for Bataille 
“une souverainete derisoire” (p. 129). We take, for example, the moment at which, 
while the judge is making half-hearted noises about rehabilitation, Notre-Dame 
interrupts him by saying, “Non, pas la relegation, je prefere claquer tout de suite 
[...].” {ND, p. 194) While this sovereignty may be derisory, Bataille goes on to
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describe Genet’s inverted saintliness as “la plus profonde”. (LM, p. 134) In the 
unrepentant criminal, transgressive sovereignty is outplayed, and is replaced by 
Genet’s saintliness, which Bataille has gone on to call ‘betrayed’ or ‘dead’ 
sovereignty, (p.154)98 The independent, extra-human life of sovereignty does not 
allow for error, and is above common ethical principles. And yet this false 
sovereignty contains strains of real saintliness, blurring identity. When Notre- 
Dame-des-fleurs is beheaded, nothing happens, no visible outcry human or 
otherwise. (ND, p. 194-95) His death is unmarked, except by Genet. Thus a 
criminal for whom all hope is impossible finds himself in the trace of the martyr, 
from the Greek martyris, meaning sacrifice. Metayer is executed by a gang of 
fellow prisoners, having been wrongfully accused of being an informer. In a 
despair involving a kind of vertigo he exclaims:
On fit aussi cela au Christ!” (MR, p.415)
This is not a derisory comparison but instead asks an essential question: can 
responsibility be taken for those who are historically, or personally, 
compromised? This is why Genet allows the criminal and the devotional universes 
to contaminate one another.
Another way of posing this question is to ask whether the wrongdoer or 
persecutor also has a face, something to which Levinas answers in the affirmative 
in Entre Nous, even in the case of a member of the SS. (EN, pp.243-44) Genet 
compares Metayer to Christ, and then settles into a description of the uniqueness 
of his facial features, in a precursor description to those in the aesthetic texts, “Le 
visage resta la devant moi. Et la ressemblance s’en echappait.” (MR, p.415) The 
flight of his likeness is a prototype to the substitution described above in 
‘Rembrandt dechire’, in which identity flows through the eyes. And yet there is an 
intermediary version in Pompes funebres in which the SS member, Erik, crouched 
on a roof amongst the chimneys in the last days of the Occupation, plays a French
98 Bataille writes, “c ’est la souverainete confisquee, la souverainete morte, de celui dont le desir 
solitaire de souverainete est trahison de la souverainete.” {LM, p. 154)
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tune on his harmonica: “II avait conscience que par ses yeux s’ecoulait toute la 
douceur triste de la France.” (PF, p.50) While feeling sad in response to sadness is 
not remarkable, this is a sadness shared with the enemy. Genet’s use of the same 
ethical description for the undesirable on the train as for the persecutor who can 
harm from a position of hiding, imposes a difficult view of responsibility as 
permanently unresolved. It is to such hyperbolic lengths that Levinas also carries 
the problem.
Genet reformulates this position of a permanently unresolved 
responsibility taking his cue from the general failure in fraternal duty of the three 
brothers, as well as of the illegitimate servant, in The Brothers Karamazov. In his 
posthumous piece from which we have already quoted, he follows his 
observations up with an intention, “Je voudrais parler de Smerdiakov. ” {ED, 
p.216)
It transpires that he had already been speaking about him in conjunction 
with others, and at times borrowing his voice through adaptations in his writing, 
for most of his career. On the one hand, Genet identifies with Smerdyakov as an 
orphan and criminal, who from his position as underdog serves, from the very 
opening of the novel, other people’s bad intentions. And yet, as we have already 
commented, the difficulty presented by this rogue element is what links Zossima 
and the devil in Ivan’s consciousness; that is associating the need for universal 
responsibility to the need for universal justice and expiation, at once for those 
already suffering and for the wrongdoer. Thus it is Smerdyakov who forces us to 
integrate an angelic reading of Levinas (involving responsibility to everything and 
everyone) with the obsessional Luciferian reading, which seeks to extirpate the lie 
of the contemporaneity of Good and Bad, a lie which must be brought before 
justice. There is a sensitivity to the Smerdyakovian inflection which occupies both 
Levinas’s and Genet’s writing, as they are each aware of the danger of confusing 
volition with ethical choice. At the same time, they both recognise that in the 
failure of self-sufficiency there is the impulse towards a mutually constituted 
world which is ethical in nature. Rashkalnikov with Sonia, Genet with his fellow 
passenger, Ivan arguing with the devil, and Smerdyakov in total solitude -  all
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realise the possibility, agonising because (as yet) unrealised, of shared community 
in an opening to the Other, which may fill the subject with dread just as much as 
with hope. Smerdyakov, for his part, finally decides that this opening is 
impossible, and rather than remain a prisoner of himself, chooses to die by his 
own hand.
The Smerdyakovian moments in Genet’s oeuvre are an integral part of the 
dialogism of his technique as a whole, drawn between solipsism and the 
possibility of community. Bakhtin argues that “[i]n everything that is secret, dark, 
mystical, to the extent that it could exert a defining influence on personality, 
Dostoevsky saw violence destroying the individual.” {PD, p.297) The insights that 
are offered by this obscurity emerge, then, from artistic reproduction in a more or 
less opaque writing. It is darkness that is productive of art, interrupting forms, 
creating ellipses, and throwing different objects or literary subjects into relief. As 
Levinas says of painting in De Vexistence a I ’existant, “Si paradoxal que cela 
puisse paraitre, la peinture est une lutte avec la vision. Elle cherche a arracher a la 
lumiere les etres integres dans un ensemble.” {DEE, p.90) When we approach 
these shadows with a critical light, rather than dispersing the shadow, we seek to 
offer literary silhouettes up to one another, to observe their similarity and 
transformation, and to make out kinship and difference. Perhaps this is why Genet 
commented of his theatre that it sought to create “une ombre fraiche et torride”. 
{EMD, p. 16) It is also worth pointing out that while phenomenology is derived 
from the Greek phaon, meaning light, from 1947 onward Levinas argues that light 
is the conditioning of being and knowledge, and that his enquiry consists in the 
places or beings which escape, occupying the dark rifts between the rays of 
knowledge, serving to call the subject into question. If an exteriority is 
phenomenologically irreducible and cannot be made, by the agency of the subject, 
to shine in a good or a bad light, fixing, thematising, stabilising, then these 
shadows, which may be very dark indeed, still conceal a relation to the Other; 
albeit one that hovers between betrayed sovereignty and confused saintliness.
Genet twice made the scandalous assertion that he was pleased at the 
German occupation of France. Now, at the time, this could easily have resulted in
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his recidivist thievery ending in a life sentence, which during the occupation 
would have been transmuted in its turn to deportation to a concentration camp. 
Perhaps there are some extra valencies of meaning we do not pick up at first. Let 
us look at what Genet says again, firstly interviewed by Hubert Fichte:
Le fait que l’armee ffan9aise, ce qu’il y avait de plus prestigieux au monde 
il y a trente ans ait capitule devant les troupes d’un caporal autrichien, eh 
bien 9a m ’a ravi. (.ED, p. 149)
And once again ten years later, to Nigel Williams:
Ravi! Ravi! Je detestais tellement, et encore maintenant, tellement la 
France, que j ’etais ravi que l’armee ffan9aise soit battue. Elle etait battue 
par les Allemands, elle a ete battue par Hitler, j'etais content, (p.301)
The assertion, it transpires, is a reinflection of a speech Smerdyakov makes in The 
Brothers 99 If we go back to the serenade, immediately following his denunciation 
of picturesque and unrigorous sympathy, he exclaims, “I hate all Russia my dear.” 
(BK, p.262) Genet adapts Smerdyakov’s description of the Napoleonic invasion of 
Russia into judgements on the German invasion of France.100 His provocative 
celebrations refer closely back to Smerdyakov’s avowal:
It would have been a good thing if them Frenchies had conquered us. A 
clever nation, my dear, would have conquered a stupid one and annexed it. 
Things would have been different then, my dear, (p.262)
99 Dominique Edde also notices the adaptation in Le crime de Jean Genet, Seuil, Paris, 2007, 
pp.40-41.
100 Hitler and Napoleon are, o f course, only similar in terms o f the building o f an Empire; in terms 
o f disregard for life, only Hitler held extermination itself as a goal.
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It is worth repeating, then, that this is not a nude conceptual assertion, but a 
reinflection of what another interiority might think.101 It displays once again the 
derisory sovereignty pointed out by Bataille in which domination even of oneself 
or one’s nation is welcomed. In Smerdyakov, therefore, for whom others can be 
sacrificed without qualms, it is not surprising that Providence may be found in 
unsuspected quarters. But whereas Smerdyakov holds the above opinions 
unproblematically, Genet, by using varidirectional speech, places himself, to 
quote Visker once again, deliberately “in the epicentre of an infinite sacrifice” .
(TaS, p.310) The passage created by a fictive Je-Tu spanning different historical 
moments can thus open a dialogue between dead protagonists, and even between a 
book character and an author-character. Smerdyakov will never succeed in 
opening his restaurant in Paris, only in starting a vocab book found later next to 
his sickbed. A Frenchman, Genet, on the other hand, escapes deportation and 
continues writing amongst the living.
Levinas tells us that in the passivity of suffering, one suffers even for the 
fault of the persecutor, “Ma souffrance est le point de mire de toutes les 
souffrances -  et de toutes les fautes. Meme de la faute de mes persecuteurs, ce qui 
revient a subir l'ultime persecution, a subir absolument.” (AQE, p. 150, AQEb, 
p. 186) This involves an absolute suffering in its non-sense, pointing back to the 
ultimate sense of anachoresis that is responsibility outside one’s liberty and 
present. (Ibid., p.81,108, Ibidb, p. 105,136) It is not by accident that Smerdyakov 
and Ivan should suffer persecution by the Accuser, because the relationship to 
being, as Levinas tells us, is in the accusative: “L’incamation du Soi et ses 
possibilites de douleur gratuite doivent etre comprises en fonction de Vaccusatif 
absolu du Soi, passivite en de^a de toute passivite au fond de la matiere se faisant 
chair.” (Ibid., p. 150, Ibidb, p. 186) This is to say that suffering inhabits being 
itself, which the subject must materially assume in the flesh. In this sense, it
101 This is not the only use that is made o f comparisons with Napoleon in Genet’s and 
Dostoevsky’s works. In The Idiot, Ganya’s mythomaniac father, General Ivolgin, claims to have 
been Napoleon’s mascot and to have dissuaded him from prolonging his campaign to occupy the 
Kremlin. (ID, p.536-542) This faith in being able to effect the political through the personal is 
dramatised in Pompes funebres when the milicien, Riton, is sent to entertain the Fiihrer in his 
bunker. (PF , pp. 100-106)
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would be easy to associate the loss of the buffer zone of thematisation protecting 
the subject with the traumatism of the heterological en-dega, as here the fact of 
being headed off on the near side of one’s identity by an alterity (which will 
replunge us into being once more), could not help but leave the impression of the 
destruction of the en-dega itself in the spreading of the il y  a. Thus through 
incarnation, the subject relates the Other au-dela or en-dega, hither or thither 
being to being. Since it is the Other which informs our attitude to being, it is 
worth asking whether Ivan and Smerdyakov sense the beyond of being from their 
position of crisis? If le Bien is an-archic, then so too may be le Mai, in its two 
understandings as evil and as suffering. These may each be untamable and 
produce a descent into the il y  a, which Levinas describes as a “descente 
vertigineuse vers Tabime”. {Tel, p.66, Telb, p.94) This can equally be 
characterised by the expression “trans-descendence”; although as Visker points
1 n?out, only the ascendent part of the term’s coupling is used in Levinas. In the 
chapter ‘Transcendance et Mai’ from De Dieu qui vient a Tidee, Evil is described 
as “le non-synthetisable, plus heterogene encore que toute heterogeneite soumise 
a l’embrassement du formel exposant Theterogeneite dans sa malignite meme.” 
(DVI, p. 198) But in spite of this radical malignity, the Other may still be found or 
searched for in the transascendence of the Good, like the little girl Ivan describes 
calling out to God for help. Levinas better defines this point of contact between 
the Other and God through suffering in Autrement qu ’etre:
il faut apercevoir dans le caractere anarchique de la souffrance -  et avant 
toute reflexion -  une souffrance de la souffrance, une souffrance « a 
cause » de ce que ma souffrance a de pitoyable, ce qui est une souffrance 
« pour Dieu » qui souffre de ma souffrance. Trace « anarchique » de Dieu 
dans la passivite. (AQE, p. 150, AQEb, p. 186)
102 Levinas uses the term in Totalite et infini: “Le mouvement metaphysique est transcendant et la 
transcendance est necessairement une transascendance." Levinas cites this as a borrowing from 
Jean Wahl, ‘Sur l’idee de la transcendance’, in Existence humaine et transcendance, (Neuchatel: 
Editions de la Baconniere, 1944). Referenced in Tel, p.5. Telb, p.24; TaS, p.238.
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In this way, God may be both “dead” and conspicuous by His absence without 
forcing us into the use of negative theology. In this way, suffering from  the evil 
done to the Other can become a suffering fo r  God in the guise of all others. Thus, 
responsibility for the other and the third may enter a state of isolated suffering, 
stirring thoughts of the Infinite, as the suffering which afflicts the subject in its 
pitifulness is understood as afflicting the Good and illeity in general.103 The God 
of suffering, therefore, cannot at the same time be the substantivated God, 
“protecteur de tous les egoi'smes.” (AQE, p.205, AQEb, p.251) Dmitry, in prison 
after having been convinced by Rakitin of the determinism of science, returns to 
the fear that everything may be allowed, the conviction that brought him to the 
very brink of murder when he heard it from Ivan in the first place. His new 
undertaking to suffer for the “babby”, he explains to Alyosha, is also fuelled by a 
new despair, which he qualifies with the following unexpected words:
“[...] fm  sorry for God, that's why!” (BK, p.690)
This idea of a responsibility to the Other in God was already exploited by 
Dostoevsky in ‘Stavrogin’s Confession', a chapter of The Possessed not included
104in the original edition. Tempted by evil acts, Stavrogin accuses Matryosha, the 
fourteen-year-old daughter of his landlord, of theft, and later violates her. 
Convinced she has committed a mortal sin, she later becomes delirious, raving 
repeatedly in her sleep, “I killed God”. (SC, p.54) God as a victim begins to 
assume a more complex character in the unformed mind of Matryosha. Unlike the 
girl locked in the privy described by Ivan, who still believes in a pre-existing 
good, Matryosha, “blaming, of course, herself alone”, in Stavrogin’s words, 
believes that the beneficent order has been destroyed by her. (SC, p.66) The 
confusion at wanting to protest against a wrong for which she herself feels
103 Even dying on the cross, Christ’s, “My God my God, why have you forsaken me” (Matt 27.45- 
47), is a quotation from another’s despair in Psalm 22.1, and is therefore also an entreaty through 
another’s suffering.
104 This is included in the annex to the Pleiade edition, while we are using the first English 
translation edited by Virginia Woolf.
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responsible leads her to suicide. The status of the adult in this situation is as the 
guardian of ethics, for they, as Ivan writes, have “eaten the apple and know good 
and evil and have become ‘like gods’”. (BK, p.278) If we accept that Stavrogin 
was like a god set next to the girl’s innocence, then upsetting the reign of the good 
has meant melding it with a capricious and violent adult order. To return to the 
shepherd Richard, the god he is introduced to by the socialites seems to be 
similarly pagan, as suffering for it results in bondage and death, (p.280) These 
gods are pagan gods, which, rather than confronting the subject with an order in 
which they are responsible, remove their freedom, compel and dominate.
In Dostoevsky’s Poor People, Makar Devushkin is rescued from 
destitution by the charity of the General, the head of his office. He is so grateful 
that he instructs Varenka, his correspondant, not only to remember him in her 
prayers, but insists: “you may not pray for your natural father, but you should pray 
every day and forever on behalf of His Excellency.”105 The use of the capitalised 
title, as well as the association with prayer, already alert us to the quasi-divine 
status that a superior may have in deciding people’s futures. Makar goes on to 
approve even of his superior’s capricious behaviour later in the text, when it has 
become evident that his boss is not only beneficent but also a faulty human being: 
“His Excellency has been good enough to be strict as well, and got very angry 
with Yemelyan Ivanovich...”, (p. 125) There is only a short distance between this 
kind of veneration and Genet’s description of an unjust world. If for Makar 
Ivanovich, God can pass by in the form of a General, then it is not surprising that 
for Divine, “Passa l’Etemel sous forme de mac.” (AD, p. 15) As Levinas argues, 
the death of a kind of God is not in dispute. (AQE, p. 121, AQEb, p. 152) What is 
of special interest to us, however, is the ways in which negative and positive 
transcendence are linked, and in Levinas more particularly, the way in which 
negative transcendence may bear positive transcendence. However, a state of 
affairs may come to be, as for Matryosha and Richard, in which suffering for God 
may obscure the true source of suffering. Like Makar and Divine, Matryosha and
105 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Poor People, trans. Hugh Aplin, (London: Hesperus, 2002), p.l 10.
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Richard are both in a position of exceptional poverty, and may attribute anyone of 
higher rank or sturdier demeanour with virtues which they do not actually possess. 
Vigorous forms o f resistance to this kind of thinking, however, may emerge.
In the third tableau of Genet’s Les Paravents, Leila is insulted by Said 
who curses their marriage. He protests that to his, the poorest and lowest family, 
the Orties, has been added the ugliest wife. During Said’s diatribe, Leila adds 
first, “Seigneur, je  vous en prie, bouchez vos oreilles, ne l’ecoutez plus!”, and 
then, “Seigneur, Seigneur Dieu ne l’ecoutez plus, il vous ferait mal!” (PA, p. 185) 
The pain she experiences is her pain, but felt for another. The intercession in the 
name of the Other or God here is so direct as to arrive before even the God of 
petition who, in His turn, is older than the indicative God, to whom attributes are 
given. (DVI, p.227)106 It seems highly likely that the suffering of Leila is 
developed in part out of the suffering of Matryosha, as Leila (at least to begin 
with) can refuse tyranny and a union with transgressive transcendence. However, 
the upheavals of abuse, eviction, imprisonment and revolution lead her 
increasingly to pursue her marital union through betrayal.107 Said and Leila’s later 
reconciliation comes at a point when they both leave the land of the living, 
unwanted -  half forced (like Sonia), half out of choice (like Rashkalnikov) -  and 
turn exclusion into exclusivity:
Je sais ou nous allons, Said, et pourquoi nous y allons. Ce n’est pas pour 
aller quelque part, mais afin que ceux qui nous y envoient restent 
tranquilles sur un rivage tranquille. (PA, p.288)
106 This is unlike the God o f the Cadi who gives judgements which are neither constant nor 
infallible (“Dieu s’en aille”), neither is it like the God conjured up by Mrs Blankansee in the play, 
whose great-grandmother and father, o f  the generation o f  the first settlers, granted themselves a 
subtle but decisive increment o f latitude in moral matters over the colonised. She describes the 
thrill o f  sexually consummating their marriage on the night before their wedding, in order to show 
that, “l’amour etait plus fort que Dieu.” (PA, p.215, 260)
107 This recalls Blanchot’s observation in L Entretien infini that in a position o f  exhaustion with no 
chance o f  recovery, the bad infinity o f the neutral is indistinguishable from the infinity o f  the 
Other detected in separation. Through this bad infinity itself an exit is sought: “nous pressentons, 
aussi bien, que si la douleur (ou la fatigue et le malheur) creuse entre les etres un vide infini, ce 
vide est peut-etre ce qu’il importerait le plus, le laissant vide, de conduire jusqu’a 1'expression, au 
point que parler par fatigue, douleur ou malheur, pourrait etre parler selon la dimension du langage 
dans son infinite/’ Maurice Blanchot, Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p.l 11.
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For them, betrayal may have taken place in a confusion whereby disaffiliation 
from their nation creates an intimacy, or derisory honour amongst thieves. 
However, their disappearance, like that of Smerdyakov, is not purely cynical, but 
bom from the disorientation that afflicts the oppressed. The author-narrator’s 
betrayal in Pompes funebres, on the other hand, is not that o f one who is already a 
total outcast. The crossing over to the other shore had to be deliberately worked 
at. But, at the same time, the appeal of the Good, detected in Evil as transgression, 
remains intact:
On sait l’ordre contenu dans ma douleur: faire ce qui est bien. Mon gout 
de la solitude m ’incitait a rechercher les terres les plus vierges, apres ma 
deconvenue en vue des rivages fabuleux du mal ce gout m ’oblige a faire 
marche arriere et m'adonner au bien. (PF, 126)
A certain kind of repentance means that a change in direction is brought about 
upon hearing the order of the Good which, Levinas remarks, “evoque la « felix 
culpa » et flatte notre gout du pathetique, notre sensibilite nourrie de christianisme 
et de Dostoievski.” (DL, p.98) This sensibility in and of itself is, however, 
insufficient, as there are some, Genet tells us, for whom repentance is impossible. 
He continues a few paragraphs later to explain:
Apres avoir connu votre interdiction de sejour, vos prisons, votre ban, j ’ai 
decouvert des regions plus desertes ou mon orgueil se sentait plus a Taise. 
Apres ce travail -  encore a moitie fait -  qui m ’a coute tant de sacrifices, 
m ’obstinant toujours plus dans la sublimation d’un monde qui est Fenvers 
du votre, voici que j ’ai honte de me voir aborder avec peine, eclope, 
saignant, sur un rivage plus peuple que la Mort elle-meme. Et les gens que 
j  y rencontre y  sont venus facilement, sans danger, sans avoir rien coupe. 
Ils sont dans I ’infamie comme un poisson dans Veau [...] {PF, p. 128, my 
emphasis)
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Although he cuts himself off from the Good deliberately, he affirms the existence 
o f those who have lost the impression of any difference between the two shores, 
and were seemingly made by nature for such an environment. The impasse Genet 
reaches on discovering the naturally wicked renders worthless his hard won 
solitude. This is why the discovery of a naturally evil world is, in the first 
quotation, left behind in the call or commandment of the good, and replaced by an 
aspiration which is cultural. Genet states, “je n’ai plus, pour gagner la solitude, 
qu’a faire marche arriere et me parer des vertus de vos livres.” {Ibid.) This 
expresses the return of a kind of order through cultural adaptation, and it is here 
that Genet becomes highly problematic, as he causes his sources to operate 
unexpectedly, often inclining them by ‘virtue’ of his writing towards evil in the 
confusion o f the call of good. As referred to in the introduction, transcendental 
reduction operated by people generally may be considered not as objectivation, 
but instead as “society”. However, these readings, as we have seen in the 
disappearance of Smerdyakov and Said, also reveal moments at which society, in 
the pursuit of ‘tradition’, may produce moments of ‘betrayal’, through act or 
omission. These may also be discovered in a literature open to being read 
disinterestedly, in which the choral work of society can be read from different 
angles, and perhaps even produce the ‘denunciation’ Genet describes in 
‘Rembrandt dechire’, placing him in the path o f a responsibility of which he was 
previously ignorant. The adaptations Genet produces are, therefore, highly 
dissonant routes through the self-bound princely or sovereign subject, and their 
place both in society, typifying the Same, and on society’s margins in the 
antisocial, criminal, or badly integrated. Genet thus stages a confrontation 
between the Same and the Ego in the name of a profound reconsideration of the 
future of society based on separation and sacrifice, in which the sacrifice of the 
other is flagged as both widespread and scandalous.
While it would be difficult to wake from the spell of Genet’s writing, as 
Alyosha does during Ivan’s telling of ‘The Grand Inquisitor’, and say, “But your 
poem’s in praise of Christ!”, since in Genet there is no Ecclesiastical affiliation,
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what we are given instead is an insight into the mind of the raskol ’nik (QDL, p.97, 
98), from the Russian raskol, meaning the schismatic or the dissident. Rather than 
hoping that Alyosha will be persuaded by Ivan, or us by Genet, we are instead 
subjected to an eloquent confrontation of themes fashioned from fragmentary 
language and address. If as Ivan says, “it’s not you I want to corrupt and push off 
the firm foundations on which you stand, it’s me, perhaps, that I’d like to be 
healed by you” (BK , p.276), then we must remember that just as the healing o f 
Alyosha did not reach Smerdyakov, the absolutely Other remains always out of 
reach. The apparent absence of Smerdyakov from Alyosha’s world would serve to 
position the traitor opposite the young Apostles whom Alyosha unites at the end 
o f the novel.
If one is responsible for everything and everyone, and as Zossima 
comments, oneself more than all others, then expiation for the suffering caused by 
the persecutor will demand a dramatic effort to understand the suffering that has 
taken place, so that no tear should be lost, and “aucune mort se passer de 
resurrection.” (DEE, p. 155) This must equally be partnered by a political effort 
which assumes responsibility for the persecutor in historical wrongdoing, which 
does not originate in our own present. For these reasons, the relationship of Self 
and Ego with the exterior is a primary stage on which human trials are acted out, 
and, indeed, take place. The shared structure of the subject is a possible such 
starting point.
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Chapter II: The animation of the inanimate trace
1. Speech, writing and the trace
Derrida’s ‘Violence et Metaphysique’ is a critique of Levinas’s conception of 
radical alterity. Derrida asks whether Levinas may have gestured towards an 
exteriority which upon expression cannot remain beyond ontology, because 
necessarily expressed in the philosophical presuppositions of Ancient Greek, the 
language and discourse of theme and concept. Derrida appreciates that the trace 
which Levinas puts in the place of the concept to disorder meaning functions as 
“le dialogue et le trajet vers l’autre”, and cannot be comprehended or comprised in 
the logos or in absolute knowledge:
Cette incomprehensibilite, cette rupture du logos n’est pas le 
commencement de l’irrationalisme, mais blessure ou inspiration qui ouvre 
la parole et rend ensuite possible tout logos ou tout rationalisme. (VeM, 
p.145)
Levinas describes the face as language, both in the sense of facial and bodily 
expression, and speech -  for the face says its hunger, (p. 148) The ability of the 
subject to come to the aid o f its speech, frequently commented upon by Levinas
1 Oft(p. 150) , leads Derrida to ask whether the trace of illeity, the absent Other in an 
unidentified third person, would instead be more readily carried by writing:
Le « II » dont la transcendance et l’absence genereuse s’anoncent sans 
retour dans la trace n’est-il pas plus facilement l’auteur de Tecriture que 
celui de la parole? (p. 151)
108 This is derived from Phaedrus, 275e, “written words”, p.97.
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And yet to be meaningful writing requires some kind of living speech (“la parole 
vive”), outside its own horizon for otherwise, it is merely a grammar or a lexicon 
without language, which one might describe as a code incapable of any form 
allowing the ‘dire’. {Ibid.) Derrida then argues that if writing, despite this, is 
allowed to occupy a sequentially secondary position, then:
c'est en Dieu seulement que la parole, comme presence, comme origine et
horizon de l’ecriture, s’accomplit sans defaillance. {Ibid.)
The fully present speech of God would serve as origin and horizon to a writing 
without lacunae, because it would need no back-up, being a fully interpretable 
archive of traces and inscriptions. However, since God could not be called back 
to presence in speech, to help out signification (since for Levinas, the absolutely 
Other is uncontaminated by being), then writing could in any case only ever 
occupy a sequentially secondary position, but now in the sense that nothing can 
be discerned to have taken place beforehand (“rien pourtant fra lieu avant elle*’). 
(p. 152) In Autrement q u ’etre the dit is said to resonate in all art, in the 
propositions it awakens and causes to resonate “en guise d’exegese'\ {AQE, 
p.53, AQEb, p.71) The resonation o f essence, however, does not rejoin an initial 
moment o f originary voice, but contains traces o f Saying absorbed in the 
narrative o f the Said. {Ibid., p.55, Ibidb, p.74) Writing, then, is the dit, through 
which the oblique strokes o f the dire may run, rather than a dictation made and 
taken straight from the divine.
Derrida thus gestures to the boundary in Levinas's thought which he will 
be testing: the boundary between an absent autrui in the ab-solu, and a present 
autrui in the other -  the other with which one is confronted: someone present, 
yet in the trace of God. Blanchot’s affinity with Levinas, Derrida writes, would 
cease at the point when “le neutre se determine” {VeM, p. 152), notably in the 
manifestation of the II through the tu. This does not express a simple wish on the 
part of Derrida to catch out the author o f Difficile Liberte, who is not unused to 
addressing difficult questions in new and difficult ways; but instead a wish to
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refocus the results of Levinas’s work on alterity on social questions. Derrida 
questions the way this presence or non-presence of the 11 in the tu is brought into 
contact with the exteriority o f an undecidable, questioning world, a
[c]ommunaute de la question sur la possibility de la question. C'est peu -  
c’est presque rien -  mais la se refugient et se resument aujourd'hui une 
dignite et un devoir inentamables de decision. Une inentamable 
responsabilite. (p. 118)
Once again, it is a matter of bringing this pursuit of the question posed on behalf 
o f the other into the present which poses the problem, as a particular other or 
flagship cause would necessarily ontologise and narrow the goal of representing 
the Other generally. How can this community of the question, which is as yet 
unarticulated, and unformed, find itself, since it is, at present, the aspiration to, 
rather than the enunciation of, a new order; it is at the stage of
cette fragile instance ou la question n'est pas encore assez determinee 
pour que lliypocrisie d'une reponse soit deja invitee sous le masque de la 
question, pour que sa voix se soit deja laisse articuler en fraude dans la 
syntaxe meme de la question. {Ibid.)
The ‘hypocrisy o f a response’ brings to mind Diouf, the false-black in Genet’s Les 
Negres, who suggests that Village, who is responsible for the articulation of the 
black community, “se repose dans la parole.” {NE, p. 100) Is Levinas 
compromising the aspiration of the ‘community o f the question’ when he hears 
the other man in the trace of God? Derrida writes:
Levinas a commence d’entendre une reponse. Cette reponse s’appelle 
encore attente, bien sur, mais cette attente ne se fait plus attendre. {VeM, 
p. 152)
111
Expectation lies in the relatedness of the other to all others in the trace; and yet, 
contends Derrida, Levinas no longer feels obliged to await this connectivity, as it 
is partially named in a “contexte theologique”: an interpretation Levinas would 
reject. As Visker explains, Levinas’s ultimate preference for the term “God” over 
the term “Good” is designed to reconcile the problem of the unseen others in the 
Third which open always to an elsewhere. This serves to preserve politics from 
the violence o f an idea the sacred might impose through total recognition o f the 
Good in one person or place, since, in monotheisms at least, the intangibile non- 
ontological nature o f God does not admit description through being. (TaS, p.257, 
266, 269) On the other hand, a relation to the other through God allows the grace 
o f being an other amongst others who share my responsibility, even though at the 
same time the subject is subjected to a plurality of commandments in the Other, 
who both flees and remains.
Derrida’s is a double reading, both within the text and against the text’s 
vouloir-dire. He will later, in Donner la mort, produce a further highly condensed 
double reading of Levinas’s thought which indicates more clearly the ontologising 
risks run by Levinas, which Derrida previously outlined in ‘Violence et 
Metaphysique’. If we follow Derrida’s inversion and read the phrase “Dieu est 
tout autre” as “Tout autre est Dieu”, we get the meaning firstly that God is 
absolutely other, but also that Every other is God. (DLM, p. 121 )109 This 
unworkable ambiguity turns attentiveness to the Other into the claim to incarnate 
the Other; just as the “se veut: l’un-1’autre” does in ‘Rembrandt dechire’, 
examined in our previous chapter on page 59.110
109 It is rendered more symmetrically in David W ills’s translation, “Every other (one) is God,” and 
“God is every (bit) other.” Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f  Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1996), p.87.
110 One can hear ‘Tout autre est tout autre’ in Donner la mort as a part response to Levinas’s ‘Tout 
autrement’ in Noms Propres, in which there is a redoubling o f the double reading o f the critique of  
logocentrism in ‘Violence et Metaphysique’. (Critchley follows the argument closely in 4.2 o f  The 
Ethics o f  Deconstruction.) Levinas observes o f Derrida’s style that it too inevitably makes 
logocentric use o f  the verb ‘to be’ in present tense predicative statements, and that this could be 
used to contest the results o f  a particular deconstruction. However, he then draws a parallel with 
refutations o f scepticism, to the effect that “d’abord terrasse et foule aux pieds, le scepticisme se 
relevait pour revenir en enfant legitime de la philosophic.” (NP , p.85) For Levinas this recovery 
applies at once to critiques o f  deconstructionism, and to his own critique o f Western philosophy in
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John Llewelyn examines the double reading in ‘Violence et 
Metaphysique’ by questioning what exactly Derrida means by ‘the hypocrisy of a 
response’. Llewelyn reads it as hesitation between conventional hypocrisy, 
implying a moral order to which behaviour does not adhere, and “hypoCrisy”, 
which is a crisis: one which imposes a criticism of Criticism; or a criticism “hither 
criticism”; a criticism pronounced on the near side of criticism, and which has a 
disordering effect in the imagination, as it attacks the modes of questioning 
hardwired in the consciousness which have produced such a response. {HI, p. 124) 
For a response to recognise itself as dangerous, or to recognise the crisis on which 
it itself verges, is itself highly significant. So in the first hypocrisy, the II, perhaps 
deliberately, is confused with the tu in order to pass off volition as ethics, and this 
takes place within the subject through the latitude the subject grants itself in the 
name of self-interest; in the second conception, however, hypoCrisy puts the 
problem of interest at stake, not only horizontally between interest groups, but 
vertically between two orders in a chiasmic induction of the problem of ‘desinter- 
esse-ment’. That is to say that disinterestedness is noticed as something beyond 
the margins of the self-interested subject. An occurrence takes place in which 
there occurs to the subject or comes to mind a command which is not directly 
prescribed by the immediate conditions of being. This is a movement from the 
order o f being to that of the beyond being, in uprightness, or ‘droiture’. 
HypoCrisy’s verticality can, therefore, also be related to problems of trans­
ascendance and trans-descendence, and forms part of the intrigue of the infinite in 
the effort to differentiate them. The ‘hypocrisy’ referred to by Derrida is therefore 
endowed with a double resonance: hypocrisy and hypoCrisis; moreover, this latter 
term is endowed with a doubleness of its own, as in recognising the danger of 
duplicity a glimpse of prophetic time may be gained. As we saw in the case of
Totalite et infini. So we are at a kissing-gate between different readings: Totalite et infini upsets 
Western philosophy, whose return Derrida predicts; Levinas returns to the argument o f  VeM in 
‘Tout autrement’ to question the permanence o f the reordering offered by deconstruction, and 
‘Tout autre est tout autre’ by Derrida arrives to upset ‘Tout autrement’, questioning the habitability 
o f ‘the wholly otherwise’. However, since these are double readings they each circulate both inside 
and outside one another’s enclosures.
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Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor in the previous chapter, this dual doubleness seeks 
both Truth and the Good, neither of which can be brought to full presence. 
Levinas explains in Totalite et infini'.
II est peut-etre temps de reconnaitre dans Thypocrisie, non seulement un 
vilain defaut contingent de l’homme, mais le dechirement profond d’un 
monde attache a la fois aux philosophes et aux prophetes. {Tel, XII, Telb, 
p.9)
Levinas addresses this difficulty in large part through the stylistic depth 
and breadth o f his writing. As Derrida explains himself in a footnote to ‘Violence 
et Metaphysique’, there may be a reluctance -  necessary to all criticism, one 
might say -  to engage with Levinas in quite the same philosophical-stylistic 
manner as Levinas himself seems to require:
[D]ans Totalite et Infini, l’usage de la metaphore, pour y etre admirable et 
le plus souvent, sinon toujours, au-dela de Tabus rhetorique, abrite en son 
pathos les mouvements les plus decisifs du discours. En renon9ant trop 
souvent a les reproduire dans notre prose desenchantee, serons-nous fidele 
ou infidele? ( VeM, p. 124)
The question of fidelity is essential to the matter o f the essay as Derrida looks at 
the way Levinas follows and departs from Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida 
investigates whether radical alterity was not already recognised by Heidegger in 
the ontological difference (p.202); while a similar argument contends that the 
notion of analogy in Husserlian phenomenology also leaves the other free of 
objectivation. Derrida’s line of argument is therefore that the venturing of the 
absolutely Other and its attendant risks may already have been obviated by two 
related thinkers who also recognise alterity. Derrida reads Husserl, at the stage the 
latter has reached in Cartesian Meditations, as presupposing the consciousness of 
other selves through the consciousness of an individual’s own past life:
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L’etranger est infiniment autre puisque par essence aucun enrichissement 
des profils ne peut me donner la face subjective de son vecu de son cote, 
tel qu’il est vecu par lui. (p.l 83)111
This, in short, already resembles Levinasian asymmetry, which is transcendental 
rather than empirical. Derrida continues:
L’egoite de 1’autre lui permet de dire « ego » comme moi et c’est pourquoi 
il est autrui et non une pierre ou un etre sans parole dans mon economie 
reelle. (p. 184)
In this reading o f Husserl, the other figures in my transcendental economy, at least 
as a counterpart ego. This is something that Levinas had cast doubt on in his 
Theorie de I ’intuition dans la phenomenologie de Husserl, in which he explained 
that although naturalistic ontology, privileging representation, had already been 
critiqued, the natural attitude persisted in so far as the phenomenological 
reduction remains purely theoretical. This continuation of the naturalistic 
viewpoint in what one could term as a coating with the pale caste of thought, acts 
so as to threaten the transcendence o f the other, Levinas tells us: for the other 
could be reduced in the same way as an inanimate object, he takes the example of 
a rock. Such a procedure would be empirical and not transcendental, with the 
result that its entry into consciousness would involve a conscious but inaccurate 
representation. With regard to consciousness and personality, Levinas emphasises 
that it is the temporal and the historical in the human which are “la substantiality
111 We might clarify this point with a comment by Valery, first brought to my attention in an 
article by Eric Marty: “On peut dire: ‘Je pense A et je trouve A faux’, mais on ne peut pas dire: 
‘Tu penses A et je trouve A faux.’” Eric Marty, ‘Andre Gide et Paul Valery: Le grand 
malentendu’, Gide-Valery: Correspondances, Bulletin des etudes valeryennes, 95 (Nov 2003), ed. 
Frederic Canovas, 131-141 (p. 137). Marty is quoting and commenting on the letter o f 25 October 
1899 from Valery to Gide: in Correspondances d  ’Andre Gide et de Paul Valery 1890-1942, 
preface and notes by Robert Mallet (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), p.360.
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meme de sa substance.” (77//, p.221) The substance of consciousness, then, is 
made in a relationship to time through individual histories:
II s’agit de ce phenomene sui generis dans la constitution de la 
personnalite, qui fait que l’homme a cette maniere toute specifique d’etre 
son passe, inconcevable s’il s’agissait d’une pierre. {Ibid.)
By putting these quotations together, we can construe the supra-historicity of 
Husserl’s onlooker as that of someone as unresponsive as stone. But as Derrida 
argues, if  it were the case that the onlooker were really outside history, then he 
would not be able to recognise objects from his own past-life. It is because he can 
correlate that he can conceive of symmetry, a symmetry without which there 
could be no asymmetry and therefore no other. (VeM, p. 188) So, although the 
ahistorical subject viewing an ahistorical object could together be seen as inert as 
two pebbles, the dimension of a time accompanying the idea of the other, who 
may or may not be absolute, has been outlined between the two thinkers. The 
notion of the trace which follows in Levinas’s ‘La trace de 1’Autre’ -  to which 
Derrida would have liked to have made more reference in ‘Violence et 
Metaphysique’, as he explains in the essay’s first footnote (p.l 17) -  develops the 
notions of diachronic time and asymmetry, which serve to bring the subject under 
a responsibility without dominating that subject.
It is conceivable, then, that even a stone, in its ability to evoke the other, 
may be implicated in the alterity and diachrony of the trace. Levinas comments in 
‘La trace de 1’Autre’ on the difference between a pebble inscribed by a person, 
which could be a trace, and another that has been striped naturally. (HdH,
j 12
p.281) If we allow ourselves to apply Levinas’s own example more broadly 
with reference to his later writing, it is conceivable that the striped pebble as a 
trace o f the other could, in a sense, speak to me before I am able to designate it as 
tode ti, that is as a particular case in a genre, because it is irreducible to any
112 One might observe that a Cherokee would interpret the stone striped by nature (or indeed 
without a stripe) as also being redolent o f  the Other.
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‘essence’, ‘genre’, or ‘resemblance’. (AQE, p.109, AQEb, p.137) That is to say 
that before I could identify this pebble as just another rock among rocks, I would 
already have been called to service through the someone that has inscribed the 
stripes; by the one who moves in, rather than is caught by, the trace of the 
Other.113
In his commentary in ‘Violence et Metaphysique’, Derrida describes 
Levinas’s style as more ‘oeuvre’ than treatise in its inter-modulation of different 
philosophical inflections:
le developpement des themes n’est, dans Totalite et infini, ni purement 
descriptif ni purement deductif. II se deroule avec l’insistance infinie des 
eaux contre une plage: retour et repetition, toujours, de la meme vague 
contre la meme rive, ou pourtant chaque fois se resumant, tout infiniment 
se renouvelle et s’enrichit. (VeM, p. 124)
Rudi Visker comments on this style in which he detects a great attentiveness on 
the part of Levinas to the inflection and reinflection of particular words and terms. 
It is in relation to such a lexis that Derrida signals his possible infidelity. Visker 
points to what is at stake in such stylistic decisions on the part of Levinas and also 
Derrida:
Although all of these waves look alike and are often described by Levinas 
with the same word, they are in fact very different. Overlooking these 
differences can be fatal; it will inevitably mean that one finds oneself 
caught up in the midst of the intrigue of what Levinas calls ‘the infinite’ at 
the very moment that one thinks one has found an exit. (TaS, p.235)
1,3 My brother Jonny once pressed his ear to a fermenting tangerine that whined in the sun with a 
look o f alarmed concentration; and on another occasion answered a concerned ‘yes’ to a sheep 
bleating the other side o f a hill that he thought was calling my name: “Tahaam, tahaam!”. It is 
therefore possible, as we shall later argue in more detail, to be subpoenaed by the non-human.
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That is to say that the question of the infinite that is being put may not be heard in 
its full complexity, and that therefore, in addressing the possibility of the 
community o f the question, the unaware reader may miss the subtle difference 
being alluded to in Derrida’s formulation “[c]’est peu -  ce n’est presque rien”. 
(VeM, p.l 18) As we saw above, this is where Derrida formulates the community 
of the question seeking to question ontology, a community which has “an 
unbreachable dignity and duty o f decision”.114
Visker is referring to the difficulty of discerning the il y  a from illeite, 
which occupied the latter part of our argument in Chapter One. Derrida calls for 
critical attention to be paid to the status of Autrui, especially in terms of language 
and metaphor. Study of the dual inflections of words which function to describe 
both “ilya”-ity, and illeity, will be paramount.115 We shall explore these 
differentiations now in relation to the central notion o f transcendence.
As Visker remarks, Jean Wahl’s problematisation of trans-ascendance and 
trans-descendance, to which we now return having approached it in Chapter 
One,116 may be very usefully applied to Levinas’s notions on positive infinity and
117the il y  a to show the role the il y  a plays in the intrigue of the infinite. At this 
point in his oeuvre, as we have already quoted, Levinas states that “la 
transcendance, comme desir et inadequation, est necessairement une 
transascendance.” {Tel, p.5, Telb, p.24; our p. 102) Although this long predates the 
essays of his final period -  ‘Transcendance et mal’ (1978), and ‘La mauvaise 
conscience et Tinexorable’ (1981), in which Evil is described in its transcendence 
-  the il y  a is already imbued with a character of excess and immeasurability: “un
114 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, Writing and Difference (1978), trans. Alan Bass, 
Routledge, London, 2001. p.98.
115 See Visker’s and Llewelyn’s studies which are able to rise to Levinas’s ambi-valent writing 
with ambidextrous responses. See Llewelyn’s eighty term glossary o f such terms in GE, pp. 196- 
97.
116 We reproduce Visker’s note from Jean Wahl’s ‘Sur l’idee de la transcendance’, in Existence 
humaine et transcendance, (Neuchatel: La Baconniere, 1944), pp.34-56, 113-59. (TaS, p.238, n.6)
117 Visker flags Hent de Vries’s over-compressed initial association, “there is no ethical 
transcendence without transdescedence”. (TaS, p.238) We reproduce Visker’s reference to de 
Vries’s essay, ‘Adieu, a dieu, a-dieu’ in Ethics as First Philosophy. The Significance o f  Emmanuel 
Levinas fo r  Philosophy Literature and Religion, ed. A. Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995)
211-20 (p.214).
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mouvement de descente vers un abime toujours plus profond et que nous avons 
appele ailleurs il y  a”. (Tel, p.66, Telb, p.94) This description follows successive 
waves of Cartesian doubt verifying exterior objects in the world but in which 
every affirmation is then in its turn placed in doubt. This creates a sinking 
movement as more and more exteriority is negated. This experience o f the il y  a is 
not arrested through the cogito, but instead awaits affirmation from the other. To 
be thus on the verge of nonsense, left to one’s own devices, does not necessarily 
mean entering a quagmire of thought in which affirmation is impossible, but 
instead being at the pivot between nonsense and the affirmation of the other. The 
above description of descent, however, in Totalite et infini, does confirm the 
validity o f using the term transdescendence with regard to Levinas. It would seem 
to combine productively with the experience of the undesirable becoming the 
desirable -  Genet’s episode on the train we described in Chapter One -  which 
rebounds into a transascendence.
A striking example o f stylistic ambivalence which fits this equivocal 
mould is to be found in expressions used to describe the il y  a, which are also 
coined to denote positive transcendence. We have only to compare enchainement 
and rivage to pure being, mentioned in Chapter One, with the inability to escape 
the Other in the status of hostage, to see that bondage and the inseverable bonds 
attaching to the Other are drawn into comparison. This allows the relationship to 
the inaccessible other to be coloured in a similar way as enclosure within the self. 
But the resulting anguish allows the other to be remarked -  both noticed and 
placed -  without ontologising that other; a discernment occurs which does not 
point out, but instead notices “une indication accusant la retraite de l’indique au 
lieu d’une reference qui le rejoint.” (DHH, p.289) The other is, therefore, able to 
exert influence without coercion, and yet the doubly inflected figure is 
strengthened to the point where enchainment to the self has become enchainment 
to and by the other; to the point where the self is the hostage of the other. It is a 
form of hyperbole or exaggeration. The emphatic power of the other allows its 
intrigue to be plotted. As Levinas says in Dieu, la m op et le temps, clarifying the 
technical term of intrigue, “L’intrigue rattache a ce qui se detache, elle attache a
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l’ab-solu -  sans le relativiser.” (DMT, p.231) Thus, the separation of the object 
described may be respected in both its transascendence and transdescendence, 
despite and because of the fact that some confusion may, as we have argued in 
Chapter One, exist between them.
There is a literary example in Valery which sheds some considerable light 
on these concerns, and which we shall quote at some length. As our starting point 
we will look at a description of waves in ‘Eupalinos’, in which the Socrates 
character describes the initial impetus that made him become a philosopher. It 
bears comparison with Derrida’s footnote in ‘Violence et Metaphysique’:
Je foulais fortement le bord sinueux, durci et rebattu par le flot. Toutes 
choses, autour de moi, etaient simples et pures: le ciel, le sable, l’eau. Je 
regardais venir du large ces grandes formes qui semblent courir depuis les 
rives de Libye, transportant leurs sommets etincelants, leurs creuses 
vallees, leur implacable energie, de l’Afrique jusqu’a l’Attique, sur 
1’immense etendue liquide. Elies trouvent enfin leur obstacle, et le socle 
meme de THellas; elles se rompent sur cette base sous-marine; elles 
reculent en desordre vers Torigine de leur duree. Les vagues, a ce point, 
detruites et confondues, mais ressaisies par celles qui les suivent, on dirait 
que les figures de Vonde se combattent. (Eup, pp. 155-56, my emphasis)
If one imagines for a moment that this is the single wave in its multiple form 
which Derrida attributes to Levinas, one can then see that it has been compiled 
from different places, breaking at the joining point with the East. After 
contemplating the simple lines o f the sky, sand and water, Socrates moves on to 
the confused repetitions of forms which have become competing figures hitting 
the “socle” or pedestal of the Hellenic world. Valery may be considering how 
what is exterior to the Greek may have influenced the young Socrates. The bi­
directionality of the wave is evoked in the next passage, and is reminiscent of 
Levinas’s ‘Realite et son ombre’, evoking not only sensation, duration, and 
descent, but also statuary:
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Les gouttes innombrables brisent leurs chaines, une poudre etincelante 
s’eleve. Ici, l’ecume, jetee au plus loin par le flot le plus haut, forme des 
tas jaunatres et irises qui crevent au soleil [... .] [M]oi, je jouissais de 
l’ecume naissante et vierge... Elle est d’une douceur etrange, au contact. 
C’est un lait tout tiede, et aere, qui vient avec une violence voluptueuse, 
inonde les pieds nus, les abreuve, les depasse et redescend sur eux, en 
gemissant d’une voix qui abandonne le rivage et se retire en elle-meme; 
cependant que I ’humaine statue, presente et vivante, s ’enfonce un peu plus 
dans le sable qui I ’entraine; et cependant que I ’ame s ’abandonne a cette 
musique si puissante et si fine s ’apaise, et la suit etemellement. (pp. 156- 
57, my emphasis)
The sinking o f the ‘human statue’ in the sand at a moment of pleasure is ominous 
and might bespeak a submergence into the sensation, after ‘sounding with one 
voice’. The mutism and immobility of the statue against which we are warned by 
Levinas in ‘La Realite et son ombre’ and Autrement q u ’etre will not, however, 
last long in Socrates’ case. (RO , p. 120; AQE, p. 191 n.21, AQEb, p.235 n .l) He 
meditates on an object he found and threw back in the shallows, forever since 
disappeared, which once again for some reason comes to his mind, “Attends done, 
et dans quelques mots, je vais trouver ce que je ne cherchais pas.” (Eup, p. 158) He 
continues:
J’ai trouve une de ces choses rejetees par la mer; une chose blanche, et de 
la plus pure blancheur; polie, et dure, et douce, et legere. Elle brillait au 
soleil, sur le sable leche, qui est sombre, et seme d’etincelles. Je la pris; je 
soufflai sur elle; je l’ai ffotte sur mon manteau, et sa forme singuliere 
arreta toutes mes autres pensees. Qui t ’a fait? pensais-je. Tu ne 
ressembles a rien, et pourtant tu n ’es pas informe. Es-tu le jeu de la nature; 
o privee de nom, et arrivee a moi, de par les dieux, au milieu des 
immondices que la mer a repudiees cette nuit? (p. 159, my emphasis)
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In spite o f his thoughts coming to a halt, they soon become active again in the 
‘battle of figures’ which follows, as he wonders as to its identity:
C’etait peut-etre un ossement de poisson bizarrement use par le frottement 
du sable fin sous les eaux? Ou de l’ivoire taille pour je  ne sais quel usage, 
par un artisan, d’au-dela les mers? Qui sait? [...]
Ou bien, n’etait-ce pas l’ceuvre d’un corps vivant, qui, sans le savoir, 
travaille de sa propre substance [...] faisant participer sa nourriture, puisee 
autour de lui, a la construction mysterieuse qui lui assure quelque duree? 
[...]
Que cet objet singulier fu t I ’oeuvre de la vie, ou celle de I ’art, ou bien celle 
du temps et un jeu  de la nature, je  ne pouvais le distinguer... Alors, je l’ai 
tout a coup rejete a la mer. (p. 160, 163, my emphasis)
Phaedrus then asks whether the relief was immediate, to which Socrates replies, 
“L’esprit ne rejette pas si facilement une enigme”, and adds, “je me sentais le 
captif d’une pensee.” (p. 164) He also describes the possible resemblance of a 
natural object to an artistic one. He takes the example o f a rock worn by the tide, 
passing through the family of the forms in order to finally assume the appearance 
of an artist’s image. As with Levinas’s striped stone, this would leave us unclear 
as to whether we are contemplating a trace or a natural phenomenon. In either 
case, however, in this reading the captivity or captivation produced by thought is 
strongly related to an unknown other.
The child Socrates, who could conceive only of certainties at the time, 
then develops a certain theory. Whereas the architect uses material for one or two 
of its qualities, e.g. its durability or ductility, the philosopher attempts to account 
for all that material’s other qualities invested by nature. The inquiring mind 
working through observation searches for traces o f the object’s possible origins in 
order to determine its qualities, as to whether it has been the product of a 
craftsman, a body, a life, of time, art or nature. This confusion of possible origins
122
also implies that the building of a complete knowledge of an object is impossible, 
as Valery also argues in L ’Homme et la coquille, in which even a seashell may
1 1 0
admit of an asymmetry denoting an unreachable alterity. If the philosopher’s 
initial pursuit is o f con-naissance, in the wish to have been present at something’s 
birth, then this desire can only be frustrated, and may perhaps be replaced by 
wisdom in the thinking of alterity and its impact on the subject. The architect who 
pursues construction therefore also works from the lessons of wisdom in trying to 
estimate unknown forces in order to produce a building which is both structurally 
sound, and fulfils a purpose. In the pursuit of what is simply effective, interrupting 
or cutting across nature’s designs, construction applies knowledge to other ends, 
fitting an object into human designs, expressing the architect’s will through 
geometrical combination. As Valery comments earlier in the essay, “chaque figure 
est une proposition qui peut se composer avec d’autres”. {Eup, p. 143) This is the 
making present to one another of objects through logos which enables a general 
combinability o f figures, which is then attributed to laws, or figures deduced from 
laws. (p. 134) What is important here with regard to Levinas is that construction, 
since it factors in only a proportion of the characteristics of the material in 
question, finds the specialist -  Socrates is speaking specifically of the geometrist 
-  at the point where “il a suffisament considere la figure”, such that he closes “en 
quelque sorte les yeux, et se fait aveugle”. (p. 144) On the one hand this expresses 
the primacy of knowledge Levinas finds and opposes in Hegel. However, while 
this knowledge -  which is bound up in itself and which, past a certain point, 
makes itself unreceptive to alterity -  is prey to “l’aiguillon du desir” (our p.65; 
DEE, p.56), it also assumes the organising powers of a symbolic interregnum. 
This paradoxical receptiveness to polysemantics is further indicated a little later 
on: “Cet aveugle admirable se contemple en tant que theatre d’une choregraphie 
savante de symboles!” (p. 144-45)
This blind choreography of symbols is little more subject to the 
geometrist’s will than were the competing figures o f the wave of primary
118 Paul Valery, L ’Homme et la coquille.
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impression greeted by the young Socrates, as we examined before. While a 
‘figure’ may be Janus-faced, and a symbol of multiple application, the trace in 
Levinas is something which signifies by disordering meaning, and resists being 
attributed to any theme. The rock containing a possible trace of the other, 
therefore, could not simply be factored into a tier of bricks in a wall, but would 
itself inspire other thoughts and projects. The ‘knowing choreography of symbols’ 
which takes place when the geometrist’s eyes are closed concerns a drifting into 
possibility itself, that which may be only partly predicted or simulated, in a 
wounding or Assuring of the rationality of logos. For Levinas the trace is a form 
of face and therefore more heteronomous than a figure or a symbol, as it refers not 
to possible present or future meaning, but to something immemorially past. This 
is the point at which the alterity of that which was observed is reanimated by the 
imagination and the senses; the point at which, as Valery comments in his 
‘Introduction a la methode de Leonard de Vinci’ (1894), one is reminded not of 
the marvel on the stage but of the stage’s wings. ( VOl, p.l 160)
For Levinas, the utilitarian marking belongs to the world, whereas the 
trace is of an unknown time; or, if  we can borrow Valery’s description of the 
unidentified object, “le fruit d’un temps infini”. (Eup, p. 161) Knowing where a 
mark came from, in the case of the artist or artisan, would remove it from infinite 
time, or from what Valery also refers to through Phaedrus as “[le] temps indefini”. 
(p. 162) It would make it the effect of a known act or procedure, returning it to the 
world. Levinas clarifies indefinite time as well as infinite time when he remarks in 
‘La trace de l’Autre’ that the past they occupy cannot be designated:
La trace comme trace ne mene pas seulement vers le passe, mais est la 
passe meme vers un passe plus eloigne que tout passe et que tout avenir, 
lesquels se rangent encore dans mon temps, vers le passe de l’Autre, ou se 
dessine l’etemite -  passe absolu qui reunit tous les temps. (DHH, p.281)
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The uniting o f all times is then evoked as part o f the extreme yore (<extreme jadis), 
a notion which Levinas borrows from Valery, (p.277)119 The insertion o f this 
infinite time into our present time is o f particular interest for our argument. Valery 
comments that a mark linked to this infinite time may be discovered in nature, or 
it may be a form arrived at by an artist, who speeds up this natural process by 
several millennia. For Levinas the mark must be made by the human. For Valery, 
on the contrary, as with Socrates’s found object, nature can arrive at such a mark, 
and give it to be discovered. As with Levinas’s mention of one pebble engraving 
another, Valery also requires something more than a simple marking endowed 
with resemblance to behave as a sign of indefinite time. Trace is discovered 
through the frustration of what could be described as a geometrical reflex on the 
part of the contemplator before that which evades transcription and measurement, 
because absented and therefore only partly discerned, (p. 13 8) Such a position is 
consistent with the trace in Levinas, which is not a depiction of the tu taken as a 
model, but instead a passing or flight of this other in the tertiality of the II, and 
therefore provides evidence o f something unrepresentable. Consequently, we do 
not contemplate a particular other immobilised in the trace. However, in spite of 
his positions on aesthetics, Levinas accepts that representations o f the human can 
signify like the trace. But if, as is said in Entre Nous, an arm by Rodin, or the nape
170of the neck may be “faced” , surprisingly, inanimate objects are excluded. (EN, 
p.244) As Llewelyn explains:
Whatever he might allow in the case of a portrait, it would seem that
Levinas could not allow that there is any ethical saying in the case of a still
life or a landscape painting in which no people are portrayed. (HI, p. 173)
119 The expression is also quoted in Tel, p.145, Telb, p.184, and AQE, p.134, AQEb, pp.167-68. 
We shall examine Valery’s own use o f  the expression at the end o f Chapter Three.
120 The expression “faced” is borrowed from Llewelyn’s subchapter ‘Being faced’ in GE. p.63.
125
But Levinas’s comment on the striped rock contradicts this condition of necessary 
human portrayal; it is not a representation of the human, or by the human. In fact, 
it is not a representation at all, but merely a mark produced by the human:
Une pierre a raye une autre. La rayure peut etre, certes, prise pour une 
trace; en realite, sans l’homme qui a tenu la pierre, la rayure n’est qu’un 
effet. CDHH, p.281)
Ultimately, the contemplator is therefore put in an undecidable position, rather 
than one of contradiction, unsure of whether they are contemplating an effect or a 
trace.
The contemplation by the inanimate as by a subject gives Derrida far less 
trouble in Glas than it does Levinas in his work. Derrida turns to the instant of 
substitution expressed as a flowing through the eyes we examined in the previous 
chapter in ‘Rembrandt dechire’. Genet asks, “Qu’est-ce done qui s’etait ecoule de 
mon corps -  je m ’ec...”, and this is quoted by Derrida. (CQR, p.23; Glas, 53b) 
This accusative pronominal particle ‘m ”  in “je  m ’ec...'' relates back in 
‘Rembrandt dechire’ to a “je  m ’ecoulais” or a “je  m ’etais ecoule”. (CQR, p.22, 
23) Derrida, however, speculates that it may imply an absent “je m ’ecrivais”: the 
appearance internal to the subject of a grapheme in response to alterity. (Glas, 
53b) He next elides ‘that which writes’, and ‘he who writes himself in order to 
show a possible indistinction between face in the human and face in the 
inanimate:
Mais les tableaux sont ecrits et ce(lui) qui (s’)ecrit se voit regarde par le 
peintre. (53b)
‘That which writes’, and ‘he who writes’ are each contemplated by the painter, 
perhaps even in their own canvas in which one may have presumed they had all 
the initiative. The writing does not know precisely its own subject or object, the
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subject or object which writes itself. That which is written does not come to full 
presence but is contemplated in the same way that two canvases on opposite walls 
o f a gallery may contemplate one another. This is also the form of the painter- 
writer parallel columns of Rembrandt and Genet in ‘Ce qui est reste d’un 
Rembrandt...’. That they may react to one another in the exegesis o f the 
contemplator is That which remains’, that which was hidden or absent, but caught 
in the trace o f the Other is reanimated.
2. The trace in Genet; the dire and the dit in Levinas
Genet’s relationship to the trace, since his first ethico-aesthetic text L ’Atelier 
d'Alberto Giacometti (1952), is ambiguous. In this text, the innumerable people of 
the dead are described as being dead to such an extent that they have never been 
alive {AT, p.8); or, to quote ‘Enigme et phenomene’, the time of the Other is non- 
simultaneous to the point that, “le passe de l’Autre n’ait jamais ete present.” 
{DHH, p.294) Like the object found by the Socrates character, come from another 
shore, “le fruit d’un temps infini”, Giacometti’s statues, rather than speaking, 
instead solicit a response which disorders the present in which the contemplator 
stands. (Eup, p. 161)
In ‘Fragments’ from 1954, Genet attempts to define an aesthetic based on 
separation and finitude. These are notions he develops around the approaching 
death from consumption of his Italian lover, Decimo, who had been chosen to 
play the part of Forlano in the film version of Le Bagne. The progression of the 
descriptions and musings is highly suggestive in the way it revolves around ideas 
of trace, absence and inscription. Derrida’s comment in ‘Violence et 
Metaphysique’ comes to mind, in which he is looking in Levinas for a writing 
which comes second; but a second place which is not preceded by a spoken 
enunciation. This will lead Levinas, in Autrement qu ’etre, to problematise the dire 
and the dit as the two sides of the amphibological nature of logos, whereby
127
meaning flickers inside and outside the concept. {HI, p. 132) We read in 
‘Fragments’ the following avowal, followed by a musing on the kind of text 
which would follow the novels:
A cette epoque, apres de miserables aventures subies puis transformees en 
chants d’ou je  tentais extraire une particuliere morale, je n ’avais plus assez 
de vigueur pour entreprendre, comme j ’en eprouvais cependant 1’intime 
urgence, une oeuvre issue non du fait mais de la claire raison, oeuvre de 
calcul, issue paradoxalement du nombre avant de l’etre du vocable, du 
vocable avant que du fait, se defaisant a mesure qu’elle se poursuivrait. 
CFrag, pp.76-77)
We already mentioned the idea of musical progression in writing in Chapter One, 
citing Mallarme. This is developed by Valery, who, in his second letter to the 
older poet in 1891, explains his admiration for Poe, who is able to produce “un 
accompagnement en sourdine”:
II precise l’echo mysterieux des choses, et leur secrete harmonie, aussi 
reelle, aussi certaine qu’un rapport mathematique a tous esprits artistes, 
c’est-a-dire, et comme il sied, idealistes violents... ( VOl, pp. 1960-61)
Valery is lauding the ability to produce parallel reaction, prepared in advance 
scientifically by the poet. This is perhaps a clue as to the prewritten relationship of 
numbers Genet claims to be aiming for in ‘Fragments’: “du nombre avant de l’etre 
du vocable”. In ‘Eupalinos’, too, geometry or architecture are used to examine 
human relationships. Much as we might approach the eponymous architect, 
Eupalinos, who in sixth-century Greece was the first to calculate the excavation of 
a tunnel from both ends, the text can be read both as a reflection on the technical 
spirit, and as in some way determining the lines of possible communication 
between subjectivities. The technical, therefore, automatically impacts upon the 
human. The mature Valery returns to the discussion of mathematics, which is a
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pure science and therefore universally applicable, in ‘Poesie pure’ of 1928. The 
governing idea o f a mathematical relationship, which he applies to music, is that it 
should be absolute and true, and not encumbered by content, address or addressee. 
In music a note leaves the order of sound and will have a definite result, a 
“resultat certain”. (VOJ, p. 1462) Genet seems to extend this observation to 
describe the immense patience with which Giacometti sculpts. Having been lost in 
his object and its material, the art object produced by his hands becomes a 
“recompense meritee, mais previsible.” (AT, p.3) However, as Valery explains, 
the relationship of sound and sense makes language too rich in primary properties 
to be clear or pure, hence the great difficulty of poetry: “Tout le monde sait bien a 
quelle point est rare les accords du son et du sens” ( VOl, p. 1462) But then the 
poet is not trying to produce straightforward voice or content, but to create a 
harmonic relation:
si le poete pouvait arriver a construire des oeuvres ou rien de ce qui est de 
la prose n ’apparaitrait plus, des poemes ou la continuity musicale ne serait 
jamais interrompue, ou les relations des significations seraient elles- 
memes perpetuellement pareilles a des rapports harmoniques, ou la 
transmutation des pensees les unes dans les autres paraitrait plus 
importante que toute pensee, ou le jeu des figures contiendrait la realite du 
sujet, -  alors Ton pourrait parler de poesie pure comme d’une chose 
existante. (p. 1463)
The ‘secret harmony’ of which Valery made mention to Mallarme in his letter is 
therefore not literally possible but is a precious analytical idea, through which the 
relatedness of separated things might be drawn into ‘harmonic rapport’. Each is 
cupped in the acoustic of the other, in what would be an adverbial rather than 
adjectival relationship, as their shared resonation is animated by the verbal 
vibration of being rather than being held in a fixed state.121 To return to
121 The notion o f sympathetic vibration in music, important in 18th-century erotic literature, comes 
to mind.
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‘Fragments’, then, Genet explains the conclusion forcefully imposed by this 
aesthetic:
Cette exigence saugrenue s’illustrait alors par cette formule: sculpter une
pierre en forme de pierre. {Frag, p.77)
On the one hand, the subject and the substrate are the same, as with a harmonic 
relationship. But as with the logic o f the ‘vide solide’, Genet is unable to persist in 
this way, “sculpter une pierre en forme de pierre equivalant a se taire”. {Ibid.) The 
musical, abstract aspect is imprisoning, rather than inspiring, and Genet explains 
that this led his thoughts to suicide. What then of the “vocable” avoided in favour 
of ‘clear reason’, but accepted in preference to actual ‘fact’? Can Genet produce 
meaningful play between these three levels: pure rational or mathematical 
relationships, then “vocables” in which the dimension of subjectivity has been 
added, and then finally the empirical reality of life?
A ‘vocable’ is a collection of sounds, possibly forming a vocabulum or a 
‘call’, but it can also mean a patronage, as in the case, for example, of a church 
which would be ‘sous le vocable d ’un Saint’. The experience o f reading Genet is 
of words “qui renvoient mal a leurs objets” (p.84), and o f a narrator preoccupied 
with personal suffering. Genet’s hope is not to go straight to pure poetry without 
content, but that the rapport between each of his words should be productive of 
meaning. He calls this interstice o f meaning between the words a “tombeau sans 
contenu”; and, earlier on, a “tombeau qui ne sera jamais, n ’aura jamais ete”. (p.84, 
82) The mark is deprived of signified and referent, and yet it is more stark and 
violent than the dead who had never been alive of the Atelier, published two years 
before, while both can be seen to signify illeity belonging to an absolute past. The 
ambiguity is maintained as to whether it signals the flight of one we could have 
supposed dead, such as the empty column b on the last page of Glas, in which the 
judas has become the empty cave representing Easter; or whether this illeity 
signals, as Sartre suggests, a sadistic humour whereby Genet allows others to 
cower over his invented victims. (StG, p.610) It would be unlike Genet to give a
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distinct patronage to his work, and so the address to Decimo should be examined 
with care for harmonic rapports. By harmonic rapport, we do not mean an 
accumulation in which the vibration of two ideas would simply join in the ellipsis 
of a blur, making two orders simultaneous, joining them at a synchronic point of 
contact. In Genet, literal and the figurative meanings cannot be separated 
definitively, and so at points o f prohibitive difficultly he is very often melding 
different elsewheres. This is done through logical connections, dressed in often 
incompatible ‘vocables’, inserted into the everyday world.
These different modulations of Decimo’s character are numerous, and
respond roughly to the illeity-ilyaity doubling ventured above. Genet has chosen
122an emissary into the world o f the living, who is dying. Every step he takes 
brings him nearer to his grave, and yet the “pas” are separated, or imprint 
themselves independently of his “demarche”. {Frag, p.71) This description has a 
Heideggerian sonority, in which death, as an unpassable limit, or boundary, 
intensifies the ‘thereness’ of the writer. {TaS, p.248) However, during the entirety 
of this letter, Genet -  who believed himself to be afflicted with consumption at the 
time -  signals that he is writing from outside the realm of the living, fertile, 
heterosexual world. Death is not trusted to describe the possibilities of the subject 
unaided, but is instead constantly accompanied by the trace of the Other -  as we 
have tried to show. This is true of his whole oeuvre, and the layering of these 
traces with those o f others is an intricate affair.
Genet claims that the aim of his sterile prose outside the world of 
communication is to produce a) the pomp of a burial, and b) its pretext, a corpse. 
The transience of life heaves a sigh, leaves a sign, and the name becomes a copy. 
Then the name and the copy disappear, leaving “une idee de misere infinie”. 
{Frag, p.82, 83) This formula, which corresponds to the infinite weakness of the 
other, contains a harmony and a power, of which Genet comments, “elle 
m ’acheve”: that is to say, it completes and perfects, but also finishes, “en ce qui
122 See Oscar Wilde’s The Portrait o f  Mr W.H. (1921) for a strong neo-Platonist interpretation of  
the identity o f  the fair youth in Shakespeare’s sonnets. He is sent into the world to leave a copy o f  
himself by marrying, while the Bard records him in poetry. Oscar Wilde, The Portrait o f  Mr W.H., 
(London: Hersperus, 2003).
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me compose”, (p.83) The Other, both passed and past, is then seen on its way as it 
crosses the subject:
Ainsi parcouru de deux pieds nus qui soulevent une poussiere miserable, si 
ma gloire n’etait pas cette poussiere, cette misere, ces pieds saignants, 
alors quoi, quel or? {Ibid.)
The pomp of the ceremony of Genet’s writing is therefore sterile in the sense that 
it is non-utilitarian, involved in a kind of vigil, outside the communality of 
language understood as a “support sans cesse renaissant d’un lien entre les 
hommes”. (p.78) These bleeding feet seem to refer to those of the errant Oedipus 
or Swollen-foot, and they are not the foot of prosody.
The stone carved in the shape of a stone would depict the invisibility of 
this absent other, leaving only footprints or dust for the artist who depicts. Genet 
separates words from language, using his sculpter’s chisel:
Ils retiennent prisonniere la confuse nostalgie d’une action que des 
hommes accomplirent et que les mots, alors sanglants, nommeraient.
(p.82)
That the tombs o f these words bleed as he fashions them is confirmation that the 
stone that refuses to accept a likeness may, for all that, harbour a trace; a trace that 
is resistant to reading, or that is unpronouncable. (AQE, p.233, AQEb, p.284)
The stone shaped into a stone bespeaks a double abandonment, once by 
the subject that is depicted, and a second time by the artist discarding the material 
that will accept no likeness. This abandonment, therefore, produces not abandon, 
but attentiveness. The other for whom the work of art is produced has been 
noticed for a particular ‘trait’, perhaps in the face, that has impressed itself on the 
subject, before the other recedes into infinity and the subject makes its ‘re-trait’; 
the ‘mark’ this may leave on the contemplator may then lead to a ‘re-mark’. This 
is how Derrida understands the alterity Levinas seeks to describe in his oeuvre as
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a whole in the late text ‘En ce moment meme’ from 1980. (ECM , p. 192) We may 
associate this with the Socrates character who abandons the original object, 
moving on to a series of considerations it provokes. To restate this process, the 
inanimate object carrying a scratch that may be an inscription expresses itself in 
relation to the dit, which produces a dire at the moment in which the flight of 
‘illeity’ is detected: the dire of the subject noticing this flight. The subject then 
responds to this primary address by a series of disorderings, which settle once 
more into the dit. This double separation from the object is neatly expressed by 
the image in ‘Eupalinos’ of a living bunch of roses sculpted in wax, which is 
buried in sand and melted in fire, before receiving molten bronze. The wax stage 
could be the dire o f the artist -  “y imposant [s]es doigts habiles, l’oeil butinant sur 
les corolles et revenant charge de fleurs vers [s]on ouvrage” (Eup, p. 115); this is 
an “ouvrage” which, by the time of the casting, has gone. While other flowers will 
resemble the work which has espoused the hollow of the absent rose, recognisable 
in the dit, none of them will be the same as the one that received the artist’s 
attention. Derrida calls this event, in ‘En ce moment meme’, “seriature”: at once 
‘series’ and ‘erasure’, in his examination of the separation and relation of the dire 
to its original object.
Let me clarify a little more Derrida’s reconstrual of the trace in ‘En ce 
moment meme’. Levinas writes at the end of Autrement qu ’etre that the ability to 
‘retie the knot’ (AQE, p.215, AQEb, p.262) of previous discourse in the said, 
making new saying possible, is not the mode of the State, for whom anything 
which does not respond to knowledge is severed; thus, “[i]l ne renoue pas les 
noeuds, mais les tranche.” A new style of referring to the retreat of the Other 
must, therefore, be developed if this alterity is not merely to be brought within the 
gravitational pull o f thematisation. As Levinas explains,
123 This concerns the same lines or fragile threads connecting the jury to the accused in which 
Dmitry’s lawyer had such faith in the trial scene at the end o f  The Brothers Karamazov. (BK , 
p.887, Book XII, Chapter 14)
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Les interruptions du discours retrouvees et relatees dans 1’immanence du 
dit, se conservent comme dans les nceuds d’un fil renoue [...] (.AQE, p.216, 
AQEb, p.264; ECM, p. 179)
Derrida then picks up on Levinas’s explanation that for the interruptions not to be 
recuperated, they must be part o f a series which is a “serie hors-serie”. {AQE, 
p.216, AQEb, p.264; ECM, p. 180) The original emission of the series is not 
known, and so the idea of erasure is developed by Derrida to emphasise that the 
retreat of the other ceases to be ontologically traceable. How then can an artwork 
become part o f the Work generally; the work of the community of the question, 
which is for the Other? Can my work depart from the Same, and go out to the 
infinity of the Other? Derrida tells us that the work works “dans le re-trait qui re- 
marque ce mouvement heteronome.” {ECM, pp. 192-93) He adds that the re-trait 
is not unique even if  it notices or remarks on the unique, whereas its seriature is 
unique. That is to say that the uniqueness of which the work takes note is not in a 
traceable re-trait which undersigns or retraces, but in its disconnection into a hors 
serie. In this way the steps of the Other’s flight are covered by seriature -  which, 
unlike the signature, is unique. {Ibid.) The signature serves instead to mark or 
remark this flight, by bringing other pronouns (from its subject matter or context) 
visibly under its ‘vocable’, aegis or patronage. It is a whole congregation of 
signatures referring to the flights formed by traces, which form our furrows of 
interpretation. A certain discontinuity of approach seems to have been necessary 
for the writers of this study to address the hors serie.
As we quoted above, Levinas uses the image of the State’s cutting of the 
lines connecting it to the II and the dire, and then an image of the retying of these 
knots of the absent or rejected other. This retying in an elsewhere is interestingly 
also described in an earlier Levinas essay, ‘Enigme et phenomene’ (1965), in 
which proximity in the face, or the ‘approche’ o f the ‘prochain’, produces a 
cutting off from the surroundings, leaving only what would become the dire, 
“expression, visage interpellant de face, venant des profondeurs, coupant le fil du 
contexte”. {DHH, p.288) We will take advantage o f this apparent contradiction in
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terminology in Levinas to look at Genet’s treatment of the image of cutting. We 
already examined in Chapter One the passage in which the boy to whom Genet 
lends his adventures “rompt le drame” and “dechire le souvenir” that have been 
attributed to him. (ND, p. 195; our Chapter I, Section 1) We now return briefly to 
the section o f Pompes funebres where Genet describes his position as a traitor 
amongst traitors. Here Genet speaks of both cutting and untying the strings 
connecting him morally to the dire:
A coup de hache et de cris, je  coupais les cordes qui me retenaient au
monde de l’habituelle morale, parfois j ’en defaisais methodiquement les
nceuds. {PF, p. 128)
While this is also an act performed by the State in the name of Justice about which 
it feels no qualms124, Genet performs this act deliberately, and at complete 
personal loss. He cuts himself off, but can achieve no community with these 
others, who remain ungraspable and hors serie. No longer connected by the 
threads of the dire, those repudiated by the State are even freer, even more able to 
withstand anonymity than Genet, for whom this no-man’s-land offers no foothold. 
The Other remains unnameable and out of reach.
How then does ‘Fragments’ fit in with our reflection on Derrida’s 
difficulty with the naming of the ‘11’ in ‘Violence et Metaphysique’? Were one to 
compare the wave and the rock metaphors which we have been developing, there 
is in each a charge of anonymity which is both propounded and vitiated: in the 
wave, familiar in its repetitions but carrying the unknown; and in the rock 
sculpted into the likeness of a rock which does not prevent it from carrying the 
trace. Indeed, Genet details Giacometti’s wish to bury a statue so that it might be 
rediscovered as a geological part of the earth, as well as Sartre’s report, related by 
Genet, that the artist would have liked the bronze itself to have risen up and 
shown itself without mediation. {AT, p.39, 47) It might also be worth calling to
124 See EN, p.242.
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mind again the painstaking slowness with which Giacometti sculpted, less 
relaying visual information than feeling his way. (p.63) There is a probable 
juxtaposition practiced by Genet here with some observations by Valery in Degas 
Danse Dessin, in which Degas, at the end o f his life, his failing eyesight having 
rendered work impossible, is also described as dominated by the tactile:
II tatait les objets; le sens du toucher de plus en plus dominant chez lui, il 
decrivaient volontiers en termes du tact; il louait un tableau en declarant: 
«C’est plat comme la belle peinture», et les gestes de sa main figuraient 
cette planitude qui l’enchantait. De la paume et du dos de la main altemes, 
il passait et repassait sur un plan ideal, le lissant et le caressant comme 
d’une brosse douce. Un de ses vieux amis etant mort, il se fit conduire 
aupres du cadavre et voulut palper le visage. (DDD, p.249-52)
Genet, in the special relationship he discerns between Giacometti’s art and the 
innumerable people of the dead, may adapt these moribund observations into a 
description of the beginning of a new way of working. Giacometti becomes the 
‘sculptor for the blind’ (AT, p.63), whose creations communicate joy to the finger 
tips, remotely guiding Genet’s own hands over artworks (p.9), for whom now a 
copied Donatello is dead to the touch (p.63). It is as though something 
communicated into the texture of the material itself were speaking instead of 
resemblance; as though the trace was able to animate the dire from a far finer state 
o f disappearance than previously thought. It is also interesting to note the way the 
sense of sight, which commonly associates understanding with light125, is 
translated into the other senses, especially the sense of touch, which, rather than 
acquiring, instead, undergoes.
As Llewelyn argues, things may be implied in the drama of responsibility 
played out in between being and the beyond being: “hypo-Critical responsibility 
[...] may welcome as its recipients everything in space and time, including things
125 “[QJu’elle emane du soleil sensible ou du soleil intelligible, la lumiere, depuis Platon, 
conditionne tout etre.” {DEE, p.74)
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that, in his account of my welcoming the other into my home, get what ethical 
relevance they have only by being donanda, that is to say as food, drink, clothing 
and suchlike, as things to be given to my guest.” (HI, pp.218-19) He then adds 
with an oblique reference to the es gibt, the giveness of being in Heidegger, that 
without a human donor or recipient these objects may also be “given back to 
themselves”. Rather than referring to animate beings as such, they may already be 
considered as etants, and that it should, therefore, not be necessary “to see them as 
somehow belonging to the other human being.” (Ibid.) These objects may be 
regarded as faces in their unassailable individuality, and stake a claim to our 
sensibility.
In ‘Ethique et esprit’ from Difficile Liberte, Levinas comments on the will 
of art to give a face to things, something which he argues it cannot achieve, but 
which nevertheless constitutes “sa grandeur et son mensonge”. (DL, p.21) For 
ethics to be derived not from external laws but from response in the anarchic 
encounter, the other needs to be capable of some kind of address or language. 
There are, however, imaginative reconstruals which Levinas offers for the 
reworking of his ideas. Llewelyn points out such a chiasmus in De Vobliteration, 
in which art is described as offering a face. Levinas denies that this could help to 
rehabilitate the artwork, since it has committed no offence, responding merely to 
its own ontological character. The danger, instead, is that by offering a face it may 
impose the silence of its beauty. (OBL, p.8) He does, however, speak about 
Gogol’s Akaki Akakievitch in terms o f his overcoat, though not as a surpassing of 
form in the face, but as an expulsion from form. The coat cannot protect its owner 
from the world, and leaves him exposed and prone. Levinas gives an account of 
another expulsion from form in ‘Norn d’un chien’, also from Difficile Liberte, in 
which Jewish prisoners of war were evicted from their humanity by the gaze of 
their captors, which saw in them only the simian. Interestingly, in the same way 
that the overcoat demonstrated the obliteration of the face, the obliteration of the 
comparison with apes is countered by another animal: a dog that recognises 
ethical commandment in the Jewish prisoners, rescuing them from the simian, and
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restoring them to the human. (DL, p.216)126 The question is not as to whether a 
dog has a face or just a muzzle, but its role as a marker of the solitude and 
separation of the faces to which it is sensitive.
We see therefore that the glimpsing of the Other to which Levinas seeks to 
sensitise his readers may find different moments of aesthetic expression. Such 
instances may involve the non-human and inanimate as well as the human. In each 
case, however, the beyond being is intimated through being in the discontinuity 
caused by the passing of the other. The withdrawal of the contemplating subject is 
thus related to the uniqueness of the Other, and may be a moment of possible 
ethical crisis, in hypoCrisis, just as it may be a moment of possible hypocrisy, if 
its representation is allowed to take precedence over its alterity. In the next section 
we will look at the artist’s and contemplator’s manner of marking and remarking 
this process in order to compare the work o f the subject, the work of the artist and 
the ethical Work performed on behalf of the Other.
3. The face in art
As Derrida shows in ‘Violence et Metaphysique’ Levinas’s treatment o f absolute 
alterity is a risky affair, as it may inadvertently ontologise the transcendence to 
which it is attracted. However, this risk, emphasised in our discussion, is 
accompanied by a stylistic strategy in Levinas, which works by doubling its 
descriptions in such a way that a positive and negative inflection of transcendence 
is discerned. This is a complex affair in philosophy and art, especially when an 
everyday vocabulary is endowed with special meanings.
126 At a recent conference Alphonso Lingis pointed out that the face in nature is vulnerable, even 
down to a smouldering cigarette butt in dry grass. (Vilnius, On the Ruins o f  Totality, April 2006) 
Glimpsing recent footage o f an ancient species o f shark rejected by the depths, lost on the surface, 
it is easy to feel that it belongs to an immemorial past and also behaves like the trace. It is also 
worth drawing the parallel between the exotically named dog Bobby, which Levinas describes, 
and the companionship o f  the dog mentioned in The House o f  the Dead  by Dostoevsky, called 
Sharik. (HofD , pp. 125-26)
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The ‘face’ is one important such example, since it is that which at once 
shows itself, and hides an interiority. An extra layer of difficulty is added when 
we consider representations of the face, which as we concluded in the previous 
section can be studies in alterity, and yet being reproductions, are not alterity 
itself, and may even risk replacing the call of the face with the prestige of the 
beautiful. This then engages the Derridian description of the re-trait and the re- 
marque of the artist struck by an alterity, who reproduces something of this 
otherness for us. The re-trait notices the unique, but is not unique itself as it melds 
the other with its interior life, but as Derrida has told us “sa seriature est unique”, 
which is to say that by being marked, its entry into discontinuity with the 
remarking subject and meaning in general can retain its unique character. {ECM, 
p. 193) It is therefore possible for the face to retain its alterity, not precisely in the 
depiction itself, but in the erasure or ‘rature’ parallel to the Said of discourse.
Let us look more closely at the commentaries on the face that may be 
garnered in some of our shared source texts and see how they may have been later 
used by Genet and Levinas in their treatment of these problems of alterity. If we 
go back to Dostoevsky for a moment, in The Adolescent there is a highly 
evocative scene in which Arkady notices the unusually good likeness of a 
photograph of his mother in his father’s study. This is explained to him by 
Versilov:
An artist studies a face and divines its main thought, though at the moment 
of painting it might be absent from the face. A photograph finds the man 
as he is [...] {AD, p.458)
As Genet explains in the Atelier, the way of approaching a work of art is different 
to that used for the living face, or a natural phenomenon:
Je crois qu’il importe de l’isoler. Si mon regard le fait echapper a tout ce 
qui Tentoure, si mon regard (mon attention) empeche que ce visage se
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confonde avec le reste du monde, et qu’il s’evade a Tinfini en 
significations de plus en plus vagues, hors de lui-meme, et si, au contraire, 
cette solitude est obtenue, par laquelle mon regard le coupe du monde, 
c’est sa seule signification qui va affluer et s’entasser dans ce visage, -  ou 
cette personne, ou cet etre, ou ce phenomene. -  Je veux dire que la 
connaissance d’un visage si elle veut etre esthetique doit refuser d’etre 
historique.
Pour examiner un tableau un effort plus grand, une operation plus 
complexe sont necessaires. C ’est en effet le peintre -  ou le sculpteur -  qui 
ont effectue pour nous Voperation decriteplus haut. C’est done la solitude 
de la personne ou de l’objet representes qui nous est restituee, et nous, qui 
regardons, pour la percevoir et etre touches par elle devons avoir une 
experience de l’espace non de sa continuity mais discontinuity. {AT, pp. 18- 
19, my emphasis)
The divining and recording of the idea, therefore, involves a discontinuity in both 
time and space, which serves to isolate the object from the distortion of other 
meanings. For Genet there are two possible layers of difficulty lying between the 
living face and the artwork. “Un visage vivant ne se livre deja pas si facilement”; 
and yet, in a mode of communication, it is usually possible to divine the meaning 
of a face, or at least to attribute a workable meaning to it, without letting it escape 
into the vagaries of the environment. The artwork, on the other hand, as we read 
in the quotation from The Adolescent, has already received the mediation of the 
artist, cutting the face from its environment, guessing its main idea, and feasibly 
adding ideas and associations of its own from elsewhere. The art object and the 
original model are each able, for Genet, to create Valery’s “temps infini”, quoted 
above. (Eup, p. 161) Levinas has already declared that the arm and the nape belong 
to the face {EN, p 244), which implies that the separation of the original face must 
be implicated in its reproduction, or in the reproduction of an accoutrement being 
or phenomenon, themselves isolated from the utilitarian world, as long as they do 
not eclipse the alterity to which they refer. This means there are two objects in
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play, concurring with Levinas’s anxiety over representation, which Genet 
expresses in the following way: “C’est done a la fois cette image qui est sur la 
toile -  et l’objet reel qu’elle represente que je veux saisir dans leur solitude.” (AT, 
p. 19) For the object to be attached to one’s own experience of space is not the 
same as for the object to offer itself to the grasp as a thing, which would, as 
Levinas fears, deprive it of the alterity expressed in the face. (DL, p.20) The work 
of separating an object from its context is considered, by Genet, in its proper 
difficulty; as an isolation which he considers as occupying a facial dimension of 
identity or alterity in uniqueness. We take the famous example of the 
handkerchief:
Un jour, dans ma chambre, je regardais une serviette posee sur une chaise, 
alors j ’ai vraiment eu l’impression que, non seulement chaque objet etait 
seul, mais qu’il avait un poids -  ou une absence de poids plutot -  qui 
empechait de peser sur T autre. La serviette etait seule, tellement seule que 
j ’avais l’impression de pouvoir enlever la chaise sans que la serviette 
change de place. Elle avait sa propre place, son propre poids, et jusqu’a 
son propre silence... (AT, pp.39-40)127
So how does Genet move on from this uniqueness of the object in order for this to 
illuminate the uniqueness of the miserable old man studied in Chapter One? Is 
there an isolatable instance o f the II, independent of the unique object, and the tul 
We have already alluded to the fact that for Genet, Giacometti does not 
create for the future generations of the living for the benefit of “generations 
enfants”, but so that his work should reunite with “l’immemoriale nuit peuplee de 
morts qui vont se reconnaitre dans cette oeuvre.” (AT, p.8) The immemorial
127 Valery describes the difficulty o f drawing the “informe”, especially o f the everyday object for 
which there is no convention. He takes the example o f a crumpled handkerchief and the 
uncommon amount o f attention it requires to draw. “Je jette sur une table un mouchoir que j ’ai 
froisse. Cet objet ne ressemble a rien. II est d’abord pour l’ceil un desordre de plis. [...] C’est ici 
que l’artiste peut exercer son intelligence, et que l’ceil doit trouver, par ses mouvements sur ce 
qu’il voit, les chemins du crayon sur le papier, comme un aveugle doit, en la palpant, accumuler 
les elements de contact d’une forme, et acquerir point par point la connaissance et l ’unite d’un 
solide tres regulier.” (DDD, p. 103)
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quality of death refers to illeity without the ontologising familiarity o f the tu. The 
idea of the Unknown Soldier enables us to imagine the single plurality of the 
vous, which would be required, but here the artwork is not a monument in which 
the absence o f the dead is in some way offered to the living and the people of the 
future. Let us read the following quotation in full:
Non, non, T oeuvre d’art n ’est pas destinee aux generations enfants. Elle est 
offerte a rinnombrable peuple des morts. Qui l’agreent. Ou la refusent. 
Mais ces morts dont je parlais n’ont jamais ete vivants. Ou je l’oublie. Ils 
le furent assez pour qu’on l’oublie, et que leur vie avait pour fonction de 
les faire passer ce tranquille rivage ou ils attendent un signe -  venu d’ici -  
et qu’ils reconnaissent. {Ibid.)
This opens a number of possible chiasmic readings between Levinas and Genet. 
As the II is absent, the dead to which the artwork is offered up are paradoxically 
described as never having been alive. So is this immemorial time, or is it an 
aesthetic time in which one may doubt that the dead have even passed or indeed 
ever been? But next their never having been alive is put into doubt, “[o]u je 
l’oublie”, he admits. That is to say he may have forgotten about them, and that he 
himself is obscurely at fault. He goes on with a seemingly simple repetition, 
which then deepens: ‘They were alive enough for us to forget them, and for their 
life to have had as a purpose that they should depart from this tranquil shore’. This 
means that perhaps the only useful act they performed was to depart, but from this 
position of departure -  shared by Sonia, Rashkalnikov, Leila, Said, the occupants 
of Le Bagne, the homosexual writer in ‘Fragments’, and Genet in Pompes 
funebres -  there is the possibility that, although gone over there, to the other 
shore, there ‘they await a sign -  come from here -  one they will recognize.’ They 
are waiting for a response, and the sign they are waiting for is not a matter of the 
aesthetic effects put there by the artist {DEE, p.85), but a supplementary sign on 
the part of the consumer of the art object. If the sign the dead will recognise 
comes from our shore, it is to be released from our environment, in which they
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have been forgotten, perhaps deliberately. In the opening to the Atelier, Genet 
describes a world which, by our own action, we could never make “absolument 
autre”. {AT, p.2) But here, already, tension between the tenses begins to appear, as 
nostalgia for a past that could have been different meets the future of the 
contemplator:
On songe avec nostalgie a un univers ou Thomrne, au lieu d’agir aussi 
furieusement sur Tapparence visible, se serait employe a s’en defaire, non 
seulement a refuser toute action sur elle, mais a se denuder assez pour 
decouvrir ce lieu secret, en nous-meme, a partir de quoi eut ete possible une 
aventure humaine toute differente. {Ibid.)
The “eut ete” of this passage carries more of a charge of pastness than the English 
pluperfect, as it is the past historic, closing the event into a past unconnected to 
the present. However, the nostalgia -  for a future -  remains intact:
Mais, apres tout, c’est peut-etre a cette inhumaine condition, a cet 
ineluctable agencement, que nous devons la nostalgie d’une civilisation 
qui tacherait de s’aventurer ailleurs que dans le mensurable. [...] Mais a 
Giacometti aussi peut-etre fallait-il cette inhumaine condition qui nous est 
imposee, pour que sa nostalgie en devienne si grande qu’elle lui donnerait 
la force de reussir dans sa recherche, (pp.2-3)
So it is a pressure of nostalgia which is capable of moving the subject and which 
forms part of this sign for which the people of the dead are still waiting.
This seems not to be a Heideggerian description of being as Mitandersein 
(being with one another), which supposes a collectivity united around something 
held in common {DEE, p. 162), since Genet describes an ‘inhuman condition’ (my 
emphasis) comparable in its impersonality to the il y  a. Neither does it follow 
Heideggerian being-towards-death, which produces care through the threat of all 
ties to the world being dissolved, (p. 13) The wish to venture ‘elsewhere than into
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the measurable’ does not butt against the immeasurable and respond through a 
renewed effort to ‘be-with’ during life; it is instead a situation in which the 
solitary self is visited by the nostalgia of the immeasurable which gives it the 
strength to “reussir dans sa recherche”. In Giacometti’s case this search or quest is 
for the unique. It brings to mind the descriptions of melancholy in Levinas’s essay 
‘Sur la mort chez Ernst Bloch’, in which the relationship of the subject to history 
and death is recalibrated, and the memento mori is turned towards the other. (DV1, 
pp.72-73)128 The intensification of the suffering of nostalgia for something outside 
the ‘zwhuman condition’ {AT, p.3, my emphasis), to quote Genet again, provides 
instead an impetus towards a not yet present condition. As Levinas writes, the 
melancholy of partial failure “c’est la fat^on dont l’homme s’accorde a son devenir 
historique, c’est sa fa<?on de se tenir dans l’etre inacheve.” {DVI, p.72) But in the 
light of Bloch’s work, he does not exclude the utopia of a possible completed 
work, by which “l’obscurite du sujet est traversee d’un rayon venant, comme de 
l’avenir utopique.” (p.73) This may be the same ray of light we already referred to 
in Chapter One, the ray coming from the eye of the young man in the train after 
his transfiguration in ‘Rembrandt dechire’, which turned senescence into 
juvenescence. This is not a derivative light, but one that crosses us from a future, 
and may be released by the experience of melancholy or nostalgia from within 
totality.129 It belongs to part of what Levinas calls on the one hand the already -  
the pluperfect insertion of an idea -  and on the other the not yet, a future 
possibility seen through a responsibility, one that is recognisable to the individual, 
who is aware of this structure that is neither merely being, nor merely non-being, 
but rather not yet.
The relation to the Other o f the subject is bound up with an experience of 
time from a position of separation. The discontinuity of this position is for Genet 
the source of all beauty, whether it be for the individual or the inanimate:
128 We also quote from Totalite et infini, “La mort, source de tout les mythes, n’est presente qu’en 
autrui.” {Tel, p. 154, Telb, p. 195)
129 This light image seems already to be present in Levinas’s middle period, and can also be found 
described as a reflection in Totalite et infini, “Cet «au-dela» de la totalite et de l’experience 
objective, ne se decrit pas cependant d’une fa£on purement negative. II se reflete a Yinterieur de la 
totalite et de l’histoire, a Vinterieur de l ’experience.” {Tel, XI, Telb, p.7)
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II n’est pas pour la beaute d’autre origine que la blessure, singuliere, 
differente pour chacun, cachee ou visible, que tout homme garde en soi, 
qu’il preserve et ou il se retire quand il veut quitter le monde pour une 
solitude temporaire mais profonde. II y a done loin de cet art a ce qu’on 
nomme miserabilisme. L’art de Giacometti me semble vouloir decouvrir 
cette blessure secrete de tout etre et meme toute chose, afin qu’elle les 
illumine. {AT, pp.3-4)
Our claim is that the relationship between the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ in 
Levinas is in this instance what the wound in Genet flickeringly illuminates. 
There are several questions here: of generation, gender, of abiding within the self; 
but all of them grouped somehow in questions of the face. The face has a beyond, 
and therefore a kind of fecundity, a ‘not yet’ of its offspring in the Third, that is 
the absent others to whom I am also responsible. We should therefore take this 
opportunity to note with Llewelyn that, in a non-biological sense, a same sex 
relationship can be understood as heterosexual. (GE, p.87) The offspring 
engendered through responsibility are conceived through the Other, which are in 
some way ‘already’ resident in the home, as the Other’s need for an abode is felt 
in the foreboding of the il y  a, as Llewelyn puts it. (p. 127) This has the advantage 
over Heideggerian theo-ria, which attempts to give us to see the gift of being, 
because in the ‘not yet’ there is a phenomenology of what is as yet absent. In the 
case of Genet’s theory of the wound, and Levinas’s theory o f the face, their 
enigma refers to a secret region, and therefore does not give itself to be seen, even 
though for Genet the wound is the place from where “tout leur etre afflue.” (AT, 
p.31) This flux or welling up is not, however, tappable at source; for the centre of 
interest in the frontal view of a portrait is derived differently, “tout doit partir de 
ce centre pour aller nourrir, fortifier ce qui est derriere, cache. [...] [L]e peintre tire 
en arriere (derriere la toile) la signification du visage.” (p.61) In a similar way, 
one can understand the theoretical gesture of the face in Levinas as non- 
theoretical, for it does not surrender itself. Rather than seeing being, the act of
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seeing itself becomes a term implying temporal generation, for it is the 
generations to come which generate time. But has not Genet explicitly told us that 
Giacometti’s art is not meant or destined “aux generations enfants” (p.8), but 
instead for the innumerable people of the dead? This apparent impasse may 
usefully be compared to Valery’s poem ‘La jeune Parque’, in which the female 
narrator is drawn out of her entombment into an, at first, impersonal, then 
individual, personal fecundity. As Levinas writes in Totalite et infini:
II s’agit d’un neant distinct du neant de Tangoisse, du neant de l’avenir
enseveli dans le secret du moins que rien. {Tel, p.244, Telb, p.299)
To be sepultured in the less than nothing of the ‘not yet’ is to cross dead time. 
This time is traversed very differently in Genet and Levinas, though with an 
ethical crossing point which we shall seek to discern. In Levinas this being and 
non-being is thought in terms of fecundity, illustrated through the parent, whereby 
“le moi est dans 1’enfant, un autre”. {Ibid.) In Genet, on the other hand, at this 
juncture, the continuity of time is thought in relation to the alternating directions 
of the people of the dead, come to greet the viewer of a statue and to pass him by, 
or recede once again. The ego is therefore implicated in the exemplar of the 
people of the dead, producing, as does fil(l)iality in Levinas, an identification 
through the self, which is at the same time a form of differentiation. And so it is 
with Giacometti’s relationships to his own statues. Genet observes to the artist, 
“c’est peut-etre que, malgre tout, la femme vous parait naturellement plus 
lointaine... ou bien vous voulez la faire reculer...”. {AT, p.22) Giacometti’s 
unstraightforward relations with women are addressed later in the Atelier, though 
Genet follows up this hesitant observation by situating himself in relation to 
women. He does this not sexually but filially in relation to, one suspects, one 
woman, “Malgre moi, sans rien lui en dire, j ’evoque l’image de la Mere, si haut 
placee, ou que sais-je?” {Ibid.) Is not Genet referring tangentially, not to the 
‘highly placed’ or “highly favoured” {Luke 1.28) Mother of the Virgin Mary, but 
to his own progenitor, known only by the name Camille Gabriel Genet? So while
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evocations of fil(l)iation in flesh and blood are relatively rare in Genet’s writing 
before the theatrical works and before Un captif amoureux, there is already 
present an ethical concern for the position of the Other in the continuity or 
discontinuity of time. Since these two moments of speculation on the feminine on 
behalf of Giacometti and himself bespeak distance or separation, we find 
ourselves in the impenetrable territory of love and death. It is possible to 
understand Genet’s use of death and the people of the dead to denote at once the 
defunct and those who have for whatever reason departed; that is been excluded, 
as with LeYla and Said, or abandoned, as we can surmise was Genet’s own mother 
when she abandoned him as a child.
Strongly throughout the oeuvre, though especially in the Atelier, Le 
Bagne, ‘Fragments’ and Les Paravents, a trace of the region of death seems to 
have all but replaced fecundity. But equally in Levinas, biology is only a 
synecdoche of future generations, which rather than being thought only in the 
mode of succession should also be thought as ‘precession’, the exercise of a 
torque through gravitational influence between separate bodies affecting the initial 
body’s orbit. By this we mean to describe the clinamen operated by the Other, 
whether near of far, and understood in terms of both space and time. As Genet 
writes, “L’injustice -  et notre douleur -  seraient trop grandes si une seule d’entre 
elle [la mort] etait privee de la connaissance d’un seul d’entre nous, et notre 
victoire bien pauvre si elle ne nous faisait gagner qu’une gloire future.” {AT, 
pp. 15-18) This communication with the dead, whereby we appear before them 
(“comparaitre”), rather than they before us, is related to a fault line in the structure 
of the subject, in its relationship to time and in its need for forgiveness. This is no 
desire for forgiveness before finite time runs out; forgiveness is sought instead in 
relation to the incompletion of time, stretching across dead time between both the 
immemorial ancestor and future generations.
In Genet, a rethreading o f the il y  a o f dead time takes place in 
receptiveness to the immemorial ancestor.130 The subject’s crossing of this dead
130 See Golding’s The Inheritors for a study on modern man’s relationship to an immemorial 
ancestor. William Golding, The Inheritors (London: Faber, 1955).
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time is further complicated in that it is also answerable before the Third; that is, 
not before a particular other, nor merely before the general alterity of Autrui, but 
before a ‘people of the dead’, comprised of interrelated individuals, in which the 
relation to one alters the configuration of all the others. This is something Genet 
describes in the progress of Giacometti’s sculpting. During the creation of one 
statue, the finished statues alter and change, “parce qu’il travaille a l’une de leurs 
soeurs.” (GOC5, p.72)131 While Genet is indifferent to the charms of nude female 
models, he sees the statues themselves in the way Giacometti sees the models, as 
goddesses, not like goddesses: that is not in a comparison with, but in their 
capacity as. Turning our attention to the power with which the statues are 
endowed, we will examine them as related both to the erotic dominion of the idol 
and to the ethical commandment of alterity:
C’est 1’ oeuvre de Giacometti qui me rend notre uni vers encore plus 
insupportable, tant il semble que cet artiste a su ecarter ce qui genait son 
regard pour decouvrir ce qui restera de l’homme quand les faux-semblants 
seront enleves. (AT, p.3)
What seems to have been left behind is the wound bom in solitude on behalf of all 
beings and things. Genet has just commented that Giacometti transforms his 
experience of women as goddesses into the statues, giving pure percept, 
dissolving utilitarian bonds, (p.45) However, Genet’s descriptions of Giacometti’s 
experience of prostitutes complicate this pure artistic position, borne out of 
respect for alterity. We quote Genet’s rendition o f the importance of brothels to 
Giacometti:
II me semble qu’il y entrait presqu’en adorateur. II y venait pour s’y voir a 
genoux en face d’une divinite implacable et lointaine. Entre chaque putain 
nue et lui, il y avait peut-etre cette distance, que ne cesse d’etablir chacune
131 This passage is missing from the Barbezat edition we have been abbreviating as AT.
148
de ses statues entre elles et nous. Chaque statue semble reculer -  ou en 
venir — dans une nuit a ce point lointaine et epaisse qu’elle se confond 
avec la mort: ainsi chaque putain devrait-elle rejoindre une nuit 
mysterieuse ou elle etait souveraine. Et lui, abandonne sur un rivage d’ou 
il la voit a la fois rapetisser et grandir dans un meme moment, (p.52)
This ambiguous description would seem to represent a collapse in this text of the 
Levinasian vocabulary used to separate the saintly (in the uniqueness of 
separation), from the idolatrous (in the sacrifices made to the idol). It is as though 
the artist, absorbed in the uniqueness of his model, in her illeity, imposes upon 
himself in response an elemental experience in the brothel in the apeiron of the il 
y  a, in which the erotic embrace has been stripped of all concern for the other’s
132uniqueness or fragility, and plunged into an impersonal, intemporal realm. So 
what are we to make of Giacometti’s view of the Other’s inviolable singularity? 
Are not these prostitutes by design violable? Returning to the movement between 
shores, it is the prostitute who slips away in the flight described above, 
abandoning Giacometti, while the distance between himself and the whore is 
given as a parallel, by Genet, for the relationship between the statue and the 
spectator. In common with the other descriptions, the ‘she’ of the prostitute, like 
that of the statue, returns to death, while ‘he’, the artist, persists in life. His, then, 
is strangely an experience of her z/leity, in a hors serie outside of any generative 
succession.133 Yet while the depth and beauty of the feminine face in the “moins
132 Nietzsche seems to examine this movement from individuation to impersonal being in his 
Dionysian-Apollonian separation, which also seems to be, as for Giacometti, sexual in nature: “the 
phenomenon that pain begets joy, that ecstasy may wring sounds o f  agony from us. At the very 
climax o f joy there sounds a cry o f horror or a yearning lamentation for an irretrievable loss.” 
(BoJT, Chapter 2, p.40) While one hopes that “horror” is not a general description for all sexual 
encounters, the scenario in the Atelier o f an exploitative conjunction followed by abandonment 
does go far beyond the idea contained in the Latin saying Post Coitum Omne Animal Triste Est, 
which would suggest mere melancholy, in that a failed meeting is not automatically a “loss”. The 
impersonal quality o f  the Nietzsche and Genet descriptions, we emphasise once again comes from 
a relation to being. Following the irretrievable loss quotation, we are also given an idea o f the 
apeiron through something like the wave metaphor, expressing both suspension and participation 
in being, through music, in “the wave beat o f rhythm”. {Ibid.)
133 The gender dissonance present in “her illeity” will be explored in more detail in a paper 
planned on Derrida’s ‘En ce moment meme’.
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que rien” risks being replaced by the image, as Levinas writes {Tel, pp.240-41, 
Telb, p.294), these images, Giacometti’s images of women and Genet’s images of 
prostitutes, may still serve to elicit a responsive Saying.
This concurs in some way with Levinas’s views on art, for Giacometti 
does not correct the squint in nature, as would the classical artist. (RO, p.l 18) The 
suspended present he produces is therefore not the comfortable one of self- 
satisfied harmony, though neither is it a form of miserabilism. {AT, p.3) If the 
artist is able to notice the wound of every being and every thing, then that which 
renders the inhuman condition (as a thing amongst things) more intolerable is also 
that which renders individual solitude more difficult to bear. This is the way we 
read the ‘nevermore’ of the delivery from solitude:
n’est-ce pas au bordel que la femme pourrait s’enorgueillir d’une blessure 
qui ne delivrera jamais plus de la solitude, et n’est-ce pas le bordel qui la 
debarrassera de toute attribution utilitaire, lui faisant ainsi gagner une sorte 
de purete. (p.53)
This dubious and paradoxical statement understands the lack of technical utility as 
non-utilitarian, which one might first of all understand as the quality of being 
attractive rather than practical. But the use to which the prostitute is put is not 
directly problematised in this quotation. A similar observation appears in Le 
Balcon: “La vie est a cote... et elle est tres loin. Ici toutes les femmes sont belles... 
Elies ne servent a rien d’autre qu’a etre belles.” (GOC4, p. 131) In fact, in a sense, 
they are utilitarian, because being beautiful is the purpose that they serve. This 
logic can be extended to argue that prostitutes are also technical, in terms of being 
proficient, as Madame Lysiane argues when she describes her girls as ministering 
to the sick. {QU, pp.300-301) But for Roger, the chief revolutionary who 
pronounces the above Balcon speech, such beauty is incompatible with useful 
political engagement, and the revolutionary cause is lost. Artistic truth and 
political engagement are, therefore, quite different. Levinas argues the same point 
in ‘La Realite et son ombre’, in a thinly veiled criticism of Sartre’s Qu ’est-ce que
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la litterature? (1948), saying that participation in an art object concerned with 
engagement is still a participation in a piece of art, itself within being, rather than 
the disordering of being in the world by the other beyond it. Genet is also 
increasingly critical of Sartre’s position and adopts the stance that art should not 
be social, and therefore neither directly political nor engaged. Giacometti’s art 
instead is one of separation and solitude:
L’art de Giacometti n ’est done pas un art social parce qu’il etablirait entre 
les objets un lien social -  l’homme et ses secretions -  il serait plutot un art 
de clochards superieurs, a ce point purs que ce qui pourrait les unir serait 
une reconnaissance de la solitude de tout etre et de tout objet. (AT, pp.72- 
73)
Political engagement would, it seems, short-circuit this new mode of solitude, 
which, as we shall see, is the premise for an ethics of alterity.
For Genet, the source of beauty in the art object, like the imperfection in 
the structure of the self, can be described as a secret wound. However, both can be 
obscured by faux-semblant, that is by the illusions that conceal what Genet 
describes as “une aventure humaine toute differente. Plus precisement morale sans 
doute.” (p.2) If, as we quoted above, Giacometti “a su ecarter ce qui genait son 
regard” (p.3), then the magnificent image he gives to us is o f something in its 
solitude. However, the brothel has played too large a part in Giacometti’s life for 
Genet to ignore it, while in his own oeuvre the brothel as house of illusion and 
metaphor for the world also plays a conspicuous role. And yet, another 
contradiction exists: if  Giacometti is able to remove the “faux-semblant” (p.3), 
then can he do this in the heart of illusion itself, to which he himself is 
intermittently subjugated, both in the French understanding of enamoured, and in 
the more etymological idea of accepting a “joug”? Is the brothel, as a response to 
alterity, more a form of compulsive resistance to this same alterity, whereby the 
solitude which the artist sets out in quest of in the first place is denied, in which
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the non-utility of the artwork enters into conflict with the use to which someone is 
put who is excluded from the artist’s preferred subjects?
Genet poses an uncomfortable question by taking the wound of solitude, 
the origin of all beauty, and making it the source of beauty and pride for someone 
who cannot choose her company, and whose solitude can only be an interior one 
of separation. Is this account of exploited beauty therefore not meant to intensify 
the dissatisfaction at the “faux semblant” against which Giacometti’s art, at least 
according to Genet, would seem to work? The secrecy of the wound may be so 
hidden that the subject him or herself is unaware of it. And yet, some of its visible 
manifestations are also welcomed as expressive of something intimate to the 
subject:
II [Giacometti] reprend sa marche en boitant. II me dit qu’il a ete tres 
heureux quand il a su que son operation -  apres un accident -  le laisserait 
boiteux. Voila pourquoi je vais hasarder ceci: ses statues me donnent 
encore l’impression qu’elles se refugient, en dernier lieu, dans je ne sais 
quelle infirmite secrete qui leur accorde la solitude, (p.33)
But would this not also mean being called out o f solitude by the solitude of the 
other’s wound, which I am able remotely to sense as the hidden source of their 
beauty? Does this not mean that by rendering the wound in some way visible in 
art, the solicitation made to the subject by the secret wound noticed in the other is 
rendered urgent? Let us examine some other literary examples.
Rashkalnikov was engaged, shortly after his arrival in Petersburg, to his 
landlady’s sickly daughter. (CP, p. 120, Part II, Chapter 1,) He recalls this later, 
after the doctor’s visit, in the company of his family, Such -  such a plain 
girl. I really don’t know why I was so attached to her at the time. Because she was 
always ill, I suppose. If she’d been lame or a hunchback I believe I’d have loved 
her better still.’ He smiled wistfully.” (p.248, Part III, Chapter 3). This bears 
comparison with Giacometti’s amorous adventures with an old tramp woman. 
Genet even asks why he didn’t marry her, and present her to the world as his wife.
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(.AT, p.66) For Rashkalnikov as well as Giacometti, the visible manifestations of 
the wound of the other produce attachment across separation. This phenomenon is 
reproduced in various elements of Genet’s work: in Stilitano’s severed hand (JV, 
p.68), Querelle’s squint (QU, p.405; Glas, 131b), and again in Genet’s limp (CA, 
p.289), and the one-legged prisoner met by Culaffoy in Notre-Dame (ND, 
p. 130).134
This strange anti-Darwinian impulse we call compassion seems to be a 
general feature of all these texts. Compassion creates a connection to the other 
which is not mere sympathy and certainly not an empathy that would claim to 
know how the other felt. It is instead a feeling for the separateness o f the other in 
their affliction. This is only one step away from the secrecy of a shared solitude 
touched upon in Chapter One, which forms the basis of a proto-ethics. As Genet 
writes in a key passage towards the end of the Atelier, “Etant ce que je  suis, et 
sans reserve, ma solitude connait la votre.” (AT, p.73) Let us examine this remark 
in the context of a further reflection on prostitutes. Genet writes:
Je ne crois pas -  je me trompe peut-etre -  qu’il en ait peinte une seule. S’il 
devait le faire, il se trouverait done en face d’un etre avec sa solitude a 
laquelle s’en ajoute une autre qui releve du desespoir, ou de la vacuite. 
(p.67)
Although the use of prostitutes as models was a common pre-war practice, Genet 
claims Giacometti did not paint a single one, as this would have supplemented the
I -2 c
solitude of the prostitute with the solitude and despair o f the artist. There seems 
to exist in the prostitute, for Giacometti, a pornography of the other’s solitude 
from which the prostitute cannot escape. This would surely have to be dissociated 
from the solitude of the beings, phenomena and things in which or in whom he 
seeks, in Genet’s view, to discover the secret wound. This is because in
134 In The Brothers, Maximov’s first wife is also lame. (BK , p.496)
135 Interview June 2005 with Simon Bolin, wife o f the painter Gustav Bolin, who held a 
neighbouring studio to Giacometti’s in the rue du Moulin Vert from immediately post-war until 
Bolin’s own death in 2000.
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pornography, the grapheme of the other’s uniqueness is represented and therefore 
accorded neither separation nor the status of trace through which a community of 
separation might be possible. It would be a retrait become reproducible and come 
loose from its commandment, rather than a seriature, to return to our above 
argument. Were Giacometti required to study the prostitute -  who is transformed 
in his eyes from a “poule” into a “deesse” (p. 11) -  in the same way he studied 
other objects in their uniqueness, then his reneging on a precontractual 
responsibility could indeed create the situation of despair or ‘vacuite’ which 
Genet mentions. We are tempted to translate this ‘vacuite’ as ‘dereliction’, in 
which time would cease to flow, become substance and discover, once again, the 
“vide solide”, in which the separated subject has become, for Levinas, “moi- 
substance”. (EN, pp.220-21) It is as though, at a certain point, attractiveness 
became practical or useful for the achievement of pleasure; or, as Genet writes in 
Un captif amoureux at the end of the description of the palace and the shantytown: 
“En pourrissant chacun se sentait soulage, done apaise, d’echapper a l’effort 
moral et esthetique, les bordels ne voyaient avancer vers eux qu’une reptation de 
desirs a calmer vite. Ce qui va au bordel s’y traine a mille pattes, le ventre dans la 
glaise, cherchant et trouvant le trou qui palpite et mouille, ou en cinq secondes par 
cinq secousses disparait l’enervement de la semaine.” (CA, p.87)
The fact that this description of the brothel was begun in the Atelier 
suggests that the escape from moral and aesthetic effort in the brothel would not 
only turn something non-utilitarian into something practical, but that this could 
become a practice in its own right. The brothels then become a parallel to 
Giacometti’s artistic practice and even an uneasy sacralized alternative. All of this 
is recorded by Genet in an effort to interrupt any easy equation between 
Giacometti’s subjects, his output and any pretence to bonte. Indeed, if  Genet 
argues that the meaning of art comes from separation, which is disengaged, he 
presents in the same gesture the concomitant danger that art could provide an 
alternative to resistance in the face of injustice. Genet identifies a pressing cultural 
danger that the plight of the other may be enjoyed aesthetically, but not be 
intervened in practically.
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The risk of this is what might be called an abortive transcendence, in 
which compassion towards the other fails to leave the self, in less the society of 
two of the erotic relationship than a society of one. Alphonso Lingis describes the 
complementary phenomena of acrotmetophilia, the love for an amputee, and 
apotemnophilia, the love “in which sexuoerotic arousal and facilitation or 
attainment of orgasm are responsive to and contingent on the fantasy of being 
lame, with a limp or crippled.”136 Very often the former group, who are attracted 
to disability (“devotees”), are also members of the latter group who want to be 
disabled (“wanabees”). While we are not suggesting that Rashkalnikov and 
Giacometti are sufferers of these complex psychological conditions, they do fit a 
certain pattern of the “pornography of the good” (GE, p. 125), in which the 
separation from the person to whom one is responsible becomes the requirement 
that this person be maintained in their enfeebled state, to a point where the 
beloved's participation may even be substituted by the care giver’s own imitation 
of them. This would remove the need for emotional or practical resources to leave 
the economy of the self, allowing them to be savoured in the ego or the same.
It is also possible, however, in sincere and self-sacrificing love of the other, 
to make of the weak an idol. We shall take another example from The Brothers 
Karamazov, from Book IV, Chapters 5 and 6, which are set in Mme Kokhlokov’s 
drawing room and Snegiryov’s cottage. An essential term forms part of the titles 
of these two chapters, the Russian, 4nadriv’, coming from the verb ‘rvat’ meaning, 
“to tear.” In the better French translations, including the one by Nietochka
1 ^ 7Niezvanov in the Pleiade edition, we read “dechirement” , while, in English, 
McDuff offers us “strain”, and Pevear, the perhaps slightly too literal “crack up”; 
Garnett suggests “lacerations”, and Avsey the very safe “crisis”. While this is a 
fiendishly difficult term to translate, having been largely coined by Dostoevsky, 
what the modem day Russian expression “to speak with ‘nadriv’” denotes is to be 
emotionally implicated, or under pressure to the point of being rent between
136 Alphonso Lingis, Body Transformations (London: Routledge, 2005), pp.77-78.
l37The translations o f the term ‘nadriv’ may be found on the contents pages o f the different 
translations; we refer the reader to the bibliography for full references.
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alternatives. The insulted Snegiryov cannot accept help from Alyosha and so 
delays the treatment of his son, Illyusha, who is gravely ill. Katerina convinces 
herself she loves Dmitry, because he may submit his will to her own, whereas 
Ivan never could. It could be further argued that she is only willing to sacrifice 
herself to Dmitry if Ivan’s ardour will lead to a kind of parallel sacrifice to her 
own. This intuited eventuality leads Ivan to give his blessing to her devotion for 
Dmitry (which is also spurred by Katerina’s rivalry with Grushenka), and leave.
Irina Levotina describes a key element of this concept in her article 
‘Dostoevskian Nadriv’. She describes the term as “masochistic self-admiration”,
138also stressing the unnatural character of these manifestations. Dostoevsky, by 
his own analysis in his notebooks, is not a psychologist, but a “realist in a higher 
sense”, portraying the depths of the human soul. (PD , p.277) For us, therefore, the 
least accurate translation used only in Andre Markowicz’s French edition is 
‘hysterie’, in Russian, ‘isterika’. This medicalising word strikes us as too clear-cut 
to do justice to the depth with which these behaviours are a part of the universe in 
which they occur, rather than being dictated by the humours of individual 
characters. These characters are instead responding with existential turmoil to 
very particular circumstances and partner characters.139 The translation which 
seems to us closest to ‘nadriv’ is Magarshak’s “heartache”, which gives the idea 
of a possible sincere beginning which could pivot into unnatural romanticising, 
self-dramatisation and a tearing between alternatives, without the tearing itself 
necessarily taking place: the rent is instead maintained in a destructive present in 
which the despair of the spectacle supplements the destitution of the contemplator.
Dostoevsky’s thinking on “nadriv” occupies many different registers, 
though characterises most often the moment at which a grain of over­
determination enters the willingness to undertake a responsible act. This can be 
spoken with the equanimity of a not too grievous sufferer, as in the case of the
138 Irina Levotina, ‘Dostoevskian Nadriv’, Itogui, 34, (1997),
<http://www.stengazeta.net/article.html?article=2547> (para. 2 o f 10) [accessed 24 January 2008] 
Olga Nezman is thanked for the translation.
139 Instances o f nervous illness are widespread in the novel, but like ‘nadriv’, are difficult for the 
sufferers themselves to recognise. See the ironic exchange between Alyosha and Mme Khoklakov, 
in which she asks why she is never “hysterical”. (BK , p.679, Book XI, Chapter 2)
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very attractive Trishatov character, who tells Arkady, in The Adolescent, that he 
wants to help him, but will not shake his hand or sit down as he is enforcing a 
judgment he has cast upon himself: “I’ll still find it pleasant to remember when 
I’m carousing dishonestly.” {AD, p.503) This recognition of self-destructiveness is 
very wistful and its self-admiration, like its masochism, is fairly mild. There are, 
however, more serious instances of ‘nadriv’: Prince Andrei Petrovich, for 
example, who is persuaded by Arkady’s sister, Lise (whom he has impregnated), 
that if he were to make a full confession of an incident in the army, “resurrection 
into a new life would be impossible”, (p.301) Having after this incident become 
indirectly involved with fraudsters, he confesses to everything at once, (also 
denouncing Vasin out of jealousy over Lise (p.412)), and collapses his world into 
that epicentre of infinite sacrifice mentioned in Chapter One. We also think of 
Stavrogin’s confession phrased with moments of callousness in which he is 
“luxuriating in [his] own psychology” {SC, p.72), a tendency which is at odds 
with his will to expiate. Tikhon fears that the rebellion involved in such assaults 
on his reader will lead him to throw himself upon another crime in order to escape 
his self-imposed punishment. This phenomenon, in a slightly different form, can 
even follow fully bipolar traits: for example, in the case of the mysterious visitor 
in the The Brothers, whose will to expiate is quickly succeeded by his will to kill 
once again. It is, as Levinas comments in ‘Philosophie, Justice et Amour’, ethics 
which creates the bridge between ontologically separate beings. {EN, p. 120) From 
a political and eschatological point of view, “heartache” is a major obstacle to 
new life, in that after creating an ethical connection, the fact of being 
ontologically separate is treated as a condition of enjoyment; or, for the 
mysterious visitor, even as a condition for personal survival. The visitor, like 
Stavrogin, dramatises both his former crime and his expiation. As foreseen in 
Tikhon’s prediction, while the visitor is sincere, his turmoil expresses itself 
against the Other once more, and targets the young Zossima who has been 
identified or dramatised as the visitor’s own accusing double. While the 
messianism is real, and this self-dramatisation not conscious, the visitor is divided 
between love and detestation, so violent is his inner confrontation. Thus, from
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having felt ethically linked to Zossima, he is now ready to murder in order to 
affirm himself as ontologically distinct. An extra layer may be added to this: an 
ethical link can provoke an aisthesis that persists in changed form, even after a 
retreat is made back into ontological distinction. We think of Lise deploring 
people’s excitement at Karamazov’s murder, from which she intuits they may be 
deriving some secret pleasure (BK , p.681); then comes her own dream of eating 
pineapple compote, whilst enjoying the spectacle of a crucified child (p.685). This 
is not so far from the universal laughter that Tikhon warns Stavrogin will follow 
his confession. (SC, p.77) We shall seek to relate this observation back to the 
relationship of Giacometti’s art to prostitutes.
If “heartache” is not present in this art, it is because the prostitutes are 
avoided as models, with the attendant possibility of being commanded by their 
alterity. In this instance, faced with that which is ravishing, Giacometti prefers an 
attitude of submission. This connection, across a divide over which one may not 
be able to deliver, may result instead in the use of the other as a pornography of 
the good. We are not claiming that this is what Giacometti does, he who never 
looked contemptuously at any person or thing, but that Genet has deliberately 
inserted a doubt into his notion of the wound, which would otherwise function 
happily as a source of uniqueness and of a proto-ethics.140 This doubt is a great 
clue for examining Genet’s oeuvre. It resembles the danger in aesthetics of an 
“egarement dans la sensation” (DEE, p.85), which can supplant actual 
responsibility to the other through mere sense impressions, through which people 
may take deliberate advantage of their inability to focus both on the foreground 
and on the background, and ostentatiously help a person whilst ignoring a people. 
(AC, p. 144-45) In this case, assistance offered to the other may deliberately ignore 
the Third; or still worse, the ignoring of the Third may turn out to be the
140 “Je ne pense pas qu’il ait porte une fois, une seule fois de sa vie, sur un etre ou sur une chose un 
regard meprisant. Chacun doit lui apparaitre dans sa plus precieuse solitude.” AT, p.62. Having 
said this, there is a moment at which the difference between them seems to become strained as 
Genet is afraid that he is irritating Giacometti by talking to the blind man in the cafe, (p.65) This 
distance was very well accentuated in the dramatisation by Philippe Chemin, as the actors in 
dialogue never faced one another. Paris, Theatre de Gennevilliers, November 2005.
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precondition for administering to a single other in escapism. This would, once 
more, reproduce a kind of pornography.141 As Genet remarks,
Le vrai luxe pour Poeil, c’est de pouvoir couver du regard un homme 
pauvre, ou des conditions de vie miserables, comme un objet decoratif. 
(AC, p. 143)
But then, what of the “misere infini” examined above? (Frag, pp.82-83) 
Does it not risk becoming a decoration, and has this not, perhaps, always been a 
danger? Continuing with the following passage from ‘Les Palestiniens’:
Incapables de vivre dans un univers entierement fonctionnel, il nous faut 
au moins poser notre regard sur quelque chose qui paraisse immuable ou 
hors du temps. (AC, p. 143)
He is speaking of the needy, the vulnerable in the Other. In a very similar way, 
Genet comments in his 1975 interview with Hubert Fichte, “je  voudrais que le 
monde ne change pas pour me permettre d’etre contre le monde.” (ED, p. 156) 
Such an observation is not unique, but it is rare to find such an antisocial view 
offered as someone’s open politics.142 This sterile symbiosis also forms part of the 
description of the proximity between the Mechouar Palace and the shantytown in 
Un captif amoureux, as poverty dreams about riches and vice versa. (CA, pp. 84-
141 Dostoevsky puts us on guard, however, as an accusation of the pornography o f the good may 
equally be an excuse for the subject to claim non-involvement. An example is the criticism drawn 
by the woman in The House o f  the Dead  offering handmade cigarette boxes to the prisoners. 
(HoJD, p. 112.)
See the following example recounted by Dorian Grey, “You remind me o f a story Harry told 
me about a certain philanthropist who spent twenty years o f his life in trying to get some grievance 
redressed, or some unjust law altered - 1 forget exactly what it was. Finally he succeeded, and 
nothing could exceed his disappointment. He had absolutely nothing to do, almost died of ennui, 
and became a confirmed misanthropist.” Oscar Wilde, A Picture o f  Dorian Grey, (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1994), p. 128. Also see John Llewelyn’s essay on Levinas and J.S. Mill’s 
autobiography, from which the Wilde anecdote is probably adapted, ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ 
in The Middle Voice o f  Ecological Conscience (London: Macmillan, 1991).
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86)143 Here, there is no inclination to change the order, merely to savour them as 
an individual from the most advantageous position.
Genet pursues his political-aesthetic musings with an observation that 
could have come from ‘La Realite et son ombre’. He observes of Les Desastres de 
la guerre by Goya: “Nous sommes tellement absorbes par la legerete et la vitalite 
du trait de Goya que la beaute du spectacle nous fait oublier de condamner la 
guerre qu’il represente.” (AC, p. 164) The point of similarity with the Levinas text 
is in the clear disengagement of art that they both postulate. And yet, parallel 
possibility opened up through art, which we examined in Valery in Chapter One, 
may create something quite new, and, indeed, opposed to politics. Precisely 
because it is disengaged, it attacks order whether it happens to be that of a former 
regime or a new one introduced by revolution. Art acts in the liminal space 
between the world and its rerendering, between values imposed by law and other 
values, cooperating with neither. This is why, in his introduction to George 
Jackson’s prison letters, Genet writes that “la poesie contient a la fois la 
possibility d’une morale revolutionnaire, et ce qui parait la contredire.” This is 
because it resonates otherwise than with a securely achieved order, stimulating 
alteration rather than repose. (ED, p.63) The apparent contradiction Genet 
mentions would lie in the ‘irrealisation’ art produces, in that rather than being 
straightforwardly unreal, the artwork awakens unrealised alternatives to the 
senses, to which the art consumer lends their imagination by suspending their 
disbelief. So whereas in the Fichte interview, Genet cites the danger of a 
revolutionary government imitating culturally and artistically the one that had 
gone before (p. 152), he had already elaborated a possible solution to that problem 
three years previously, when he wrote, “Le devoir de la revolution est 
d’encourager ses adversaires: les oeuvres d’art.” (AC, p. 164) This is to say that 
rather than aestheticizing our view of war or turmoil, art should operate as a form 
of opposition -  neither official, as in a shadow cabinet, nor unofficial, as in 
protest. On the contrary, through being disengaged, art works on every aspect of
143 See also its prototype in ‘Les Palestiniens’ from 1972. (AC, pp.143-145)
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experience, and only behaves as opposition in so far as this can raise traces of 
alterity from unexpected quarters, which may confront actuality in a new way. 
This is also why Genet admires Giacometti’s respect for the solitude of objects. A 
social art, or a politically engaged one, would short-circuit the work of the artist 
and ally itself instead to an order.144
So, if  disengaged, the experience of art can be a test in discerning 
confrontations with different orders, as the commandment of the other one 
responds to is constantly supplemented by other others in the Third. Thus we are 
made aware of the offering up of the immeasurable Third, both in the sense of 
thwarted efforts to calculate its needs, and the possible sacrifice that neglecting 
these efforts could involve. Therefore, within a limited and controlled frame, the 
experience o f art gives insights into the way the Other is able to come to mind. 
Let us return to Versilov’s analysis of painting and photography in The 
Adolescent. There, the photographer finds the subject as it is, whereas the painter, 
though we could also say the writer, divines and represents main thoughts, related 
to idea-characters we examined in Chapter One. Versilov goes on to explain that 
in a photograph “it’s quite possible that Napoleon at some moment, would come 
out stupid and Bismarck tenderhearted.” (AD, p.459) In short, the main idea of a 
character may be changed, such as when a barbaric ruler is able to outmanoeuvre 
the image held of them using the media, throwing the claims of the rest of the 
world into disarray. This in part explains the mix of reality and illusion in Genet, 
who could be said to simulate photographs, images or documents as part of the 
real world, whilst changing their ‘main idea’ deliberately, both bringing them to 
our attention, and leaving them out of our reach.145
144 An example that comes to mind in a pseudo-Genetian line is Caryl Churchill’s Cloud Nine, in 
which a political engagement is claimed in the author’s preface with a quotation dubiously 
attributed to Genet and which is not sourced, “the colonial or feminine mentality o f interiorised 
repression”, (p.245) Very quickly gender preoccupations upstage ones o f race, as in the scene in 
which, Clive, a colonial administrator, encourages his mulatto valet to disrespect his own wife. 
‘Cloud Nine’ (1979) in Caryl Churchill Plays, vols 3 (London: Methuen, 1985-97), I (1985).
145 We think o f Ron Mueck’s sculptures in which their hyper-realism is coupled at the same time 
with a kind o f  misframing o f the observor who is drawn into a play o f scale.
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Art throws us into a recognisable world, though one that does not signify 
in the usual register.146 Everyone has a face, Levinas tells us, as we mentioned in 
Chapter One, even a member of the SS (EN, p.244). Yet the representation of the 
face is another affair, as it must be represented at once in its asymmetry, and as 
signifying like a sign. We may agree with King Duncan in Macbeth, that “there’s 
no art/ to find the mind’s construction in the face” (1.4), as Genet rerenders 
murderers and traitors in the favourable light of his writing. But then, the duplicity 
of his writing style, which goes so far beyond that of an unreliable narrator, is 
exactly the way Genet turns the art consumer’s “recherche infinie de la beaute” 
(AC, p. 164) from its passivity into an active disposition. It is, after all, for us to 
attribute meaning to the expressions of what Genet calls, in Notre-Dame-des- 
Fleurs, “ces belles tetes aux yeux vides” (ND, p. 10), referring to the newspaper 
images o f famous criminals with the eyes cut out, which he has used to decorate 
his cell wall. Genet’s perverse interiority, then, is able to refer at once to real 
interiority and behave as a stencil for others’: layering reality, role-play and 
duplicity between different subjects.147
There is also a later comparison Querelle makes between the 
impenetrability of his own demeanour and that of the legendary sailor-criminal, 
Campi, “...sa physionomie avait des aspects changeants: de feroce elle devenait 
douce et souvent ironique”. (QU, p.228) Genet then complicates this assessment 
by reminding us that although enigmatic, it is an image; one might almost say a 
still life or nature morte: “nous savons que ce portrait de Campi, decapite le 30 
avril 1884, fut fait apres coup.” Genet finally compliments Querelle on his effort, 
and observes that although artistic, it is also accurate: “Pourtant il est exact 
puisqu’il interprete.” (Ibid.) Here, then, between Genet’s narrator’s animation of 
the faces decorating his cell walls, in which he solipsistically dictates the action, 
and Querelle’s ‘interpretation’ of Campi, we meet at once evidence of the 
asymmetry of the face, and at the same time, evidence of semantic bias. The faces
146 C f  Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le langage de la fiction’, La Part du feu  (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p.79.
147 Genet presents us with a gallery o f impenetrable criminal faces in the epigraph to the original 
edition o f Querelle, to be found embedded in the text on pp. 19-20 o f the Imaginaire edition.
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are ferocious, soft, ironic, friend, foe, but the moods congregate and overlap, such 
that the inventions of Genet’s narrator and the interpretations of Querelle’s 
character become melded, announcing at once their fictional character, and a 
certain objectivity. Querelle animates Campi, Genet animates Querelle, and yet 
Querelle is fictional, and Campi real. The depiction of the face in art, therefore, as 
simultaneously a source of expressivity and enigma, is of great interest, as it 
indicates the orchestration of the different moments of the flight of the dire in 
relation to which art is created.
The mode in which manifestations of the trace are treated is, therefore, all- 
important in writing. Levinas tells us that the trace is not the trace that has been 
placed there deliberately, as, for example, in a financial transaction. (HdH, p.66) 
He takes instead the example of the criminal who tries to commit the perfect 
murder, but who leaves behind clues, clues that are then followed by the detective. 
{Ibid.) Querelle muses on the impossibility of the perfect murder, and the mistakes 
which creep in unawares, of which he makes an offering to the divinity protecting 
murderers. (QU, pp.307-308) This explains his smile, which on the one hand 
seeks to tame the god, and in its sadness is also the expression of ‘Tabsolue 
solitude que lui impose un destin si particulier.” (p.308) His impression of his 
own separation is stronger than ever. This sensitivity has served to make of him a 
detective in his own right, one of essences and their vibrations:
La certitude de vivre dans un monde qui est le double silencieux de celui 
ou effectivement il se meut, accordait a Querelle une sorte de 
desinteressement qui lui permettait de comprendre spontanement l’essence 
des choses. Habituellement indifferent en face des plantes ou des objets -  
mais se mettait-il en face d’eux? -  maintenant il les apprehendait 
spontanement. Chaque essence est isolee par une singularity que l’ceil 
reconnait d ’abord et communique au palais: le foin est foin surtout a cause 
de ce caractere poudre blanc et grisatre que mentalement le gout interroge, 
eprouve. Et cela, pour chaque espece vegetale. Mais si l’ceil permet la 
confusion, la bouche la detruit, et Querelle avan£ait lentement dans un
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univers savoureux, de reconnaissances en reconnaissances. Un soir, il 
rencontra Roger. II ne fallut pas longtemps au marin pour savoir qui etait 
le gosse et pour reussir a penetrer dans la cachette de Gil. (p.327, my 
emphasis)
Having disturbed the world’s order through murder, he is now pretematurally 
attentive to the surrounding configurations: able to detect and corroborate through 
the relation between his different senses the smooth running of the outside world. 
What is termed ‘disinterestedness’ (desinteressement) is strangely that which 
allows him to apprehend isolated essence. His crimes have rendered him 
simultaneously attentive to the Other beyond being, whom he rejects, and to the 
circulations of being which implicate him. This is partially consistent with the 
“desinteressement de la subjectivite” to be found in sensibility in Levinas. (AQE, 
p. 18, AQEb, p.31) The Levinasian proto-ethics of separation remains traceable in 
the situation of Querelle, as these others penetrate his solitude from the en-dega, 
or near side of being; however, they are quickly thematised for reasons of self- 
preservation, and the response of responsiblity is not made. {Ibid.)
Similar to the experience of ‘nadriv’, the masochistic admiration of one’s 
own feelings of woe, Querelle will experience a particular attraction and revulsion 
to Gil, a fellow murderer. In the original version of the text, reproduced in the 
Imaginaire collection, Genet describes the conscience as a fortified room filled 
with wretched caged monsters, o f which the most heart-rending is our “intime
148reproche”, or “living reproach”. This can be compared to what Levinas 
describes as the “monstruosite de lTnfini mis en moi”. (DV1, p.l 10) But whereas 
the monstrosity o f the infinite is a kind of monstration, or showing, the monster 
occupying the centreplace of the room is kept in check: “II ressemblerait a un gros 
poisson, n’etait la tristesse tres humaine de sa tete. Le dompteur qui surveille les 
monstres meprise surtout celui-ci qui nous le savons, trouverait quelque paix dans
148 ImQU, p.166; Querelle o f  Brest, trans. Gregory Streatham (1966), (London: Faber, 2000), 
p. 151.
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l’etreinte d’un de ses pareils.” {Ibid.) So while the passivity of remorse is alive in 
this “living reproach”, the activity of the minder keeps not only repentance, but all 
society at bay. As though to avoid any drifting beyond being, Querelle accuses Gil 
not only of the murder of Theo, but also that of Vic, of which he is himself guilty. 
The reaction of Gil, now in a position of pure passivity and incapable of initiative, 
is described through a further evocation of flowing through the eyes. Whereas 
Genet’s later description of this process in ‘Rembrandt dechire’ results in the 
substitution examined in Chapter One (CQR, pp.22-23), here there is no 
movement of the one-for-the-other:
Gil se sentit blemir. Sa vie, sa presence en lui-meme, afflua dans ses yeux 
qu’elle secha, s’echappa par son regard pour se perdre, se diluer dans les 
tenebres du cachot. (QU, p.334)
The previous sequence of quotations can be thought of as the conatus 
essendi closing in on itself to form a “moi-substance” in the struggle for dominion 
of the subject, which the subject can ultimately only lose. {EN, p.220-21) While 
the ‘vide solide’ from ‘Rembrandt dechire’ is the clearest formulation in Genet, 
there are stranger examples of moi-substance to be found, for example when 
Querelle secretes a bag of loot in a masonry wall:
Se voyant entrer dans la muraille dont tous les details lui apparaissaient 
avec precision, son corps penetrait dans le mur. [...] II fut bientot le mur et 
il le demeura un moment, sentant vivre en soi tous les details des pierres, 
les fissures le blesser, par ou coulait un invisible sang, d’ou s’exhalait son 
ame et ses cris silencieux, une araignee chatouiller l’antre minuscule de 
1’interstice de deux de ses doigts, une feuille se coller delicatement a Tune 
de ses pierres humides. Enfin, s’apercevant d’etre appuye a la muraille 
dont il sentait une des asperites mouillees, il s’efforsa de la quitter, d’en 
sortir mais il en sortit tale a jamais, marque par l’endroit tres particulier
165
des remparts qui resteraient dans la memoire de son corps [...]. (QU, 
p.304)
As Bataille points out, to the impenetrability of communal subjectivity is added 
the impenetrability of separate objects. (LM, p. 149) The definitive version of 
Bataille’s essay on Genet appeared in 1957, the same year as the Atelier, in which 
various critical responses made by Genet to Bataille may be discerned. We have 
already analysed the highly important remark: “ma solitude connait la votre” (AT, 
p.73). But if  an object can be endowed with solitude as well as can a person, then 
the relationships between things cannot be simply technical. It is not the objects 
exercising their will, but the interactions and ends associated with them that are of 
interest. In this way, the tie in Notre-Dame-des-fleurs remains part of the world of 
profane material exchange, but is at the same time one of the “instigateurs” of an 
act (ND, p. 19), and shares in the capitalised personal pronoun “Lui”, used to 
identify the victim who inspired the murder (p. 183). Thus, we meditate on 
interhuman relations generally in their impenetrability, ‘Timpenetrabilite de nous- 
memes et du monde” (LM, p. 149) described by Bataille, but in which so many 
things present a face, in which so many facets font mine.
We started this chapter by looking at a person inscribing a rock. At this 
point in our analysis, a rock inscribes a person and leaves a trace of the use to 
which it has been put. Whether it is a matter of illeity respected or illeity rejected, 
the intrigue -  that is to say plot, thread, machination or seduction -  of the infinite 
can place people in a relation of common drama, whilst not itself relativising that 
drama through a code of interpretation. Instead, it is the disordering movements of 
alterity which are dramatised. Thus, the intrigue of the infinite is part of the shared 
consciousness of incommunicability; part of what can draw people together who, 
as Levinas explains, and as we discussed in Chapter One, are “separes absolument 
par le secret inexprimable de leur intimite” (DVI, p.221).
The myriad dramatic relationships opened up between subjectivities and 
objects interlace into a theatre of the invisible. In such a theatre, it would be
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possible to dramatize the impenetrable aspects of life, which determine existence 
and only occasionally manifest a trace of their passage. We take, for example, the 
role of time examined in a ‘Lettre a Jean-Jacques Pauvert’. Children are described 
playing a game of army:
La nuit, disaient-ils, allait venir. Mais il etait midi dans le ciel. Ils 
deciderent done que l’un d’eux serait la Nuit. Le plus jeune et le plus frele, 
devenu elementaire, fut alors le maitre des Combats. «I1» etait l’Heure, le 
Moment, 1’Ineluctable. De tres loin, parait-il, il venait, avec le calme d’un 
cycle mais alourdi par la tristesse et la pompe crepusculaires. A mesure de 
son approche, les autres, les Hommes, devenaient nerveux, inquiets... 
(GTC, p.818-19)
The child playing the capitalised role of the Ineluctable is thus part of the 
impenetrability of the world rendered visible. Though if one can have a child 
playing the sun in order for a battle to proceed149, one can also have a man playing 
the moon so lovers might meet, in A Midsummer N ight’s Dream (V.l); or guards 
maintaining sun and moon and their different qualities of light, in the second 
tableau of Genet’s Le Bagne. The ordinary lines of communication are, they too, 
seen in a light not of comprehensibility, but of the impenetrable. In Jean Rouch’s 
Les Maitres fous  (1954), one of the Ghanans of the Hauka cult exorcising white 
power plays a locomotive, showing the impact of mechanical power.150 Equally, 
Querelle can become part of the wall in which his fate is implicated, and Dmitry 
can lead his entourage to believe he is swearing on his heart, when he is, in fact, 
swearing on a bag of money round his neck belonging to Katerina. All these
149 In Joshua 10.12-14, there is a similar measurement o f time, and while the children abolished 
the sun in their game, Joshua had to petition God in order to be able to finish his battle.
150 Genet also gave his approval to journalist Jean Cau for a close connection to be made between 
NE and Les Maitres fous in an article: “L’un est le Gouvemeur, l’autre le General, tel autre la 
Femme-du-docteur, tel autre enfin la Locomotive qui, bien qu’etant un engin mecanique est 
supposee appartenir -  a juste titre « poetique » -  a la race blanche.” Edmund White, Jean Genet, 
trans. Philippe Delamare (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), p.423.
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objects, like Giacometti’s serviette, individually represent something of the drama 
of the world.
Might not this even create a situation in which these objects may, be they 
as inanimate as rock, contain the accusatory power of the face? Such is the case, 
perhaps, in Querelle’s heightened anxiety, and his peculiar disinterest in the 
consciousness of guilt in proximity to his crime? In the site of his crime he 
displays not a personification of rock, but a petromorphism of the human in 
people like himself and Gill who may be de marbre, but who are not, for all that, 
without emotion. It is of these minute non-human enigmas that we have spoken in 
this chapter, rather than of the ‘glowing nimbus’ of a thaumaturgic encounter.151 
We have also demonstrated the bridge in Genet’s work linking a Levinasian trace 
of sensibility to a Derridian one of writing, and shown that the trace of the other in 
writing is apt to be reactivated by the sensibility o f the body, pursuing the unique 
trace of something that has retreated.
These are the routes through which language as the non-dit may also lead 
to Saying, or, as Levinas puts it in the preface to the German edition of Totalite et 
infini, to a “[ljangage de l’inaudible, langage de l’inoui, langage du non-dit. 
Ecriture!” (Telb, III, EN, p.233) This chapter has been in partial response to the 
Derridian anxiety over the identity of the logos at work in Levinas’s oeuvre, 
which leads Derrida to describe it as a writing coming in second place, one that is 
not preceded by originary voice, but which, nonetheless, elicits an answer.
The different ideas of hypocrisy we have been examining in this chapter 
have also been enlightening. While Querelle fails to repent and is certainly 
hypocritical, his could not be described as an ‘indifference’ to the death of the 
other, so disasterous is the impact of his murders on his own personality. If there 
is also a register of hypoCrisis in his relationship to Gill, in an ethical register of 
crisis, following which he must make a conscious effort to betray him and reject 
this responsibility, then considerable work has been carried out in the novel on the 
staging of the conscience and consciousness. Significantly, the etymology of
151 The articles o f Querelle’s thefts are imbued with the sacred through “une sorte de nimbe qui 
rayonnait d’elles". (QU, p.302)
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hypocrisy is originally derived from the Greek ‘hupokrites’, which is to be an 
actor on the stage, ‘a pretender or a dissembler’. Querelle quite clearly dissembles 
(hupokrinesthai), while our judgement (krinein) on him is as the judgement of a 
fiction upon which we are practicing our discrimination. The staging of the 
response (hypo-krinein) made to the other therefore raises questions that may be 
usefully treated through an examination of the use Levinas has made of drama and 
theatre.
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Chapter III: Production
1. Theatre and witnessing
We have examined the way in which the intrigue of the infinite can be bom out of 
the il y  a, while the ily  a does not have a part to itself in this intrigue. This means 
that the Anglo-Saxon use of the word ethical, which would accept an antonym, to 
point out, for example, ‘unethical behaviour’, which does not exist in French, 
certainly does not exist in Levinas’s philosophy. Levinas seeks the meaning of 
ethics, and not to construct his own. {Eel, p.85) He seeks to do this through the 
concreteness of that which is not thought as such in the human intrigue. This is 
shown through the drama of existence in Levinas’s use of hyperbole and 
emphasis:
L’emphase, cela signifie a la fois une figure de rhetorique, un exces de 
l’expression, une maniere de s’exagerer et une maniere de se montrer. Le 
mot est tres bon, comme le mot « hyperbole »: il y a des hyperboles ou les 
notions se transmuent. Decrire cette mutation, c’est aussi faire de la 
phenomenologie. L’exasperation comme methode de philosophic!” {DVI, 
p. 142)
Exasperation is the situation in which the subject has become engaged in spite of 
him or herself. ‘Production’ in Levinas is a technical term, like emphasis, 
hyperbole, and intrigue. It describes the situation of interiority, in which the 
subject both passively undergoes phenomena, and at the same time is strangely 
responsible for them. The working of this term throughout Levinas’s oeuvre will 
be examined in the course of this chapter.
“[L]a realite scenique”, Levinas tells us, accomplishes itself without 
leaving anything physical behind: “elle ne laisse pas de traces.” {DEE, p.34) A 
play is played and then nothing remains: “un theatre vide est afffeusement desert.”
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(p.35) For Levinas, any traces that are left in a theatre itself are of the actors 
playing the roles and not of the characters themselves. To take an example from 
the Old Vic, one is more interested on the stairs to see the framed photograph of a 
young John Gielgud, than one is by the Hamlet whom he is dressed as; or to take 
one of Levinas’s examples, the memory of Sarah Bernhardt outlives that of the 
Phedre that she played. {Ibid.) For the trace of the characters to be activated they 
require the donation of another’s body, firstly of the actors and then of the 
spectators, as the spectator is left with the remnants of sound, image, and sense 
impression. Genet describes this process for the actor in Pompes funebres:
Une ame est en peine a qui j ’offre mon corps. Avec la meme emotion le 
comedien aborde le personnage qu’il rendra visible [...] L’operation 
magique qu’ils accomplissent, c’est le mystere de l’incamation. (PF, 
p.59)
This incarnation could also be a mode of substitution, in which the actor witnesses 
in place of another, voicing the character’s alterity in what would otherwise be the 
silence of the empty theatre. This is the case of Genet’s narrator in Pompes 
funebres who offers these words in homage to Jean Decamin. However, in spite 
of what Genet set out to achieve, he finally leaves us with a stronger impression of 
himself, the incamator turned betrayer, than of the incarnated when he 
mysteriously allies himself with those responsible for Decamin’s death. As 
narrator-witness, Genet gives up his direct role of author and subjects his 
obedience and passivity before the memory of Decamin to a receptiveness and 
obedience to the moral disharmony of the Occupation. That obedience comes 
from the Latin word oboedire, formed from audire To hear’, is significant for our 
discussion of influence and adaptation. While the person or thing that is 
incarnated or adapted is dependent on its new medium, the incarnation or 
adaptation is also different from the original, and is therefore distinct. Forms and 
contents are borrowed from different times, which intersect in a present, in a 
process perhaps more properly described as underlapping than overlapping, due to
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hidden layers of diachronic time. The silence and emptiness of the theatre itself 
preceding the performance may well be the same as that which follows it; but this 
does not prevent such silence from inscribing something in the inner-life, or inner- 
stage of each member of the audience, and also of anyone with whom they 
communicate afterwards. The end of the play and the emptying of the theatre 
could therefore be another underlapping, or underscribing, that may gain 
momentum and articulation. Genet explains in his first letter to Roger Blin that in 
such a way, one or several performances of Les Paravents could impose “une 
deflagration poetique, agissant sur quelques milliers de Parisiens”. But he goes on 
to include people other than those present, and indeed all others, by addressing the 
problem of the remnant in the spectator:
je voudrais qu’elle [la representation] soit si forte et si dense qu’elle 
illumine, par ses prolongements, le monde des morts (ou plus justement de 
la mort -  des milliards et des milliards -  et celui des vivants qui viendront 
(mais c’est moins important?). (GOC4, p.221, GTC, p.845)
This would mean that those who had never attended the production would also be 
effected by it, even though, as Genet points out, this would not be predominantly 
in the sense of a physical troubling or disordering of the future world but, 
strangely, in the illumination or resonation of the silence of those now past; or the 
people of the dead we disussed in the Atelier in the previous chapter. Two 
directions of enquiry will be pursued in the present chapter: into the different 
types of action possible for the subject, in relation to itself and the other; and into 
the space implied by these different forms of action, in the private, public and 
communal. An examination of types of action on the one hand, and types of space 
on the other, will therefore form the two principle pathways in this chapter.
The background to Levinas’s coining of ‘production’ is in proximity with 
his various other uses of theatrical terms and metaphors. Already in ‘De 1’evasion’ 
(1935), Levinas describes the relationship between the ego and the self as not 
having a tautological structure but as concealing “une forme dramatique.” (EV ,
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p.98) This same relationship is described as ‘tragic’ in De I ’existence et I ’existant, 
as a basic form of determinism is uncovered, which yields the il y  a in every 
moment. {DEE, p. 143) In Le temps et Vautre Levinas seeks to examine “la place 
de la solitude dans l’economie generate de l’etre.” (TA, p. 18) In the following 
paragraph he goes on to add that Heideggerian Dasein does not enter into the 
economy of being with autrui, in so far as it is based on a structural rather than a 
practical relationship, playing no role in existential questions or in what he calls 
“le drame de l’etre”. {Ibid) This drama is described later as the possibility of 
futurity through pleasure in the caress, (p.83) The drama of internal relations to 
the self is therefore bound up with the relation to the Other in time.
Levinas describes the dramatic relationship of the ego and the self through 
phenomenological descriptions of anguish, as the subject is forced to abide in an 
abode which no longer provides protection from the exterior. He takes as notable 
instances nausea, insomnia, and laziness, which show unmastered being 
incompatible with economic life, and which reveal and ‘produce’ nothing but 
more of themselves. This makes the hinderance they represent impossible to
_ I c 'y
displace. This is their only ‘accomplishment’. In this chapter we shall explore
153the structure of the ego and the self in its dramatic qualities. Taking la paresse, 
first of all, which Llewelyn translates as ‘dilatoriness’, with its associated idea of 
delay Levinas describes it as follows:
La paresse se rapporte au commencement comme si 1’existence n’y 
accedait pas d’emblee, mais la previvait dans une inhibition. II y a ici plus 
qu’un espace de duree s’ecoulant insensiblement entre deux instants; a
152 ‘Accomplishment’ is used in this context in place of Heidegger’s Ereignis or ‘event’ as a way 
o f describing the encounter with being. As Heidegger insists in ‘Letter on Humanism’, “The talk 
about [language as] the house o f Being is no transfer of the image ‘house’ to Being.” Therefore, he 
does not mean it as a metaphor, but seeks through knowing the essence o f Being to be more 
readily able “to think what ‘house’ and ‘to dwell’ are.” (BW, p.260) Levinas tries to think the 
dwelling and habitation in terms o f mastery over being. By examining pure being in these early 
phenomenological analyses, he attempts to think the event of being as folded in upon the subject. 
What concerns us here is to think the implication o f  the human in being post-// y  a, and that the 
thinking o f Being as such is not possible for the human mind. Levinas then describes a 
preoriginary endebtedness to the Other which precedes fundamental ontology.
153 Nausea (EV , pp. 116-119), insomnia {DEE, pp. 109-113), dilatoriness (p.34), and fatigue (p.42).
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moins que Tinhibition de la paresse ne soit pas aussi la revelation du 
commencement que chaque instant accomplit par sa vertu d’instant. {DEE, 
p.33-34)
The subject’s initiative is flattened out because dilatoriness presents itself, “prae- 
esse”, but by definition can never reach a full state of preparation, “parare ”, and 
becomes itself “l’accomplissement du commencement.” {Ibid.)154 This is not yet 
an act, not yet the state of projectivity that Heidegger has taught us to expect from 
Dasein, in which “To accomplish [Vollbringen] means to unfold or lead 
something forth into the fullness of its essence -  producere.” {BW, p.217) Levinas 
does, however, adapt the notion of production, anticipating the way he will use it 
to describe the philosophical primacy of infinity, in which
l’infini se produit dans la relation du Meme avec 1’Autre et comment, 
indepassable, le particulier et le personnel magnetisent en quelque fa^on le 
champ meme ou cette production de l’infini se joue. Le terme de 
production indique et Veffectuation de l’etre (l’evenement « se produit », 
une automobile « se produit ») et sa mise en lumiere ou son exposition (un 
argument « se produit », un acteur « se produit »). L’ambigui'te de ce verbe 
traduit Tambiguite essentielle de T operation par laquelle, a la fois, 
s ’evertue l’etre d’une entite et par laquelle il se revele. {Tel, XIV, Telb, 
p. 11, my emphasis)
The ambiguity of the verb “se produire” is illustrated helpfully by Lingis in a 
footnote with a pair of examples in English. It carries the sense of a bringing 
about: “Art may make a Suit of Clothes, but Nature must produce a Man. Hume”; 
it also carries the sense of a bringing to light, “Produce your cause, saith the Lord, 
bring forth your strong reasons. Isa. xli, 21.” {Tal, 26) “Se produire” can also be 
divided into other evocative verb and noun forms whose influence stretches deep
154 Llewelyn brings to bear these Latin terms “parare”, and “prae-esse”. (GE, p.37, 39)
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into the weft o f Levinas’s oeuvre. Llewelyn picks out the ‘play’ through which 
‘Tinfini se joue”, is ‘acted out’, and relates it to the lack of physical inscription in 
being, which characterises “la realite scenique” quoted above. (GE, p.31) One 
might tend to interpret the ‘virtue’ or endeavour of “s’evertuer” in producing a 
car, or an event, in terms of poiesis, in other words as a task independent of 
interhuman relations bestowing a quality or effect. But one must also remember 
that in De I ’existence a I ’existant, it is ‘by virtue’ of the event of the elapsing 
instant that accomplishment is possible, and that this positioning may not get any 
further than positing itself “par sa vertu d’instant”, as quoted above. {DEE, p.34) 
This involves the relating of the human intrigue to the intrigue of the infinite. The 
phenomena of the human intrigue are the events themselves of that which has 
taken place but have been experienced other than in simple thought. They instead 
illuminate “« l’intrigue humaine» -  ou interhumaine -  qui est la concretude de son 
impense, qui est la necessaire « mise en scene » dont les abstractions se sont 
detachees dans le dit des mots et des propositions.” {EN, p.229) This ‘human 
intrigue’, “mise en scene” or production, therefore stretches from the innermost 
event of consciousness to the outermost projects that the subject may undertake; 
this uses the dit to evidence the originary dire, and is the joining point between the 
human intrigue and the intrigue of the infinite. Thus, accomplishment might only 
be the endeavour of an endeavour, and may not accomplish the design it meant to 
effectuate, but may already be an active loop in a plural, interhuman world. The 
second part of the verb ‘se produire’, as ‘se reveler’, as is mentioned in the 
preface to Totalite et injini, is used to open this magnetisation of the of the 
individual and personal to our view. This would serve to render concrete this 
production, such that meanings illuminate the other’s place in the drama or 
general economy of being. We might quote Levinas’s essay ‘Signature’, in which 
he outlines his career, and returns to the production of the infinite which takes 
place in separation, but whose principle is not a state of sad solitude at the the 
other out of one’s reach, but one of possible happiness in “jouissance”. This 
would, as Levinas writes, represent a pluralism without totality. {DL, p.411)
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In this sense, one thing can be produced as another, an object can be 
illuminated and leave a trace allowing the irreducible in the other to be signified, 
in spite of the absorption of the other in the interstices of the world. As Valery’s 
Socrates comments in ‘Eupalinos’ on the production of the artist, the world is an 
assembly of contradictory character: “les etres vivants (et meme les immortels), 
quand ils sont mis en oeuvre par l’artiste, ne laissent pas d’etre ce qu’ils sont, et de 
meler leur nature et leur signification propre, au dessein de celui qui les emploie a 
exprimer sa volonte.” (Eup, p. 129) It is the possible incompatibility of this 
“mis[e] en oeuvre” with the ethical production of the above “mise en scene”, 
which Levinas draws our attention to in ‘La Realite et son ombre’. This may also 
colour the melding Genet makes of his nature with that of Decamin, as he 
occupies an uneasy position somewhere between author and incamator of his 
characters. Indeed, Valery’s Phaedrus first gives us the simple idea of multiple 
application: “Tel est le profit, et tel est le desavantage, d’etre asservi aux objets 
reels; chacun d’eux est une pluralite de choses pour l’homme, et peut entrer dans 
une pluralite d’utilites differentes pour ses actes...”. (p. 130) This accumulation of 
qualities means that it is difficult to draw pure relationships between objects, as 
one loses track of the plane of comparison, and begins to receive erroneous 
intuitions which impose themselves with scientific conviction, as for example in 
the comparison of a ton of lead and a ton of feathers, or the one Valery takes, 
which is the race between Achilles and a tortoise. This means that logical 
relationship is disturbed, such that the contemplators “pensent Tun, et pensent 
Tautre; et creant ainsi deux temps et deux espaces incommunicables” {Ibid.). For 
Socrates, thus, the different arts give insight into this underlying harmony through 
a multiplicity of explanations, and myths, producing “une infinite de causes 
imaginaires”. (p. 131) The summit of this for Valery, as we discussed in the 
previous chapter, are music and architecture which measure the world without 
being representations, thus avoiding the problems of being under a vocable, 
referring to actual fact or an actual thing, since their primary qualities are as 
measurements or intervals:
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[L]a Musique et l’architecture nous font penser a tout autre chose qu’elles 
memes; elle sont au milieu de ce monde, comme les monuments d’un autre 
monde; ou bien comme exemples, 9a et la dissemines d’une structure et 
d’une duree qui ne sont pas celles des etres, mais des formes et des lois. 
(p l  32)
This sharing of law and form is related to the immemorial underlying harmony 
examined above. Production in Levinas is not, therefore, a question of output; but 
comes instead as the event which activates the field of the infinite which, as we 
saw above, magnetises the individual and the personal.
Buildings may stand or fall and boats sail or sink, but the field in which 
the infinite is produced is drawn by the individualities that work with or dwell in 
them. Socrates did not notice his man-made prison wall because he was 
surrounded by friends: “La lumiere du soir mettait la couleur de la chair sur les 
pierres de la voute...”. (p. 108) When asked specifically about his experience of 
prison, in a comment that could almost have belonged to Zossima, Socrates 
answers that he is absorbed by the parallel possibility of the other selves that may 
have been his, who might have merited imprisonment for “crimes vagues et 
enormes”. (p.206)155 Elsewhere, there is a description of a ship leaving port: “la 
presence de l’horizon pur, la naissance et l’effacement d ’une voile, l’emotion du 
detachement de la terre, [...] le seuil etincelant des contrees inconnues; et l’avidite 
meme des hommes, toute prete a se changer dans une crainte superstitieuse, a 
peine lui cedent-ils et mettent-ils le pied sur le navire... Ce sont en verite 
d’admirables theatres”, (p.l 10) The poietic task o f sailing a ship, therefore, shares 
a field with the dramas of the production of the infinite, through which the
155 This following speech from Phaedrus in ‘Eupalinos’ seems to announce architecture’s poietic 
function, “La pierre prononce gravement ce qu’elle renferme; le mur est implacable; et cette 
oeuvre, si conforme a la verite, declare fortement sa destination severe...”. (Eup, p. 107) Genet 
follows this in the Journal du voleur, “Au detenu la prison offre le meme sentiment de securite 
qu’un palais royal a l’invite d’un roi. Ce sont les deux batiments construits avec le plus de foi, 
ceux qui donnent la plus grande certitude d'etre ce qu’ils sont -  qui sont ce qu'ils voulurent etre, 
et le demeurent. La maiponnerie, les materiaux, les proportions, 1’architecture sont en accord avec 
un ensemble moral qui laisse indestructibles ces demeures tant que la forme sociale dont ils sont 
le symbole tiendra.” (JV, p.93)
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individual rather than simply playing a part in a system, is called upon 
individually. Thus, the relationship of the ego to the self involves not mere 
separation but the positioning of the self as a production and responsibility: “La 
separation est l’acte meme de Tindividuation”. {Tel, p.276, Telb, p.334) Across 
the vestibule of this interiority to the outside are received both the technical 
commands of the captain or foreman, and inspiration -  a particular form of the 
intrigue of the infinite described in ‘Dieu et la philosophic’ as the manner in 
which “je me fais l’auteur de ce que j ’entends.” (DVI, p.124) This is a form of 
witnessing from a position within being.
Rather than saying what Being ‘is’, something we are warned against in 
the ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger came up with the es gibt, translated in 
‘Letter on Humanism’ as “il y a l’Etre”, and by the English translator Frank A. 
Capuzzi as “there is/ it gives”. (BW, p.238)156 This giving, or es gibt is adapted in 
turn by Levinas, who explains that “l’objet, tout en existant, existe pour 
quelqu’un, lui est destine, se penche deja sur un interieur et, sans s’absorber en lui 
se donneT {DEE, p.75, my emphasis) This donation is not received in pure 
passivity, however, but is witnessed by the subject. To quote from the Levinas 
interview, ‘Questions et reponses’:
Les sensations sont produites en moi, mais moi je me saisis de ces 
sensations et je les regois. Nous avons affaire a un sujet passif quand il ne 
se donne pas ses contenus. Certes. Mais il les accueille. II se livre 
davantage quand il se dit; quels que soient les refuges du Dit -  des mots et 
des phrases -  le Dire est ouverture, un degre de passivite. {DVI, p. 142)
So the subject is passive, but at the same time produces, conceives and welcomes 
contents, receiving them not as the il y  a of Heidegger’s “il y a l’Etre”, but as
156 The expression remains flawed in English because o f  the pleonasm contained in the ‘is’ o f  
‘there is Being'. It is more satisfactory in the French i l y  a offered by Heidegger, as closer to the 
German es gibt. There is, o f course, an obvious clue here to the origin o f the term the il y  a in 
Levinas which views the es gibt not as generosity but as bondage. Levinas emphasises this 
difference in meaning during his interview with Francois Poirie. Francois Poirie, Emmanuel 
Levinas: essai et entretiens (Arles: Actes Sud, 1996), pp. 101-103.
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Dire. Something similar to this 1977 description of production by Levinas had 
already been given in 1964 in ‘La signification et le sens’, in which
rien ne peut se refleter dans une pensee avant qu’une rampe ne s’eclaire et 
qu’un rideau ne se leve du cote de l’etre [...]. Le spectateur est acteur. La 
vision ne se reduit pas a l’accueil du spectacle; simultanement, elle opere 
au sein du spectacle qu’elle accueille. (HdH, pp.25-26)
The pronominal forms se refleter, s ’eclairer, and se lever, are not merely 
passively intended, and do not have the character merely of a closed reflexivity; 
they instead signify prereflective participation of an interiority in what they 
perceive. This active and shared undergoing of being is described in De 
Vexistence a Vexistant through the form not of ‘on est’, but “on s’est”. {DEE, 
p.38) The subject is therefore implicated in what they are producing, but in such a 
way that, as Levinas explains elsewhere, “Tout ce qui advient dans le psychisme 
humain, tout ce qui s’y passe, ne finit pas par se savoir.” {DVI, p.212) What is 
experienced, then, is not merely the doubling of substantives by nouns, but at the 
same time, the temporalisation by the user of essence in the verb: “l’amphibologie 
ou l’etre et l’etant peuvent s’entendre, et s’identifier, ou le nom peut resonner 
comme verbe et le verbe de l’apophansis se nominaliser.” {AQE, p.54, AQEb, 
p.72) This would also allow an adjective applied to a noun to stretch out into time 
in its verbal form. The nominalized adjective of red in ‘to redden’ has not only 
become a verb, but also resounds adverbially. {Ibid., pp.50-51, Ibidb, pp.68-69) In 
this way, the Said is only reflected, illuminated or revealed, through the 
incarnated spectator-actor who, through the feeling subjectivity she or he brings to 
temporal events, pushes the different essences experienced in phenomena out of 
kilter157:
157 The passivity o f  the spectateur-acteur has been recast and rehabilitated since its first use in ‘La 
Realite et son ombre’, where the subject is drawn into an environment o f things as a thing: 
“exterieure a lui-meme; mais d’une exteriorite qui n’est pas celle d’un corps, puisque la douleur de 
ce moi-acteur, c ’est moi-spectateur qui la ressens, sans que ce soit par compassion.” (RO , p .l 12)
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Parler du temps en termes de fluence, c’est parler du temps en termes de 
temps et non pas d’evenements temporels: la temporalisation du temps, 
ouverture par laquelle la sensation se manifeste, se sent, se modifie sans 
alterer son identite, se doublant -  par une sorte de diastase du ponctuel -  se 
dephasant -  n’est ni un attribut ni un predicat exprimant une causalite 
« sentie » comme sensation. {Ibid., p.43, Ibidb, p.60)
‘Diastasis’ is a moment of stretching out and overflowing. Its biological meaning 
refers to the moment before the contraction of the heart at which no more blood 
can enter the expanded chambers, an instance of passive reception preceding 
action. It describes logical causality experienced through sensation, but which 
cannot be limited to sensation. It involves a loss of synchrony in language, as the 
meaning of the sensation is doubled up within and by the subject, without this 
being the result of an added predicate or attribute. This is lived experience, which 
overflows with meaning and fails to be contained by language.
Something which is named is designated by being, but also resonates 
there, retaining the possibility of becoming a verb once more. The Said of the 
name therefore contains vibrating essence. The reflexivity of language renders 
this amphibology of beings and being more complex. Having begun by drawing 
our attention to “s’etre” in De I ’existence a Vexistant, in ‘La Signification et le 
sens’, Levinas places se refleter, s ’eclairer, se lever in a special relation to the 
subject, who is “en face de l’etre pour « accueillir le reflet », est aussi du cote de 
l’etre pour operer le rassemblement.” (HdH, pp.25-26) In the same manner, he 
later asks, in Autrement q u ’etre, “Dire, n’est-il que la forme active du Dit? « Se 
dire » revient-il a « etre d it»?” {AQE, p.55, AQEb, p.74) This rhetorical question 
draws our attention to the reflexive pronoun “se” and the recurrence it produces 
which cannot be understood merely as the passive form ‘is Said’, as the subject 
also colours the Saying. Like the “je m’ecrivais” that Derrida reads into the “je 
m’ec...” of ‘Rembrandt dechire’ examined in the previous chapter, this is a 
situation in which the subject is both agent and patient before the other. Its 
discreet passive-accusative form means the subject participates in the attendant
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verbs, hither or beyond their function as an activity, or as a state. This passivity is 
a movement out of phase with the Said, a reduction which is also a tracing 
backwards or a “remonter” to the initial Saying. {Ibid.)
The Saying is not a representation, but instead a connection to the face 
which makes all discourse possible. As Levinas mentions in Ethique et infini, 
through all literature “parle -  ou balbutie, ou se donne une contenance, ou lutte 
avec sa caricature -  le visage humain.” {Eel, p.l 15) Great literature ‘speaks with’ 
rather than ‘appearing as’ (“apparaissant par”) the human face. (OBL, p.8) When 
the saying comes about, it is through the relation to the Other, in a “Dire d’avant 
tout Dit.” {AQE, p.56, AQEb, p.75)
The Dire this occasions in the subject will then become a Dit, but this 
must not be allowed to claim the status of representation or theme, as this would 
result in the Said, once recorded, becoming an aeon, which is a manifestation of 
the divine, setting itself up as an idol independent of the living world. Valery 
picks up on such a danger repeatedly in his ‘Introduction a la methode de Leonard 
de Vinci’, in the risk of declaring universal what are mere stages in over 
simplified thought. These universals would be “idolatries”, which exercise an 
unavoidable kind of hypnosis over the subject. {VOl, p.l 161, 1162, 1192) Levinas 
therefore adds that it is the task of philosophy to note the dictation of the dire into 
what is recorded in the dit, and then to reduce the dit in its turn, producing an echo 
in the dire. The result would be to retain “malgre la reduction, sous les especes de 
l’ambiguite -  sous les especes de Texpression dia-chronique, le Dit dont le Dire 
est, tour a tour, affirmation et retraction -  l’echo du Dit reduit.” (AQE, p.56, 
AQEb, p.75) The ambiguity of the echo of the Dit allows an openness to the Dire. 
If this enables philosophy to respect alterity, it also figures in litterature in the 
implicit which may allow the Said to be both recognised and pushed out of phase.
In the unreduced aeon, the Said would function idolatrously as Levinas 
argues in ‘La Realite et son ombre’, removing the contemplator’s freedom. 
Bakhtin’s peculiar mistrust of theatre and poetry, which we discussed in Chapter 
One, could perhaps also be compared to the aeon, as he understands the poet or
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playwright as having the final word, as having definitively reduced the dire and 
removed language from its source in alterity. While we have already mentioned 
the later exception Bakhtin would make for theatre, he prefers the echoing 
ambiguities of the said, affirmed or retracted by the saying, in the way this said is 
reduced in novelistic prose by a heteroglossia of other saids and the dialogic 
pauses or hesitations between them. While Levinas is highly sensitive to the 
poetry of Celan and Shakespeare, he will in a similar way to Bakhtin refer to 
prose in its role as the reproduction and reduction of the Said. He explains that the 
“essence dite” of the meta-language of art is brought back to ‘T  essence 
proprement-dite”, which is the “logos qui resonne dans la prose de la proposition 
predicative.” {AQE, p.53, AQEb, p.72, Levinas’s emphasis) This, “the world’s 
prose”, as Llewelyn puts it {GE, p .l81), could be seen to tally with Bakhtin’s 
preferred genre. In each case therefore we are moving from the result of a 
reduction of the Said and not from a privileged view of Saying at its origins. Thus 
a single voice sharing in the Said, by reducing it, may cease to be single, and have 
instead emanated from the anarchic source of language in the other.
Inspiration is a manner in which the subject is witness, whereby “un Dire 
d’avant tout Dit” {AQE, p.53, AQEb, p.72) interjects in such a way that the 
reflexive “me dire”, becomes an accusative “me void”. One very clear such 
example not unknown to Sartre would be Le Veritable Saint Genest by Rotrou, in 
which the original script is supplemented by a divine whisperer, carrying the 
represented action into the order of the real and concrete through the conversion 
of the lead actor, Genest, who assumes the role of the Christian martyr he is 
playing. This creates a saying from the interrupted said of the script. Sartre would 
seem to draw into question the way in which Genet’s writing is also receptive to 
the call of the other in the ambiguities of its said.
In this way, the said is reproduced, and yet also allows the Other to be 
heard. As in what Henri Gouhier calls an art a deux temps, the said is resaid, and 
both interrupts and rerenders the essences that have been congregated in the
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artwork, even before the work of exegesis. Production, in Levinas’s emphasised 
(em-p/zaott-omenological) 159 sense, is a kind of deduction beyond the 
phenomenological reduction, rendering sensible the “l’un-pour-1’autre”. {AQE, 
p.58, AQEb, p.77) This deduction allows one thing to be produced as another. As 
Levinas explains in the preface to Totalite et infini, “L’analyse intentionnelle est 
la recherche du concret”, the search for that which signifies concretely for the 
subject. {Tel, XVI, Telb, p. 14) In a similar way, Levinas says in the avant-propos 
to De Dieu qui vient a Videe, that he seeks to describe “la «mise en scene » 
concrete de ce qui se dit en guise d’abstraction.” {DVI, p.7) These two quotations 
point to the reality of the subject’s diastasis as meaning overflows from language. 
Returning to the preface to Totalite et infini, Levinas writes:
L’eclatement de la structure formelle de la pensee -  noeme d’un noese -  
en evenements que cette structure dissimule, mais qui la portent et qui la 
restituent a sa signification concrete, constitue une deduction -  necessaire 
et cependant non analytique -  qui, dans notre expose, est marquee par des 
termes comme « c’est-a-dire » ou « precisement», ou « ceci accomplit 
cela » ou « ceci se produit comme cela ». {Tel, XVII, Telb, p. 14, my 
emphasis)
Let us pause a moment on this last quotation. We remember our special usage of 
exposition as akin to the production of an actor as “mise en lumiere”, which we 
evoked above in response to the preface to Totalite et infini. {Ibid., XIV, Ibidb, 
p .l l)  If in deduction as production this can be produced as that, then Levinas is 
drawing our attention not only to the precautions he is taking when talking about 
being, but to the grounds for the play of the intrigue of the infinite from within 
being, moving beyond ontological production in the light cast by thematisation.
158 Henri Gouhier, Les arts a deux temps (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989).
159 From ‘phainesthai’ meaning to appear, and ‘phaos’ meaning light.
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The ontological character of light is dwelt upon in the Levinas’s 1947 
texts. As Monsieur Teste bears out, the levelling effects of light are considerable. 
However, the mise en lumiere operated by a subject is a situation in which the 
subject is itself also illuminated. As Teste says to his companion, the narrator, of 
the audience, fixed by the light of the stage,
« L’eclairage les tient. »
Je dis en riant: « Vous aussi? »
II repondit: « Vous aussi. » (M.T, p.27)
While of course it is the shared light and the shared scene or stage that makes the 
one-for-the-other possible, Derrida criticises in Totalite et infini what he describes 
as the effort to empirically describe the claims of the absolutely other. Derrida 
quotes Hegel saying that ‘Tempirisme oublie toujours au moins ceci: qu’il se sert 
du mot etre. L’empirisme, c’est la pensee par metaphore qui ne pense pas la 
metaphore comme telle.” (VeM, p.204) So, as soon as Levinas uses the verb to be 
we are once more in the situation of describing the beyond being with being. The 
use of ontologised language, in so far as the verb cto be’ is employed, as Levinas 
points out, is something Derrida himself does not, and indeed cannot avoid. (NP, 
p. 185) In this case, as Llewelyn puts it, “to think of metaphoricity as such is to 
think of being again, a metaphor more or less.” (GE, 179) Whatever is coined is in 
an explicatory role, and seeks revelation -  to tear the veil of being.160
Llewelyn points out that according to a Parmenedian-Heideggerian thesis, 
“being and thinking are one” {Ibid.), such that to think a metaphor obliges the 
thinking of being.161 Levinas overcomes this problem of an unavoidable relation
160 In ‘Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral sense’ Nietzsche explains that the original faces o f verbal 
exchange have been lost, and so are restruck by the artist in order to make their metaphorical role 
vivid once again. (GE, p. 163) As Bakhtin says, one word reconceptualises (DI, p.279) another and 
recolours the transparent neutrality o f its use, while any new expression starts metaphorically and 
is reabsorbed into general usage. As Llewelyn observes, Levinas’s technique is not to neologise, 
but to pre-ethically paleologise (GE, p. 164) by showing the ethical non-metaphoricity next to 
ontological non-metaphoricity. (p. 178)
161 “The word metaphor means carrying something from one place to another, and it comes from 
the Greek words p e r a  (which means from one place to another) and (pepeiv (which means to
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to being in his own writing by supplementing the thinking of being with the 
difficulty of substitution. Substitution involves the claims of the other taking 
priority over the subject’s own, without them being ontologically predetermined; 
thus he argues not for an affiliated being otherwise, but for the discrete influence 
of an otherwise than being. If in ethical non-metaphoricity something is ‘carried 
over’ (meta-phore), for Levinas it is done through production. For him production 
is not the same as representation. Production concerns the implication or manner 
of engagement of the disengaged subject in the social relation, in “la presentation 
de 1’Autre au Meme”. (Tel, p. 188, Telb, p.235) This bringing of the for-itself into 
contact with alterity allows a preoriginary for-the-other to be distinguished from 
Heideggerian being.
So what of the paradoxical question of passivity in Levinas’s idea of 
production? How can something occur in passivity, and still be the pro-duction of 
the human, interhuman, and transcendent intrigues, which presumes a certain 
bringing-forth? Levinas answers this interim enquiry in Autrement q u ’etre, by 
saying that the book demonstrates “la defaite ou la defection de [...] Yactualite 
originaire de tout acte, source de la spontaneite du sujet, ou du sujet comme 
spontaneite.” (AQE, p. 179, AQEb, p.220, Levinas’s emphasis) Spontaneity is 
replaced by something similar to the “passivite fonciere” of ‘La Realite et son 
ombre’, but not in the form of an endless participation. (RO, p.l 11) This time, 
however, passivity is inflected as illeity, to give us a “passivite de la passivite”, 
ruling out a reversal back into activity, like “une cendre d’ou l’acte ne saurait 
renaitre”. (AQE, p. 182, AQEb, p.223) Substitution of the self for the other, 
implicates the subject in the difficulty of action in response to the Other, though at 
the additional price of the loss of the subject’s bearings. An originary actor met in 
the trace effectuates something upon the subject that cannot be simply reversed.
carry), and it is when you describe something by using a word for something that it isn’t. This 
means that the word metaphor is a metaphor.” Mark Haddon, The Curious Incident o f  the Dog in 
the Night-time (London: Jonathan Cape, 2003), p. 15.
See also the autistic hero’s dream in which he is the last person left on earth, which bears 
comparison with Blanchot’s childhood scene in which the realisation o f his finitude comes as his 
first secret. L ’Ecriture du desastre (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), p.l 17.
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Denis Guenoun describes such a transcendant actor as being “sans acte, 
sans action et sans actualite”.162 This encounter is characterised by a Dire without 
a Dit {AQE, p. 188, AQEb, p.231): not an act, but, as Llewelyn observes, a 
dighting, Dichtung, diction, or, we might add, through the Latin dictare, an order. 
{GE, p. 171) This is a dialogic diction which gives us a command without content 
in the Saying, serving to ‘expose exposition’.163 This exposition is also significant 
in understanding the address, made to the self alone, which may elicit the “me 
void”, whereby the self is addressed as a singularity, and by a singularity in a 
plural ethical world. {AQE, p. 186, n .l l ,  AQEb, p.231, n.2) Thus, the manner in 
which the self is implied in production, we have seen, develops from an initial 
role of passivity. We will now proceed to examine this passivity in relation to 
different notions of action.
2. Drama, action and passion
Previous to 1961, the term drama was used by Levinas with some frequency and 
figures in De I ’evasion, De Vexistence a I ’existant and Le temps et I ’autre, quoted 
above. In an important footnote to the preface to Totalite et infini, Levinas 
explains the distance he will, from this point on, assume in relation to drama:
En abordant a la fin de cet ouvrage des relations que nous p la in s  au-dela 
du visage, nous rencontrons des evenements qui ne peuvent etre decrits 
comme noeses visant des noemes, ni comme interventions actives realisant 
des projets, ni bien entendu comme des forces physiques se deversant dans 
des masses. II s’agit de conjonctures dans l’etre auxquelles conviendrait 
peut-etre le mieux le terme de drame au sens ou Nietzsche voudrait 
Temployer lorsqu’a la fin du Cas Wagner il deplore qu’on l’ait toujours a 
tort traduit par action. Mais c ’est a cause de I ’equivoque qui en resulte que
162 Denis Guenoun, ‘Le temple ou le theatre: de la transcendance’, Levinas et les arts, Paris 4, 16- 
17 November 2006; conference proceedings to appear 2008.
163 “[j:jXpOSer l’exposition”. {AQE, p .182, AQEb, p.223)
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nous renongons a ce terme. {Tel, XVI, n. I, Telb, pp. 13-14, n .l, my 
emphasis)
If Levinas abandons the term ‘drama’ that would have perhaps best elucidated his 
argument, it is because of the confusion it might have lent to the distinctions he 
makes in the nature of production (to bring about, and to illuminate), as not being 
a Dasein, “realisant des projets”, which, being poietical, would violate the idea of 
the infinite as command without content, as described above. Production is not 
comprehension and agency, but “mise en moi” of the idea of infinity, “le fait 
etonnant de contenir plus qu’il n’est possible de contenir”, that which I harbour, 
or to which I provide hospitality, but upon which I cannot act. {Ibid., XV-XVI, 
Ibidb, pp. 12-13) This is radical passivity. Yet, the question remains, in what sense 
does Nietzsche, in his bewildering footnote to which Levinas refers, think drama 
without action is possible? Here are Nietzsche’s comments:
It has been a real misfortune for aesthetics that the word drama has always 
been translated “action” [Handlung]. It is not Wagner alone who errs at 
this point, the error is world-wide and extends even to the philologists who 
ought to know better. Ancient drama aimed at scenes of great pathos -  it 
precluded action (moving it before the beginning or behind the scene). The 
word drama is of Doric origin, and according to Doric usage means 
“event,” “story” -  both words in the hieratic sense. The most ancient 
drama represented the legend of the place, the “holy story” on which the 
foundation of the cult rested (not a doing but a happening: dran in Doric 
actually does not mean “do”.) {CW, p. 174)
The reason Nietzsche gives for criticising Wagner is the forced-ness of his action, 
duping the audience into a kind of participation bom out of heightened sensation, 
rather than logical sequence between action and character, as required by Aristotle
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in the primacy of plot.164 Wagner is said to start from the third act and work 
backwards (CW, p. 174). Whilst determinism itself would not be at odds with 
absolute will, drama requires “rigorous logic”, and not contrived action, (p. 175) 
In addition to which, neither the mystery of the will in Nietzsche, nor the 
“conjonctures dans l’etre” beyond the face in Levinas (Tel, XVI, Telb, p. 13), are 
subject to action exerted upon them, but lie before or beyond the difference 
between the active and the passive, as the will is impenetrable, and autrui 
unreachable.
In the ‘Notes’ to The Birth o f  Tragedy (1869) — Nietzsche’s first book and 
one written in praise of Wagner -  Nietzsche had not yet arrived at his strict 
definition of drama, expressed in The Case o f  Wagner, as not constituting a form 
of action. Consequently, he situates drama as coming after the origin of tragedy, 
which he roots in musical pathos. At this stage in his analysis, tragedy precedes 
drama and drama begins with dialogue: “L’action arriva dans la tragedie d’abord 
avec le dialogue. Ce qui montre que dans ce genre d’art, d’entree de jeu, on 
n’avait pas du tout en vue le dr an: mais le pathos. Ce n’etait tout d’abord rien que 
le lyrisme objectify (‘Notes’, NdT, p .l74; Tam, p. 153) Whereas in The Case o f  
Wagner, dran would mean the engagement of the subject in a story or event, its 
“scenes of great pathos” seem to bring it under the definition of tragedy too. Both 
the pathos of tragedy and the experience of drama, when understood as being 
implicated in a happening, represent related kinds of passivity, which we shall 
explore in the rest of the chapter. We shall return to Nietzsche’s position in this 
problematic later, and sum up at this stage in common with the older Nietzsche 
that drama is not expressive of action, although it already opens an element of 
dialogue, as argued by the young Nietzsche. We will turn now to a recent article 
on the subject.
164 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin, 1996), 1450a, p .l 1. Nietzsche says 
that Wagner’s method is, however, safe as he disposes o f a “genuine actio”, or persuasive 
delivery. This rhetorical figure, with its “hautrelief o f gestures”, creates a scene which “throws 
people”: “this he thinks through in depth and from this he then derives the characters.” This is then 
formed into “strong scenes”. (CW, p. 174)
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Claire Nancy in ‘La Raison dramatique’ differentiates the use of the term 
dr an, to undergo, from the terms praxis, Athenian for action between people, 
which in Aristotle is what is represented in mimesis praxeos; and finally, from 
poiesis, which is the realisation of a particular object or plan. An initial example is 
taken from the Odyssey, in which Ulysses explains that he will enter amongst the 
suitors: “« j ’aurai tot fait de bien dran avec eux tout ce qu’ils voudront», verbe 
assez obscur pour que le scholiaste traduise « servir, se faire esclave ».” (Song XV 
of the Odyssey) There are also, we are told, instances of its use in religious texts 
and in the description of rites, putting oneself at the service of a god, with other 
traces of the word used to mean gesturing or miming. The theory Nancy ventures 
is that ‘dran’ means “se mettre au service de Dionysos en mimant. Le verbe 
designerait exactement l’activite de l’acteur dionysiaque.” (Nancy, p. 113) This 
would mean that the Dorian claim to the invention of tragedy and comedy could 
be strengthened by the further claim to the invention of the word ‘dran’ which fills 
an insufficiency in Athenian verbs o f action.165 So, whereas in poiesis something 
is made out of nothing, dran accepts no substantive, except the neutral drama. 
You cannot drama something, you cannot be drama’d, and as soon as we start to 
speak of dramatisation, we are describing a genre, and not directly a mode of 
happening. Dran describes the passive engagement or implication of the agent in 
an action, unlike prattein, derived from praxis, in which the action it refers to is 
itself free of any particular agent or object. (Nancy, p.114)166 If, as we shall 
maintain, dran is not an action but an event, and if it is part of the hypostasis of 
the individual, then it concerns the relation of the individual to being and to the 
production of the infinite. The infinite can only take place in the individual, not 
having a place of its own in being. Were we to take the example o f Divine’s 
speech at Notre-Dame’s trial in Genet’s novel, it would show the moment at
165 Nancy then quotes from Chapter 3 o f the Poetique, “Les Doriens, disait Aristote, « alleguent 
que pour dire ‘faire’ {poi'ein), ils disent dran la ou les Atheniens disent prattein. »”. (Nancy, 
pp.l 13-14)
166 See the comparison o f the three terms in Denis Guenoun, Actions et acteurs: Raisons du drame 
sur scene (Paris: Belin, 2005), p.80.
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which self-dramatisation meets drama in ‘dran’, as Divine alone is called to 
witness.
Claire Nancy goes further than this Levinasian description of the 
prereflective engagement of dran and describes it as a decision, engaging the 
individual, in the production of an outcome:
C’est le verbe qui autorise la distinction, introduit du jeu entre le fait de 
produire un resultat (comme Hephai'stos enchaine effectivement 
Promethee) et le fait de le decider, d’en assumer la libre decision. (Nancy, 
p.l 15)
It is therefore precisely the status of the decision which is in play. Nancy takes the 
example of Orestes’ guilt in killing his mother, Clytemnestre, to avenge his father, 
Agamemnon. Oreste is responsible, dran 61, while from a pragmatic point of
I  r Q
view, he merely carried out {prattein) Apollo’s orders . It is because of the 
number of discrete pressures going to form this decision that it is a case of dran, 
in which will and responsibility may goad one another in complex interactions. 
This same distinction is shown within a single individual in Agamemnon, when 
Agamemnon’s own need to sacrifice Iphigenia in order to wage war on Troy can 
be seen to contain the possibility of his own will introducing itself, which would 
mean that his daughter was sacrificed out of military ambition. This kind of 
staging, with which the Athenian theatre confronted its audience for the first time, 
opened the “jeu” or performance of the characters to the “enjeu, pour une 
possibility pour l’homme de peser, de penser son role, et d’en revendiquer ou 
recuser les consequences.” (Nancy, p. 116) What is at stake in the play is the 
possibility of the characters, as of the audience, to be able to view their behaviour: 
“confrontant l’homme au spectacle de sa propre decision. Cette scene, c’est
167 Orestes: “Car j ’en suis responsable [dran], tel quel, je ne le nierai pas.” (1.613 in Nancy, p.l 15) 
And in the Fagles translation “Strike I did, I don’t deny it no.” ‘The Eumenides’, 1.617. Aeschylus, 
The Oresteia, trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin, 1977), p.258.
168 The Eumenides addressing Apollo: “C’est toi seul qui as effectue (prattein) tout, puisque tu en 
es toute la cause.” (1.200 in Nancy, p.l 16) And in Fagles, “You did it all, and all the guilt is 
yours.” ‘The Eumenides’, Fagles, 1.198. p.239.
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effectivement le drame, c’est-a-dire, 1’action ou il s’engage, 1’action en tant 
qu’elle 1’engage et le determine.” {Ibid.)
To allow us to gauge the extent to which dran concerns action in the sense 
of its premise in engagement, we could take the example of King Lear, whose role 
of king insulated him entirely from the Poor Toms of this world. After the scene 
on the heath, he is able to say, “I have ta’en too little care of this!” (III.4); and 
also, as Levinas quotes as an epigraph to the foreward of L ’Humanisme de Vautre 
homme, “I should e’en die with pity to see another thus.” (IV.7) The reflexivity of 
this second statement bespeaks the pathos, or passion, at the root of action. It is 
this which constitutes the acuteness of anagnoris, or recognition scenes: a 
character realises he or she is the agent of that which they believed to have 
opposed or refused. Hence, the king may assume the role of the clown as is 
argued by Jan Kott.169 Like Lear, who is “a man more sinned against than 
sinning” (III.2. 59), Oedipus explains before being driven to Colonus that he 
underwent rather than intended the acts that he performed: “Since my acts, at
1 70least,/ were acts of suffering more than actions outright - ”. And then later: 
“Why even if  I had known what I was doing [dran],/ how could that make me 
guilty [prattein]?”171 Between the French and the English translations, the sense of 
a ‘happening’, rather than a ‘doing’, is underlined in different ways. In Nancy’s 
French version the situation is rendered as “ce qui m’a ete inflige” (1.268), against
177Fagle’s, “I was attacked” , in which he allows himself a more stark use of the 
passive. The fact of miscarried intention, therefore, may result in action in terms 
of prattein as people interact in unexpected ways; only dran, however, is an
169 C f  Jan Kott, Shakespeare Our Contemporary (1964), trans. Boleslaw Taborski (New York/ 
London: Norton, 1974), p. 168.
170 Sophocles, ‘Oedipus at Colonus’, The Three Theban Plays, trans. Robert Fagles rev. edn 
(Penguin, London, 1984), 11.284-286. p.299.
171 Ibid., 11.291-293. As Nancy writes it: “...les actes qui sont miens, je le dis,/ m’ont ete infliges 
plutot que j ’en suis coupable, [...] Et certes, comment puis-je etre mauvais de nature/ moi qui, face 
a ce qui m’a ete inflige, ai engage en retour ce que j ’ai engage [dran]; /si bien que, si j ’agissais 
(prattein) en connaissance de cause,/ meme dans ce cas, je ne serais pas mauvais pour autant? 
(11.267-274) p.l 18.
172 ‘Oedipus at Colonus’, 1.290, p.299.
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activity that has been owned, or that is owned, as it emanates from the relation of 
the self to its action, to which the self and only the self can reply.
Drama, then, for Nancy reconnects action to its source, to “la scene de sa 
decision, et le heros a sa propre determination, a son autopraxie.” (Nancy, p.l 19) 
It is as though Levinas’s allegiance to drama were a quest to reach behind action 
to its part in the staging of the individual. This is not a space, as such, but the 
pressure and disorientation of substitution.
Plato and after him Hegel take a highly poietical view of the Greek State. 
Plato in The Republic requires that the actor not be allowed to “s’y produire”, 
favouring rather statecraft in the hands of rulers, whose task is qualified rather 
strangely in The Laws by the old Athenian when he exclaims, “we’re tragedians
1 7^ourselves, and our tragedy is the finest and best we can create.” This is meant to 
redirect the prestige of truth and nobility to the state, rather than to its artistic 
imitation. For Hegel, tragedy will be retained as a necessary element in an 
aestheticized ethics, linking the Greek State to the modem state via a speculative 
theory o f religion. Before opening into a more general discussion of Hegel, we 
should display our intentions more clearly by discussing the unity of action in the 
Aesthetics, that will prove important in creating the ethical conflicts between state 
law and family law which are explored in Antigone.
The unity of action, as a collision between two characters and between 
opposing, mutually exclusive, ethical viewpoints and wills, presupposes a unity of 
conflict, whereby one character opposes another in his or her goal. (Aesth, 
pp. 1166-67) Unity of action requires that action be bom out of conflict. If the 
conflict can be described as two colliding arrows, then that which generates the 
meaning of the drama is as Hegel puts it, “the dissolution of the one-sidedness of
173 See The Republic, III, 398, and the rest o f the old Athenian’s speech in The Laws, which 
continues, “our entire state has been constructed so as to be a “representation” o f the finest and 
noblest life -  the very thing we maintain is most genuinely a tragedy.” (VII, 817bc) Plato, The 
Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin, 2004), p.264. Also detailed in Taminiaux, Tam, 
p.29, 30.
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these powers” (p.l 163); whilst in the throes of the action, as Denis Guenoun 
sometimes describes this model of drama, c ’est le sens qui fa it le sens.114 If we 
take Dans la solitude des champs de coton, Bernard-Marie Koltes identifies the 
premise for such a bipolar view of action in the formal difference between action 
and character. The action takes place along a straight line in a dark street between 
two lit interiors, and is unified by the attribution of will; that the Buyer put 
himself in the path of the Dealer deliberately, which translates into cooperation or 
conflict, a willingness or resistance in view of the other’s designs. The uncertain 
outcome of the collision of these arrows does not change the action’s form and the 
structure remains determined.175 The dramatisation of Koltes is almost
1 7Aincomparably stripped down , but also holds true for larger more complex plots 
whereby the conflict comes to a head in like manner through a collision of wills or 
desires along a straight line. Oedipus wants to know what has cursed Thebes, and 
Creon finds out. The curse originated in a meeting of Laius and his son on the 
road to Delphi as neither father and son, (nor later mother and son) recognise one 
another. Of course, these models are highly deterministic, causing someone lost 
on roads that are far from straight nevertheless to reach a preordained finishing 
point for the dissolution of their drama. In this way, comedy can turn to tragedy, 
as forces collude:
Lai'os, pour dejouer les predications funestes, entreprendra ce qui est 
exactement necessaire pour qu’elles s’accomplissent. (Edipe, en 
reussissant, travaille a son malheur. Comme le gibier qui sur la plaine 
recouverte de neige fuit en ligne droite le bruit des chasseurs et laisse 
precisement ainsi les traces qui feront sa perte. (EN, p. 14)
174 The formulation has been used at conferences, though the reasoning behind it is to be found in 
Part One, ‘Idees du drame’, in Guenoun, Actions et acteurs.
175 “Le Client: [...] J’allais de cette fenetre eclairee, derriere moi, la-haut, a cette autre fenetre 
eclairee, la-bas devant moi, selon une ligne bien droite que vous vous y etes deliberement place.” 
Bernard-Marie Koltes, Dans la solitude des champs de coton (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 
1986), p.13.
176 Guenoun, ‘Actions et acteurs’, p.75.
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It would be irreverent to point out that Oedipus could have said simply ‘after 
you’, rather than confront the traveller, and that this could have interrupted the 
straight line of fate on the road to Athens177; something which could also have 
been achieved had Oedipus invited Creon to complete his investigations, rather
178than being infuriated by them and making himself simultaneous to the crisis. 
Once simultaneous to the crisis and saturated in being, the tragic genre exerts its 
own gravity such that the tragic protagonist cannot escape or adjourn its 
destiny.179 However tragedy itself possesses a strange proximity to the comic in 
the difficulty of the struggle against destiny. After all, the tiniest element of a 
decision, partnered with the unlikeliest event, may obliterate an anxiously sought 
after increment of freedom. As Levinas observes in L ’Humanisme de Vautre 
homme:
La mort rend insense tout souci que le Moi voudrait prendre de son 
existence et de sa destinee. Une entreprise sans issue et toujours ridicule: 
rien n’est plus comique que le souci que prend de soi un etre voue a la 
destruction; aussi absurde que celui qui interroge en vue de Taction les 
astres dont le verdict est sans appel. Rien n’est plus comique ou rien 
n’est plus tragique. II appartient au meme homme d’etre figure tragique 
et comique. (HdH, p.90)
“Apres vous”. {Eel, p.84)
178 Levinas recounts a tale by Max Picard, ‘Quelqu’un passe son chemin en bordure de foret. La se 
tient l’assassin. Le passant ne lui prete pas attention, car il se recite sa propre histoire. L’assassin 
ne peut rien. Comme si l’inattention de sa victime le separait du monde du crime et ne laissait pas 
au geste meurtrier 1’instant qui est necessaire a l’acte d’assassinat, instant commun a 1’assassin et 
de la victime. [...] Comme si dans son histoire personnelle -  a condition de ne laisser vide aucun 
instant -  Lhomme trouvait refuge contre la contempotaneite.’ {NP, pp.145-46) This is also 
reminiscent o f  an account by Jorge Semprun describing the impossibility from his hiding place of  
shooting a nazi soldier while this latter was singing. Jorge Semprun, L ’ecriture ou la vie (Paris: 
Gallimard folio, 1994), pp.50-51.
179 Another example would be Phedre, in which the heroine’s fatal declaration o f love can only 
lead her to the horror o f an “engagement irresiliable” to life and a fatal end. {DEE, p. 102)
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This merging of comedy and tragedy is not to deny the significance o f suffering 
but to mark the astonishing disparity between the factors and possibilities that 
swarm around every interaction and the crude finality of mortal outcome.
Hegel sets the dissolution of opposing powers in the action of tragedy 
against the resolution of these differences in comedy, “revealed directly as 
inwardly self-dissolving”, because not fundamentally based on conflict. (Aesth, 
p.l 163) In the complex events of life, however, powers are not usually mutually 
arresting, and do not reach the standstill of either dissolution or resolution Hegel 
mentions. There are instead traces left of different encounters which have an 
effect on the determinism of the unity o f action as they mark crossing-points, 
alternatives, and invisible alterities. This effect can be thought, instead of as 
colliding arrows, as oblique arrows, braking, speeding up or cutting off the action 
of the unity of conflict.
As a first alternative to the Hegelian unity of action in the Aesthetics, let us 
look at a text familiar from our earlier analyses, The Brothers Karamazov. The 
initial unity of action is a conflict between Karamazov senior and Dmitry over the 
latter’s inheritance, although the reader quickly understands that the father’s life is 
in danger. The strongest, straightest arrow pointing in that direction, even from 
the early chapters, is Dmitry, with Ivan as an almost completely excluded 
alternative. The characters opposing the accomplishment of the murder number at 
least three, firstly Alyosha and Zossima, but also Smerdyakov, who is considered 
to be a faithful servant. If two of them are trying to undo (defaire) the imperious 
climax to the action in the murder, then the one we least expect defects (de/ait), 
undoes the expectations of the reader and commits the murder. In spite of the 
imminent trial, Lise later comments that, in fact, everyone in their community 
approves of the murder as an outcome, as we mentioned in Chapter Two. This 
leads to her having dreams in which violence figures as aesthetic spectacle, (our 
p. 158) There is an old woman in the opening sequence with Zossima, however, 
whose confession, it is implied by Dostoevsky, is that she either willed, or simply
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felt no sorrow at her abusive husband’s illness and death; this sin of thought is 
forgiven, for she leaves with a smile. Such a sequence of events would mean that 
she had inadvertently been drawn into a unity of conflict with her husband, which 
then persists, in that she has momentarily found an ally in the illness which 
carried him away. It is the conflict’s continuing momentum which mars with guilt 
any release she might feel. (BK, pp.55-57) This is similar to the unity of conflict 
into which Ivan enters with his father, which afflicts him with such serious 
feelings of culpability that he grows to believe that he and he alone is guilty of his 
father’s murder. This multiplicity of arrows and their ability to change direction 
shows that there are not merely two singularities of will in conflict with one 
another, but already within a single individual bipolar tendencies, surrounded by 
other indirect forces, able to be reactivated from the trace. This implies another 
model of action whereby the community does not carry destiny as a single unit 
with dissolution as its outcome. Indeed, as Genet remarks of The Brothers, every 
act in its tiniest aspects is able to misfire and produce its opposite, in an instability 
of peripeteia that is more easily associated with comedy than tragedy: “Tout acte a 
done une signification et la signification inverse.” {ED, p.214) But this is not a 
comedy which is “self-dissolving”, but instead one in which the direction of 
action and of sense can be inverted by changes at such a micro level that indirect 
valencies of meaning are implied which are not exhausted in the complementarity 
of the Hegelian outcome, whether it is found in the dissolution of tragedy or 
comedy. There is instead something exterior to these endings.
To examine exceptions to the rule of single outcome, we will look at the 
expansion of a play’s events to include other wills and the way this may generate 
meaning. We turn to Arthur Schnitzler’s Reigen, translated in English as Round 
Dance, in which the structural unity of action we saw in Koltes’s Dans la solitude 
des champs de coton, which is shared between only two characters, is shared 
instead between a series of couples, sub-units of action forming the unity o f action 
as carried by the community as a whole. Here, the final dissolution of the conflict 
of wills described in Hegel occurs from the start in a kind of consensual
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overlapping, rather than in confrontation, as ten scenes show ten different sexual 
encounters; A with B, B with C, all the way to the J with A, which completes the 
effect of circular unity.180 The motivation of the dramatic gesture is at once shared 
and atomised. The events in Genet’s Le Balcon might be looked at in a similar 
light, in which the momentum of direct conflict is replaced by the playing out of 
fantasies in a world of simulacra. Fantasies absorb and disarm the action of the 
revolutionaries on the outside, as well as that of the police, the chief of which has 
privileged access to, and a strange familiarity with, the brothel; finally Roger 
castrates himself, while the Chief achieves the simulacrum of the simulacrum, and 
is entombed. Although there is a strong unity of action in Le Balcon, Pierre 
Laforgue has pointed out that, while in the 1956 version the sounding of the 
trumpets signalled the return to order, in the 1962 version the uprising has not 
entirely been put down, and we hear a burst of machine gun fire in the distance
I o  1
after the stage lights have been dimmed. This would imply that the 
revolutionaries are still active, and the action not at an end, placing it outside of 
the determinism of fate.
In order to analyse the unity of action further we will have to go back to 
Aristotle’s Poetics in which he seeks to identify the whole of an action as single 
and continuous:
A whole is that which has a beginning a middle and an end. A beginning is 
that which does not follow necessarily from anything else, but some 
second thing naturally exists or occurs after it. Conversely, an end is that 
which does itself naturally follow from something else, either necessarily 
or in general, but there is nothing else after it. A middle is that which itself 
comes after something else, and some other thing comes after it. Well
180 Arthur Schnitzler, ‘Round Dance’, Round Dance and Other Plays, trans. J.M.Q Davies (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
181 Pierre Laforgue, ‘Les corps glorieux dans Miracle de la rose’ given at the conference Rituels de 
I'exhibition, at Paris III, 9-10 February, 2007.
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constructed plots should therefore not begin or end at any arbitrary point,
1R?but should employ the stated forms.
This means that Aristotle’s idea of action envisages a single and isolated 
antecedent for each event that will break into conflict, resulting in an isolated 
ending point; in short, for him action has a dialectical structure. This is in contrast 
to the multiplicity one finds in, for example, the Dostoevskian world. There may 
be topological determinations for people finding one another along the same 
trajectory, or in the same space; but drama also springs from the arena of a 
multiplicity of action, as for example that in which Alyosha, Smerdyakov and, in 
The Idiot, Prince Myshkin are caught.
There are indeed various ways in which the dialectical nature of drama has 
been contested, notably with regard to Hegel’s insistence that the archi-structure 
of drama is one consisting of three acts. (Aesth, pp.l 169-70) Dramas in five acts, 
he argues, display this same tri-partite structure: “exposition falls into the first, the 
three intervening ones detail the quarrels and reactions, complications, and 
struggles of the opposing parties, and finally the fifth alone brings the collision to 
a complete conclusion.” (p. 1170) The refusal to be drawn into this structure is to
1 O l
expose aesthetic determination in narratives and their rules of intelligibility. 
The drama of existence can be portrayed otherwise, in two acts (En attendant 
Godot), in four (Le soulier de satin), or in a return to the tableau instead of the act 
as in Genet’s theatre.184 As Levinas explains, “le Moi est [...] drame en plusieurs 
actes” (Tel, p.258, Telb, p.314); and not three or five, one presumes. Genet’s 
admiration for the equivocal nature of The Brothers, as well as for the coda to 
Don Giovanni in which the dead rise again and embrace (ND, p.206), shows his
182 Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b 2.
183 Guenoun, Actions et acteurs, p.73.
184 Sarrazac remarks the distaste o f Lukacs for tableaux “qui y voit justement la decadence, c ’est- 
a-dire la fin de la collision et du mouvement dramatique au sens hegelien: « on obtient les tableaux 
qui n’ont pas plus de liens entre eux que les tableaux accroches dans un musee ». Jean-Pierre 
Sarrazac, Jeux de reve et autres detours (Paris: Circe, 2004), p.38.
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interest in resistance to the dialectical laws of three that we have found in Hegel 
and Aristotle. We will look now at examples in Dostoevsky and Shakespeare.
In The Brothers, Zossima describes his infancy and young life at the scene 
o f his deathbed, a scene which occupies the beginning of the second volume. 
After the prophecy given before his death, that the Russian people is a Godbearing 
people and that the best is yet to come, and given that the law of three had been 
respected (birth-life-death), one would have thought that his earthly journey 
would have been complete. But no, his burial will impose difficulty and doubt 
upon the meek flock. Instead of dying and remaining incorrupt, his reputation 
amongst the inhabitants of the town, and in the heart of Alyosha, as well, is 
tainted, as each imputes the stench o f his body to its former occupant and 
considers this to be his legacy, losing sight of his announcement of a prophetic 
future in the disappointment at being deprived of a cheap miracle. This outcome is 
revealingly referred to as his “conduct” by Madame Kokhlakov in a letter to 
Rakitin (BK, p.401, Book III, Chapter 3), who feels, having been the most avid 
believer, that miracles are no longer to be expected. Genet places the importance 
of this episode far above the parallel event of a continuation beyond death in ‘The 
Wedding at Caana’ (Chapter 4), in which Alyosha has a vision of Zossima joining
t or
the wedding guests at the feast. Genet even goes so far as to change the order in 
the story, heightening incongruity by describing this religious experience as 
coming between Alyosha leaving the cell, and him going to see Groushenka, 
rather than following this visit. He also claims the religious experience was 
something Alyosha had claimed for himself, rather than an event reported by the 
narrator. {ED, p.214) If Zossima’s intervention in the family quarrel had been 
successful, and had the reading of his life story by Alyosha been corroborated by 
a sacred incorruptibility, then that would have defused the unity of action, and 
sent it in the direction of resolution rather than dissolution. But this is not the case,
185 In Genet’s telling, chapters three and four o f this book have been inverted. “II pretend meme 
avoir ete visite a ce moment-la, et il finit, avec son ffoc de moine, dans l’appartement de 
Grouchegnka.” {ED, p.214) But, as Edde points out, Genet made other slips in his recollections o f  
Dostoevsky, including the mention o f Sonia as a character in The Brothers Karamazov rather than 
Crime and Punishment. Dominique Edde, Le Crime de Jean Genet, p.42; ED, p. 166.
199
implying at once the strength of fate in drama, and the multiplicity of possible 
side routes and turnings, changes of pace, and distractions in the surrounding 
action. These could keep the hero away from Thebes, in the case of Oedipus, and 
away from Chermashnya and at home, in the case of Ivan, where he could prevent 
the murder of his father. (BK, p.713)
In fact, it is possible to conceive of the fatality of drama regressively, as 
was pointed out by Nietzsche with reference to Wagner: as starting from the 
ending and working backwards. Having quoted Aristotle against the illogicality of 
forcing the action to a predetermined end point, Aristotle’s wish to isolate the 
action can be seen in another way itself as threatening the primacy of its logical 
unfurling, in that all kinds of valencies of experience must be cut out for mimesis 
praxeos to cooperate with unity of action, or as Guenoun summarises the 
construction of drama, the “mutation des pragmata (les faits) en dramata (les
1 k f\actions dramatiques).” In this context, an actual fact may not qualify as an 
intelligible act in the progression of a plot, but nevertheless remain vital, as all 
kinds of simultaneous events are possible which are not for all that extraneous, of 
which Dostoevsky managed to include more than, perhaps, any writer.
Poe too has interesting things to say on the matter of the logic of 
determinism in the novel generally in ‘The Philosophy of Composition’, a text 
that would so influence Valery in his ‘Introduction a la methode de Leonard de
1 8 7Vinci’. There Poe relates how he guessed the ending to Bamaby Rudge in a
f  D O
correspondence with Dickens, before the final instalments had been published.
Looking at his later essay ‘Charles Dickens’, he attributes certain problems in that
novel to the author becoming distracted during the periodical publication from an
1 80original intended ending, leading, instead, to a second one. This indicates that
186 Guenoun, Actions et acteurs, p.93.
187 Lois Davis Vines, Valery and Poe: A Literary Legacy (New York: New York University Press, 
1992), p.192.
188 Poe, ‘Charles Dickens’, Edgar Allen Poe Poems and Essays (London: Dent, 1977), p.208.
189 Edgar Allen Poe Poems and Essays, p.205, 206, 208.
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the requirements of logic changed during the book’s composition as the original 
ending became excluded by already integrated events.
In Poe’s ‘The Philosophy o f Composition’, another interesting matter for 
our argument comes to light, which is the use of theatre metaphors to describe the 
process of novel composition. The reader is deliberately excluded from this 
process of composition, which would unsettle them by challenging the impression 
of a writer being in control of every aspect of the illusion created:
Most writers [...] would positively shudder at letting the public take a peep 
behind the scenes at the elaborate and vacillating crudities of thought -  at 
the true purposes seized only at the last moment -  at the innumerable 
glimpses of the idea that arrived not at the maturity of full view -  at the 
fully matured fancies discarded in despair as unmanageable -  at the wheels 
and pinions -  the tackle for scene-shifting -  the step-ladders and demon- 
traps -  the cock’s feathers, the red paint and the black patches, which in 
ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, constitute the properties of the
190literary histrio.
All this has to take place before the novel can admit a reading public. This would 
suggest that the planning that has to be done by the artist is immense, in order to 
create a terrain in which the conclusion must follow logically from a vast array of 
possibilities. These possibilities, as Valery explains in ‘Introduction a la methode 
de Leonard de Vinci’, puzzle the individual in his or her own interior drama:
Interieurement, il y a un drame. Drame, aventures, agitations, tous les mots 
de cette espece peuvent s’employer, pourvu qu’ils soient plusieurs et se 
corrigent l’un par l’autre. [...] Ces lambeaux nous forcent a les interroger. 
Ils nous font deviner par quelles bizarres introductions des evenement 
humains et des sensations continuelles, apres quelles immenses minutes de 
langueur se sont montrees a des hommes les ombres de leurs oeuvres
190 Edgar Allen Poe Poems and Essays, p. 165.
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futures, les fantomes qui precedent. [...] il suffit d’observer quelqu’un qui 
se croit seul et s’abandonne; qui recule devant une idee; qui la saisit; qui 
nie, sourit ou se contracte, et mime l’etrange situation de sa propre 
diversite. ( VOl, p.l 158)
This means that the individual, like the artist before a future work, is inhabited by 
multiplicity. The finished quality of a work requires the organisation of 
multiplicity into a determination, but to what extent can those phantoms that 
precede it and are cast in front of it be determined? Are they not cast by the 
undecidablility of what is going to happen?
Guenoun draws our attention to Georges Forestier’s explication that 
Racine’s plays were written regressively; that Racine too wrote towards an 
already predetermined end point.191 Levinas remarks of tragic determinism in ‘La 
Realite et son ombre’ that it involves the audience attending an event that will 
always unfurl in the same way. (RO, p. 121) In that light, the Hegelian division of 
art into the plastic and the temporal, which meets its zenith in the theatre, does not 
change the fixity of the image. (RO , p. 120; Aesth, p.l 181, 1188) Quoting from the 
Aesthetics: “The actor should be, as it were, the instrument on which the author 
plays, or the sponge that can absorb any colour and give it back unchanged.” 
{Aesth, p.l 188) This unaltered transfer could not be further from the actor-witness 
in Levinas who discovers the Saying in their own speech. Guenoun resumes the 
playwright’s difficulty of giving the impression of freedom between characters: 
“[l]a dramatisation consiste a construire des dilemmes, devant lesquels chaque
I ^
agent est libre, dramatiquement libre, mais dont 1’auteur sait 1’issue.” In this
sense, the ending transcendentally precedes the characters, leaving the characters 
no choice but to follow paths in a single direction.193 Dostoevsky, by making 
Zossima act after his death, gives him a stronger role than that of Polyneices in 
Sophocles’ Antigone, whose stench plays into the fatality of the action and not
191 Guenoun, Actions et acteurs, p.99.
192 Actions et acteurs, p.99.
193 Actions et acteurs, p. 100.
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against it, as any transcendence must be searched for outside the bounds of the 
dialectical law of threes. We would venture further that the Aristotelean-Hegelian 
determination meets another, that of Heidegger’s being-towards-death, a 
production, or coming to fruition in the projectivity of Vollbringen, whose 
presentation is highly dramatic, but which is, it too, a determinism, the production 
of an outcome.
Hamlet is an example of a play in which action has been slowed down into 
passion, in which agents have become patients, to such an extent that the event of 
the decision in the dran has become an indecision. As Nietzsche comments, 
Hamlet is both the spectator and the inhibited actor of the action in which he 
participates.194 The action is de-dramatised, and comes almost to a halt, before 
Hamlet, who seems to have delayed all plans of taking revenge, agrees instead to 
fence for a bet. (V.2) That which is played, or “se joue”, is his relation to his own 
action. In the same way, Shakespeare takes Coriolanus, the soldier and man of 
action, and makes him a politician, so as to interrupt his relationship to action on 
behalf of the polis. Determinism remains, only it is presented in slow motion.
There are different ways of ironising or testing the strength of the laws of 
determinism hemmed in by death. Zossima dies and strangely continues in the 
role of agent in the story beyond death. Shakespeare’s Hamlet hesitates on the 
nearside of death, and Lear does too, having given up his decision-making role as 
king. It is disconcerting that Genet could speak of a freedom in genius, such as 
that shown by Shakespeare in Lear, as a discovery of laughter, as this is not a play 
known primarily for provoking mirth. He is referring to a state in which “apres 
avoir eu du talent et du genie, ils connaissent autre chose de plus rare: ils savent 
rire de leur genie.” (ED, p.216) Here the law of three is unable to exert its haste: 
Lear is unable after his anagronisis, his recognition of his relationship to 
“unaccommodated man”, to die. (III.4) He does not want to return to power, and 
addresses Cordelia, “Come, let’s away to prison:/ We two alone will sing like
194 “[T]he Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once looked truly into the essence o f  
things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action (BofT, p.60, Part 7)
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birds i' the cage:/[...] and hear poor rogues/ Talk of court news” (V.3); only at the 
very end does Gloucester comment that, “he hates him much/ That would upon 
the rack of this tough world/ Stretch him out longer.” (Ibid.) The action rather 
than speeding to an end is slowed down to a terminal degree. In a similar way, 
Genet uses the medical term ankylosis, a siezing up or ossification of the joints, to 
describe Decimo’s slowing steps towards death in ‘Fragments’, examined in the 
previous chapter. (Frag, p.71) This slowing down and seizing up is a pathos 
which describes the frontier to a new literary form. Genet continues in his essay 
on The Brothers, from which we have already quoted:
L’ceuvre d’art construite sur de seules affirmations jamais contrariees est
une imposture qui cache quelque chose de plus important. (ED, p.216)
Lear, who, as Jann Kott puts it, has fallen off the stage on which the player struts 
and frets (described by Macbeth), still addresses other characters as though they 
were part of it, until a story that was a history, become a tragedy, is then read as a 
comedy, with Lear learning the clown’s language. It is in this that the predicament 
of the tragic hero is expressed, that is in “tragic scenes shown through 
clowning”.195
In an, until recently, unpublished essay treating similar themes, Genet 
explains that such an artist gifted with laughter -  adding to Hals, Mozart, and 
Shakespeare discussed in the Dostoevsky essay, Manet, Racine, Goya, Mallarme, 
Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Nerval, and Proust -  “ouvre une breche [...]. II la referme 
sur lui-meme.” (‘A propos de Manet’, Cat, p.289) This breaching, which is also a 
broaching of the faux-semblant, is, as has been said of Giacometti, unbearable. 
This is not in the manner of tragedy, but in the way the subject is made passively 
to withstand an alterity-content carried by a new form, which allows an alterity to 
perform a “mise en moi de son idee.” (Tel, XV, Telb, p. 12) This makes the subject 
the space for that which inhabits no space. Such a crossing enables, as Levinas 
writes at the end of ‘La signification et le sens’, the trace to figure as “l’insertion
195 Kott, Shakespeare our Contemporary, p .166, 168, 149.
204
de l’espace dans le temps”. (HdH, p.67) This finding in the trace o f that which 
cannot otherwise take place complicates the subject’s decision-making, such that 
he or she cannot come to a de-cision, a sharing out or a breaking down of what it 
complicates. This is a non-lieu, whose claim the subject cannot merely throw out 
o f court, as the French term would suggest, because of insufficient evidence, but 
which commands engagement, and does this by interfering with our positioning of 
ourselves. The subject pursues meaning in the trace, which is impenetrable, and 
fails to unveil or reintegrate itself into the existing codes of the world. {Ibid.) 
Working from this breach or retreat the artist produces works which deny, 
however briefly, access to the world and its illusions:
L’ceuvre sortie d’eux-memes, semble etre nee comme ceci: dans une aire 
geographique une epoque s’interroge. Elle voit arriver, venant vite, a la 
rapidite de la maree montante, le mensonge, le faux-semblant et avec eux 
Tankylose. Elle doit reagir. Pas de temps a perdre [...].
II semble done qu’une epoque sente et meme voit venir Tankylose, elle 
depeche quelqu’un d’assez robuste pour dire la verite, la nudite du roi par 
exemple. La verite est dite. L’inquietude se dissipe. Un autre mensonge se 
prepare ailleurs [...]. (Cat, p.289)
If a society sends the artist on ahead, then the ankylosis of the loss of control of 
one’s destiny in the ascendency of the impenetrable over the communicable is 
being preceded by the ankylosis of the art object. Artistic ankylosis is therefore an 
aesthetic way of battling determinism in the world, as it works by inducing 
controlled passivity. Genet’s characters are above all those that are unable to act, 
as they are ontologically overexposed. We think of those characters who are 
unable to take part in revolutions: Said the traitor, the clients of the Grand Balcon, 
Diouf in his role as apologist for historical usury, the maids unable to conceive of 
a life without Madame, Leffanc in his derisory sovereignty, and the inmates in Le 
Bagne, all lacking purchase beyond their confinement in ontological prisons. But 
is intensifying their confinement the only way of drawing attention to
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determinism, through exercises in aesthetic determinism, or are such exercises, on 
the contrary, also part of tragedy? Or to express this question differently, is the 
beginning of a new dedramatised form of addressing determinism nevertheless 
subsumed into tragedy and its closed view of fate?
3. The continuation of the tragic spirit
Hegel was the one to conceptualise tragedy as a poietic rendering of State 
affirmed by the tragic individual. This can also be read in terms of the unity of 
action, as the community, the carrier o f fate, is confronted by a contradiction in 
ruling principles embodied by the tragic hero, who is then reabsorbed.
The relationship between the individual and the community is drawn in 
Hegel and Nietzsche, respectively, through Spirit and Will, each of which 
describes their connection to the universal, and functions as an aesthetic- 
metaphysical theory, rather than a commentary on human affairs in the mimesis 
praxeos. {Tam, p . l51)
In Nietzsche, tragedy’s birth takes place from the choir, said to have been 
spawned from the hypnotic power of the poet Archilochus. These origins, 
Nietzsche tells us, should not be read in the light of a political reading of tragedy, 
derived from Aristotle through oppositions between the prince and the people, the 
chorus and the stage; for here, the choir is considered alone, and in a purely 
religious-metaphysical sense. {BoJT, Chapter 7, p.56) The result o f this is an 
alteration of our view of the theatrical, theor-etical space, by which that which is 
given to visual contemplation, through the Greek theoria, is no longer beheld, 
theasthai, by a critical community. As Taminiaux explains:
II suffrt qu’au moment de la naissance, deja promue au rang de fondement,
la tragedie soit reduite a un choral religieux pour que, dans sa version
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achevee — chceur, scene, gradins — , «1’ensemble de la sphere politico-
sociale » [BofT, p.56] soit mis hors jeu. (Tam, p.l 54; NdT, p.66)
The Will is the only qualified spectator and actor in the fabric of being itself, 
while music, rather than presenting a copy of praxis, as in Aristotle, presents 
instead a copy of the Will. (Tam, p. 141) In line with ‘The Greek State’ dedicated 
to Cosima Wagner (1871-72), Nietzsche writes in the Preface to The Birth “that 
art represents the highest task and truly metaphysical activity of this life”. 
(Preface, BofT, pp.31-32) There is a form of redemption associated with 
Nietzsche’s artistic view of existence, which has its origins in Schopenhauer. 
Redemption in Schopenhauer is operated by a disengagement from the voracity of 
the individual will’s tendencies, impulses, and yearnings.196 So whereas in 
Schopenhauer, art, as with asceticism, achieves a distance from the will to live, in 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, it is the will itself, as Taminiaux puts it, which 
‘confirms and affirms’ artistic activity. (Tam, p. 134, 143, 145) This expresses 
itself through the Apollonian, the individuated, and the Dionysian, the destruction 
of individuality.
So if  the chorus is considered as a religious entity, which is both creator 
and spectator of the events it enacts, then, for Taminiaux, it follows on from the 
theoria-poiesis coupling (thinker-technician) described by Hegel; only this time 
with regard to the production of will rather than spirit. This creator-spectator 
(Tam, p. 152) recalls the spectator-actor we found earlier in ‘La signification et le 
sens’, who is individuated, but also as an individual feels itself acted upon in 
every phenomenon with which it is confronted, and through which at the same 
time it is produced or produces itself (se produit). One important difference 
remains, however, in that the spectator-actor does not enter into the ecstatic 
alienation about which we were warned in discussing ‘La Realite et son ombre’. 
(RO, p.l 12) Going back to the ‘Notes’ to The Birth from Winter 1869-70, we find 
that Nietzsche wanted to leach both spectator and actor of all implication in
1% [Qlue l’on s’arrache aux tendances, aux pulsions et aux convoitises de son individuality 
singuliere”. {Tam, p. 134)
207
praxis. For this reason drama was put to one side in favour of tragedy and its 
pathos playing on the will. He diminishes the role of Aristotle’s mimesis praxeos, 
through which the public could study the consequences of action, in favour of a 
metaphysical experience of pathos in relation to the will. We continue quoting 
Nietzsche in the Michel Haar edition used by Taminiaux:
La fin emouvant, phobos et eleos n’ont rien du tout a faire avec le drame:
ils appartiennent a la tragedie, mais non pas en tant qu’elle est drame.
Toute histoire peut comporter ses elements: mais surtout le lyrisme
musical. (NdT, p. 194; Tam, p. 153)
Fear and pity are considered only in so far as they form part of the will, forming a 
metaphysical-musical response, rather than a reasoned, practical one even in 
response to the imitation of mimesis praxeos. From this position in the ‘Notes’ to 
The Birth, Nietzsche wants to test the impact of tragedy upon drama, which is 
what he does in The Birth itself and The Case o f  Wagner. Thus drama comes to be 
considered not as action but as event into which the spectator enters and is acted 
upon through the will, exposing the subject’s decision-making apparatus, yet 
without the drama being played out in mimesis of societal interaction. This is the 
point at which Levinas begins to make use of Nietzsche’s thought on drama, as 
drama which engages the will does not offer the individual an escape route from 
the portrayed events, implying not a climax followed by the spectator’s exit from 
the theatre, but engagement in “the legend of the place”, a kind of foundational 
activity. (CW, p. 174) It is instead, as Nancy argues, a ‘staging of the decision’, 
which can be considered as a response to Nietzsche’s event of high pathos, a 
“happening” rather than a “doing”, in which the spectator-actor participates. This 
means the individual is implicated in the whole and the whole in the individual. 
We read, later on the same page of the ‘Notes’, Nietzsche’s ecstatic version of 
drama:
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Tout art desire un « etre hors de soi », une ecstasis; de la provient le 
passage au drame, en ce que nous ne faisons pas retour en nous, mais 
penetrons dans un etre etranger, dans notre ecstasis; en ce que nous nous 
comportons en ensorceles. D’ou le profond etonnement au spectacle du 
drame: le sol vacille, ainsi que la croyance en l’indissolubilite de 
l’individualite. (NdT, p. 194)
This quotation relates to the two extremes of Levinas’s oeuvre: in which, on the 
one hand, a warning is issued about ecstasis and ensorcelement in being or “etre 
etranger”, while on the other hand, each spectator is at the same time astonished at 
finding that their individuality is not indissoluble, leaving them porous and prone. 
Thus “etre etranger” can be understood as either a sinking into being, or as a claim 
exercised by the Other, who disturbs the spectator in his or her position of 
separation by either joining him or her there, or enabling the subject to recognise 
the moment when he or she has lost distinction from others temporarily in the 
choral, or the collective. While the former creates participation, the latter creates 
recurrence, whereby through the “happening” a claim is made on the subject. If 
art desires that which is outside itself and in drama we do not return to ourselves, 
then it is possible that substitution has taken place whereby the self witnesses on 
behalf of the Other who has no voice outside the artwork.
In this sense, everything perceived in the drama of the individual can 
overfill the soul and lead to his or her ‘going down’ (Untergang), or descending 
into the world, to quote part four of the Prologue to Zarathustra, which is used in 
epigraph to ‘Humanisme et an-archie’. (HdH, p.73) Levinas, therefore, is able to 
envisage the use of the notion of drama in Nietzsche not in pursuit of a 
metaphysics of will, but a metaphysics of ethics. There are other moments in these 
texts by Nietzsche that will be reworked by Levinas; for example, the points at 
which Nietzsche effects an explosion of the myth that reason and individuation 
are able to control the will. {Tam, p. 133) This concurs with our argument in 
Chapter One on Rashkalnikov, to the effect that in the possibility of erroneous 
readings introducing themselves into logical calculation, science may be the
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plaything o f the will. (DV1, p.40) Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, criticises 
rational discourse as part of a “science interessee”, a theoria subject to the will, 
(Tam, p. 151), calling instead for “desinteressement” to be found in the purity of 
art. (p. 135, 134) We also remember the peculiar and unpredictable switching 
between ‘disinterestedness’ and self-interestedness found in Querelle de Brest, 
examined at the end of Chapter Two. (QU, p.327) In each case, however, in 
common with the Schopenhauerian description of disinterested art, a watchfulness 
outside of the self is created which registers the inadequacy of the individual 
viewpoint, as signification is received outside any will to receive significance.
Before venturing onto a political reading of the stage and choir, we should 
first of all signal the difference between the poiesis of the Spirit in Hegel and that 
of the Will in Nietzsche. In Hegel the Spirit involves everyone, absorbing them 
teleologically into the theoria which will turn them from a polis into a Sittlichkeit, 
or ethical community. (Tam, pp.71-72) Nietzsche, in the precursor text to The 
Birth, ‘The Greek State’, presented to Cossima Wagner, expressed the belief that
197slaves should work not for the state but for the artist. His discussion of will 
guided by art also therefore advocates poiesis. (GE, p. 171) In the cases presented 
by both Nietzsche and Hegel, the construction involved in poiesis also involves 
destruction. This, it transpires, is the basic structure of the Hegelian concept of 
Aufhebung. Although poetry, understood in this way, as a perfected structure 
achieved with savoir-faire, is indeed poietical, Levinasian production, on the 
other hand, consists in a passivity which is not a participation in a poietic act of 
accomplishment, either of the spirit or of the will. Rather than being turned into a 
satyr carried out of himself, the member of the chorus might, as Genet puts it in 
‘Comment jouer Les Bonnes', see him or herself as they normally ‘do not dare’198.
197 Nietzsche, ‘The Greek State’, The Nietzsche Reader, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan 
Large, trans. Carole Diethe (London: Blackwell, 2006).
198 In ‘Comment jouer Les Bonnes', “[...] je vais au theatre afin de me voir, sur la scene (restitue en 
un seul personnage ou a l'aide d'un personnage multiple et sous forme de conte) tel que je ne 
saurais -  ou n'oserais -  me voir ou me rever, et tel pourtant que je me sais etre.” GOC4, p.269.
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Genet tells Frechtman in a letter of 1960 that his conception of the theatre is 
exactly the same as Nietzsche’s (GTC, p.943); but he qualifies this in the 1981 
interview with Bourseiller and he explains that he believes neither in a moralising 
God, nor in Nietzsche’s dithyrambic god of dance, but one experienced within the 
subject {ED, p.221). Furthermore, he refers in work notes taken at the time of the 
interview, in a strange mixture of the active and the passive, to being acted 
through, “j ’agis tout le temps comme si j ’etais agi par lui”. (p.399 n.10) Seeing 
oneself at the theatre the way one knows one is, but would not dare to view or 
even dream oneself as being, is strangely parallel to the notion of being observed 
by God or a god who never takes his eyes off one of its creatures.
This enables the subject, both in the context of the theatre and of the 
drama of the individual, to see themselves passively, though actively absorbed in 
goals that remain potentially hidden. This is a passivity that includes a me void , 
interrupting the complacency of knowledge and aesthetic enjoyment. This 
produces an anagnoresis or exterior recognition, which awakens the subject to 
what is secretly occurring in the innerlife of the Will or Spirit. For Levinas, it is 
therefore not the accomplishment of either Spirit or Will which is produced, but 
the subject’s relationship to his or her own action in drama; a relationship is 
produced, rather than a specific poietic product.
Furthermore the theoria-poiesis (thinker-technician) coupling in Hegel 
describes the relation of the individual to the multitude in Spirit, and the state to 
religion, in the aspiration to absolute Spirit. This is far more at odds with 
Levinas’s philosophy than are Nietzsche’s ideas on poiesis in The Birth, which in 
spite of its attitude to construction and destruction also contains elements of the 
notions of drama and passivity that Levinas will flag in The Case o f  Wagner as 
worthy of emulation. I want to discuss this further now.
Taminiaux points out the significance of Hegel’s early piece, Jenenser 
Realphilosophie II  (1805-1806), as a foretaste of Hegel’s maturity, and his
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formulation of the absolute Spirit in the Encyclopedia (1816). He draws our 
attention to the speculative value of art for Hegel, which is at the same time 
interpreted in a sufficiently open way to keep it clear of particularities which 
could hinder its application to absolute Spirit. Taminiaux translates from the R-P 
Horstmann edition of the Realphilosophie:
« U Esprit absolument libre, qui [a] repris au-dedans de soi ses 
determinations, produit desormais un autre monde; un monde qui a la 
figure de soi-meme; ou son oeuvre est accomplie au-dedans de soi, et ou il 
accede a F intuition de soi comme soi. » (Tam, p.70)
Taminiaux then comments:
[Rjemarquons d’emblee que la caracterisation de la nature speculative de 
F Esprit absolu -  c’est-a-dire son acces a Vintuition de soi comme soi dans 
un monde qu'il produit et auquel il confere la figure de soi-meme -  
s'opere dans un langage a la fois suffisamment precis pour annoncer 
Fimportance speculative de Fart, et suffisamment large pour permettre a la 
pensee speculative de fonctionner a la maniere d’une esthetique alors 
meme que son propos n’est pas strictement Foeuvre d’art. (Ibid.)
This speculative-aesthetic approach will, in the Encyclopedia, allow the classical 
beauty of art to become absolute religion, combining with Christianity to 
supersede it as absolute Spirit. This purified, synthetic teleology is opposed by the 
anti-synthetic approach of Genet and Levinas whose views on the sublation of 
alterity and the sublimation of feelings aroused by alterity are quite different.
The generalised aesthetic Hegel describes, and which serves to reconcile 
through theatre the singular and the universal in the Greek city state, had already 
begun to change form, Taminiaux argues, with the beginning of the modem state 
in the epoch of Plato. In The Laws, the only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates is 
absent, the Athenian stranger becomes the mouthpiece of Plato himself, it is 
argued by Taminiaux, and explains the exclusion of the player from the polis by
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saying that the bios theoretikos is already a poet in his own right, and one that 
contributes to the composition of the whole of existence. (Tam, p.30) This 
position understands the theatre as the imitation of praxis, and praxis as failed 
poiesis. (Ibid.)199 The modem state of Hegel, in its turn, requires a different 
poietic theory of the production of the individual in order to reach universal 
applicability. To summarize Taminiaux, this universal meaning is reached through 
Christianity, in which the spirit is reconciled with the world, in which everybody 
is the same in the eyes of God, and in which worldly events and nature are 
reconciled, leaving no discord, or unreconciled necessity without a representative 
self.
Both Genet and Levinas are sceptical, in their different ways, of this 
representativeness. For in this representativeness, the singular leads to the 
sacrifice of potential being to what is there, the “etre-la”; while what is, is 
sacrificed to the advent of the spirit. (Tam, p.80) This structure is that of the 
modem state: isomorphic with its religion, in which nothing is accepted which is 
exterior to this fused structure. I want to examine further the implications of this 
sceptical approach to Hegel’s notions of drama and the state.
In Hegel, the state sacrifices the potential for etre-la o f those that compose 
it. But such a position cannot discount the fact these people are, nevertheless, 
beholden to animate the spiritual universality of the body of the state. The state 
will not die for the individual, but will ensure the survival of its absolute power 
through the death of the warrior. God, as the spirit of the community in the 
modem state, is ubiquitous, and this is stated by Hegel in the Realphilosophie in 
two ways: ‘the spirit of the community is the State of the Church’, or ‘the Church 
is the State raised in its thoughts’.200 This, then, is a synthesis of the Church and 
the State. But just as it is unclear as to whether Hegel’s is a philosophy of the
199 Aristotle, on the other hand, deliberately replies that the poetic art is also a poiesis: “the correct 
way to construct plots if  the composition [poiesis] is to be o f high quality”. Aristotle, Poetics, 
(1447a 2-3) p.3.
200 We quote Taminiaux’s translation o f the Realphilosophie: “C’est une seule et meme chose de 
dire que « Pesprit de la communaute est PEtat de PEglise » et de dire que « PEglise est PEtat 
eleve dans les pensees ».” Jacques Taminiaux, Naissance de la philosophie hegelienne de I ’etat, 
Commentaire et traduction de la Realphilosophie d ’lena (1805-1806), (Paris: Payot, 1982), p.286, 
§284. Tam, p.80.
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mind or of the spirit, it is also unclear as to whether such a synthesis is possible. 
This is especially apparent if one considers, as Levinas does, that religion is 
eschatological whereas universal history teleological. We are left wrestling with 
the paradox as to whether Hegel’s is a philosophy of politics, or of religion.
If there has been an aestheticisation of ethical philosophy in Hegel, then 
religion serves as the route out of aesthetics through which intuition is abandoned 
in favour of the certainty of thought. (Tam, p.78) Art, Hegel argues in the 
Realphilosophie, does not have the same breadth of speculative possibilities as 
religion, for religion, more powerfully, creates reconciliation with the world, with 
the way the world is. Instead, art creates nostalgia for heaven and therefore pain. 
This returns us to the impenetrability of human experience pointed out by 
Bataille, a pain or discomfort which is attenuated through artistic expression, 
fulfilling, therefore, at the same time a religious function, as we discussed in 
Chapter One; a judgement that also, though in a different way, colours the 
thinking of Nietzsche. In Hegel, religion is thinking spirit, but which does not 
think itself, and is not equal to itself, and so is not immediate. This, however, will 
develop into knowledge, which is immediate. Religion then is mediate, refers to 
the exterior, and yet can free itself of content and return to immediacy. It is as
immediacy that the Spirit knows itself. Spirit arises from immediacy as its own
201‘peaceful work of art -  the existent universe and the history o f  the world’. It is 
plain to see that a number of religious elements have gone awry in Hegel. The 
“futur utopique” that Levinas will attribute to religion (DVI, p.73), is instead 
attributed by Hegel to art as a peaceful, unmediated savouring of the present. The 
figure enters Hegel’s system as a way of presenting the same in the other, such 
that recognition of the other is at the same time affirmation of the self.
This serves to argue that, in effect, the poiesis of art in the Sittlichkeit is a 
teleological progression that goes past anxieties for the state to absolute
201 Taminiaux’s translation: “C’est en tant qu’immediatete qu’est possible qu’est en general 
l’esprit qui se sait [...]. L’esprit est son oeuvre Tartpaisible — I ’univers I ’etant, et Yhistoire du 
monde’'. Taminiaux, Realphilosophie, p.289, § 286-87; Tam, p.81.
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knowledge. By coupling theoria and idea in art, jouissance is identified in the
discovering of the same in the other, an outcome which Taminiaux expresses in
202Levinasian terms as the ‘negation of the imperious disturbance of the other’. 
The Hegelian aesthetic schema, therefore, which comes from interaction with 
difference, then obliterates its own source by excluding the unmasterable, 
invisible, unnameable, surprise or enigma. Art is then made to serve the Idea as 
the surpassed past of spirit, behaving as an insulation, therefore, from the irruption 
of the other. That tragedy on the one hand and aestheticised Christianity on the 
other could be considered as passages to absolute spirit, serve to bring with them 
the anxiety that the peaceful contemplation of the art work might instead be a 
continuation of the tragic spirit, in which suffering is almost figureless, except in 
its brief incarnation by the tragic protagonist or by Christ.
Let us first consider the case of Antigone. In a modem Hegelian society, 
there is no room for each member of the collectivity to debate the decisions of the 
rulers. Their task is to carry out effectively, occupying particular roles, the tasks 
given them by the foreman. Personal, familial, romantic interests could be 
damaging to this unity of the ruled. This, Taminiaux speculates, seems to have 
been what attracted Hegel to founding the ethical essence of the family on the 
brother-sister relationship, as it is without desire, especially where a dead brother 
is concerned. {Tam, p.99) The conflict between Creon and Antigone, the 
representatives of divine-family law and human-state law, shows that ethical 
actions of the individual may be partial and therefore flawed. (Aesth, pp. 1217-18) 
This leads to the dissolution of the tragic action we described above, (p.l 163) 
Hegel has found in Christianity a way of ensuring the status of the individual after 
this dissolution; it is through Redemption, something through which every 
individual is absolutely valued. However, the valuing of an individual in so far as 
they are dead or caught in determinism is still to leave them to languish in being. 
This would make of religion a mythologised politics, a political reality which, as 
Lacoue-Labarthe puts it, is created from a philosophy o f  tragedy, which is also a
202 veritable denegation de l’imperieuse distance de l’autre.” (Tam, p.81)
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poetics o f tragedy.203 Hegel’s is then a religion which is also a philosophy, and a 
poetics, and which places its value not in seeking to exceed being, but in the state 
of being itself.
How then does Genet’s poetics compare to this deterministic philosophy 
of tragedy? His poetics, as Derrida explains in ‘Signature’, a revisiting of his 
Genet commentary in Glas, is at once an echo and a subversion of the Hegelian 
model. We will now discuss that ambivalence through Derrida’s positions and 
counterpositions in Glas.
One of the chief features of Glas is the way in which the Genet column 
allows us to visualise the construction of absolute knowledge in the Hegel 
column. The white light of the sun characterises the superficial sense certainty of 
natural religion, and also its teleology in absolute knowledge. Both natural 
religion and absolute knowledge are an “absence de figure” in a “moment 
irrepresentable.” (Glas, 264a)204 The certainty of the senses, like that of 
knowledge, is to that extent purged of the other who has now been discovered in 
the self; this is true of Hegelianism and also possible to construe in Aristotelean 
tragedy, as we have seen above. Figures do, however, operate in the second stage 
of the syllogism, in the religion of plants and animals, a stage into which, in Glas, 
Genet signs himself as both flower, genet, and horse, genet. Something similar 
had already been related by Genet in ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’, when he describes the 
interactions of language as like both those of animals and plants: pollen, grafts, 
forests, beasts and migrations. (EMD, p. 17) This erodes determinism, as the 
heliotropic flower or animate animal come to fill subject positions as instances of 
signature. Genet’s identity as flower is animalised and gains a for-itself, 
something which correlates with our observations in the previous chapter, to the
203 I transliterate the following extract from an interview: “La philosophic de la tragedie est 
forcement une poetique de la tragedie”, followed by a definition o f religion as “de la politique 
mythologisee”. Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘De Holderlin a Marx: mythe, imitation, tragedie’, 
Labyrinthe, atelier interdisciplinaire, 22 (Autumn 2005), 121-33 (p. 133, 129).
204 This also brings to mind the Holderlin poem ‘Bread and wine’ examined in Chapter One (our 
p. 12), in which words are described as light, and which we now requote: “Long and hard is the 
word o f this coming but / White (Light) is the moment.” (OWTL, p. 10)
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effect that the trace can spread from the inanimate to the animate, which is more 
redolent of the face. A famous example by Genet, commented upon in Glas, is the 
passage from Journal du voleur in which Genet sees himself as the broom flowers 
(genista), and so acts by auto-figuration, or auto-production of the self, as he 
cannot be certain he is not the king, the fairy or the god of these flowers which 
carry his name. {Glas, 17a; JV, p.46-47) Through its accompanying signatures this 
enables Genet, from a starting point of illegitimacy, to occupy all roles himself in 
a sort of divine independence; to be his own father, mother and offspring; and to 
be on the point of reaching from natural religion, which carries but one figure, that 
of himself, to the threshold between absolute knowledge and absolute religion:
Cependant la filiation divine dont s’affecte le genet, c’est une conception 
immaculee, permettant au fils de prendre -  done de laisser -  toutes les 
places, de coucher seul -  avec ici le pere en soi, la la mere effective 
{ansichseiende Vater und nur eine wirkliche Mutter, mais nur eine c’est le 
meilleur) comme dans la religion absolue, e’est-a-dire au seuil 
(representatif) du savoir absolu ou le glas revient enfin aupres de soi, 
resonne, se reflechit pour soi, admire sa gloire et s’egale a lui-meme. 
(122b)
This would seem at first to be a solipsistic conclusion and yet it announces a 
position which is that of neither of the Hegelian suns -  neither that of natural 
religion, nor the one of reason.
The figures are not, as in Hegel, consumed by white light, apprehended 
only in ‘Tine consumation de la figure”. (264a) Instead of being consumed, the 
figures fragment and multiply. The single figure is not Genet’s only position; just 
as the text functions without the archi-signature of the writer, its contents, flora, 
fauna, human, non-human, can also signify as nouns and pro-nouns. This offers an 
alternative, carrying on past the light of absolute knowledge, and yet this 
alternative has yet to emerge as an alternative, as it is described by Derrida using 
the Phenomenology with a choice of quotations which evoke apocalyptic burning
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in ‘holocaust’; the light of absolute knowledge producing “streams of fire 
destructive of [all] structured form”. (Glas, 265a; PS, p.419) We now continue 
quoting the relevant passage of the Phenomenology using A.V. Miller’s 
translation, adding in square brackets Derrida’s use of the Hyppolite translation 
for key terms: “light disperses [dissemine] its unitary nature into an infinity of 
forms, and offers itself up as a sacrifice [holocaust] to being-for-itself’. (Glas, 
268a, PS, p.420)205 Here, holocaust is a sacrifice of disseminated meanings made 
for the self-determination of the for-self. This sacrifice of possible meaning calls 
in its turn for a kind of self-sacrifice, as the subject is implicated in a movement 
reminiscent of freedom in Levinas, which is a finite freedom; paradoxically, a 
freedom to be constrained by responsibility, in which the trauma of the impact of 
the other “ne me heurte pas seulement, mais m’exalte et m’eleve et, au sens 
litteral du terme, m ’inspire.” (AQE, p. 160, AQEb, p. 198) So, from a position of 
certain sense which has become immediate knowledge in absolute knowledge, we 
are brought back to the need of interpretation once again, as the white light of 
absolute religion shows the objects of natural religion, once more -  that is to say 
flora and fauna in a diverse ethical landscape. What was “une consummation de la 
figure entre deux soleils”, becomes instead its reappearance in a similar way to the 
trace. (Glas, 264a)
The use of the terms ‘burning’ and ‘holocaust’ do not, as Critchley writes, 
seem felicitous. As Agamben comments, “Holocaust” is a term describing 
sacrifice whose application post-war designates the scandal of death, but in a
207terminology adapted from the religious life of one of its chief victims. 
However, Derrida’s reconstrual of Hegel is not intended to be politically neutral 
since his emphasis is upon describing the loss of alterity voiced in the implied 
death of the other. Derrida’s then is a holocaust which is almost synonymous with 
the remnant, the remnant being bom of a responsibility pre-dating the subject of
205 Hegel, La Phenomenologie de I ’esprit, 2 Vols, trans. Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier, 1941), II, 
pp.215-16.
206 Simon Critchley, ‘A Commentary Upon Derrida’s Reading o f Hegel in Glas’, in Hegel After 
Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett (London: Routledge, 1998), p.221.
207 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants o f  Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller- 
Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2000), Chapter 1.10, pp.28-31.
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which the subject can never be rid, whose burning is in some way permanent. 
Thus the subject’s freedom is preceded by a responsibility it will not be able to 
shoulder. (AQE, p. 160, AQEb, p. 198; OB, p. 124) Indeed, Derrida hinges his 
observation on a quasi-metaphorical alternative to the complete destruction of 
holocaust: “holos” “caustus”, that which has been entirely burned. He thus draws 
our attention to dissemination possible through a particular treatment of Hegel. 
(269a) This alternative involves a multiplication of figures put at the disposition 
of the subject:
Alors au lieu de tout bruler on commence a aimer les fleurs. La religion 
des fleurs suit la religion du soleil. (268a)
This availability brings with it a responsibility in the treatment of the trace. Earlier 
in the text, Genet “s’est fait une fleur” (20b), in the sense of both rendering 
himself a flower, and offering himself a flower. He is, therefore, not the sole 
beneficiary, he is instead an object offered to itself which is also discoverable by 
the other. As Jane Marie Todd describes, this transforms the signature from origin 
-  that is source, sun and non-figure -  instead into a proper name, the proper name 
of a flower: and thereby also proper noun into common noun. We now quote 
Derrida’s explanation:
[I]l a mis en terre, en tres grande pompe, mais aussi comme une fleur, en 
sonnant le glas, son nom propre, les noms de droit commun, le langage, la 
verite, le sens, la litterature, la rhetorique et si possible le reste. (20b)
‘Glas’, as knell, can produce a resurgence of “le reste”, that is the remnant or 
remains. This is why Genet as disseminating flower (referred to as “1’accent 
circonflexe”, meaning “Genet”, 203b) starts off as his own parent, or mother 
(122b). Later, the flower becomes a kind of sister (273a), responsible like
208 Jane Marie Todd, ‘Autobiography and the Case o f the Signature: Reading Derrida’s Glas, 
Comparative Literature, Vol. 38, 1 (Winter, 1986), 1-19 <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0010- 
4124( 198624)38%3A1 %3C 1 %3AAATCOT%3E2,0.CO%3B2-Z> (p.7) [accessed 25 January 
2008],
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Antigone for burial of denied others -  as Genet was responsible for Jean Decamin 
and Decimo -  in an unclearable debt to the remnant. So while one mode of 
production is auto-perpetuating, the other produces on behalf of the Other. This 
presents a route out of Hegel’s philosophical metaphorics, whereby the ‘is’ of 
being in general may function as an ‘as’, and present alternatives to an ontology 
of white light, o f being uninhabited by beings; alternatives which replace an archi- 
metaphor with a whole variety of others, presented by the imagination, 
disordering and re-ordering what is.
The resurgence of the remnant takes place through traces in language, and 
yet Derrida has shown through his ambiguous expression of the remnant as holo­
caust, that the remnant may be situated in a position of both partial readability and 
of invisibility. This trace may be both readable and invisible like that which has 
become known under the proper noun of the Holocaust is the visible, readable 
proper noun of invisible proper nouns and their associated common nouns that 
have been consumed. It is a pro-name, and so refers to other names. And yet is 
this not too easy, to have one noun or kind of noun recall another? Would not 
Levinas, who condemns men-trees in Heidegger {EN, p. 127), and men-animals in 
fable (RO , p. 115), also be the first to condemn men-flowers in Genet? Does this 
not risk aesthetically circumscribing and bringing to presence events marked by a 
terrible loss and absence?
It is this kind of risk which led Adorno to state, “To write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric.”209 This comment, resonant with the thinking in ‘La 
Realite et son ombre’, implies that the aesthetic response may risk a perpetuation 
of barbarity more serious than any philistinism. What Derrida implies instead is a 
multiplication of meaning from an apparent unity, which is instead comprised of 
alterities. Thus for those bom into a culture as mere inheritors of a geo-political 
situation there is a responsibility that persists in the remnant. This becomes part of 
a culture’s pre-metaphysical coming to be that is given prior to ontological 
distinction. This giving in Heidegger is the es gibt, which in Levinas is reworked
209 Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1967), p.34.
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in the trace. This, therefore, is not so much the remnant of what may be restored 
to being, but the remnant of the remnant. It is here that the remnants of 
unconsumed figures may interrupt absolute knowing. Being may be a gift, and a 
pure gift, but on achieving existential consistency, it must (doit) assume a for- 
itself, and it does so in the receiver. So even without transaction between the 
receiver and donor, pre-original responsibility arises which is not in the register of 
a simple return: “Je te donne -  don pur, sans echange, sans retour -  mais que je le 
veuille ou non, le don se garde et des lors tu dois.” (Glas, 270a) The gift of the 
trace in being, therefore, reserves itself; and in the absence of donation and donor 
gives the subject a responsibility (devoir).
Derrida has taken a Hegelian-Heideggerian notion of being, and 
rerendered it, using Genet, such that the remnant, unthought and irreducible to the 
subject’s utility calculation, can behave like the trace. In a text not published until 
1907, ‘The Spirit of Christianity’, written in Frankfurt between 1798 and 1800, 
Hegel attempts to found Sittlichkeit on a community sharing the universal love of 
Christ, who is offered in the host. This acts as a sublation of finitude and carries 
the individual to the superlatively beautiful idea of the universal to be found in the 
love of God. And yet this love, as Stuart Barnett points out, is not for the Other, 
for as Hegel writes: “In love man has found himself again in another.” (SC,
710p.278) The attempt to reach the wholeness of divine love in the oneness of the 
community ultimately fails, for Hegel, because of Christianity’s will to autonomy 
and a separate destiny.
Still, the aesthetic aspects of Hegel’s description merit further analysis. In 
his treatment of the Last Supper, Hegel attempts to discern love as the expression 
of the feast, but in which “[ljove is present only as an emotion, not as an image 
also.” (p.248) This offering leaves no remnant. The signified, love, is released into 
the world, while the signifier and referent disappear. Mary Magdalene understood 
that Christ’s love would continue after his death, whereas the disciples showed 
themselves to be attached to the signifier, both in their difficulty in believing in
210 Stuart Barnett, ‘Eating my God’, Hegel A fter Derrida, p. 143.
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victory over death without Jesus’ physical, living presence, and in their 
disapproval of the woman with the jar of perfume, who is a prostitute, but who, as 
Hegel comments, behaves like a Jungfraulichkeit. {Glas, 72a) When Mary 
Magdalene annoints Christ’s feet, Jesus defends her from the disciples, “Why
*711trouble ye the woman? for she hath wrought a beautiful [good] work upon me./ 
[...] For in that she hath poured this ointment on my body, she did it for my 
sepulchre [burial].” {Matt 26. 10, 12) Derrida notes Hegel’s attentiveness to this 
being the only moment in the story of Jesus that uses the aesthetic word 
“beautiful”. {Glas, 73a; SC, p.243) This would mean that through an aesthetic 
moment, love could continue, but free from a physical remnant.
In the section of the Phenomenology, ‘Religion in the Form of Art’, Hegel 
describes the movement from the Spirit of Nature to self-conscious Spirit. This is 
thought in relation to art, as objectivity and intuition are made to complement one 
another. A person worships not a representation but “the Being of the risen Sun, 
[...] a Being which has now ‘set’ within itself’. {PS, p.436) By being directly 
experienced and consumable, at least by the senses, as in the earlier ‘Spirit of 
Christianity’, immediate certainty within the self of the divine Being of the Cult is 
maintained as something that can be “seen, felt, smelt, tasted”, serving as an 
object of desire, (p.437) The divine light that may be absorbed by fruit achieves 
self-consciousness and “now roams about as a crowd of frenzied females, the 
untamed revelry of Nature in self-conscious form.” (pp.437-38) The frenzy of the 
Furies, just mentioned, or the stammer of the Dionysian, however, are too 
indiscriminate and wild to describe universal consciousness. Hegel writes, “the 
mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and of Bacchus, [...] is not yet the mystery of 
flesh and blood.” (p.438) To achieve this connection to flesh and blood, which 
evokes Communion, Hegel calls on the artist, and more particularly the actor, 
whose corporeal beauty should lead him to be decorated in the Cult in place of the 
statue, joining Bacchic enthusiasm with artistic clarity. This is, one remarks, 
strikingly similar to the Dionysian-Apollonian coupling in Nietzsche. And yet
211 Kdkov in Greek, translated as “good” in the King James version, is also translated “beautiful” in 
the sense o f morally so.
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here the hero becomes a “handsome warrior” (p.439), and in spite of the Christ- 
like parallels in representing universal human existence in the mysteries of bread 
and wine turned into flesh and blood, takes part in a celebration in which he is 
feted, rather than sacrificed. This is done harmoniously and universally, as 
representation, in the loose equation between the aesthetic and the religious, 
which Taminiaux mentioned.
Nietzsche’s view of aesthetics is different, as he recognises the challenge 
of the impenetrability of the world to the Will, rather than its harmony in Spirit. 
The Dionysian-Apollonian coupling is reexpressed as the cruelty of nature, on the 
one hand, and the optimistic clarity of science and philosophy, on the other. In the 
last paragraphs to Glas, Derrida encapsulates the origin of literature as lying in “la 
ressemblance entre Dionysos et le Christ.” {Glas, 291a) In Hegel’s case, the 
unruliness of the Dionysian is synthesised with the perfection of the statue, in the 
actor-warrior, “an inspired and living work of art that matches strength with 
beauty”. {PS, p.438) This is neither the mere beauty of the statue, nor the 
enthusiasm of the Bacchic, but a reconciliation of the temporal and plastic modes 
in kenosis. Nietzsche also describes a relation between Christ and Dionysis, 
though in his writing the movement is more Dionysian and musical and also 
therefore destructive. For him Dionysian enthusiasm and Apollonian clarity are 
basic forces whose meeting and result, rather than offering themselves to a 
philosophical system, deny explanation. In a language which, like Hegel, also 
deliberately evokes Christian kenosis, he argues that the incarnation of gods and 
their sharing in being is the only way to justify the sacrificial logic of the life of 
man, and is therefore “the only satisfactory theodicy!” {BofT, p.43) So whereas 
Hegel tries to reconcile Spirit with the world through synthesis and assimilation, 
Nietzsche maintains a contradiction in the Will, and a scandalous quality to the 
suffering recorded. In the light of this argument from ‘Hellenism And Pessimism’, 
The Birth's subtitle, Levinas will use his own ideas on production to critique both 
tragedy and the philosophy with which it shares a dialectical process.
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4. Society of two and Society of one
In Chapter One, we examined the manner in which anachoresis, whilst being for- 
the-Other, can reject this as a burden and found its Ecclesiastical life instead on 
itself, or on the exclusion of a particular third party or group in denial of the 
Other. This would correspond to the two kinds of signature in Genet: one is a 
moment of reduction to figurations of the self in solipsism, in which everything is 
Genet, and in the other the same figures open into traces of the Other. The 
formulations of this hesitation in The Possessed and The Brothers Karamazov 
play too major a role in our problematic for them not to retain our attention still 
further here. For those searching for an underlying metaphysical theory of being, 
the proximity of the il y  a to illeity renders the attribution of meaning difficult, as 
they are each in different ways impenetrable. Since the demands of illeity may 
provoke the wish for a triumphant return to the self, in denial of the Other, the il y  
a that rushes in to take the place of illeity will receive particular scrutiny here in 
the role it plays in the ethical intrigue of the infinite.
We shall preface this argument with parallels and possible Symbolist 
sources for the il y  a. As we discussed in Chapter One (p.58), the experience of 
the il y  a is described by Levinas as requiring forgiveness regardless of any fault, 
in order for the bond to being to be even momentarily relieved by what is beyond 
it, or exterior to it. In De Tevasion, o f 1935 (one of the precursor texts to the 
eventual formulation of the il y  a in 1947), Levinas gives one of his earliest 
phenomenological descriptions of the saturation of being, and the need for 
transcendent exteriority, or “excendance”. (EV , p.98) Rolland develops Levinas’s 
reflections on nausea, through their nautical etymology, into a discussion of 
seasickness, in which the self cannot be evaded, because it is, as Levinas writes, 
“rive a soi-meme”. (p.l 16) Rolland writes in his preface to Levinas’s text:
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La nausee doit ainsi etre comprise comme le sentiment de notre etre 
lorsque nous sommes en mer de telle sorte que, dans la derive de la terre et 
la disparition de l’embarcation, la mer elle-meme se retire comme mer et 
que nous demeurons seuls a flotter dans le pur element, (p.35)
The description of errancy within a single substance, intensifying bondage, finds 
another very vivid formulation in Valery’s 1939 poem ‘Sinistre’, which describes 
a shipwreck:
Homme hideux, en qui le coeur chavire,
Ivrogne etrange egare sur la mer
Dont la nausee attachee au navire
Arrache a 1’ame un desir de l’enfer [...] (VOl, p.301)
The fact of being rive to the vessel while at the same time being de-rive, far from 
any shore, spells the disaster of the poem’s title; but the impression of imminent 
harm, or death, is traced not through an accomplished annihilation, but through 
the still more originary suffering of being. The impulse to seek escape through the 
other is given very unexpected expression by Valery, whose rigorous thinking on 
the isolation of the Ego is usually consistent with atheism. It transpires that the 
last man on deck is Christ, who is not at the helm trying to ‘save’ the ship, but 
bound to the yardarm, turned at the will of the wind, suffering in pure passivity: 
“Je vois le Christ amaire sur la vergue!.../ II danse a mort, sombrant avec les 
siens”. {Ibid.) This highly unexpected image leads to a particularly dense 
conclusion, “Son ceil sanglant m ’eclaire cet exergue: UN GRAND NAVIRE A 
PERI CORPS ETBIENS! ”
These lines possess the unusual quality of fulfilling the function of both 
final couplet (their actual position), and of epigraph (the position in which they 
are illuminated through a face-to-face). This adds an alpha and omega quality to 
the disaster that the poem evokes. Whether it is a past or present disaster, the 
speaker is progressively drawn in, making the subject viewpoint far from clear.
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There is a sequential movement starting from viewing man and his achievements 
from the exterior -  “Homme total” -  to a sharing of the crisis with the subject -
“L’abime et moi formons une seule machine” -  only then for the speaker to step
212back and view the bark in the reflection of the Other’s “oeil sanglant”. The 
Other is glimpsed in the final moment of the ineffable experience of death, 
supplanting, it would seem, the speaker’s own crisis with that of a plurality. The 
arrival of the other’s demise in the consciousness of the speaker seems to bespeak 
a world, albeit in this case moribund, constituted through the other.
For his own part, rather than shattering against the barrier of nothingness, 
as in Heideggerian being-towards-death -  something he would see as inducing not 
‘a supreme lucidity’ or ‘supreme virility’, but “rendant impossible toute 
assomption de possibilite” (TA, p.57, 58) -  Levinas discerns an originary bond to 
the Other perceived in a shared, though finite time for the moribund subject him 
or herself. Before the face-to-face with the Other on which Valery’s poem ends, 
the obstacle of death is described in the fourth verse through a reference to time as 
the ultimate limit: “Le temps se brise ainsi qu’un instrument...”. One can read the 
irremissible into this, and a fast approaching end to the human register. The line 
might also recall Revelations, in which the Archangel states, “There shall be time
j  1 1
no longer”. (10.6) The slowing down of time before its destruction is
212 It is worth adding a word to Vines’s fine genetic work in Poe and Valery: a literary legacy, 
which describes the influence o f Poe’s MS in a Bottle on Valery’s Agathe, whose original title was 
Message trouve dans une cervelle (Vines, Valery and Poe , p.64), whereby, internal to the subject, 
a form o f recurrence occurs creating a spontaneous address within the self, as to a third party. As 
in MS in a Bottle, also describing a ship wreck, the addressee in Sinistre is not known. However, 
just as the initial promise to place the message in the bottle has been fulfilled, so the poem through 
its epigraph seems to spiral up from the whirlpool in the same way as the message in the bottle, 
each released at the last possible moment.
213 Another description from Revelations includes the image o f a thief: “If therefore thou shalt not 
watch, I will come on thee as a thief, and thou shalt not know what hour I will come upon thee”. 
{Revelations 3.3) This verse is also noted by Genet in Un captif amoureux as a prefiguration o f  
Christ’s coming, with which he contrasts his own trip to the Holy Land in 1984. (CA, p.236) There 
are two interesting moments, one in Autrement q u ’etre (AQE, p. 189, AQEb p.232), the other in De 
Dieu qui vient a I ’idee, in which the devastating arrival o f the other is described as being like the 
entry o f a burglar. We quote the latter example: the other “se glisse en moi comme un voleur, 
malgre les fils tendus de la conscience”. (DV1, p. 123) It is possible in the continuity o f saturation 
in being that the other, who may be our deliverance and possibility o f forgiveness, may also add 
further demands, breaking into consciousness like a thief. (This would be especially true for 
Stavrogin, and for Zossima’s mysterious visitor, who feel compelled into a position of  
responsibility.) The wires layed for consciousness may be a reference to the Talmudic reading on
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characteristic of the concentration of being in the il y  a. Blanchot describes this 
concentration in L ’Espace litteraire, with reference to suicide by hanging; as does 
Dostoevsky in The Idiot, through Myshkin’s descriptions of the guillotine, and of 
an acquaintance reprieved before facing the firing squad. {ID, p.46-48, 86, 90- 
93)214 For Levinas, the continuation of time demands a rerouting through the 
social, without which being is ‘for-death’, rather than ‘for-the-other’, since it is
215the other who endows the subject with time through forgiveness.
For his own part, Genet never uses such vocabulary. His description in the 
avertissement to Le Balcon disavows practical responsibility and instead turns its 
eye to the dramatic plight of the subject in being: “Si dans l’ceuvre d’art le 
« bien » doit apparaitre, c’est par la grace des pouvoirs du chant, dont la vigueur, 
a elle seule, saura magnifier le mal expose.” (GOC4, p.35) This does not mean the 
bad for its own sake, but rather the figuring of the predicament of the subject. Any 
situation approached poietically as a problem to be solved may assume this 
quality of existing in a realm independent of its participants. Thus Genet criticises 
the intellectual playwright of the piece a these:
ils chantent le Peuple, la Liberte, la Revolution, etc., qui, d’etre chantes 
sont precipites puis cloues sur un ciel abstrait ou ils figurent, deconfits et 
degonfles, en de difformes constellations. Desincames, ils deviennent 
intouchables. (p.36)
‘Refuge Towns’, in which wrongdoers, or people who have accidentally hurt their neighbours, are 
relocated to protect them from the vengeance o f their victims’ families. In these towns, the sale o f  
arms, traps, and wires is illegal, and upon decree neither warning nor protection from attacks is 
available. The quotation in De Dieu qui vient a I ’idee may then imply that the lines set to protect 
consciousness are bypassed, allowing the subject, nevertheless, to be reached in a pang of  
conscience, in a non-bloody strike. ‘Les Villes-Refuges’, ADV, p.51.
214 Maurice Blanchot, L ’Espace litteraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), p. 127. Also see the section on 
the scintilla dei (the spark o f God) in Simon Critchley, Very Little...Almost Nothing (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997) Section l.g, pp.69-70.
215 Interestingly, Kirilov from The Possessed  finds that the “time no longer” line, quoted to him by 
Stavrogin, affirms his intended philosophical suicide. (PO, p.243) He believes that through his 
own suicide he may demonstrate to man how to permanently escape his relationship to time, and 
therefore have no reason to fear death; that its phenomenological reduction is indeed possible, and 
that its accomplishment would carry man outside time, into a godlike state. This divinity would be 
an ultimate example o f Bataille’s confusion o f dead sovereignty with saintliness discussed in 
Chapter One.
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As they are “cloues sur un ciel abstrait”, not only can peoples’ fate not be 
changed, but they have become, we read next, “les signes constitutifs d’un poeme, 
la poesie etant nostalgie”. {Ibid.) This nostalgia would arrest the time of that 
which is sung or celebrated, rather than incarnating it, thus “detruisant son 
pretexte, nos poetes tuent ce qu’ils vouaient faire vivre.” {Ibid.) This unusual 
evocation of Christian imagery identifies a continuation of tragedy, intolerable to 
the subject, through an arrest of temporality. Genet’s magnification of evil 
dramatizes this process, making it dramatic rather than poietic.
Seen in such a light, Levinas’s thought on the forgiveness of being is all 
the more clearly coupled with the effort involved in the accomplishment of the 
present and the subject’s continuation within time. The central component of time 
for Levinas is the effort involved in occupying and renewing the present, at once 
unchangeable and open to the subject’s hopes and initiatives. The presence of the 
present contains an “exigence” or demand for “le denouement du noeud qui se 
noue en elle”, the present is both undone and recast, both part of the 
impermanence of time, engaged in absenting itself, and leaving something behind 
at every moment. {DEE, p. 159) Levinas speaks, in evocatively Christian terms, of 
“la resurrection de l’irrempla9able instant”, (p. 158) However, this description 
does not contain the particular kenosis, that is, the divine self-emptying of an 
identified Christ. If there is resurrection, it is one of non-thamaturgical 
continuation. {Ibid.) The hope of ‘resurrection’ does not take place through an 
intercourse of the soul with itself, but with the Other, which is also what is 
discovered by the speaker in ‘Sinistre’. (p. 161) It is for this very reason that 
Levinas identifies time as part of the problem of social relation and dialogue.
It would therefore follow that the events of ‘Sinistre’, which illustrate a 
solitary demise conjugated with that of others, fit Levinas’s description of time. 
There also seems to be a hint in the poem that the moribund quality of the instant 
may be followed by a resurrection, since “[a]u moment meme ou tout est perdu,
216 In the priest’s discussion with Mme Emilie Teste’s he encourages her to continue to be patient, 
confident that on her husband’s arid island, there may one day appear a footprint. (M.T, p.51)
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tout est possible” (p. 158), even though from epigraph to conclusion, destruction 
gains an ever firmer hold in the poem, and any transcendence remains outside of 
the bounds of the text. But as Levinas writes, “L’objet veritable de l’espoir, c’est 
le Messie ou le salut”. (p. 156) This therefore would make of the messiah, rather 
than a parousia in appearance and presence, a futural movement. The coming of 
the Messiah for Levinas does not mean the end of time, as it does for Kirilov, but 
acts as a hinge, or in ‘Textes Messianiques’, “une chamiere” between two 
different times. (DL, p.91) The Messiah may well not experience messianic time, 
which is brought forth through him, but looks forward to a time from which the 
Other may benefit. Hence, for Levinas, “sa mort dans l’intervalle vide aura ete la 
condition d’une nouvelle naissance” {DEE, p. 157), or as Dostoevsky puts it, 
quoting John, in the epigraph to The Brothers Karamazov, “Except a com of 
wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth 
much fruit.” {John 12.24)
5. The One Church vs the Church of One
The appeal of messianic time in preparation of a future world should not bum the
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retina or enthral the observer, as would an authoritarian or fascist messianism , 
but should be pursued through an attentiveness to the Other in justice and 
expiation. At the beginning of The Brothers, a dialogising question is asked in 
Zossima’s cell on the future of the Russian Church. An ecclesiastic has written a 
book which Ivan has half-jokingly countered with an article. The book claims that 
Christ’s is not a kingdom of this world, and that therefore the Church’s vocation is 
to evolve into part of the state. That is to accept the pursuit of power as its chief
217 Rabbi Yehouchoua opposes the idea o f free deliverance expressed by Rabbi Eliezer in the 
expectation that “Dieu va susciter un roi, un pouvoir politique, dont les lois seront dures comme 
celles de Haman et alors Israel fera penitence et reviendra a Dieu.” Levinas continues, “Rabbi 
Yehouchoua repugnerait a l ’idee d’une delivrance gratuite. Le phenomene Haman [the tyrant in 
the Book o f Esther] (ou le phenomene Hitler) est situe dans la perspective du messianisme.”
‘Textes Messianiques’, DL, p. 107.
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aim. It is also to risk the idolatry of state Levinas identifies in ‘Etat d’Israel et 
religion d’lsrael’. (DL, p.302) The Christ upon which such a state is founded 
would be one who had succumbed to the third temptation of the devil described in 
Matthew 4.1-11, accepting worldly power. Ivan argues that the historical vocation 
of the Church is quite the opposite. He argues that instead of the Church 
becoming a state or accepting a portion of it, “the church ought to contain the 
whole State”. (BK, p.67) This is further reiterated by Father Passy, who says that 
“every State on earth must eventually be entirely transformed into a Church and 
become nothing but a Church, renouncing those of its aims which are 
incompatible with the principles of the Church [...]”. (p.69) This powerfully 
evokes Hegel’s idea of Spirit as either the State of the Church or the Church of the 
State, where in fact there is no difference between the two, as we shall see in a 
moment. The Church for Russia of which Zossima speaks, in spite of attendant 
risks of Slavophile particularism, could be described as non-synthetic, as we shall 
go on to discuss. The Church of the Grand Inquisitor, on the other hand, is 
synthetic, associating peace with a people too weak to use freewill for an 
eschatology, and requiring instead a teleology related to the power and knowledge 
of a technocratic ruler. The spirit of such a state cannot survive subjective liberty 
of freewill in the bios politikos. As Hegel explains in Lectures on Plato, while 
there are different echelons of technician, the State is ‘the system of these 
systems’. (Tam, p.98)218
Ivan’s argument will have to be further examined in the context of other 
sections of the novel, before its relevance to Genet and Levinas can be properly 
discerned in a comparison that is more than caricatural.
In our current political climate, the will to transform the world into the one 
church would be highly reminiscent of different theocracies and fundamentalisms, 
which attribute sovereignty over life to themselves in the name of a particular
218 “Chaque Etat est necessairement un systeme de ces systemes a l’interieur de lui-meme.” Hegel, 
Legons sur Platon 1825-1826, trans. J-L. Vieillard-Baron (Paris: Aubier, 1976). p. 129.
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church.219 Thus, under the guise of a monotheism, a pagan disqualification from 
membership of the justice system of a given Church may come about. This tends 
towards what in ‘The Grand Inquisitor’ poem is called the “world state” (BK, 
p.302), the agglomeration of political power into a totality. In Levinas’s thought 
since the 1930s, and especially in Quelques reflexions sur la philosophie de 
Vhitlerisme and De Vactualite de Maimonides, the basic form of monotheism is 
affirmed as a freedom from fate and destiny, which are associated with paganism, 
likely to result in moral relativism. (PH, p. 12) Edouard Glissant is right to express 
his concern, as Bobby Seale of the Black Panthers does elsewhere, that a colonial 
monotheism pursuing homology may be equally pagan as the animisms it is keen 
to replace.220 As Howard Caygill argues, the contamination of Holy History by 
Universal or Profane History may allow an idolatry o f state to establish itself 
invisibly.221 However, as the least Russian of the brothers, Ivan’s ideas on the One 
Church are not unadulterated slavophilism, which saw Russian becoming in 
contradistinction to that of the West; in Ivan’s quandary Russian becoming is 
instead situated precisely on the dividing line between the combination of all 
states, churches and societies by ethics, and their agglomeration, as described in 
‘The Grand Inquisitor’, by power.
If the transformation of the State into a Church can be understood in terms 
o f a universal receptivity to the Other which is at the same time aware of the 
hidden tears of the Third, there is also the danger of a purely ideological religion, 
in which there are, as Zossima complains, “no more Churches left [...], but only 
clergymen and magnificent church buildings”. (BK, p.72) Dostoevsky, partially
999affiliated to the Slavophiles , concentrates the ire of many of his characters 
against the Roman Church, which Father Passy argues was simply absorbed into 
the pagan Roman state. Genet’s particular form of atheism favours a
219 Lacoue-Labarthe, Labyrinthe, p. 128.
220 Edouard Glissant, ‘Les Empires qui se suivent et ne se repetent pas’, La Cohee du Lamentin 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2005) p. 161. Bobby Seale, Seize the Time (London: Arrow Books, 1970), 
p.283-84; Seale discusses single- and multi-headed godhead; discussed in Hadrien Laroche, Le 
dernier Genet (Paris: Seuil, 1997) p. 166-68.
221 Howard Caygill, Levinas and the Political (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 164-72.
222 David I. Goldstein, Dostoi'vski et les Juifs (Paris: Gallimard, 1976); Dostoevsky and the Jews 
(Austin, TX, London: University o f Texas Press, 1981), p.42.
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generalisation of this suspicion of a pagan ecclesiasticism to being at the root o f 
all organised religions:
Leur trait distinctif, c’est la Loi qui est la Loi, il n’y a pas d’explication,
aucune raison n’est donnee: ce sont toutes des religions cesariennes. (AC, 
P-119)
Levinas addresses such a position in ‘Etat de David, Etat de Cesar’, in addressing 
the necessity of a state law which does not exclude the messianic character o f 
moral law. (ADV, pp.209-220) In spite of Genet’s problematicisation of the “coup 
du calendrier” in ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’ in which a community posits itself as 
foundational, there are instances in which he remarks on the possibility of a 
surprising, perhaps authentic, religious trait, especially amongst the Black 
Panthers and Palestinians. Genet identifies this possibility less through the 
Marxism of these two groups, which he finds unrigorous (CA, p.62, 69, 125), than 
through the possible advent of a new order. He explains that “il est urgent de 
multiplier les « Avenements »” (EMD, p. 10), so that new possibilities may 
advenir, or come to be: “Si le marxisme-leninisme est par autorite athee, des 
mouvements revolutionnaires comme les Pantheres et les Palestiniens ne semblent 
pas l’etre: mais leur but secret plus ou moins, c’est peut-etre de lentement user 
Dieu, le rendre plat, exsangue, oublie, transparent, jusqu’a l’effacement total.” 
(CA, p.62) This strange process of flattening out godhead would, for Genet, seem 
to involve a deontology of the ways others move within the trace of the Other; 
towards something futural, rather than nostalgic which in its support for a past 
order could risk turning the intangibility of Spirit into Mind, and functioning as a 
Hegelian synthesis.
A true Church genuinely concerned by its relation to the Other, Miusov 
comments, gives the improbable impression of an idealistic mixture of socialism 
and the Second Coming of Christ. He is quick to follow this up by posing a 
concrete problem that the Church would face were it to supersede the state: its 
understanding of the nature of crime and its punishment. Zossima’s approach is o f
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great interest, “Crime and the idea of crime will undoubtedly have undergone a 
change {BK, p.70) Faced with the theistic Russian criminal, the church
“does her best to preserve Christian communion with him: she admits him to 
Church services, to the holy sacrament, gives him alms and treats him more like 
an enslaved than a guilty person.” (p.71) If and when the church takes the place of 
the state, on the other hand, it would be charged with the guilty man’s sentencing, 
which would take the form of excommunication, the sending of men out of the 
company of men, which is nonetheless different from execution, which is merely 
the “cutting off [of] the infected limb”, (p.70) The church’s current welcome 
attempts to awaken in the criminal the consciousness of community, such that the 
damage to this bond in the loss of the company of men would register in the same 
way as excommunication. As Zossima comments, “This, strictly speaking, is so 
even now, but it is not officially so”. {Ibid.) The bond to the Third may command, 
but it does not obligate, such that “our criminal today very often strikes a bargain 
with his conscience. ‘“ It’s true I’ve stolen, but I’m not transgressing against the 
Church. I am no enemy of Christ’.” {Ibid.) The continuing dissociation between 
society and Church would thus render it impossible to apply moral regulation 
rigorously.
Fedka, the convict in The Possessed, comes especially to mind; he attacks 
Peter Verkhovensky for doing something one might compare to performing a 
desecration with unwashed hands:
Now you see, sir, I have never made any bones about robbing them icons; 
but I jest took out the pearls, and how do you know, maybe my tear too, 
was at that moment turned into a pearl in the furnace of the Most High for 
the trials I’ve suffered in this world, seeing as how I’m just an orphan 
child what has no proper place or refuge. {PO, p.577)
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So, if  there is a slight pang of conscience, it can only be in relation to the Church 
which forgives and not the state.223 The idolatry of the criminal we find in Genet’s 
novels is therefore, in part, an adaptation of this Dostoevskian idea in which, 
rather than the criminal claiming not to be an enemy of Christ, Christ Himself 
becomes identified with the criminal, perhaps even a criminal anointed for 
suffering and glory. This directs all eyes in Miracle de la rose towards the cell of 
the condamne a mort, as to a chapel, making theirs a “communaute mystique”. 
(MR, p.300) While in Haute surveillance, as we observed in Chapter One, it is 
Yeux-Verts who carries the weight of the prison: the sacrificial idea of the felon is 
not interrupted, or even explicitly opposed by Genet. Instead, in both cases, the 
order of this sacrificial church is being placed above the state, as its crowning 
glory. (GTC, p.6)
This moral relativism and confusion may creep unknowingly into plans 
not only of rebellion, but even of principle. We take a secular example from 
Agamben: he discusses the bifurcation between judicial and moral guilt, in which 
a claim may be made to moral guilt but not legal guilt, or legal but not moral.224 
Two moral escape routes are therefore perceived by the criminal. Either the 
criminal is the product of an unjust society, in which case “his crime is not a 
crime but only an act of rebellion against an unjustly oppressive force” (BK, p.72), 
involving no societal or religious guilt; or the criminal is guilty in relation to the 
Church, which dispenses forgiveness, but not in relation to society, which is not 
able or interested in rehabilitating the criminal. In his interview with Bourseiller, 
Genet offers numerous interpretations of the former position, notably that a 
certain class of criminal excludes him or herself from society. While in his 
interview with Fichte, he describes a lawyer encouraging a criminal to tell himself 
such a story. (ED, p.224, 163)
223 “The criminal today, therefore, is capable o f recognising his guilt only towards the Church”, 
that is, to the comer o f the state without power, “and not towards the State.” {BK, p.71)
224 Agamben, Remnants, Chapter 1.7, pp.21-24.
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Zossima goes on to contextualise further the problem of the future life of 
the criminal. The church’s claim is to honour responsibility to the Other and 
beyond to consider all others who form the Third. When the Church takes the 
place of the State responsibility will be generalised such that the criminal will find 
it more difficult to claim he is just, unless of course he altogether denies the 
authority of the Church on earth, and the claims of the Other that are imperfectly 
acknowledged therein. This denial can create impressive contortions in moral 
reasoning. “All are mistaken, all have deviated from the right path, and belong to 
the false Church. I alone, a thief and a murderer, am the Christian Church” {Ibid.): 
this would be an argument making the One Church a Church of One in the 
criminal. This Church should be understood as claiming to represent the Other, 
and in its declaration of infallibility, as eradicating the Third. This intermeshing 
of the church and society discovers a pagan view hidden within a monotheistic 
one. Genet, therefore, injects doubt into positions of monotheism in which the 
axis mundi is claimed not by the crucified, but by a criminal underworld made 
celestial:
La colonie, dont Divers, toumait autour de cet axe: Harcamone. Mais elle, 
dont Harcamone, toumait autour de cet axe: Divers. Puis autour de 
Villeroy et de beaucoup d’autres. Son centre etaitpartout. {MR, p.362)
This at once establishes a kind of Church of One, interwoven with other Churches 
of One behaving as an alternative to anachoresis in a communion of punished 
criminals.
The affirmation of the self alone as the Church contains a vein of 
solipsism to which all organisations (and systems, structures, as well as 
individuals) are prone, that is that they are, as Levinas puts it, “a tout moment sur 
le point d’avoir leur centre de gravitation en eux-memes, de peser pour leur 
compte.” {AQE, p.203, AQEb, p.248) The Anarchist network of which Peter 
Verkhovensky is a leader, for example, while being to some extent anarchstic is
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shown to have an increasingly definite foundation; it founds itself on the 
elimination of any member who would attempt to disaffiliate himself, a process 
that will start with Shatov’s murder. Just as individuals are kept in check by the 
other members, so the group as a whole is kept in check by the idea of other 
groups in the network observing them spread throughout Russia. Stavrogin 
informs Shatov that his life is in danger, and goes on to insist on the ideological 
power of the organisation, in spite of its limited membership. The fanaticism at its 
heart is not to be underestimated:
I’ll even go so far as to say that, in my opinion, the whole society consists
only of Peter Verkhovensky, and it’s only his great modesty that makes
him consider himself to be only an agent of his own society. (PO, p.250)
This method of rule would effectively impose upon others the recognition of a 
sovereignty which the group leaders can exploit whilst creating the illusion of it 
resting at some distance from themselves. As we saw in our discussion of derisory 
sovereignty in Chapter One, however, the isolation such a mode creates makes it 
costly for the perpetrator. Just as the Grand Inquisitor succumbs to the idol of 
power via the love and service of the poor, so it appears Peter Verkhovensky 
arrives at a similar view of power through an infatuation with Stavrogin who 
represents for several of the characters a messianic figure. Thus the an-archic 
link to the Good described by Levinas (HdH, p.88) is twice succeeded by the 
anarchic fear or mistrust of the Other.
This sovereign abuse allocates the power of the Church to itself, a power 
which was in fact intended to respond to a new beholdeness to the Other and to 
overcome the risk of parochialism limiting responsibility through self-interest. 
The problem this tendency causes for the messianic future of mankind receives 
considerable attention from Genet. Any progress to be made would have to be 
holistic and aware of the danger in which it places other others. This brings into
225 It is Stavrogin who inspired Shatov and Kirilov’s attempt at cultivating a holy land in America.
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close proximity our earlier discussion of sovereignty with our present discussion 
of the Church. Without the immortality of the soul, eternally held accountable for 
current behaviour, Ivan argues that there is no chance of a binding morality. He 
explains, “If there is no immortality of the soul, there is no virtue, which means 
that everything is permitted [...]”. {BK, p.92) But as Rakitin argues, albeit from a 
position that suits his careerism, virtue is also possible through simple concern for 
others: “Mankind will find in itself the strength to live for virtue even without 
believing in the immortality of the soul! It will find it in love for freedom, 
equality, fraternity...”, which form, of course, the triptych of modem French 
politics. {Ibid.)
Miusov’s above comparison of religion and socialism would form the 
basis of an eschatological politics, to which Levinas gives some attention, 
amongst other places, in his reading of Ernst Bloch, in whose thought the 
concentration of transcendent forces in culture -  through successive artistic, 
critical, philosophical and technological advances put to the service of the human 
-  does not require faith in the non-human. {DV1, p.63) Although Dostoevsky’s
99  f \journalism was sometimes stridently Slavophile , in his novels the extent to 
which faith is considered a necessity for political eschatology is unclear. 
Dostoevsky’s thought on the impact of belief on the Other, is, however, very 
sophisticated, and can be divided into two main arguments: one on atheism, the 
other on idolatry.
In a scene genetically anterior to the audience with Zossima in The 
Brothers Karamazov, Stavrogin, in The Possessed, visits the Bishop Tikhon to 
prepare his public confession of child abuse. The Bishop is untroubled by 
Stavrogin’s atheism and lends a critical ear to his confession on the grounds that, 
“A complete atheist stands on the last rung but one before absolute faith (he may 
or may not step higher) but an indifferent man has no longer any faith at all.” {SC, 
p.33) It is significant that, in Totalite et infini, Levinas repeats a very similar
226 C f  Dostoevky, A Writer’s Diary, trans. Kenneth Lantz, 2 vols (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2000), II, ‘The Jewish Question’ (March, 1877) p.901, and ‘War. We Are 
Stronger Than the Others’ (April, 1877) p.929.
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argument that independence is only possible in atheism through a non­
enslavement to God, in the freedom to enjoy the fruits of economic life 
selfishly.227
Derrida issues a warning in Glas as to the kind o f belief that may succeed 
atheism, as atheism forms one of the stages of the Hegelian System, which 
sublates into belief. (Glas, p.227ai) A related argument, clearly expressed in The 
Adolescent, is that atheism may, perhaps, not exist as such, but may instead 
conceal different kinds of idolatry, different forms of the discovery of the Same 
rather than the Other. We quote Makar Ivanovich in conversation with Arkady:
If he rejects God, he’ll bow down to an idol -  a wooden one, or a golden 
one, or a mental one. They’re all idolatrous, not godless, that’s how they 
should be understood. (AD, p.373)228
It is in this sense that the declaration in favour of freedom, equality and fraternity 
of the quite transparently unscrupulous Rakitin should be understood. He makes 
claims for the future self-sufficiency of the Third in a world in which everyone is 
provided for, but he is himself far from immune to the idolatry of power, whereby 
a sovereign position in abuse of liberte, egalite and fraternite can be founded in
227 t“La separation s ’accomplit positivement comme interiorite d’un etre se referant a soi et se 
tenant de soi. Jusqu’a l’atheisme!” (Tel, p.275, Telb, p.333) Only from this separation is ethics 
possible, through the opening o f interiority (Ibid., p.276, Ibidb, p.334). For this reason we find 
unconvincing Diane Oenning Thompson’s distinction with regard to Dostoevsky between the 
thaumaturgic Christ o f the Gospels and the merely human vulnerable Jesus o f the Grand Inquisitor 
poem. The human Christ o f the Grand Inquisitor poem cannot be subsumed to the context o f  
nineteenth-century socialist renderings o f Christianity. Neither belief, nor the supernatural take 
precedence in Dostoevsky’s novels over complex descriptions o f interactions with alterity. Diane 
Oenning Thompson, ‘Problems o f the biblical word in Dostoevky’s poetics’, Dostoevsky and the 
Christian Tradition, ed. George Pattison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.69- 
101
228 This argument would be true o f the Grand Inquisitor, who claims to be with ‘him’, the devil, 
rather than ‘Him’, God. There is an interesting exchange when Alyosha exclaims that the Grand 
Inquisitor does not believe in God, with which Ivan appears to agree. Though, in a partly analogue 
scene between Makar Ivanovich and Arkady , a lay brother o f  a technocratic disposition, 
fascinated by science and learning, delays taking his final vows. Arkady is even somewhat cavalier 
on the subject: “Quite simply, your Pyotr Valeryanych eats kutya in the monastery and bows, but 
doesn’t believe in God [...]”. (AD, p.357) Makar disagrees and explains instead that “his heart is 
uneasy [...] for such men seek God.” (Ibid.)
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the name of these ideals, creating what Caygill calls in the context of Levinas’s 
late essays on human rights “a parochial definition of fraternity as [...] class,
99Qnation, race or church”; once again a view of the Other only in view of the self; 
and simultaneously a way of dispensing with the problem of the Third.
In The Possessed, Shatov traces the evolution of the relationship between 
state and religion in order to determine the likely emergence not of a Church-state, 
but the possibility of the Church taking the place of the state, which we began by 
discussing in relation to the scene in Zossima’s cell. Very schematically, 
according to Shatov: Judaism as the first monotheism worshipping the true God 
was succeeded by the religion of the Greeks, who deified nature and worshipped 
philosophy and art; their religion was in its turn succeeded by that of the Romans, 
who deified their people and worshipped the state for the better spread of their 
nation. The next example Shatov takes is that of France, which retained the 
embodiment of the Roman God in the people, but then rejected the people in 
revolution (1789), putting in its place a form of ‘socialism’. (PO, p.255) Needless 
to say, even for the Slavophile Shatov, these few lines are too cursory a look at the 
five millennia separating the origins of Judaism from the French Revolution. 
What is of particular interest to us, however, is the conclusion with its view of 
socialism and the way it is to come about, expressed in the astonishing phrase, 
“the abolition of the people”. {Ibid.) This would be the abolition of the people by 
the people, beginning with the inclusion of the Third Estate and ending with the 
Terror, removing first rulers, then revolutionary rivals, then simply society rivals. 
However, the risk of the abolition of the people by the people in a certain kind of 
socialism, is for Shatov already “healthier than Catholicism” {PO, p.250) which, 
in the Slavophile doctrine, is already fatally contaminated by universal history in 
pursuit of power, rather than holy history in pursuit o f ethics. Unlike Rakitin, who 
hopes to steer the triptych to his own advantage, Shatov longs that these values, 
which are at the same time beliefs in connectivity to the Other, will be understood
229 Caygill, Levinas and the Political, p. 151.
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as already associated with each other through the transcendence of the Greek 
Church, which will, he hopes, become the one church.
Hence Shatov is prepared for a disordering of the world which may lead to 
a more just reordering. The moment just after such reordering, Genet tells us, is 
politically the most delicate, as the social revolution needs to be explained, 
sharpened or completed -  in the sense of counterpoised -  by an artistic one (as we 
discussed in the previous chapter, p. 160). It is as though the revolutionaries said:
“Nous allons prouver au regime que nous venons de renverser que nous 
sommes capables de faire aussi bien que lui.” Et alors, ils imitent les 
academismes, ils imitent la peinture officielle, T architecture officielle, la 
musique officielle. (ED, p. 152)
For Genet, Saint-Just presents a possible exception to this rule in his two speeches 
leading to the death sentence of Louis XVI. They employ eighteenth-century 
rhythm, syntax, grammar and style, but are new in their boldness:
Saint-Just dit dans la deuxieme intervention pour T execution capitale de 
Louis XVI: si le roi a raison, il est le Souverain legitime, alors il faut tuer 
le peuple qui s’est revolte contre lui -  ou bien le Souverain legitime c’est 
le peuple et le roi, c’est l’usurpateur, done il faut tuer le roi. (pp. 152-53)
This is not artistically new, as Genet says himself in the same interview. The 
liberty of the encyclopaedists and a certain violence o f style, were already in place 
(p. 148 and 152) but in the violent courtly language of Saint-Just, the cultural and 
political revolutions become indistinguishable for a moment, as one spurs the 
other. This Genet contrasts with Victor Hugo’s pride at the canon caste in his 
name during the 1871 Commune, by insisting that Hugo did not properly 
understand the Commune, and certainly did not develop as an artist as a result.
240
(p.153)230 So, since Genet approves of instability and worry as signs of life 
(p.240), it is no doubt these qualities which strike him in Saint-Just’s oratory. Yet 
if Louis XVI ends as its first victim, Saint-Just himself is quick to follow, as he
9^1was himself ‘abolished’ in the name of the people.
Saint-Just’s aesthetic expression, in its violence, may have had a beneficial 
effect on political deadlock, pointing out abuse of power. However, an entirely 
non-bloody use of such rhetoric is also possible, as Brecht demonstrates in his 
1952 poem ‘Die Losung’, or ‘The Solution’. During a time of social unrest in the 
German Democratic Republic, the government expressed its disappointment with 
state workers, on near starvation wages, going on strike. Brecht counters that in 
that case, the only option that remains for the government is to dissolve the people
9^ 9and re-elect a new one. Such a rejection of the people in the name of an 
eschatology for the people brings us back to the problem of a solipsistic church 
embodied in one person. Such a church, it should be remarked, would ironise 
Hegelian Aufhebung which we discussed earlier in this chapter, showing that its 
raising to self-consciousness is arrived at by dislodging and digesting alterity in 
the name of progress. Such a community undermines all confidence in the ability 
of this eschatology for the people to be what it claims to be: representative; raised 
from pure singularity to universal singularity. It seems likely Genet knew Brecht’s 
adaptation of Saint-Just, since his attacks on Brecht occur in the same interview as 
his own quotation of Saint-Just. How, therefore, does he consider his own theatre 
to vary from that of Brecht? Their differences, at first, seem broadly to fall into 
the opposition between “dramatic” and “epic” theatre, between contrasting
230 It is worth emphasising the ontological value o f the cultural object by means o f a counter­
example in Genet, which is the casting o f the giant bell, ‘La Savoyarde’, hung in the Sacre Cceur, 
forged by the state to celebrate the falling o f  the second commune. Le bleu de I ’ceil, version 1, 
p.34c, consulted at IMEC, Caen.
231 Genet applauds the poetic punishment o f the Chinese Emperor, who after the Revolution, was 
made a gardener. He only regrets that this kind o f turnabout in fortunes does not prevent escape, 
therefore making possible the dangerous resurgence o f  an individual’s influence. {ED, pp. 158-59)
232 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Die Losung’, ‘The Solution’, Bertolt Brecht: Poems 1913-1956, eds John 
Willett and Ralph Manheim (London: Methuen, 1976), p.440. The link with Saint-Just is 
somewhat strengthened if  one remembers that Brecht was consistently engaging with French 
revolutionary themes at this period, especially in D ie Tage der Commune, 1949. Brecht, ‘The Days 
o f the Commune’, Collected Plays, ed. John Willett et al., 8 vols (London: Metheun, 1994-2003), 
VIII (2004).
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engagements with illusion, on the one hand, and with critical lucidity on the other. 
However, one critic, Lucien Goldmann, describes Genet as “un tres grand auteur 
realiste”, and Le Balcon as “la premiere grande piece brechtienne de la litterature 
fran9aise”233. Genet twice robustly rejects such an idea and combines it with 
acerbic criticism of Brechtianism. Let us examine these issues further.
First of all, the witness to an epic event, whose basic form Brecht 
describes in the archetypal “street scene”, is not internally implicated in the 
action, but instead stumbles across it.234 In spite of the concreteness of the “street 
scene” on which Brecht modeled his theatre, it was very probably of the Brechtian 
school that Genet was thinking when he described the suffering protagonist as 
nailed to an abstract sky in the prologue to Le Balcon, quoted above. (GOC4, 
p.36) In so doing he also accuses the Brechtian school of a certain romanticism in 
its use of functional symbols, in which one character is the people (e.g. Mother
235Courage), and another Capital (e.g. Creon in Brecht’s Antigone). While these
symbols are situated in the drama’s events and are not essentializing, they do lack 
the nuance of interhuman relations found in theatre of the self. The difficulty 
being that while the non-implication of the audience in an “alienated” viewing or 
witnessing leaves theatregoers free to reflect, they do so in such a way that, in 
Sarrazac’s words, “la voix du questionnement domine la voix du 
fictionnement”.236 Though active, this questioning remains detached, unlike the 
staging of the decision proposed by Claire Nancy as a way of making sense of 
passivity and engagement in drama, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter. 
For his own part, Genet also protests, in the context of Brecht’s Galileo Galilei, 
that criticism from a position of alienation is facile, and moreover that it could 
equally be attempted in prose. {ED, p. 145) Opposed to this alienated viewing is
233 Lucien Goldmann, ‘Une piece realiste: Le Balcon de Genet’, Les Temps M odem es, xv, no. 171, 
June 1960, p. 1896.
234 Brecht, ‘La scene de la rue’, Ecrits sur le theatre, trans. Jean Tailleur et. al. (Paris: L’Arche, 
1963) pp.522-33.
235 See ‘The Antigone o f Sophocles’, trans. David Constantine, Collected Plays, VIII (2004), and 
‘Mother Courage and Her Children’ trans. John Willett, V (1995).
236 J.-P. Sarrazac, Jeux de reves et autres detours (Paris: Circe, 2004), p.39.
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the theatre of the ego in relation to the self, which is summarized in Nicolas 
Doutey’s commentary on Sarrazac in terms of introducing a new kind of witness: 
“Dans le theatre du moi [...] le temoin est temoin de lui-meme; l ’intrasubjectivite 
se substitue a l’intersubjectivite de la collision dramatique”.237 Intrasubjectivity 
reveals the combat of man with, as Sarrazac puts it, “les forces invisibles,
J ' l Q
cosmiques, symboliques qui trament sa destinee”. This serves to open up a 
critical distance even within the intimacy of the subject. The conflict that might 
otherwise form a Hegelian unity of action, responsible for the Aufliebung which 
metabolises the tragic hero, may instead function within the passivity of the 
spectator’s own perception. It is for this reason that Genet’s theatre is so opaque 
and so demanding on the faculties of perception, which are saturated, stripped 
bare and resaturated in illusion.
Genet asserts in the same interview that Brecht’s theatre is too alienated, 
and even bourgeois; that one should not be able to smoke a cigar during the 
action, because this would mean one was more interested in one’s cigar than in 
Mozart’s Requiem, for example. {ED, pp. 145-46) He cites, in opposition, 
Strindberg’s theatre, which, he argues, would not be possible in prose, and which 
produces an experience which implicates the spectator. The example cited is of 
Mademoiselle Julie, traces of which can be found in Les Bonnes. These 
comments are later strengthened, to insist on the importance of the interior 
experience of the theatre. For if  epic theatre may become overdetached, and the 
chorus in relation to the audience too distanced, then the importance of a theatre 
of the self, in dramatic relationship to the ego, is also neglected. The person 
witnessing him or herself, however, is in a position to observe the manner in 
which he or she is called to action. In this way, Nancy’s “scene de la 
responsabilite” implicates the public in passive reception o f the invisible forces of
237 Nicolas Doutey, ‘Le regard et le present: dramaturgies de la scene’, Critique, 699-700, 
(August-Sept 2005), 627-37 (p.632).
238 Sarrazac, Jeux de reves, p.38.
239 The cigar smoking comment refers to Brecht’s wish that the audience at a Shakespeare play be 
allowed to smoke. Bertolt Brech, ‘Es gibt kein Grosstadttheater’ Werke: grofie kommentierte 
Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, Schriften zum Theater, ed. Werner Hecht, Jan Knopf, Werner 
Mittenzwei and Klaus-Detlef, 30 vols (Frankfurt & Berlin: Muller Publishers, 1988-2000) XXI 
11.34-38, p.134.
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the environment. This internal drama of implication in the event is critically 
important.
In Stavrogin’s Confession, Bishop Tikhon explains to Stavrogin the 
reception his confession is likely to receive from the public. He is curiously self- 
aware or even cynical, though also wild in his assertions. Its publication will 
necessarily result in the author losing control over its composition, in the same 
way that his act even within his own consciousness has come to revisit him in new 
ways. And yet, warns the Bishop, the reaction will be shared between the different 
publics’ intrasubjectivity, as well as their intersubjectivity, creating highly 
contradictory reactions:
The horror will be universal and, of course more false than sincere. People 
fear only what directly threatens their personal interests. I am not talking 
about the pure souls: they will be horrified in themselves and will blame 
themselves, but no notice will be paid of them -  besides they will keep 
silent. But the laughter will be universal.240 (SC, pp.77-78)
At the beginning and end of the quotation horror and laughter are noted as two 
colluding universals, in which the subject is exceeded by forces which surround it. 
This suggests that feelings of horror and responsibility, in an impulse towards the 
good, are restricted to intrasubjective life, in which the good are “horrified in 
themselves”, but keep silent outside themselves. This is not Tikhon’s final 
position on the matter, as he wants to send Stavrogin to the monk Zossima, a 
figure who will only be developed in Dostoevsky’s final novel, in order to allow 
him to work on his anachoretic life. This connection between horror and laughter 
requires a reading o f the apparent aporia in ethical relations in which Tikhon 
seems to read active responsibility as all but stifled, in which the bad feign horror, 
and the good who do feel guilt keep silent and do nothing. But according to 
Tikhon, they do not only hold their silence, since this laughter, being universal,
240 One has only to gauge the reaction o f the press and public to allegations o f paedophilia amongst 
celebrities to believe in the likelihood o f such laughter.
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must surely also emanate from their mouths. This could be explained by the 
trauma within the internal epic of the self. The staging of an event in which one is 
unable to intervene makes the staging of the decision in response difficult or 
impossible to calibrate. An event’s scandalous qualities would do two things: 
attack one’s belief in preordained fate by underlining one’s part in that fate, and at 
the same time weaken one’s belief in one’s own agency. Lucidity and the 
possibility of intervention would require the non-intoxication by the 
transcendence of wrong. The internal epic o f the self knocked away from the helm 
of preordained action would have to withstand the oppression o f this lack of 
sense, within earshot of this laughter from others, until the moment at which the 
Other, as Levinas puts it, makes distraction impossible, and causes the laughter to 
‘stick in the throat’? (DV1, p. 115) Stavrogin’s encounter with the other is not 
expected by Tikhon to produce action or direct change, for Tikhon stresses the 
persistence of the wrong that has been done, both in the case of Stavrogin, who 
partially aestheticises his account, and of the public, who is unwilling or unable to 
sanction successfully against the repetition o f this wrong. But for Genet, 
aesthetics is not expected to bring practical change in any case, operating instead 
at the intrasubjective level inside the subject. In his second attack on Brecht, this 
time in an interview with Michele Manceaux (1970), he states:
Je crois que Brecht n ’a rien fait pour le communisme, que la revolution n ’a
pas ete provoquee par Le Manage de Figaro de Beaumarchais. Que le plus
une oeuvre est proche de la perfection, plus elle se renferme sur elle-meme.
Pis que 9a, elle suscite la nostalgie! {ED, p.62)
The hermeticism of the artwork is created in the traces it unites, and these are 
precisely what appeals to (or calls from within) the intrasubjective economy of the 
subject, and reproduces the moments at which it is interrupted by heterology. This 
produces a different quality of laughter from that which may be released when 
faced with horror, as we see in Les Paravents in which breaking down, breaking 
into tears, and breaking into laughter are all associated with each other. Another
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kind of laughter is to be found in the anticipation of something beyond nonsense, 
but not beyond or after death, as in the ultimate example of Les Paravents, but 
situating the subject instead on the verge of discovery. In Les Negres such 
anticipation is found beyond the disruptive high spirits of the laughter of political 
resistance, which first of all denounces injustice, but is also melded to the need for 
a reordering of human ties. In addition to its propensity for disruption, laughter 
may therefore also work to produce a reordering of our staging of reality.
If we take the Greek chorus’s implication in the stage, on one level, and 
the individual’s implication in what Claire Nancy refers to as the staging of each 
individual decision, on the intrasubjective level, each serves to create a 
meaningful interface with the world. Hegel’s philosophical intention to close the 
chorus (viewing it as undermining the alignment of wills) and his opting to 
privilege the speculative space of the stage in its place, traces the rise of the bios 
theoretikos, a process which Nietzsche also points out in the eclipse of the 
Dionysian by the science of Socratic philosophy. Genet and Levinas comment 
explicitly on the dangers of such unbridled bios theoretikos, (Tam, p.7) but do so 
not from a position which examines the interactions of the chorus with the stage in 
praxis, but from a position of drama which looks at the staging of the individual. 
In this way they cross from chorus to stage, in a description of the spectator 
become actor.
But this staging of reality by the spectator-actor may opt for finding the 
self in the self rather than in the difficulty of the other. Thus it is clear that the 
spectator-actor involves not only the polis in the movement between chorus and 
stage, but the intrasubjective staging of the individual. The absorption of the tragic 
hero into the State, and away from his status as an exception to the rule of State, is 
carried out in Hegel by turning pure singularity into universal singularity and 
then, through Redemption, into Spirit. According to this process, every individual 
is absolutely valued, but only in so far as he or she is absolutely required in the 
form of a step in historical progress towards a teleological outcome. Religion 
understood as teleology rather than eschatology may be complicit to this process. 
There is a Nietzschean reading in The Anti-Christ which comes to mind in which
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the question of faith is allowed to eclipse more important questions of action to 
which we shall now turn. On the few occasions Genet speaks theistically, he 
draws attention to responsibility for the time allotted him, “il semble donne par un 
dieu”, and to a kind of faith which he leaves vague, his “foi profonde, mais en 
quoi?” (ED, p.221, 27) In some recently published notes from 1972 Genet 
comments, “j ’aimerais croire en Lui, un peu pour emmerder le monde.” (Cat, 
p.302) Here the question of faith and its effects on the believer are being 
indirectly addressed. Nietzsche traces through St Paul and Luther an abandonment 
of the Christian mission to live like Christ, because of its sheer difficulty. The 
rhetoric is strong: “there was really only one Christian, and he died on the cross.” 
(AX, p.35) He goes on to criticise the cooperation between Christianity and 
temporal power:
It is false to the point of absurdity to think that Christians are characterised 
by their ‘beliefs’, like a belief in salvation through Christ: only the 
practice of Christianity is really Christian, living like the man who died on 
the cross... (Ibid.)
In his reading of Nietzsche, Kaufinann refers in Luther to an “occasionally fierce 
deprecation of all moral effort, and [...] his doctrine of absolute obedience to the 
authorities of this world.”241 He goes on to quote from Luther’s Samtliche 
Schriften, that those “who have faith and know that their sins are borne by Christ 
are just.” Still speaking about Luther, Kaufinann points this out as a double 
standard, that
[f]aith takes the place of action: instead of perfecting oneself, one has faith 
that Christ was perfect -  and meanwhile there is a Church that, instead of 
insisting that man leave father and mother and break with conformity,
241 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, AntiChrist, 4th edn (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), p.346.
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insists that man conform to the Church in matters of faith and to the State 
in matters of action. {Ibid.)
We see therefore that there is a danger in religion itself that the sacrifice of a 
Hero-Redeemer may not be emulated, but instead be viewed, to re-evoke Hegel, 
as the ephemeral individuality of the tragic hero reabsorbed into the state; or 
worse still, as idealism providing camouflage for pragmatism. In some of Genet’s 
recently published notes, thought to date from 1972, he views Christianity as a 
form of tribalism resorting to the use of emergency power, leading to the 
declaration of a state of exception, through which,
[l]’homme ou le peuple mettent dieu (et ces commandements) entre 
parentheses, de la meme fa9on que l’entreprise revolutionnaire met sa 
theorie entre parantheses. {Cat, p.302)
This would mean that a certain kind of religion in its allergy to the Other would 
be a form of cynical pragmatism. Read in the context of Hegel, this would mean 
that absolute religion as a stage in the philosophy of Spirit had taken a turn 
towards Realpolitik, and had become more a philosophy o f Mind, 
intrasubjectively monitoring hetero-affection and the claims of that which lies 
outside the self; ready to bracket away Christian tenets and ignore commandment. 
A sacrificial quality is introduced into thought, which echoes ironically its origins 
(as Hegel presents them) in Christ, in the Crucified; for the individual is 
peacefully forgotten, or rather remembered only aesthetically in the Spirit’s work 
of art. The unease this process causes is only made acceptable by the impression, 
consistent with theodicy, of historical progress. Pompes funebres is a fine 
example of a quasi-Hegelian Aufhebung in which a work of mourning or tribute 
becomes, in an atypical moment of justice under the Occupation, an act of 
perversion and forgetting.242
242 Derrida suggests, “one o f the oppositions between these two great Christians Hegel and Genet 
remains that between a Protestant, Hegel who believes that Reform has a privileged link with
248
In Hegel’s Phenomenology the Family is charged with the task o f the 
universal individuation of the defunct, such that an individual’s “supreme ‘work’” 
is to sacrifice their individuality and die for the community. In universal 
individuation, posthumous consciousness of self, affirmed through the family, 
replaces simple, natural death and assimilation into nature. {PS, p.270) Hegel 
continues:
Blood-relationship supplements, then, the abstract natural process by 
adding to it the movement of consciousness, interrupting the work of 
Nature and rescuing the blood-relation from destruction; or better, because 
destruction is necessary, the passage of the blood-relation into mere being, 
it takes on itself the act of destruction. Through this it comes about that the 
dead, the universal being, becomes a being that has returned into itself, a 
being-for-itself, or, the powerless simply isolated individual has been 
raised to universal individuality, (p.271)
This affirmation as universal individuality through the family is what Genet is 
able to offer Jean Decamin in Pompes funebres, even taking in part upon himself 
the act of destruction. For Hegel the interaction of family and state law is one of 
interdependence, but also one of hierarchy. For immediate individuation in the 
element of the family to become an element in ethical life, service must be done to 
the state. The State can call the individual to work in war:
In order not to let them become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby 
breaking up the whole and letting the [communal] spirit evaporate, 
government has from time to time to shake them to the core by war. By 
this means the government upsets their established order, and violates their
philosophy and absolute knowledge (many o f Hegel’s texts show that Protestantism makes 
thought possible, makes Hegelian thought possible), and on the other hand a perverse, very 
Catholic choirboy, very marked, as Genet himself says, by faith, by a faith initially carried by the 
Catholic catechism then freed from the catechism and especially from a theology that Genet holds 
to be more Prostestant than Catholic. In other words he liberates himself more easily from 
Protestantism than from Catholicism.” ‘Countersignature’, p.25.
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right to independence, while the individuals who, absorbed in their own 
way of life, break loose from the whole and strive after the inviolable 
independence and security o f the person, are made to feel in the task laid 
them their lord and master, death, (pp.272-73)
Decamin was a resistant and a Marxist, and yet in fighting the enemies of the 
State he met death from a member o f his own state, in the form of “une balle tiree 
par un Fran9ais.” (PF, p. 17) In Hegel’s understanding of Greek tragedy, women 
are the representatives of the family and it is for them to occupy themselves with 
the individuation of the dead, as does Antigone. In Pompes funebres, it is Genet, 
out of love for John, who occupies this feminine role of mourning on behalf of a 
diverse and accidentally constituted family: Juliette, who perhaps conceived her 
child by a Captain of the Militia (pp.39-40), and the collaborator mother and her 
SS companion, Erik, posthumous stepfather to Jean. Since in Genet the divide 
between family law and state law is not clear, the opening into universality is 
subverted. Genet’s corrupt family law as a law of betrayal, reverberates, therefore, 
within a corrupt State.
In the case o f Pompes funebres the enjoyment of individuality is soured by 
a traitorous family, while the enjoyment of the virtue of universal life is soured by 
a more general political instability in ethical codes. (PS, pp.276-77) In Hegel the 
conflict between family and state law seeks nevertheless their reconciliation in 
unconscious acts of commission or omission, whereby each has a view to 
reintegration into the whole. In this sense government is “the self-affirming 
individuality of the universal essence and the self-conscious will of all.” (p.277) 
The Spirit of the individual who has suffered wrong, rather than ceasing in death 
to exist, becomes instead an Erinys or Fury, threatening from the netherworld, 
while the family continues his bloodline. Hegel refers to this interaction between 
individual, family and nation in being as a “stable equilibrium of all the parts”, in 
which each part is “a Spirit at home in this whole”. (Ibid.) Therefore, the 
individual’s conflict is not against the community but against death, and the 
forgetting involved in becoming a Thing in Nature; the individual is therefore in
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conflict with “mere being”, making of tragedy a struggle within ontology. It is 
against being that the hero or heroine turns. The bloodline, on the other hand, 
prefers to read the conflict that has claimed their relative as “a work deliberately 
done”, so that the wrong should be something willed and performed by the 
community, and therefore be something which can be opposed, producing ethical 
significance and an ensuing history, (p.278, Hegel’s emphasis) Genet’s reading of 
such issues in Pompes funebres would therefore remain bound within tragedy and 
an aestheticisation of the will.
In Hegel, this produces the strange cathartic logic in which the wrong is 
absorbed into being, but remains “something willed and thus something 
agreeable”; agreeable because expressive of singularity (p.278). The funeral rites 
given to the tragic hero, which in this Hegelian perspective should reconcile the 
individual with the ethical work of universal life, were actually used by Genet to 
his own advantage when drafting, with Sartre and Cocteau, his appeal against his 
sentence to life imprisonment. His tenth conviction, which would have meant “la 
relegation”, was excused on the grounds that he had confessed to the crime 
committed by Decamin only so that the war hero’s name “ne rev iv e  aucune 
tache”.243 The pragmatic hypocrisy of the author of Pompes funebres does not, for 
all that, diminish the complexity of the book’s exercises in mourning and 
memory. In fact, its impressive compression of contradictions with regard to 
relations of family and state behave as an anti-synthesis in which Spirit 
regurgitates rather than assimilates its constituent parts. The conflicts surrounding 
Jean Decamin threaten to make him indigestible to the ethical community of the 
future state, a view which Genet uses to his own advantage in trying to secure his 
release. In this way, the jouissance of a tragic spectacle is not disturbed and 
singularity, at least outside Genet’s novel, is successfully reintegrated into a 
peaceful postwar Liberation narrative. This confirms a distance between Genet 
and Hegel, significant because it illuminates the irreducibility of singularity; at the 
same time, it follows the way in which the metabolisation, digestion and re-
243 Eric Marty, Genet, post-scriptum  (Paris: Verdier, 2006), pp.l 14-15.
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absorption of singularity may be aesthetically and rationally approved and 
accepted.
The sublation of an individual or group belonging only to the past, and in 
the past tense of a philosophical-historical development, may be used to derive 
pleasure, and thus confirm the identity of today’s victors. The immediacy of 
knowledge can make spirit “its [philosophical knowledge’s] peaceful work of 
art”, as Hegel had shown in the earlier Realphilosophie d ’lena. This serves to read 
selfhood as equal to itself, with knowledege and spirit contained one in the other, 
and requiring the exclusion of hetero-affection.244 Such a disposition can lead to 
ambiguity in the derivation of values, for as Levinas writes, “la legalite des 
choses” can become bonded to “leur egalite a nos desirs”. (DV1, p.201) More 
worryingly still, therefore, the logic o f egality with the self is further used in 
Hegel to derive an ethics. But, as Levinas writes in Difficile Liberte, this tendency 
and this danger long predate Hegel:
L’histoire de l’humanite, a travers religions, civilisations, Etats, guerres et 
revolutions, n’est que la penetration -  ou cette revelation -  de la raison 
dans l’Etre, bien avant que la pensee du philosophe n’en ait pris 
conscience en formulant le Systeme. (DL, p.329)
In the above piece, ‘Hegel et les Juifs’, Levinas criticises Bernard Bourgeois’ 
uncomplicated lauding of Hegel’s ambiguous and highly anti-Semitic Frankfurt 
writings (which include ‘The Spirit o f Christianity’). Levinas writes that Hegel is 
already aware that his views of the Jewish people conceive of them as members of 
a past contributing to a Christian present, in “un destin tragique que Hegel 
reconnait”. (p.331) In 1950, Claudel’s post-war rewriting of the Bible, Emmaiis, 
also provokes Levinas’s anxiety for, in common with readings of type and anti­
type, it understands the Old Testament as a prefiguration of the New Testament. 
For Levinas, man here becomes actor in a piece of theatre, functioning as a figure
244 Hegel, Realphilosophie, p.289, §287.
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for a miraculous, sacred ‘beyond’ realized in the Christian itself, leading him to 
ask in protest, “La dignite spirituelle de ces humains et de ces femmes leur vient- 
elle d’un drame situe sur un plan miraculeux, dans un au-dela mythologique et 
sacre, plutot que du sens que cette vie -  qui est conscience -  se donne a elle- 
meme?” (p. 173) He later asserts once again his opposition to any deterministic 
reading of the Bible in dramatic terms, and stresses again that “L’histoire Sainte 
n’est pas interpretation d’une piece a these, fut-elle transcendante, mais 
l’articulation par la liberte humaine d’une vie reelle.” {Ibid.) Levinas grounds still 
more closely his anxiety in aesthetic preoccupations by speaking of “l’homme- 
figure”, and “l’homme statue” which he finds in Hegel; along with “la 
petrification de nos visages” by a “Dieu metteur en scene”, (p. 174) This is a 
response to Hegel’s description of tragedy according to which “the Divine is the 
inmost objective truth lying in the external objectivity of the action”, and in which 
the “decision on the course and outcome of the complications arising from the 
action cannot lie in the hands of the single individuals who oppose one another, 
but only in those of the Divine itself, as a totality in itself” (Aesth, pp. 1162-63) 
Claudel’s exegesis and transliteration of the Old Testament therefore also risks 
performing a kind of racial transfiguration, serving to chase Judaism from the Old 
Testament as a relic religion, in spite of Claudel’s profound sympathy for the 
Jewish people following the Shoah. {DL, p. 173) Instead of reading the unique 
origins inscribed in the Hebrew language, a retroactive loss occurs of the traces 
that produce meaning. Theodicy may even collaborate in this, whereby a “peuple 
dei'cide” can be blamed for their own demise. Levinas traces the development of 
such thought in the dangers of revisionism: “Cain ne prefigure-t-il pas le Peuple 
Juif et Abel l’Agneau Immole?”. (p. 174)
Earlier in this chapter we discussed the epigraph to The Brothers, “Except 
a com of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if  it die, it 
bringeth forth many fruit.” (p.229) We were seeking to discern something similar 
in Levinas, something he describes as the Good beyond being. And yet could this 
Biblical image not also refer to the threat of a sacrifice made necessary by the 
Hegelian unity of action, in which one death ensures another life? And would not
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this acceptance of a necessary sequence be complicit with the logic of the 
apologist, for whom history is characterised by determinism? We have shown that 
the good beyond being is prone to becoming sealed in upon itself to the detriment 
of alterity. Genet and Levinas in different ways each point out the danger in Hegel 
of such a tendency becoming religious in character. In the next and final section 
of this chapter we will show the point at which Levinas and Genet address the 
determinism of Hegelian poiesis; and show how each uses Nietzschean drama to 
reintroduce an ethics of responsibility.
6. Aisthesis and drama: two modalities of sacrifice
In The Birth o f  Tragedy, Nietzsche observes the dangers of theoretical man's 
ascendancy, holding science to be not only the prime method of cultural 
production, but also of cultural meaning. He criticises science’s falsely optimistic 
belief in the moral perfectibility of human beings through the technical 
satisfaction of their needs, and identifies it as a gateway to supreme selfishness 
insofar as it allows the other’s needs to be cast off out of preference for one’s 
own. He asserts that tragedy and pessimism are rejected more out of theodicy, 
reconciling suffering with a beneficent God or the beneficent order we call 
progress -  much in the manner, comments Levinas, of Job’s friends245 -  than any 
wish to contemplate the world realistically, or its pains in their non-integratable 
complexity.
To recapitulate, Nietzsche examines the benefits that were once gained 
from viewing the world figuratively and aesthetically with a kind of 
disinterestedness, rather than conceptually with the self-interest of science; and 
divides this aesthetic viewpoint into ‘dream’ and ‘inebriation’: respectively, the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian modes. The former represents the individual who 
has risen beyond suffering to dreamlike clarity, while the latter represents crossing
245 BoJT, ‘Attempt at a self-criticism’, Section 1, p. 18. C f  also Levinas, ‘Transcendance et Mai’, 
DVI, p. 199.
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into plural anonymity in the inebriate enthuiasm of the bacchanalian whirl. Here 
we encounter concerns with Nietzschean aesthetics expressed by Levinas in ‘La 
Realite et son ombre’ (1948), in which participation in the work of art leads to a 
Hegelian-sounding statufication of the character, which in its turn takes hold of 
the contemplator (RO, p. 120); a situation in which, as Nietzsche himself puts it, 
man “is no longer artist; he has become a work of art”. {BofT, Chi, p.37) As we 
have seen, throughout his oeuvre, Levinas reworks, sometimes openly, sometimes 
covertly, problems raised by aesthetics, and he seeks to describe the relationship 
of both art and knowledge to alterity: each seems to represent its own specific 
dangers, as it would appear that man may participate in his technological creations 
in the same way that he participates in the image, each being of ontological 
character, only to become lost in them. As Taminiaux tells us:
L’activite de poiesis n’a pas de fin en elle-meme mais justement dans ce 
qu’elle produit. Elle est done un moyen en vue de ce produit. Et ce produit, 
a son tour, est pour tel ou tel but, tel usage ou tel bien. II en resulte, non 
seulement que cette activite se diversifie en fonction des nombreux 
produits qu’elle a pour buts, mais encore qu’elle risque de transformer tout 
desir, fut-il lie a une intelligence et metamorphose par un choix deliberatif, 
en quelque chose de futile et de vain parce qu’emporte dans un processus 
infini (apeiron). {Tam, p.61)
The ‘infinite process’ that poiesis commands in the technical universe takes over 
from the more general interactions of praxis, in which action is not attached or 
limited to a particular object, as in poiesis, or to an agent, as in dran. Thus praxis 
and the eupraxia246 of seeking to act or interact well (p.62), is succeeded by the 
will to act effectively. This creates the poiesis of state discussed above in Plato 
and Hegel, and in Nietzsche a poiesis of the artist as chief technician within the 
state.
246 Aristotle, The Nichomacean Ethics, trans. J.A.K.Thomson, further rev. edn (London: Penguin,
2004), 6.5, 1140b, 5-6. p. 150.
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But to return to Nietzsche himself: he regards the first exponent of the 
optimistic self-possession and self-interest of the scientific mind as Socrates, who 
played a decisive role in the dampening of an already waning tragic tradition, 
leading to the remains of antique poetry being incorporated into the Platonic 
dialogue. (BofT, p.90-91, Section 14) Whereas the spectator of tragedy sought to 
contemplate the suffering of an individual, as an exponent of “eternal suffering” 
(p. 112, Chapter 18), Nietzsche contends that the scientific mind can tend towards 
a debased tragic sensibility which acts in such a way as to “confine the individual 
within a limited sphere of solvable problems”, (p. 109, Chapter 17) Kaufinann, on 
the other hand, is careful to point out that Nietzsche’s position is shared between 
that of the tragic and the philosophical, and that it is from this contradiction that 
he derives the motor for his argument. In that way, the dialectic between the 
scientific optimism of Socrates and the artistic pessimism of ancient tragedy 
emerges as a necessary one, as they each work on the interpretation of an 
otherwise impenetrable world.247
In ‘De la connaissance a la veille’, Levinas comments on the risk that the 
transcendental illusion, which grasps phenomena only in their appearance, might 
create a reason entirely reliant on the order of being which produces it; such an 
outcome would throw the entire field of action into dangerous parallax:
Comme si la rationalite, c’est-a-dire, selon l’acception occidentale, 
1’absorption de la connaissance par l’etre, etait encore une griserie; comme 
si, toute dressee dans sa vigilance de lucide, la raison identifiant l’etre 
dormait debout ou marchait en somnambule et encore revait; comme si, 
dans sa sobriete, elle cuvait encore quelque vin mysterieux. (DVI, pp.35- 
36)248
Levinas is evoking the illusory character of rational discourse, which through self- 
referentiality ceases to be sufficiently rational. While in Levinas, this awaits the
247 Cf. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp.392-93.
248 See also the dream description in RO, p.l 12.
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sobering influence of the other, in Nietzsche’s reading of theatre many of the 
practical, social, personological aspects of a play’s reception that are applicable to 
everyday life are removed. For example, the attribution we have discussed of fear 
and pity not to drama249 understood as dialogue, but to the pathos and lyricism of 
tragedy instead, a sphere he presents as independent of the mimesis praxeos, 
because it is not yet societal in the sense of showing individualities able to 
interact, debate, and disagree with one another. Nietzsche’s ontological 
understanding of tragedy does not therefore allow the disaffiliation made possible 
by mesotes -  that half-determined quality of the human animal and its nature -  
requiring instead the completion characteristic of the tragic event. In Levinas, 
however, phronesis, practical wisdom, is retained in the effort of the subject 
engaged in a dramatic event to see clearly. In Nietzsche’s ‘Attempt at Self 
Criticism’, the unreliability of science is examined through the lens of art, and 
then that of art through the lens of life. (BoJT, Section 2, p. 19) Levinas’s own 
critical use of Nietzsche describes the inability to see soberly or clearly as the 
result of intoxication by the rational apparatus of the world, which inebriates in 
the same way as wine; this is a none too oblique reference to Bacchus. It would be 
convenient if art were a straightforward means of “degrisement” from which 
knowledge and the scientific spirit might benefit. Unfortunately, the mysterious 
wine of reason is only the first o f what Nietzsche refers to as the “stimulants of 
culture”. (Section 18, p. 110) The second and third are “art’s veil of beauty”, taken 
generally, but also at its highest point: the “metaphysical comfort”, or the 
consolation of tragedy. (Section 18, p. 109) Levinas is therefore making more 
explicit Nietzsche’s construal of poietic science as replacing the ecstatic 
experience of tragedy. This ominous development suggests that both science and 
tragedy solicit an anonymous, deterministic mode of participation.
The blurring between concept and aesthetics had already been underlined 
by Valery in ‘La soiree avec Monsieur Teste’. Teste’s companion exclaims that he 
would love to see a theatre inspired by his meditations, to which Teste replies,
249 Aristotle, Poetics, 1453a, p.21.
257
“Personne ne medite.” (M.T, p.27) Valery seems to imply that the mind 
participates in being in ways other than the rational. Levinas draws the conclusion 
that poietic art in its self-enclosed character might be able to mimic the other, who 
makes “excendance” possible, to return to a notion we remember from ‘De 
l’evasion’, quoted above. (EV, p.98) He also concludes that this might merely be a 
representation, and therefore not produce real alterity containing the possibility of 
substitution, just as the slave in Le Balcon creates a decoy focus of energy, 
absorbing Roger into the aesthetics or narrative of revolution, rather than its 
completion. (GOC4, pp. 129-30) And so we read in a note to Autrement q u ’etre 
that the dia-chronic and non-contemporaneous are merely ‘imitated’ in art. (AQE, 
p .l91, AQEb, p.23 5)250 In ‘Dieu et la philosophic’, furthermore, Levinas writes 
that in the presence of the Other, the aesthetic element of the ethical in artistic 
enjoyment is cut off. The intrigue of the infinite, or the divine comedy, is played 
out “dans l’ambiguite du temple ou theatre”, but is a comedy nonetheless, though 
one in which, to return to a quotation to which we have already alluded, “le rire 
vous reste dans la gorge a l’approche du prochain, c’est-a-dire de son visage ou de 
son delaissement.” (DVI, p.l 15) The divine comedy is therefore a kind of drama 
which follows the interruptions of what was previously determined. It is 
ambiguous because it belongs to two orders -  a terrestrial order, and the order of 
an elsewhere; this opens the possibility of crossings between the ordinary world 
and the reality of the Other, without this being an ‘alternative reality’. This 
splicing of realities, rather than resulting in poetic enthusiasm, creates instead the 
very opposite effect, and acts so as to sober the subject on the approach of the 
other.
Yet is not tragedy an exception to this kind of “degrisement”, in that both 
the jouissance and the meaning of the event are bound up in the completion of the 
tragic action, bringing us back to the unity of action in Hegel? This determinism 
and the poetic approval which condones it would mark the difference between the
250 “Par une subreption irresistible, 1’incomparable, le dia-chronique, le non-contemporain, par 
l’effet d’un schematisme trompeur et merveilleux, est « imite » par Part qui est iconographie.” 
AQE, p. 191, n. 21 ,AQEb, p.235, n .l.
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“resorption” of the other by the subject in the self-constitution of the I  think, 
and substition. Substitution is the point at which passivity is retracted in activity at 
the risk of pure loss to the subject. This pure loss may take place after the trauma 
of lost bearings in “Pexcessif ou l’e-coeurant remue-menage et encombrement de 
Yil y  cC\ {AQE, p.209, AQEb, p.255) This disordering of situatedness and 
signification is not merely aesthetic, and is receptive to alterity. The trauma of the 
i ly  a is the effort of thinking, not that which “puzzles the will” in death {Hamlet, 
III. 1) which would deprive the subject of everything, but through the interference 
of excess in the Other depriving the subject of its princely independence. 
However, in art there may be a disparity in primary content between sensation and 
the alterity it is meant to represent. Might not the aesthetic create a loss of 
bearings which is agreeable to the subject protecting it from loss of resources 
demanded by the Other?
In beauty, then, the other may be shrouded in poetic effect, supplanting 
him, and removing the subject’s initiative. In tragedy, the position of the Other in 
tragedy is still more ambivalent. Nietzsche identifies tragedy’s strange and uneasy 
nature in turning the fate of the tragic hero into an exercise in pathos and style. 
Goethe is quoted as noting the “lively pathological interest” {BofT, p. 132, Chapter 
22) that tragedy arouses; the stupefying experience in which “the deepest pathos” 
can, at the same time, be “aesthetic play” (pp. 132-33), for actor, poet and 
spectator alike, (p.52, Chapter 5)
Nietzsche’s theory holds that in Greek tragedy the energy of this aesthetic 
participation is created by the playwright’s use of the chorus, which dynamically 
joins actor and spectator. The chorus occupies the orkhestra (originally the area 
for dancing), the shape of which is followed by the mounting concentric tiers of 
spectators who, for Nietzsche, drawn into the action, disregard or “overlook the 
whole of world culture” and feel themselves becoming part of the chorus, part of 
the ecstatic Dionysian rhythm, (p.63, Chapter 8) The work of Sophocles,
251 “[...] se resorbe”, AQEb, $.\(A ,A Q E , p.132.
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Nietzsche argues, has a decisive effect on the character of the theatre, removing 
the chorus from the orkhestra and placing it on stage, (p.92, Chapter 14) This 
change in the gradations between dramatic spectacle and its audience alters the 
kind of ecstatic participation produced. For Nietzsche, this trend towards the 
privileging of the stage is continued in Euripides, in whose work logic and 
continuity guarantee the pathos on the stage by means of the prologue and the 
ending, which are generally entrusted to a divinity who can assure us of the reality 
of the myth being represented, (pp.84-85, Chapter 12) And, as we have discussed 
above, the deployment of the stage as a conceptual space as required by Hegel 
began, according to Nietzsche, from Euripides onwards, as the audience is 
increasingly given to recognise a reality positioned before them, rather than being 
drawn into its constitution themselves. The conceptual disposition of 
consciousness, to requote from De I ’existence a I ’existant, allocates “le pouvoir de 
se trouver toujours derriere ce qui [lui] arrive”. (DEE, p.78) Here an act of mind 
creates the distancing effect. The passivity of the chorus of which the audience is 
a part forms a different kind of positioning opposite, however, one that is in a 
passivity akin to Levinasian substitution. Nietzsche describes a process in which 
the impact of the actor is increasingly removed from the audience, turning the 
passivity of the otherwise than being (which lies prior to the opposition between 
activity and passivity) instead into an aestheic and conceptual act. This serves to 
prevent ethical substitution, whose disposition towards the other, rather than being 
initially an act, is instead the undergoing of a quandary on their behalf, followed 
by “Tultime retraction de la passivite”. (AQE, p.209, AQEb, p.255)
This flattening out of the three areas of the Greek theatre (stage, orkhestra, 
and audience) alters the multiplicity of points of view for which theatres “in the 
round” are known, and would seem to begin a trend towards the privileging of the 
image we know today, which makes of assignation in production, thematisation in 
essence.252 The Bacchanally primed actor, as Nietzsche develops the idea, “sees
252 See Denis Guenoun’s distinction between “une scene de jeu” and “une scene des images” 
(Guenoun’s emphasis), in ‘Grand temoin: Scenes et autres scenes’, Mises en scenes du monde:
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the role he is to play quite palpably before his eyes”, like an image; and at the 
same time as the spectator’s sight becoming capable of “penetrating into the 
interior”. {BofT, p.63, Chapter 8 ; and p. 130, Chapter 22) So for Nietzsche, 
however participatory the experience of tragedy may be, the ultimate wisdom of 
tragedy goes beyond the spectacle of a succession of scenes, or an illusion of 
omniscience. Its wisdom, for Nietzsche, lies instead in the “destruction of the 
visible world of mere appearance”, (p. 140, Chapter 24) Thus for Nietzsche, rather 
than being a Heideggerian moment of aletheia, o f unveiling being, the destruction 
of the world of appearance goes beyond the image of that which is on or behind 
the veil, without having to settle on that image. As Nietzsche says earlier in the 
text, “our consciousness of our own existence hardly differs from that which 
soldiers painted on canvas have of the battle represented on it.” (p.52, Chapter 5) 
While, on the one hand, this image is completely aesthetic, on the other it 
recognises image as a limit to understanding.
In the courtroom scene in Notre-Dame, Death descends on the proceedings 
as a piece of material occupied and surpassed by different images:
Ici, la mort n’est qu’une aile noire sans corps, une aile faite avec plusieurs 
coupons d’etamine noire soutenue par une mince carcasse en baleines de 
parapluie [...]. Cette aile d’etamine flottait sur le Palais que vous ne 
confondez avec aucun autre, car c’est le Palais de Justice. Elle 
l’enveloppait dans ses plis et, dans la salle, elle avait detache pour La 
representer une cravate de crepe de Chine vert. Sur la table du President, la 
cravate etait la seule piece a conviction. La Mort, visible ici, etait une 
cravate, et j ’aime qu’il en soit ainsi: c’etait une Mort legere. (ND , p. 177)
Through the arrival of Death in its one representative in the courtroom, the tie is 
said to be at risk of becoming erect and covering the proceedings with ridicule in
Colloque international de Rennes, 4-6 Nov 2004 (Dijon-Quetigny: Les Solitaires Intempestifs,
2005), p.202.
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the form of dissemination: for etamine in French also means ‘stamen’, the male 
pollen-carrying part of the flower, (p. 183) The piercing of the silk representing 
death will not, however, reveal anything behind it, and this penetration threatens 
to divest us of the images which illuminate charted thought: “Notre-Dame danse, 
au bord d’un goufffe herisse de bai'onettes, une danse perilleuse.” (p. 177) Other 
folds in this silk forming both foreground and background are flattened and taken 
back into impersonal being, as “les petites tantes de Blanche a Pigalle perdaient 
leur corolle, comme la fleur de papier que tient le danseur au bout de ses doigts et 
qui n’est plus, le ballet fini, qu’un tige de fer. Ne valait-il pas mieux qu’il dansat 
toute la danse avec un simple fil de fer?” (p. 187) Within the courtroom, the crowd 
is worried by Divine, who is divested of this name and called instead to the 
witness stand by his original name, Louis Culafroy. This arrival at the edge of the 
world of appearances between monde and demi-monde, for Divine is also 
associated with an inner-change: “Divine sort de son drame interieur, de ce noyau 
de tragique qu’elle porte en soi, et, pour la premiere fois de sa vie, est prise au 
serieux dans la parade des humains.” (p. 189) This ajoumment of tragic fatality is 
rejected by the court, impatient for a sentence; such that kinship relations -  “II 
pourrait etre mon fils” -  can only be viewed as semantic miscarriage: “On 
annon9ait qu’un deraillement mettait la Mort en retard.” (p. 188, 190) Favourable 
witnesses, though not suppressed, are sidelined to the witness room, as though 
hidden in the wings of a theatre. Genet writes, “L’avocat general fit cesser la 
parade. Les temoins etaient ressortis par la porte entrebaillee. Chacun n’etant 
apparu qu’une seconde, ils brulaient au passage: l’inconnu les escamotait.”
n o
(p. 189) The contemplative space of the courtroom-theatre is fragmented, “Les 
veritables centres de vie etaient cette salle des temoins -  Cour de miracles -  et la 
chambre des deliberations”. {Ibid.) This separates the witnesses, the action, and 
the discussion of the impact of proceedings on the jurors. Interestingly, the public
253 Valery describes a conversation between Degas and Clemenceau which may have impressed 
itself upon Genet: “Une autre fois, rencontrant encore Clemenceau a l ’Opera, il lui dit qu’il etait 
aile le jour meme a la Chambre: « Je ne pouvais, durant toute la seance, dit-il, detacher mes yeux 
de la petite porte de cote. Je me figurais toujours que le paysan du Danube allait entrer par la...
-  Voyons, Monsieur Degas, riposta Clemenceau, nous ne l ’aurions pas laisse parler... ».” DDD, 
p.123.
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who would in Greek theatre occupy the space filled by the chorus, behold the 
dramatic action taking place as illusion in a “Cour a miracles”, rather than through 
the mode of multiple viewpoint that should be encouraged when assessing 
responsibility. From the public’s midst, finally, a catalyst for the action is issued:
Enfin, le President fit nommer l’expert alieniste. C’est lui qui, vraiment, 
surgit par une trappe invisible d’une boite invisible. II etait assis parmi le 
public, qui ne s’en doutait pas. (p. 190)
Here, the reliable form of scientific evidence delivered with the prestige o f a 
criminal psychologist, serves to dissolve definitively our bonds to the Saying in 
the Saids of criminal science, “...Desequillibre... semi-responsabilite... secretion... 
Freud... Jung... Adler... secretion...”. {Ibid.)
The significance of this episode for Divine is great, as her self­
dramatisation and representation are ruined in favour of the Other, and replaced 
by the call to witness. Her declared feeling of filiality towards Notre-Dame-des- 
fleurs is an evocation of the Holy Family. Although this forms part of the Said in 
scripture, her declaration through Genet re-evokes it as part of the Saying, 
reaching beyond the rest of the court proceedings. For her, “des circonstances 
d’une exceptionnelle etrangete l’avaient choisi comme lieu d’election, sans lui en 
faire part.” {Ibid., p. 189) Finally, Notre-Dame pre-empts the death sentence, and 
we arrive at the limit of what may be represented:
Notre-Dame-des-Fleurs se sentait danser une legere gigue. Le desespoir 
l’avait traverse comme une fleche, comme un clown le papier de soie d’un 
cerceau, le desespoir l’avait depasse et a lui il ne restait que cette 
dechirure, qui le mettait ainsi en loques blanches, (p. 194)
In burlesque this image of piercing prefigures the ultimate experience of death 
which cannot be phenomenologically reduced: the image is tom at the same 
moment as the subject is who contemplates the image. From this position, the
263
destruction of the image rooted in sensibility becomes consonant with a useless 
suffering; with the fact that suffering may have no redemptory value whatsoever; 
with the fact that there is no presiding God who can register death and guarantee 
its meaning through the rending asunder of a curtain; with the fact that the 
marking of significance may be left up to mere technical pretence and artistry. 
Instead of a divine guarantor for meaning, Genet imagines a derisory illusion, 
“qu’un gamement irreverencieux le troue d’un coup de pied et se sauve criant au 
miracle.” (p. 195) Notre-Dame’s verbal intervention to the effect that he would 
like to die immediately cannot, for all that, take away death’s sting. But it does 
affirm death as meaningless and anonymous, and more importantly allows it to be 
witnessed, if not by the jury then by the reader.
Phronesis, described by Aristotle in Book Six of The Nichomacean Ethics, 
is the practical wisdom applied to the variable world outside of scientific 
knowledge, things “which may actually be otherwise”254, which serves to sober 
the subject, producing reflection, discouraging precipitation and honing 
judgement. It can be seen as providing a complement to eupraxia, “good 
action”255. In that its end is “merely doing well”256, phronesis would come 
sequentially between the staging o f  the decision in drama, and poiesis, which is 
blind to that which falls outside the creation of its product. David Haney identifies 
phronesis in Levinas as part of the constant renegotiation of the saying in relation 
to the said. This would allow the clear sightedness of phronesis to be read as 
necessarily following drama and preceding action. As part of the continuity of 
witnessing, phronesis must compete with exteriorities which irrupt upon the
254 Aristotle, The Nichomacean Ethics, 6.5, 1140a. p. 150.
255 Ethics, 6.2, 1139b 1-4 p. 147.
256 Ethics, 6.5, 1140b5 p. 150.
257 “[PJhronesis must express itself in techne, as in Levinas’s terms, that the “saying” o f  ethical 
experience is inevitably reduced to the “said’ o f discursive and conceptual structures.” (OB, pp.5- 
8) David P. Haney, ‘Aesthetics and Ethics in Gadamer, Levinas, and Romanticism: Problems o f  
Phronesis and Techne’, PMLA, 114, 1, Special Topic: Ethics and Literary Study. (Jan, 1999) 
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-
8129(199901)114%3Al%3C32%3AAAEIGL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V32-45> [accessed 25 Januray 
2008] 32-45 (p.43).
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258subject in both pleasure and pain. The displeasure caused the subject by both 
the plight and the commandment of the other shows the subject’s vulnerability at 
the core of its ability to enjoy and threatens it with meaninglessness; with a 
droning, pre-thematic consciousness of the possibility “dans la soufffance de 
« soufffir pour rien »”. {AQE, p.93, AQEb, p.l 19) This trial of the lucid vigilance 
of rationality hampers poiesis, preventing suffering from entering an aesthetic or 
poietic logic, keeping it in the realm of election and assignation of the subject by 
the Other.
Nietzsche relates the ambiguity of the image of a tragic spectacle to the 
will, though in such a way that there is still an aesthetic justification for suffering:
The metaphysical joy in the tragic is a translation of the instinctive 
unconscious Dionysian wisdom into the language of images: the hero, the 
highest apparition of the will, is negated for our pleasure, because he is 
only phenomenon, and because the eternal life of the will is not affected 
by his annihilation. (BofT, p. 104, Chapter 16)
It is important to note that for Nietzsche, it is the “eternal life of the will” which 
remains untouched, and not the spectator, who “seeks to grasp, with sympathetic 
feelings of love, the eternal suffering as its own.’ (p.l 12, Chapter 18) And yet, 
making the other one’s own could risk becoming an elective choice, rather than 
election based on commandment, and, so represent for Levinas, a reverting to 
activity rather than an intervention on behalf of the other from a state o f maximal 
unpreparedness, coming directly from one’s own resources as in Liturgy, “une 
mise de fonds a perte”. (.HdH, p.45-46, 49) Levinas does, however, elsewhere 
speak of the will itself as anterior and posterior to art, “alpha et omega a toute 
Representation” (p.55); that the will unpreoccupied by the self, and before an 
unknowable order, may become a kind of humility:
258 Aristotle, Ethics, 6.5, 1140b 18, p. 151.
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humilite plutot que volonte de puissance? Humilite qui ne se confond pas 
avec une equivoque negation de Soi, deja orgueilleuse de sa vertu [...]; 
Thumilite de celui qui “n’a pas le temps” de faire un retour sur soi [...]. 
(.HdH, p.55-56)
This non-retour would be the drama in the staging of the decision, as in 
Lear's realisation that he had taken too little care. It begins a work, perhaps 
inadvertantly undertaken, which goes out to the infinity of the Other, (p.56) This 
does not quite assuage our fears, however, over “negation” or annihilation of the 
tragic individual “for pleasure” (BoJT’ p. 104, Chapter 16), an idea that, as we shall 
show, greatly preoccupied both Valery and Genet. Might it not be possible 
sequentially to enjoy the humility of the eternal will, and the predicament of the 
other therein, and then make a hasty return to the self, producing not even a ripple, 
never mind an irruption in being? In one sense this is the whole difficulty of 
ethics: something so elusive it has to be learned anew by everybody through the 
other all the time. Ethics serves to pitch an eschatology for the future against what 
can be achieved in the here and now. However, the implications of this 
unfinishedness have important aesthetic implications for the finite subject who 
craves for being to be made open to description. The Other represents a flaw in 
this describability, and puts the subject at risk of accepting an aesthetic gesture 
and allowing it to take precedence over an ethical intervention.
In both ‘L’Ame et la Danse’ and ‘Eupalinos’, Valery offers a highly 
interesting exposition of aesthetics and architecture, each behaving as both 
refuges within and intensifications of ontology. These texts are written as Socratic 
dialogues, as though trying to relate the artistic and scientific modes to each other; 
indeed, they seem in part to take their inspiration from Socrates’s late interest in 
music, as related in the Phaedo, during his imprisonment and just before his 
death.259 In ‘L’Ame et la Danse’, Socrates asks the doctor Eryximachus if there is
259 See also BoJT, Chapter 15, p. 122.
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no cure for the poison of all nature, the poison, “[q]ui se nomme: 1’ennui de 
vivre”:
J ’entends, sache-le bien, non 1’ennui passager; non 1’ennui par fatigue, ou 
F ennui dont on voit le germe, ou celui dont on sait les homes; mais cet 
ennui parfait, ce pur ennui, cet ennui qui n’a point l’infortune ou 
l’infirmite pour origine, [...] -  cet ennui enfin, qui n ’a pas d’autre 
substance que la vie meme, et d’autre cause seconde que la clairvoyance 
du vivant. Cet ennui absolu n’est en soi que la vie toute nue, quand elle se 
regarde clairement. (AeD, p.52)
The resemblance of this description to Levinas’s i ly  a, confinement in pure being, 
is striking, though has, consistent with a hint of self-admiration, drifted from 
anguish to ennui in pursuit of diversion. Furthermore, in Valery’s text, Socrates 
comes up with a cure, which is not the entry into the time of the Other, but instead 
the use of a cultural stimulant. He goads one of the assembled:
Tu ne vois pas [...] que parmi toutes les ivresses, la plus noble, et qui est la 
plus ennemie du grand ennui, est l’ivresse due a des actes? Nos actes, et 
singulierement ceux de nos actes qui mettent notre corps en branle, 
peuvent nous faire entrer dans un etat etrange et admirable [...] (p.56)
Even though dance has earlier been said to “s’arrache[r] incessamment de sa 
propre forme” (p.42), this does not seem to be the face exceeding its plastic image 
described in Totalite et infini260, but instead an entry into the interval. As Levinas 
explains in ‘La Realite et son ombre’ of the separate units of rhythm:
ils s'imposent a nous sans que nous les assumions. Ou plutot, notre 
consentement a eux s’invertit en participation. Ils entrent en nous ou nous
260 Telb, pp. 165-66, Tel, p. 128.
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entrons en eux, peu importe. Le rythme represente la situation unique ou 
Ton ne puisse parler de consentement, d’assomption, d’initiative, de 
liberte -  parce que le sujet en est saisi et emporte. (RO, p.l 11, Levinas’s 
emphasis)
Thus, carried away without initiative or liberty, time is transformed into the 
immobility of image, or as Levinas states later in the essay, the subject “fait partie 
de sa propre representation”; or later that the artist takes events and immobilises 
them, “Ce qu’on appelle le choix de Tartiste traduit la selection naturelle des faits 
qui se fixent en un rhythme, transformant le temps en image.” (p.l 11, 122) This 
conversion of rhythm into an image is reminsicent o f the dancer, Athikte, 
“immobile au centre meme de son mouvement.” (AeD, p.67) It is disconcerting 
that during her performance for Socrates and his friends, they begin to describe 
the spectacle in tragic terms as “la plus noble destruction” (p.60). She falls, and 
while Phaedrus rushes to her aid, fearing she may die, Eryximachus gives his 
medical opinion:
Je n’ai pas coutume de hater dans ses circonstances! Si les choses doivent 
s’arranger, il sied que le medecin ne les trouble point, et qu’il arrive un 
tres petit moment avant la guerison, du meme pas que les Dieux. (p.68)
The similarity to the final scene in Genet’s Haute surveillance, the only play set in 
prison produced during his lifetime, is of considerable interest. Lefranc murders 
Maurice out of jealousy, and when Yeux-Verts, already condemned to death, 
knocks on the cell door to summon the guard, it opens immediately. It transpires 
that the guard and Surveillant General of the prison had been watching all along:
On a tout entendu, tout vu. Pour toi de ton poste, 9a devenait cocasse; pour 
nous de l’oeilleton du judas ce fut une belle sequence tragique, merci. 
(GTC, pp.31-32)
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The scene is interesting in that in these officials, the actor and spectator roles 
have been integrated, such that they become actor-spectators. (.HdH, p.26) Were 
they in the antique chorus, they would interpret the events on stage as empirically 
real. Here, however, their relationship to those confined is unclear, as they could 
easily have prevented the ‘tragic’ events being applauded as though they were 
fictional. For them, the “eternal will” of ontology is not coincident with humility, 
but with their own will. Furthermore, because the voyeuristic role of this 
pathological chorus is suddenly linked with that of the spectator, the audience’s 
sobering up from this aesthetic experience is brutal and alters their enjoyment; 
turning a spectacle into the indecency of reality treated as spectacle. This pseudo­
chorus, therefore, does not seek to draw spectators into the play as though it were 
reality, but into reality as though it were a play. Deprived of the gradations 
between stage and audience in the chorus, participation may run, alarmingly, 
unnoticed, moving between full involvement in the image to non-involvement in 
reality. It is almost as though we had been feasting in the middle o f  a famine, to 
echo ‘La Realite et son ombre’. (RO, p. 125) The link made in Levinas between 
confinement in an ontological category, reflected upon in the light of Jewish
9 A 1identity in his texts from 1933 to 1935 , and the confinement within the aesthetic
9 fSJinterval discussed in ‘La Realite et son ombre’ , seems, thus, to be being 
demonstrated in Genet’s theatre, and in this coda to the determinism of the unity 
of action.
It is as though the dereliction of duty towards sections of the political 
theatre were being thought through aesthetic terms. Genet’s understanding of the 
stage, therefore, has implications both on the individual and the communal level. 
In Haute surveillance, rather than forming themselves into an audience
2 6 1 ‘La comprehension de la spiritualite dans les cultures frangaise et allemande’ (1933), Levinas, 
ed. Danielle Cohen-Levinas (Paris: Bayard, 2007). Quelques reflexions sur la philosophie de 
I ’hitlerisme, followed by an essay by Miguel Abensour (Paris: Payot et Rivages, 1997). See also 
‘De l ’evasion’, 1935, our EV; the lesser known, ‘L’inspiration religieuse de l ’Alliance’, in Paix et 
Droit, 8, (Oct, 1935) 4; and ‘L’actualite de Maimonide’, in Paix et Droit, 4 (April, 1935) 6-7. Both 
these last two texts are reproduced in Cahier de I ’Herne: Levinas.
262 In RO  Levinas explains ‘Ces animaux qui figurent des homines donnent a la fable sa couleur 
propre parce qu’ils sont vus comme ces animaux et non pas a travers les animaux seulement [...]. 
p.l 15.
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concentrically around the orkhestra, as in ancient theatre, it is as though the 
spectators in an Italianate theatre, to their own surprise, have been formed around 
the spy hole in a prison door. Whereas the ancient theatre in its origins would 
have been one of Dionysian participation, this one is made up of unconnected 
interiorities who realise they have been hiding like Gyges, thanks to the theatre 
lighting which keeps them in the dark and the objects of their jouissance in a 
clear, conceptual brightness. The change in the role of the viewer alters this light 
discovering the unthought other. This irruption while traumatic arises not 
primarily through accusation, but through appeal, and it is to this, Visker explains, 
that we react with guilt and shame. (TaS, p.260) Genet’s criticism of violence is 
launched not in the form of an accusation by Yeux-Verts, but by his appeal to 
Lefranc over the nonsense of his act. Just as the coda to the play draws attention 
to the relationship of the spectator to the event through the structure of the theatre, 
so shame, in Levinas, comes about from what we learn about the structure of our 
being. To refer back to Visker’s analysis, the self-relatedness of my being shows 
my imperfection, and therefore also provides an intimation of perfection through 
the other. (TaS, p.260; Tel, p.56, Telb, p.82) The passivity of the spectator-actor 
must, therefore, not be a deliberate, assumed action, but must come prior to the 
opposition between activity and passivity; otherwise there is a reversion into an 
act, and the danger that participation in an aesthetic event could be sufficient unto 
itself. (AQE, p.93, 118, AQEb, p.l 19, 148; OB, p.74, 93) So such a mode of 
participation would be not only futile, but present the graver risk of taking pain 
itself to be redemptive as we discussed in ‘Messianisms’, independent of action or 
repentance. (DL, p. 105)
7. Production and the theatre
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An important deciding factor in dictating kinds of action and production is the 
structure o f  the theatre itself, on which we shall now offer some remarks. In a 
thematising theatre, the subject assumes a “recul infini” {DEE, p.78) in relation to 
the spectacle, acting so as to suspend it, such that the binaries of dark-light, 
seating-stage, active-passive and subject-object are preserved. One could perhaps 
go so far as to consider the characters in such a representation as never having had 
to appear at all, but as having been ‘surveyed', by virtue of an architectural feature 
peculiar to the Greek stage -  the skene. This is not the scene as in the French 
usage, but consists of a cabin or tent positioned in full view at the rear of the stage 
so that the actors appear from behind a covering, instead of from the wings. From 
the point o f view of the object-actor, the spectator has already raised the curtain 
on the characters, making this pre-stage the stage. (HdH, p.25) In Haute 
surveillance the Surveillant General’s presence, which participates in the 
theatrical event, acts on both sides of the spectacle; that is to say, both on the side 
of the subject-spectator, and within the spectacle in producing a relationship with 
the action on the stage. We ourselves are now actors operating at the heart of the 
spectacle. But through the Surveillant, Genet uses this technical positioning to 
turn the scene back into a skene, creating a theatre taking place in the wings alone, 
from where the tragedy emanates, and from where the tragic action will be 
repeated. This seems to indicate that the flattening out of the orkhestra, and the 
privileging of the stage in Hegel, is followed in a modem political reading by a 
flattening and retraction of the space of the stage itself. The access to the stage of 
the tragic individual may be denied, or made only fleeting, and the stage as a 
conceptual space may allow the audience to savour, from a position of private 
interiority, the other’s pain as meaningful. These compressions of space offer 
insights into the way experience is produced, viewing theatre as both an edifice 
and a practice to describe the workings of subjectivity.
Benjamin remarks on the loss of the orchestra in an essay on Brecht, 
describing it as an abyss separating stage from audience, in the service of which
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playwrights continue to put pen to paper even though it is no longer in use.263 
Genet remarks in a letter to Roger Blin that Les Negres and En attendant Godot 
were the only modem plays that could be performed in a classical Greek theatre, 
addressing a community as a whole, countering the confined Italianate theatre. 
(GTC, pp.939-41) One may thus be given clues as to Genet’s unusually practical 
commentary that if plays are to offer more than diversion for an audience too 
much the master of its own conscience, then the form of the theatre has yet to be 
discovered. (EMD, p.l 1)
In Valery’s ‘Eupalinos ou l’Architecte’, which figures a dialogue in the 
spirit world taking place on the banks o f the Styx, the experience of music as 
measurement and interval is extended into ideas of architecture. While 
architecture is a suspension of the architect’s and subject’s will in stone, music is 
a suspension of the composer’s and listener’s will in melody.264 For Socrates in 
Valery’s text, the music forms a temple producing a mobile-immobility, 
reminiscent of Athikte’s dance, through a merging of “[la] pierre” and “Fair” in 
what is simultaneously an artistic sensation and a physical construction. (Eup, 
p. 126, p. 128) It is as though the il y  a, temporarily evaded through activity 
(technical or artistic), had been fed straight back, once more, into the 
intensification of the fatum. Socrates urges Phaedrus to remember the “fete” or
a ssymposium , which “emplissait la salle de sons et de fantomes”:
Ne te semblait-il pas que l’espace primitif etait substitue par un espace 
intelligible et changeant; [...]. N ’etait-ce pas une plenitude changeante, 
analogue a une flamme continue, eclairant et rechauffant tout ton etre par
263 As Benjamin observes, the form o f modem theatre concerns the stage more than it does drama. 
‘What is epic theatre?’. Consulted in Walter Benjamin, Essais sur Brecht, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 
trans. Philippe Ivemel (Paris: La Fabrique, 2003), pp. 18-34.
264 As the architect, Eupalinos, used to say, “II n’y a pas de details dans l ’execution”, {Eup, p.86), 
in a similar way to Nietzsche speaking in the singular o f “a tremendous symphonic movement 
[ungeheuren symphonischen Satz]” in Wagner, without the aid o f word or image. (BofT, Chapter 
21. pp. 126-27)
265 In the Symposium, Socrates is himself qualified by Alcibiades in Dionysian terms as a musician 
o f  philosophy, and as like the satyr Marsyas. Plato, Symposium, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 215a5 - 216c3, pp.60-62.
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une incessante combustion de souvenirs, de pressentiments, de regrets et 
de presages, et d’une infinite d’emotions sans causes precises? Et ces 
moments, et leurs ornaments; et ces danses sans danseuses, et ces statues 
sans corps et sans visage [...], ne te semblaient-ils pas t’environner, toi, 
esclave de la presence generate de la Musique? Et cette production 
inepuisable de prestiges, n’etais-tu pas enferme avec elle, et contraint de 
l’etre, comme une pythie dans sa chambre de fumee? (pp. 125-26)
It seems that this ominous intelligible space may become physical space once 
again in a different historical moment -  in a parallel setting, though in radically 
different circumstances. We refer once more to the “destruction noble” (AeD, 
p.60) of Athikte’s performance, in which “on croirait que la danse lui sort du 
corps comme une flamme!” (p.59) These already disturbing descriptions of 
confinement and fire from the 1920s are impossible to read without greater 
disquiet in the post-Second World War period, so much do they seem to contain a 
presentiment of the Nazi horror. But how, then, should art and philosophy treat 
this memory of the Nazi horror, which is beyond both theodicy as well as the 
representational powers of the tragic?
Genet seems to have been influenced by the Valery remarks quoted above 
when, in the ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’, he explains that modem society’s hygienic 
attitude to mortality is depriving it o f a great theatrical resource. He imagines a
266 And later, “Cette femme qui est la est devoree de figures innombrables [...].” (AeD, p.62) These 
problematic quotations are not alone. We remember that in Monsieur Teste, Valery commented o f  
the audience “qu’ils jouissent et obeissent” (M.T, p.26); while Huguette Laurenti has gathered 
other remarks from the Cahiers in which Valery describes the theatre as “[une] machine pour 
traiter les humains en nombre”; or as staging an event described as “massique” (p. 131); or again, 
“ce theatre, couleur de boucherie -  etal -  Machoire” (p. 133); and above all the description o f a 
visit to the theatre in March 1928, in Vienna:
Je retrouve mes impressions de jadis. Epoque de Teste. Les reunions d’humains (ici bien 
enchasses et formes en rangees) me font toujours un etrange effet.
On n’a pas fait la nuit totale -  il y a des lampes dans l’arriere des loges. Le tout a la lueur 
sourde et puissante d’un interieur de four chauffe au dehors, (p. 131)
Huguette Laurenti, Paul Valery et le theatre (Paris: Gallimard, 1973). The above page numbers 
refer to this volume.
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theatre in close proximity to the disposal of the remains of the dead, so that the 
ffequentation of these sites by the living can be at least partially ensured. We read 
of a theatre in a graveyard in which “le public devra passer par des chemins (pour 
y venir et s’en aller) qui longeront les tombes.” (EMD, p. 14) The proposal 
resonates in several ways. Firstly, society understood as comprised of its modes of 
production would render that society poietical, and mean that it could become lost 
in architectural projects ; if  society forms its modes of production in interactions 
between people, then it is a question of praxis, and how best to act. Whereas 
drama, to reiterate the main argument running through this chapter, is the 
challenge presented by phenomena to the individual, prior to action, and prior to 
thematisation. Genet contests that if  understanding society as comprised of its 
modes o f production is the primary form of its objectivation, and if theatre is to be 
saved, theatre should be shifted away from a closed theatre of illusory depiction a 
la Grand Balcon, and towards theatrical representation of the material conditions 
of interaction, as Benjamin describes. Genet writes:
A un Italien qui voulait construire un theatre dont les elements seraient 
mobiles et Farchitecture changeante, selon la piece qu’on y jouerait, je 
repondis avant meme qu’il eut acheve sa phrase que l’architecture du 
theatre est a decouvrir, mais elle doit etre fixe, immobilisee, afin qu’on la 
reconnaisse responsable: elle sera jugee sur sa forme, (p.l 1)
With the move away from a theatre of illusion, there is a proposed move towards 
theatre as concrete production, reflecting at once the immobility of the Same, but 
also the production of events, of intrigues and of multiple viewpoints detailed by 
the Other. Here, as we quoted Levinas saying at the start of the chapter, “l’infini 
se produit dans la relation du Meme et 1’Autre”. {Tel, XIV, Telb, p. 13) Thus the 
infinite is created in the realm of the concrete and the real, within which we may 
be held responsible.
267 Which would also include quotas, sliderules and railway timetables.
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The unity o f action is mocked at the end of Haute surveillance by the 
scandal of a change in tone from poietic tragedy to comedy, which at the same 
time draws the witness into the role of protagonist. Genet now carries the critique 
of determinism in tragedy to the point of venturing to propose a theatre- 
crematorium, where the destruction of the hero as image leaves behind a piece of 
architecture as a permanent part of the City. The extreme discomfort which 
Genet’s comparison can cause comes from the way it describes architecture itself 
both as a practice and a product, in which some part of the mystery, or enigma, of 
the human as well as the inhuman encounter is to be found. The critical 
disposition of the theatregoer would be receptive to the concrete as co-creator of 
the conditions of the world, which come “autant de I’urbanisme que de la 
culture”. (EMD, p. 15) Yet there is also a caesura, and this is what causes the real 
discomfort, for we are no longer in the realm of spectacle or of representation. As 
Levinas explains in ‘Humanisme et an-archie’:
La ou j ’aurais pu rester spectateur, je  suis responsable, c’est-a-dire encore,
parlant. Rien n’est plus theatre, le drame n’est plus jeu. Tout est grave.
{HdH, p.87)
The relation between produire and produit could also be described, to 
borrow a description from Autrement qu ’etre o f the process of becoming an 
essence, as a verb fallen back into a substantive. (AQE, p.52, AQEb, p.70) In that 
light, Genet’s comparison should be thought of as a verb kept “en eveil” from this 
lapse back into the substantive and the concrete; neither action nor result, but 
“parlant” in the register of the saying. It is through this evocative power, Levinas 
tells us, that in Valery’s ‘Eupalinos’, “1’architecture fait chanter les edifices.” 
{Ibid., Ibidb) This chant, however, is not primarily part of the illusory-aesthetic, 
but instead produces a relation to the concrete said which vibrates in relation to 
the real, and not to play; in relation to historical events.
Rather than being circumscribed within the dramatic action, Genet’s 
theatrical proposal with its qualities of fable shifts the catastrophe from a terminal
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to an inaugural position. The optimism of this theatre, whereby there are no 
longer theatregoers, but workers encouraged to sing or whistle, is significant. 
(EMD, p.9) Genet seems to use aesthetics to draw our attention to unbridled 
poiesis, coming from everyone and everywhere in the concrete conditions 
surrounding us. But even more than that, the comparison allows Genet to extend a 
critique of tragedy focused on the tragic hero to one that includes the betrayals 
arising from the idea of universal history, in which “la Ville ou l’Etat veuillent se 
defaire, pour ainsi dire en bloc, d’une autre communaute”. (p.9) That is to dispose 
of another community understood in terms of ethnicity, religion, language or 
some other marker o f alterity. While Hegel’s poietic theatre sought to minimise 
the role o f the chorus in favour of the conceptual space o f the stage, in Genet it is 
the staging of the chorus which is prioritised. So whereas in Hegel the synthesis of 
concept is assured by aesthetically dramatising and consuming the Other, in Genet 
the tragedy of universal history loses the alibi of being mere aesthetics, or 
representation, and is contaminated by the real. This could be the moment at 
which the absurdity of the il y  a submerges comprehension in nonsense, and may 
deprive the subject of self-referentiality, resulting in the “« denucleation » du 
bonheur imparfait” -  the imperfect happiness of the aesthetic experience: 
translated by Lingis as “coring out”. (AQE, p.81, AQEb, p. 105; OB, 64) If sense is 
overrun by nonsense, the only way sense can bypass nonsense again is in personal 
engagement. As Llewelyn points out, if  “everyone is my contemporary in the 
diachronic time of responsibility, [...] there is a sense in which I was at
96 QAuschwitz”. This responsibility does not translate directly into simple guilt, but 
into hyperbolic responsibility, a responsibility for the responsibility o f the other; 
this other may be friend, foe, near, far, personally known or unknown to us, but 
nonetheless calls us to account for individual failings, individual moments in 
which the call to ethics of the face has been received with intolerance. In this 
sense, Levinas tells us, we are all anti-Semites, in the
268 Nicolas Doutey, ‘Le regard et le present’, p.636.
269 John Llewelyn, Appositions o f  Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 138.
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repugnance a l’inconnu du psychisme d’autrui, au mystere de son 
interiorite ou par-dela toute agglomeration en ensemble et toute 
organisation en organisme, a la pure proximite de 1’autre homme, c’est-a- 
dire a la socialite elle-meme. (ADV, p.223)
This makes the events at Dachau the source of a diachronic responsibility 
from which we cannot be absolved, just as we cannot be absolved from our 
passivity in response to conflicts that take place in the here and now, wherever 
they may be. In the same way that we are all anti-Semites, Levinas argues that we 
are all Jewish. This repugnance faced with the other is also what we have been 
exploring in the bipolar impulse occasioned by the other, and which we examined 
throughout Chapter One. This begs the question, though -  especially in the 
context of ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’, in which Genet makes a generalised accusation 
of anti-Semitism against the chorus's cooperation with the State in doing away 
with an individual or community (EMD, p.9) -  as to whether Genet, whose corpus 
embodies bipolar moral impulses with unusual strength, can himself be dismissed 
as anti-Semitic?
8. The space of witnessing
Our earlier reading of Hegel and Nietzsche which culminated in Genet’s reading 
of the theatre-crematorium suggests that rather than being a snub directed at 
Adorno’s cautioning over the barbarity of writing poetry after Auschwitz, such a 
massive and provocative critique as Genet’s is instead prompted by a 
preoccupation with the trace and the difficulties of witnessing. Theatrical 
speculation is pursued in relation to the dead individual. In ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’, 
Genet proposes an alternative fete to Valery’s sinister prefiguration, and one that 
is not pure inebriation. In an ancient Roman burial ceremony, the mourners, the 
enemies and the inquisitive form the public in attendence; the coffin is placed at
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770the front of the stage ; the funeral mime preceding the procession then splits in 
two, and multiplies in number, in order to represent the key scenes of the man’s 
life:
qu’il devienne troupe theatrale et qu’il fasse, devant le mort et le public, 
revivre et remourir le mort [...]. (EMD, p. 17)
The mime would appear to behave as an explanation o f the community to itself, of 
what or who has come to pass. Strangely, the alliteration used to express the task
-  remourir le mort -  seems at the same time to suggest that the actors might 
rememorer le mort in a traceable internal echo; yet here there is no chance of 
matching up protension and retension, of finding out what actually happened. The 
time the actors are referring to is beyond memory. The ending of the imagined 
scene is surprisingly unostentatious, and yet meaningful:
qu’ensuite on reprenne le cercueil pour le porter en pleine nuit, jusqu’a la 
fosse; enfin que le public s’en aille: la fete est finie. {Ibid.)
It is worth venturing a last reflection on the form of this theatre, which is haunted 
by elements of antiquity. It is not by accident that the coffin is buried in the fosse,
-  that is the fosse d  ’orchestre or pit. While the orkhestra as a space has been 
filled in since Roman times, is not Genet proposing its reemergence in modem 
theatre? Not simply in its vestigial form as orchestra pit, but as a kind of symbolic 
fosse commune for the discovery and animation of the dead? Furthermore, if  one 
goes back to Greek theatre, the appearance of the actors through the skene, 
originally a place of celebration, means that instead o f making an entrance they
771were making an exit ; this is remodelled by Genet to give an exit from the skene 
onto the stage272and then from the stage into the pit, or orkhestra. It is worth
270 One can imagine the coffin placed on a catafalque as in Les Negres.
271 See Denis Guenoun, ‘Grand temoin’, Action et acteur, pp. 198-99.
272 Nietzsche describes Plato’s account o f Socrates’s death as an exit, as though he were leaving
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reminding ourselves here of the other instances of stagecraft in Genet’s plays 
which exploit the ambiguities of theatre architecture. In Le Balcon, the Chief of 
Police, who is deified as the foremost representative of power, is entombed in the 
Mausoleum, which is described as resembling a well or the inside of a tower with 
an underground spiral staircase. The choices open to the director are to place the 
tomb either in the pit or in the skene, although the Mausoleum is already
273underground, which might favour the former. (Tableau 9, GOC4, p. 126) In Les
Paravents, Genet writes the deaths of the characters, which conventionally would 
take place off stage after an exit, as entrances onto a posthumous area of the stage 
(Tableau 14), with the Mother piercing through the screens that have been used to 
form a constantly changing background to each tableau throughout the play. For 
Genet the orkhestra, as an intermediate zone between actor and public, may be 
dramatically recaptured, and become in some way the issuing point of the drama, 
in common with the skene.214
Derrida comments indirectly on the status of the “fosse” in ‘L’Etrange mot 
d’...’, although he focuses its significance on Genet’s critical standpoint with 
regard to absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge necesarily relies on the 
absorption of alterity and its inhumation in synthesis. Literature records this 
process whilst at the same time reconnecting certain lines of intrigue, enabling us 
to follow fortunes, to plot lines of ascent and descent as well as the moments at 
which they are broken or reconnected. The ability to record this process, as we 
have argued, is determined by genre in the extent to which it cooperates with, and 
exemplifies, or else exceeds unity of action. As Hegel’s account in the Aesthetics
the symposium or banquet to start a new day, “while on the benches and on the earth his drowsy 
table companions remain behind to dream o f Socrates, the true eroticist.” BoJT, p.89, Chapter 13. 
This represents another movement beyond inebriation, sleep and illusion contained in the image.
273 The chapel o f Les Invalides containing Napoleon is more o f a mausoleum than a crypt, as rather 
than being partially hidden and reached by steps, it opens onto a circumference o f  ten metres 
directly under the transcept and is as ostentatious as the altar to which it prevents access. The giant 
tomb is surrounded by the names o f the campaigns fought. It is as though the oculus usually 
serving as a skylight were fulfilling its less common role o f connecting the relic under the altar to 
the body o f  the church, as in early octagonal chapels.
274 The skene is also reminiscent o f the bridge from the spirit world in No theatre. The waki, the 
monk support character, first to make the crossing, enters there, as well as the ghost protagonist.
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of the relation of the tragic hero to Spirit shows, this is a teleological narrative of 
being. This narrative and its goal of absolute knowledge is exceeded and 
disordered by alterity, which resists a grand narrative of this kind. Derrida 
observes early in Glas Genet inspecting the defeats suffered by absolute 
knowledge:
II n’ecrit presque plus, il a enterre la litterature comme pas un, il saute
partout ou le savoir absolu de l’Europe en prend un coup [...]. (Glas, 45b)
This image is returned to towards the end of the text, embedded in a commentary 
on ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’ which shows the continuity from the funeral mime, and 
in which Derrida ventriloquises Genet: “La je  saute, allez voir vous-meme ce que 
devient la mort pendant la fete.” (260b) This jumping describes not only a 
political restlessness, alluded to in the first quotation, but also a hint in the “allez 
voir vous meme” that Genet himself might be seen as jumping into the pit with 
the unremembered dead, and inviting the reader to the same.
If our construal of these lines of Derrida are correct, they could still risk 
indulging in a figurative excess which Levinas would be the first to denounce. 
However, the very last section of ‘L’Etrange mot d’...’ attempts to follow the trace 
not through a relic of theatre architecture in its correspondance with the structure 
of subjectivity, but in language. In Derrida’s remark, it is literature that has been 
buried; though, it is equally literature that may help to reissue meaning in the uses 
to which language may be put as an encounter between alterities; in the mutations 
o f “ces mots dialectophages”, in which “le sens se perd non dans la nuit des temps 
mais dans l’infmi des mutations tendres ou brutales.” (EMD, p. 18,17) These 
mutations of meaning are caused by uncrossable distances between interlocutors 
each leaving their mark in language. Language may receive the trace of the Other, 
and open the dramatic staging o f  the decision in the readers or listeners 
themselves.
The role of witness, and of inspiration and prophecy, is important for 
Genet’s writing from the earliest texts onwards. In Pompes funebres we read of
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the mystery o f Incarnation, quoted at the beginning of this chapter. (PF, p.57) 
Genet’s is then not a disincamated theatre of ideas whose realisation is applied 
poietically to the world, and still less one of the indulgent illusion we call 
escapism. These would require an ordering of meaning and output which the trace 
in language instead serves to disorder, producing meaning instead as a byproduct 
which the incarnate subject must make its own, through interpretation and 
embodiment. The newness of this experience means that this theatre does not 
hanker after a tragic past, but instead proposes a future performance:
proposee par un autre mort dont la vie meritera une representation
dramatique, non tragique. La tragedie il faut la vivre, pas la jouer. (EMD,
p.18)
If tragedy as such has become impracticable, then we should practise instead the 
creation of the stage, or the field of the experience of our very existence, which is 
where and how the phenomena of the human are exposed, in drama or dr an. For 
tragedy to be lived by the spectator after his or her exit from the theatre, then each 
has to feel the enchainment of others to being, and of themselves to their own 
roles.
At the end o f ‘La Realite et son ombre’, Levinas expresses the dependence 
of cognition on exegesis by signalling the usefulness of art to philosophy; the 
ambiguity o f image contains multiple possibility, such that “[l]e philosophe 
decouvre, au-dela du rocher ensorcele ou [1’image] se tient -  toutes ses possibles 
qui rampent autour [...]”. (RO, p. 126) It is these possibilities that are relived 
through Genet’s dead, by an audience comprised of individuals taking the fate- 
bound image and making it move and speak. Valery evokes this interruption of 
the image and its silence in ‘Cantique des colonnes’ (1922); once again, the 
participatory nature of the orkhestra comes to life:
275 Valery, ‘Cantique des Colonnes’, Charmes (1922) in VO],  p. 116-18.
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Douces colonnes, o 
L’orchestre des fuseaux!
Chacun immole son 
Silence a l’unisson.
And then, in the voices of the columns themselves, now that the silence is broken, 
the columns seek out dancing partners, animating the fabric and occupants of a 
bygone world who are only present through an animation of inscribed traces:
Nous primes pour danseurs 
Brises et feuilles seches,
Et les siecles par dix,
Et les peuples passes,
C’est un profond jadis,
Jadis jamais assez!
The “profond jadis” evoked through the unknown origin of the trace is attendant 
on the irruption, in spite of oneself, of the Other, who signifies, beyond any 
intention to form a sign. Valery is not indicating technical prowess in the image, 
or its capacity to announce “un avenir a jamais avenir” (RO, p. 119), but evoking 
an irretrievable past that may guide the subject, the “delegue” of being in the 
present. (HdH, p.28) In that sense, art may be a celebration. A celebration which, 
coupled with exegesis, may aid in the (re)cognition of our roles in a non-tragic 
future.
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Conclusion
We have seen in the neighbourhood which gives this dissertation its title that anti­
social tendencies which are apparently discrete may reveal themselves to be 
responsive to alterity, even if that response takes the form of a refusal o f alterity 
or its subversion. In this sense, the term “neighbourhood”, as both a space of 
possible meeting and a collection o f people has been suggestive in our 
discussions, and indicates a said made up of different sayings.
Returning to the encounters made by Genet in this neighbourhood, and 
which we discussed in Chapter One, we remember that for Bakhtin Dostoevksy 
was able to reproduce heteroglossia and the living word of others within it, but 
that Bakhtin was hostile to other genres, especially reified poetry. However, the 
difficulty of tracing the particular other with whose word one may be in contact 
does not prevent Genet’s work from having a highly dialogic quality. Set next to 
Dostoevsky’s living, breathing multivoiced world, it would be incorrect to see the 
intumed language and viewpoint of Genet as being dependent for its sense on an 
only occasional chink of light illuminating his underground cell. Genet creates 
meetings across literary history, which change radically the meaning of the 
original characters and situations he brings together. This form of adaptaton is 
already a meeting in separation, and rather than a totem or centre, creates instead a 
non-lieu. We saw in Chapter Two that it is possible to read the trace o f the Other 
not only in the human or its accoutrements, but also alter-humanistically in the 
apparently inanimate world.
To return to a methodological problem with which the dissertation has 
been faced, by working on just a very few literary and philosophical precursors 
one could have run the risk of circumscribing a problematic that takes 
transcendence as one of its objects, and yet wants attribute an origin to it. The 
opposite danger is that through too broad an approach, the idea of a sequence with 
its own logic, while not thought of as a genealogy, would be lost. Instead we were 
careful to pursue the mutations of the Other in our authors not directly through the
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shifting meanings of differance, but through differences of signature in alterity 
and influence; that is, through the idea of neighbourhood as suggesting difference 
of signature grappling with similar encounters.
The simultaneous flexibility and etymological rootedness of literary 
expression permits fine traces to be pursued across great distances. As Levinas 
comments in Autrement qu ’etre, philosophy also has an organic relationship to 
language, expression and encounter, and is described as a drama
ou entre toujours de nouveaux interlocuteurs qui ont a redire, mais ou les 
anciens reprennent la parole pour y repondre dans les interpretations qu’ils 
suscitent, et ou cependant, malgre ce manquent de « surete en marche » -  
ou a cause de lui -  a personne n’est permis ni un relachement d’attention, 
ni un manque de rigueur. (AQE, p.25, AQEb, p.39)
This is also a calling across time and space and from within another’s speech in its 
resaying. This revisiting and reanimation of another’s inscription is also 
reminiscent of signature and countersignature in Derrida’s thought, in which the 
accumulation of marks, and remarks, creates supplementary meaning. In this 
sense Derrida’s ‘En ce moment meme’ is an instance of difference of signature 
with Levinas; and the mise en espace o f Glas an instance of countersignature 
between Genet and Hegel on the nature of savoir absolu. There may also, 
however, be the trace of Levinas’s signature in this latter text, as we have already 
mentioned, and which may point elsewhere.
In a paragraph from ‘De la conscience a la veille’ from De Dieu qui vient 
a Videe we find examples of reinflected terms derived from the il y  a used to 
describe the beyond being, and in receptivity to the Other. They are “insomnie”, 
“dechirement”, and “otage”:
Insomnie ou dechirement qui est non pas la finitude d’un etre incapable de 
se rejoindre et de « demeurer en repos » en guise d’etat d ’ame, mais
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transcendance, dechirant ou inspirant 1’immanence qui, de prime abord, 
enveloppe comme si de l’infini il pouvait y avoir idee, c’est-a-dire comme 
si Dieu pouvait tenir en moi. Veille sans intentionalite mais seulement 
reveillee sans cesse de son etat meme de veille, se degrisant de son identite 
pour le plus profond que soi. Subjectivite comme susception de l’lnfini, 
soumission a un Dieu et interieur et transcendant. En soi, liberation de soi. 
Liberte de l’eveil plus libre que la liberte du commencement qui se fixe en 
principe.[*] Elle ressemble a celle qui eclate dans la proximite du 
prochain, dans la responsabilite pour 1’autre homme ou, cependant, uni cite 
du non-interchangeable, condition ou incondition d’otage, je suis unique et 
elu. (DVI, pp.51-52)
“Insomnie”, “dechirement”, and the status of “otage” cease to be for the self and 
are a wakefulness, an openness, and proneness before the Other. The inability for 
the subject to remain unmoved before the Other bespeaks its exposure to the 
beyond being even within being. Here, in the self, there is an awakening from a 
pre-existing position of watchfulness, which is freer than the effort involved in re­
engaging with being in commencement, detailed in De Vexistence a Vexistant. 
And yet the real interest o f this quotation for our conclusion lies in a footnote that 
appears where we have placed the asterisk. Here the “degrisement” or “reveil” 
mentioned is related to a biblical character, Samson:
La bible hebraique pour nommer l’eveil religieux de Samson dit (Juges 
13,25): « Tesprit de TEtemel commen^a a agiter a Mahane-Dan... ». Elle 
emploie pour ‘agiter’ le terme ‘vatipaem’, mot de la meme racine que le 
mot ‘paamon’ -  cloche. L’esprit s’agitant comme le battement ou la 
percussion dont resonnent ou vibrent les sons de cloche. (DVI, p.51)
That this spiritual awakening or agitation should take place for Samson at a time 
after he has lost his strength is remarkable, and yet he finds new sources of energy 
through an ‘interior and transcendent God’. We should point out that the agitation
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or percussion of the term ‘vatipaem’, etymologically related to ‘paamon’, the 
word for bell, in this article dating from 1974276, may be related to another 1974 
text, this time by Derrida, that is Glas, which is the word for knell. This produces 
a number of repercussions, whether Derrida commenting upon Levinas or Levinas 
on Derrida.
277Glas ’ subtitle in the paperback version, ‘Que reste-t-il du savoir absolu’ , 
refers to the erosion of the columns one by the other, implying that the strict 
architectural delimitation of the two writers involved, Genet and Hegel, had 
become strewn with traces, echoes and signatures. It is therefore possible that the 
ringing of the knell, marking the demise of savoir absolu, is performed by the 
clapper of a spiritual agitation between the two columns. These might be the two 
columns of a temple comprising on the one hand knowledge in Hegel, and on the 
other hand illusion in Genet. It is Samson’s waking to an inner-call of the other 
which sets this process in motion. This would endow the weakness of the Other 
with the strength of Samson. As Visker explains, Levinas
treat[s] the appeal of the Other as the echo-chamber, as it were, in which 
the sound of a bell which was ringing in me all along, not only becomes 
audible for the first time but also finds its only possible meaning which is, 
o f course, ethical. (TaS, p.344)
This inner-agitation through the acoustic o f the other has the potential to produce 
far reaching exterior effects.
In Genet’s ethico-aesthetic texts, the Atelier, ‘Rembrandt dechire’ and 
‘Fragments’ -  though also ‘Le secret de Rembrandt’, and ‘Le funambule’, that we 
have not discussed -  the importance of the other inscribing itself on consciousness 
is described with great attentiveness, and without quite the same intensity of 
moral hermeticism that we find in the novels. The theoretical approach we have
276 Levinas, ‘De la connaissance a la veille’, Bijdragen, 35 (1974), in DVI.
277 Derrida, Glas: Que reste-t-il du savoir absolu (Paris: Editions Gonthier/Mediations, 1981).
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adopted to Genet’s theatre, often admired for its qualities of being solidaire rather 
than solitaire, has been to read it as an epic of the self neighbouring other selves.
At the end of Chapter Three, we arrived at an analysis of ‘L’Etrange mot 
d’...’ and interpreted it polyvalently as an allegory reworking Valery and arguing 
against tragic determinism. We arrived at the position whereby Genet is creating a 
general indictment of anti-Semitism understood as the hatred of the other man. 
1967, the year of this publication, is significant for Genet since it also marks the 
last of his ethico-aesthetic texts and the beginning of his political writings. There 
have been problems in recent debate understanding the circulation within different 
periods the genres used by Genet. Our approach has sought to overcome them by 
using bridges of influence from works by other authors whose influence can be 
discerned both upstream and downstream from enigmatic or problematic sections 
in Genet’s own works, and thus bring us closer through a chiasmic reading to the 
crux or creux of his thought.
What these works hold in common is a Levinasian understanding of the 
disruption of the face. The face is at the same time “1 'expression originelle” and 
“le premier mot: « tu ne commettras pas de meurtre ».” {Tel, p. 173, Telb, p.217) 
The concomitance of the appearance of particularity with commandment is what 
allows interpretation through adaptation so powerfully to map the parallel 
repercussions of encounters with alterity. It matters little what Valery thought of 
Genet’s work when Cocteau read him passages from Notre-Dame-des-fleurs and 
replied that the book should be destroyed -  “Brulez-le” . What does matter is the 
use to which Genet may have put certain o f Valery’s texts, in an activity derived 
from an encounter among encounters producing iteration, as Valery himself 
describes when discussing influence in his ‘Lettre sur Mallarme’. ( VOl, p.634) 
The interactions between the upstream and the downstream of Valery means there 
is influence on Genet, but no question of describing him as a Valeryen. In a 
similar way, the fact of his having worked from certain o f the same source texts as 
Levinas will not make Genet a Levinasian or Levinas a Genetian. Instead, our
278 Cocteau’s journal quoted in White, Jean Genet, p.212.
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method has sought to examine bipolar ethical reactions to the presence of the 
Other in different writers, and to compare them. After all, as Genet writes, 
referring to just a part of the face, “les yeux [...] appellent comme pour un 
sauvetage ou un aneantissement”. (CQR, p.31) Levinas makes a similar 
observation when he explains in 1982, just after the events of Sabre and Chatila,
279that in the other “we can find the enemy”.
This leads us on sequentially to mention Genet’s final work. While the 
imaginary and symbolic are unusually affirmed in Genet’s oeuvre, his greatest 
preoccupation is with their relationship to reality. And yet his affirmed fantasy 
and nightmare visions in Un captif amoureux suggest that the fault-line separating 
artistic symbol, imagination and reality has only become more unstable. Felix 
Guattari explains that, “sa maitrise de l’ecriture n ’a abouti qu’a une exacerbation 
de ses contradictions et de ses dechirements”. (GR, p.30) The constant, however, 
is the concreteness of the encounter with the other, which gives insights into the 
circulation between the mind and the world. In the light of the methods of this 
study, it should be possible to pursue a rereading of Un captif amoureux in the 
light o f the symbolic and the imaginary in so fa r  as they are also real. Hence, as 
Genet writes, “Evidemment sous mon recit un autre pousse et voudrait venir au 
monde.” (CA, p.320) This is a text without circumscribed context, but which 
instead promises another text. Guattari studies this point in the light of Bakhtinian 
dialogism before moving from the dialogic to what he calls the ‘synaptic’. This is 
a less personnological, intersubjective way of discussing the way the Other comes 
to mind. It seeks to render visible the mobility o f image modules, reading them at 
a finer level as ‘synaptic operators’ capable of producing change. They are used in 
this way in the deterritorialising description of the Pieta as a Palestinian symbol of 
revolution in Hamza and his mother in Un captif amoureux. Going upstream again 
from Un captif amoureux, between 1976 and 1978 Genet wrote four different
279 ‘Ethique et politique’, Les Nouveaux Cahiers, 18 (1982-83), 71, 1-8. Transcript o f  the 
discussion between Alain Finkielkraut and Levinas, invited by Schlomo Malka to speak on Israel 
and Jewish Ethics on Radio Communaute, 28 September 1982, repr. The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean 
Hand (New York: Blackwell, 1989), p.289.
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versions o f a film scenario, ‘La nuit venue’, in which a Moroccan boy comes to 
settle in Paris, and on the first day, after losing his belongings and money, is 
visited by an Angel, with whom he wrestles. This evokes the renaming o f Jacob 
after wrestling with an Angel, and before receiving the name of Israel. (Genesis 
32) Next a priest from the Sacre Coeur who witnessed the meeting tells his 
doubting colleagues, “Je n’ai pas eu une vision simple, moi, j ’ai eu la vision d’une 
vision.” While this is highly enigmatic, it gives clues as to the later 
deneutralised use o f religious imagery at work in Un captif amoureux.
The disseminatory practice of Un captif amoureux is new in relation to the 
other texts in the pains it takes to describe the real as it detaches itself from the 
dying author. The way in which it strews signatures on its way is far more discreet 
than in Derrida’s Glas, and is far more rooted in historical events than elsewhere 
in Genet’s oeuvre. At the same time, this text fuses that reality with unusually 
dense meeting points of the imagination. If the agitation or sounding of a bell may 
bring with it an ethical re-concentration on the other, then it may also produce a 
clearing away o f what was self-referentiality and illusion. However, as with the 
near side and the beyond of being, there is no chance of Samson, inspired by the 
Other, doing more than creating a Assuring in the subject. The call of the Other 
does not clear away the fragments or rubble of the Same which instead remain. It 
is between these fragments that we live, and in which we are able to discern 
alterity, assume worry and take risks on its behalf.
Does Genet really unsay (dedit) any of his darker assertions? Or can their 
unsaying only be undertaken by the reader, as strands of sense, separated along 
tracts of contradictory meaning, are traced back, bewilderingly, not to the same 
signature, but to the unreadable signature of a plural world?
280 La nuit venue, version 2, IMEC. p.51-52, 54.
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